JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is a petition praying for an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act directing the Respondent to issue a certificate under sec. 3 of Ordinance No. III of 1948, certifying that a certain proposed sale of property was exempt from capital gains-tax or in the alternative an order directing the Respondent to issue a certificate permitting the registration of a deed of sale of the said property. The Petitioners were the owners of certain premises known as No. 6, Sunny Park, Calcutta which they had purchased on January 28, 1941, from the Administrator-General of Bengal for a sum of Rs. 62,000. In or about the month of May, 1948, the Petitioners sold the property to Madho Prasad Birla, Krishna Kumar Birla and Basanta Kumar Birla for a sum of Rs. 5,50,000. A sale deed was drawn up which is annexure "A" to the petition. 2. On May 24, 1948, the Petitioners applied to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax, Range II, Calcutta for a certificate under sec, 3 of the Transfer of Property (India) Ordinance, 1948, which certificate, it was alleged, was necessary before the said deed of sale could be registered. 3. In a letter dated May 28th, 1948, the income tax Officer pointed out to the Petitioners that capital gains tax was attracted on the sale of the property in question as well as on the sale of other properties mentioned by the Petitioners in annexure "B" of their application to the income tax Officer. 4. In their application to the income tax Officer the Petitioners had claimed that by reason of the second proviso to sec. 12B of the Indian income tax Act no capital gains tax was payable in respect of the sale to the Birlas by reason of the fact that the vendors had been the owners of the property for more than seven years previous to the sale. The income tax authorities, however, pointed out that the Petitioners had not been in possession of the property for seven years as required by the second proviso of sec. 12B of the Indian income tax Act and, therefore, capital gains tax was payable. They also pointed out that capita! gains tax was also payable on the other transactions set out by the Petitioners in annexure B to their letter to the authorities. 5. 12B of the Indian income tax Act and, therefore, capital gains tax was payable. They also pointed out that capita! gains tax was also payable on the other transactions set out by the Petitioners in annexure B to their letter to the authorities. 5. On June 8, 1948, the Petitioners wrote to the income tax authorities pointing that they had been in possession of the property for seven years and that the word " possession " in the second proviso of sec. 12B did not and could not mean physical possession as alleged by the tax authorities. They further pointed out that they had been in possession of the other properties mentioned in annexure "B" for over seven years before the sales of those properties and, therefore, capital gains tax was not attracted. 6. On June 21, 1948, the tax authorities replied that they could not accept the view of the Petitioners concerning the nature of the possession required to bring the case within the second proviso of sec. 12B of the Indian Income Tax Act. They further pointed out that in this proviso the term " assessee " had a restricted meaning. In view of the tax authorities the proviso could not apply to companies, but only to human beings who had transferred property. The tax authorities made it clear that they would not issue a certificate and that the Petitioners were bound to furnish to the tax authorities details not only of the sale in question, but of the other sales mentioned in annexure " B " to their letter in order that the amount of capital gains-tax should be assesssed. 7. Being dissatisfied with the view of the tax authorities the Petitioners have preferred this petition praying for orders under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act directing the Respondent to issue the necessary certificate. 8. Under sec. 3 of Ordinance No. III of 1948, called the Transfer of Property (India) Ordinance, 1948, provision is made for the registration of documents. Being dissatisfied with the view of the tax authorities the Petitioners have preferred this petition praying for orders under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act directing the Respondent to issue the necessary certificate. 8. Under sec. 3 of Ordinance No. III of 1948, called the Transfer of Property (India) Ordinance, 1948, provision is made for the registration of documents. The section is in these terms:-- No Registering Officer, Revenue Officer, Custodian or other officer appointed to deal with property shall register any document, relating to property other than agricultural land, which is required to be registered under the provisions of clause (a), (b), (c) or (e) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908) unless it is certified by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax of the area in which the property is situate In respect of every person whose right, title or Interest in the property is or will be transferred assigned, limited or extinguished under the terms of the document, either that such person is not liable to taxation under the income tax Act, 1932 (Xl of 1922) the Excess profits Tax Act. 1940 (XV of 1940) or the Business profits Tax Act. 1947 (XXI of 1947) or that he has either paid or made satisfactory provision for the payment of all existing or anticipated liabilities under any of the said Acts, or that he is otherwise satisfied that the registration should be allowed . 9. It is conceded that this deed of sale executed by the Petitioners in favour of the Birlas requires registration under sec. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and application was made, therefore, for the necessary certificate. 10. This transaction of sale did, in the view of the tax authorities, fall within sec. 12B of the Indian Income Tax Act. This section which relates to what is known as the capital gains tax, was introduced into the Indian Income Tax Act by an amending Act of 1947. 10. This transaction of sale did, in the view of the tax authorities, fall within sec. 12B of the Indian Income Tax Act. This section which relates to what is known as the capital gains tax, was introduced into the Indian Income Tax Act by an amending Act of 1947. Sec. 12B reads as follows:-- (1) The tax shall be payable by an assesses under the head "Capital gains" in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset affected after the 31st day of March, 1946; and such profits and gains shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange or transfer took place : Provided that where the amount of capital gains in the previous year does not exceed fifteen thousand rupees, the tax shall not be payable by the assessee and Such amount shall not be included in his total income : Provided further that the tax shall rot be payable by an assessee in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset, being property the income of which is chargeable u/s 9 and which has been possessed by the assessee or a parent of his for not less than seven years before the date on which the sale exchange or transfer took place; and the amount of such profits or gains shall not be included in his total income: 11. It is clear that the amount of the capital gain in the transaction now before us far exceeded fifteen thousand rupees. In fact it amounts to Rs. 4,88,000. Further it seems clear that the property transferred was property, the income of which was chargeable under sec.9 of the Income Tax Act. The property, however, had been purchased by the Petitioners a little over seven years before the sale to the Birlas and they, therefore, contended that they were exempted from payment of any capital gains tax by reason of the provisions contained in the second proviso to the section. 12. It is common ground that the Petitioners were not in actual or physical possession of the property which they had sold, but on the contrary the property was let to ten-ants. If the term " possession" in the second proviso to sec. 12. It is common ground that the Petitioners were not in actual or physical possession of the property which they had sold, but on the contrary the property was let to ten-ants. If the term " possession" in the second proviso to sec. 12B covered such possession as a lessor would have, then clearly the proviso would apply to this sale. Further if the term " Assessee " in the section covered not only human beings but corporations and companies then clearly the Petitioners would not be liable to pay capital gains tax in respect of his sale. 13. It was strongly urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the view of the taxing authorities as to the meanings of the terms " possession" and "assessee" in the second proviso to sec. 12B were clearly erroneous. That being so, it was contended that no capital gains tax was payable in respect of this transaction and a certificate should have been issued. 14. In my view, it would not be right for this Court to express an opinion upon the respective contentions of the Petitioners and the Respondents as to the meaning of these terms because I am satisfied that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition. 15. On behalf of the Respondents the learned Advocate-General contended that this Court had no jurisdiction in the matter by reason of sec. 226 of the Government of India Act as adapted by the India (Pro-visional Constitution) Order, 1947. That section is in these terms: (1) Until otherwise provides by Act. of the appropriate legislature no High Court shall have any original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue, or concerning any act, ordered or done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force. (2) A Bill or amendment for making such provision as aforesaid shall not be introduced into or moved in the Dominion Legislature or in a Chamber of a Provincial Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General or, as the case may be, of the Governor". 16. The contention of the Advocate-General was that this Court was asked to make an order in a matter concerning the revenue and that our original jurisdiction was being invoked for that purpose. Accordingly he contended that this petition fell within the ambit of sec. 16. The contention of the Advocate-General was that this Court was asked to make an order in a matter concerning the revenue and that our original jurisdiction was being invoked for that purpose. Accordingly he contended that this petition fell within the ambit of sec. 226 of the Government of India Act and, therefore, this Court had no jurisdiction. 17. Mr. P.B. Mukherji on behalf of the Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that he was not invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court but on the contrary was invoking the revisional or supervisory jurisdiction whatever this latter term may mean. The petition was presented under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act the material portions of which are as follows:-- Any of the High Courts of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay may make an order requiring any specific act, to be done or forborne, within the local limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, by any person holding a public office, whether of a permanent or a temporary nature, or by any corporation or inferior Court of judicature : Provided: (a) that an application for such order be made by some person whose property, franchise or personal right would be injured by the forbearing or doing (as the case may be) of the said specified act: (b) that such doing or forbearing is, under any law for the time being in force, clearly incumbent on such person or Court in his or its public character, or on such corporation in its corporate character : (c) that in the opinion of the High Court such doing or forbearing is consonant to right and justice: (d) that the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy; and (e) that the remedy given by the order applied for will be complete. Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to authorise any High Court........... (h) to make any order which is otherwise expressly excluded by any law for the time being in force. 18. In my view, a petition praying, for an order of this Court under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is a petition praying for an order to be made by this Court in exercise of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. 19. It is quite clear that Mr. P.B. Mukherji's contention that such a petition invoked our revisional jurisdiction cannot possibly be correct. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is a petition praying for an order to be made by this Court in exercise of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. 19. It is quite clear that Mr. P.B. Mukherji's contention that such a petition invoked our revisional jurisdiction cannot possibly be correct. This Court has revisional jurisdiction under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it can only revise orders of Courts subordinate to it and that only in certain circumstances. The Respondent to this petition is the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax, Range II, Calcutta, and I cannot understand how it can be said that he is a Court subordinate to this Court and whose orders are revisable by this Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Quite clearly, the jurisdiction invocked is not the Revisional Jurisdiction of this Court. 20. Mr. Mukherjee's (sic) contention, was that the jurisdiction invoked Was our supervisory jurisdiction, that is the jurisdiction we possess by reason of our right of superintendence over the lower Courts. This right is now governd by sec. 224 of the Government of India Act which provides :-- (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts in India for the time being subject to its appelate jurisdiction, and may do any of the following things, that is to say (a) call for returns; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; (c) prescribe form in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts; and (d) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff, attorneys, and all clerks and officers of courts; Provided that such rules, forms and tables shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. 21. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. 21. It is quite clear that though this Court has a right of superintendence over the Courts, for the time being subject to its Appellate jurisdiction, nevertheless such right does not entitle this Court to question any judgment of such inferior Courts unless it is entitled to do so by way of appeal or revision. 22. Under the Government of India Act, 1919, certain of the High Courts did claim a right to interfere with judgments of inferior Courts by reason of their right of superintendence. It is, however abundantly clear that since the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, no such right now exists. In any event the right of superintendence only exists over Courts for the time being subject to the Appellate jurisdiction of this High Court, and it can-not possibly be contended that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range II, Calcutta, is a Court subject to our Appellate jurisdiction. It is, therefore, clear that the jurisdiction which the Petitioners seek to invoke is neither our revisional nor our supervisory jurisdiction. 23. It is clear that our Appellate jurisdiction is not being invoked and it seems to me that this petition is a petition asking the Court to exercise its original jurisdiction in making the order prayed for. 24. Previous to the Specific Relief Act, this Court on its Original Side could issue a writ of mandamus compelling persons holding public offices or inferior Courts to do or refrain from doing certain acts. It has now been held that the jurisdiction to issue any of the prerogative writs is part of the original jurisdiction of this Court [see Ryots of Garbandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimadi L.R. 70 IndAp 129: S.C. 48 C.W.N. 18 (1948) and Moulvi Hamid v. Banwarilal Roy L.R. 74 IndAp 120 S.C. 51 C.W.N. 716 (1947)] and had this petition been for the issue of the old writ of mandamus it would clearly have been an application made invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court. By sec, 50 of the Specific Relief Act the old writ of mandamus was abolished and a somewhat similar remedy was given by sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. By sec, 50 of the Specific Relief Act the old writ of mandamus was abolished and a somewhat similar remedy was given by sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The section only applies to the High Courts of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, that is, to the three Courts in India which have original jurisdiction. 25. Further, it is clear from the section that he order made by the Court can only re-quire a specific act to be done or forborne within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction. It seems to me clear from the very words of the section that petitions under sec, 45 are petitions invoking the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court. That being so, it seems to me clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to make an order in this case if the order asked for concerns revenue. 26. As I have already stated, the Petitioners prayed for an order directing the Respondent to issue a certificate to the effect that the proposed sale of the property was exempted from capital gains tax or an order directing the Respondent to issue a certificate permitting registration of the document under sec. 3 of the Ordinance No. III of 1948. The orders asked for clearly concerns revenue. In fact the Court is asked to say that the Petitioners are not liable to pay any capital gains tax, that is revenue, in respect of this particular transaction. To direct the income tax Officer to issue either of the certificates prayed for would be tantamount to holding that no tax was payable and that the view of the taxing authorities was wholly erroneous. In my judgment, this Court is clearly asked to make orders in mailers concerning revenue and as the Court is asked to do so in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction, the case falls within sec. 226 (2) of the Government of India Act and, therefore, it must be held that the Court has no jurisdiction to make such an order. 27. It was urged by Mr. 226 (2) of the Government of India Act and, therefore, it must be held that the Court has no jurisdiction to make such an order. 27. It was urged by Mr. P.B. Mukherji that orders such as those asked for in this case would not be orders made by this Court in the exercise of its Original Jurisdiction in any matter concerning revenue and he relied upon a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, namely, Alcock, Ashdown and Company, Limited v. Chief Revenue-Authority, Bombay L.R. 50 IndAp 227: S.C. 28 C.W.N. 762 (1925). In that case the Chief Revenue-authority which was bound under sec. 51 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1918, to state a case and refer it to the High Court when in the course of an assessment a serious question of law arose, refused to state such a case. Their Lordships held that the High Court had power under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, sec. 45, to make an order requiring the Chief Revenue authority to perform that duty and they held that the power not being the exercise of Original Jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue, was not excluded by the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1915, sec. 106, sub-sec. (2). The provisions of sec. 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, are now contained in sec. 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It should be observed that as the Indian income tax Act then stood, the power of this Court to order the taxing authority to state a case under sec. 66 (2) of the Act was not in existence and the only remedy which an assessee could have would be a remedy under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. 28. It is to be observed that shortly before this case was decided by the Privy Council the Madras High Court in the case of Chief Commissioner of Income Tax v. North Anantapur Gold Mines ILR 44 Mad, 718 (1921) held that the High Court could not direct the Chief Revenue Authority to state a case by means of an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act because the case fell within sec. 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915. But this case was expressly overruled by their Lordships. 29. 45 of the Specific Relief Act because the case fell within sec. 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915. But this case was expressly overruled by their Lordships. 29. In my view, this case cannot assist the Petitioners because it was expressly held that an order directing a revenue officer to do his statutory duty by stating a case would not be an order made in the exercise of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the Court in a matter concerning the revenue. Mr. Mukherji has attempted to argue that their Lordships held that the order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act was not an order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction. But it is clear that what their Lordships held was that the order made was not in exercise of the original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue. Their Lordships dealt at length with what the order asked for really meant and they came to the conclusion that the Court was not asked to make an order in a matter concerning the revenue, but were asked only to make an order directing the revenue authority to perform its duty, namely, to state a case for the opinion of the High Court. That being so, this case is of no assistance whatsoever to the Petitioners. The learned Advocate-General pointed out that the Federal Court in the case of The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. (1944) F.C.B. 229: S.C. C.W.N. (F.B.) 73 had expressly held that an order similar to the one prayed for in this case would be an order concerning the revenue, and, therefore, sec. 226 of the Government of India Act would he attracted and this Court would have no jurisdiction. In The Raleigh Investment Co.'s case (5) the assessees after being taxed under protest instituted a suit in this Court for a declaration that certain provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act were ultra vires the Indian Legislature and for the refund of tax recovered from them. Their Lordships of the Federal Court held that the matter was one concerning the revenue within the meaning of sec. 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that the Calcuta High Court had, therefore, no original jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In that case it was urged that cerain provisions were ultra vires and, therefore, no tax was recoverable. 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that the Calcuta High Court had, therefore, no original jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In that case it was urged that cerain provisions were ultra vires and, therefore, no tax was recoverable. In the present case no question of any provision beta vires arises, but it is contended that under certain provisions of sec. 12B of the Indian Income Tax Act no tax is payable. Clearly this is a question relating to revenue and therefore, this Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 30. Before concluding I think I should point that in any event this petition is misconceived. This Court was asked (a) to make an order directing the Respondent to issue a certificate under sec. 3 of Ordinance No. III of 1948 certifying that a certain Sale was exempt from the capital gains tax; and (b) to make an order directing the Respondent to issue a certificate allowing the registration of the document set out in annexure "A" to the petition. 31. It is to be observed that sec. 3 of Ordinance No. III of 1948 does not contemplate the issue of a certificate in respect of any particular transaction, because it provides that no document can be registered unless it is certified that the vendor is not liable to taxation under the Income Tax Act, 1922, the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, or the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, or that he has either paid or made satisfactory provision for the payment of all existing or anticipated liabilities under the said Acts or that the officer is otherwise satisfied that registration should be allowed. Even if we had jurisdiction, we could not make an order in the terms of the prayer because the officer concerned is not bound to issue a certificate unless the conditions set out immediately above have been complied with. 32. As I hold that this Court has no jurisdiction I do not think it right to consider the merits of the contentions that the second proviso of sec. 12B of the Indian Income Tax Act did not apply to this transaction by reason of the fact that the Petitioners were not in physical possession of the premises and are not human beings, but a company. In any event, if actual physical possession is required. 12B of the Indian Income Tax Act did not apply to this transaction by reason of the fact that the Petitioners were not in physical possession of the premises and are not human beings, but a company. In any event, if actual physical possession is required. I cannot see how a company could ever have such physical possession as it is a pure notional entity or person. 33. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed with costs in both Courts. Chakravartti, J. 34. This is a Rule under sec. 46 of the Specific Relief Act on the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax, Range II, Calcutta to show cause why he should not issue a certificate to the Petitioner under sec. 3 of Ordinance III of 1948 in respect of a certain transaction of sale or why an order under sec. 45 of the Act should not be made, directing him to issue a certificate allowing registration of the sate deed. 35. The Rule was issued by Mr. Justice Majumdar and it came up for hearing in the first instance before Mr. Justice Chatterjee. As that learned Judge thought that the case involved substantial and difficult questions of law, affecting a large number of persons who were similarly placed as the Petitioner, be made a report to the Chief Justice under Chapter V. Rule 2 of the Original Side Rules for the constitution of a larger Bench. Thereupon, the present Bench was constituted. 36. In order to explain the nature of the reliefs prayed for, it is necessary to refer first to certain provisions of law. Up to the year 1947, the Indian Income Tax Act continued to be an Act for the levy of a tax on "income, profits and gains" which may roughly be described as the periodical monetary return, arising from the use of property or services or labour and coming in with some regularity or expected regularity from certain defined sources. Capital receipts or profits arising from isolated sales of capital assets were not taxable. In 1947, the Indian Legislature enacted the Indian income tax and Excess Profits (Amendment) Act (XXII of 1947) and, by sec, 5 thereof, added in sec, 6 of the main Act a new head of taxable income, called " capital gains." It also introduced in sec. Capital receipts or profits arising from isolated sales of capital assets were not taxable. In 1947, the Indian Legislature enacted the Indian income tax and Excess Profits (Amendment) Act (XXII of 1947) and, by sec, 5 thereof, added in sec, 6 of the main Act a new head of taxable income, called " capital gains." It also introduced in sec. 2, the definition section of the main Act, a new clause numbered 4A, defining "capital asset" as property of any kind other than agricultural land, subject to certain exceptions which are not here material Next, it amended the definition of "income," contained in sec, 2 (6c) of the main Act, so as to include "any capital gain chargeable according to the provisions of sec. 12B." Sec. 12B was itself a new section introduced by the amending Act and so far as is material, it reads as follows:-- 12B. (1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head "Capital gains" in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset affected after the 31st day of March. 1946; and such profits and gains shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange or transfer took place : Provided that where the amount of the capital gains in the previous year dues not exceed fifteen thousand rupees, the tax shall not be payable by the assessee and such amount shall not be included in his total income. Provided further that the tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset, being property the income of which is chargeable u/s 9 and which has been possessed by the assesses or a parent of his for not less than seven years before the date on which the sale, exchange or transfer took place; and the account of such profits or gains shall not be included in his total income 37. The property chargeable under sec. The property chargeable under sec. 9 of the Act is "buildings or lands appurtenant thereto." Broadly speaking, the provision made by the amending Act is that profits made by any person from the transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st March, 1946, shall be chargeable to tax as a part of his income of the year in which the transfer took place, provided the total amount such profits made during the year exceeds fifteen thousand rupees; but if the property transferred be a building or lands appurtenant thereto and if it was in the possession of the transferor or a parent of his for not less than seven years before the date of the transfer, the profits made by the transfer shall not be chargeable to tax. 38. The direction contained in sec. 12B is that the profits, where they are chargeable to tax, shall be deemed to be the transferor's income of the year in which the transfer rakes place. That direction means that the profits shall be assessed to tax, along with the other income of the transferor, in the course of normal assessment proceedings. But in February, 1948, it was thought necessary, for reasons into which we need not enquire, to provide for an immediate collection of all taxes due from persons who transferred immovable properties in certain parts of India or at least for an examination of their affairs in order that the income tax authorities might be satisfied that there would be no difficulty about the realisation of tax dues. Accordingly, the Governor-General promulgated an Ordinance, called the Transfer of Property (India) Ordinance (III of 1948) which, by sec. 3, enacted as follows:-- 3. Accordingly, the Governor-General promulgated an Ordinance, called the Transfer of Property (India) Ordinance (III of 1948) which, by sec. 3, enacted as follows:-- 3. Registration of documents : No Registering Officer, Revenue Officer, Custodian or other officer appointed to deal with property shall register any document, relating to property other than agricultural land, which is required to be registered under the provisions of clause (a), (b), (c), or (e) of sub-section I of section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, XVI of 1908, unless it is certified by the inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax of the area in which the property is situate in respect of every person whose right, title or interest in the property is or will be transferred, assigned, limited or extinguished under the terms of the document, either that such person is not liable to taxation under the Indian income tax Act, (XI Of 1922), the Excess Profits Tax Act, (XV of 1940) or the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 (XXI of 1947) or that he has either paid or made satisfactory provision for the payment of all existing or anticipated liabilities under any of the said Acts, or that he is otherwise satisfied that the registration should be allowed. 39. It will thus be seen that the machinery provided for securing an immediate collection of the tax or for ensuring its security is to make registration of the deed of transfer dependent upon the production of a certificate from the income tax authorities, showing either that all taxes due have been paid or that those authorities are satisfied that the tax is not in jeopardy. Sec. 4 of the Ordinance gives certain further powers to the income tax Officer to collect, on his own initiative, taxes due from persons who made transfers after the 14th August, 1947. 40. The Ordinance was first brought into force in the Provinces of East Punjab, Delhi and Bombay, but has since been extended to West Bengal. 41. The Petitioner, a limited company, purchased Premises No. 6, Sunny Park, Calcutta on the 28th January, 1941, for a consideration of Rs. 62,000 and has since been in possession of the property through tenants. Recently, it became desirous of selling the property and concluded negotiations for its sale with certain Birlas. 41. The Petitioner, a limited company, purchased Premises No. 6, Sunny Park, Calcutta on the 28th January, 1941, for a consideration of Rs. 62,000 and has since been in possession of the property through tenants. Recently, it became desirous of selling the property and concluded negotiations for its sale with certain Birlas. The draft Indenture of sale, a copy of which is an annexure to the petition, shows that the sale is to be for a sum of Rs. 5,50,000, that is to say, at a taxable profit. In view of the provisions of the Ordinance, the Petitioner, on the 24th May, 1948, applied to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax, Range II, Calcutta for a certificate under sec. 3 in order to enable itself to have the deed of sale registered. The application was in the prescribed form and disclosed sales of other properties effected after the 14th August, 1947, as required, but in respect of the proposed sale, exemption from the " Capital gains" tax was claimed under the second proviso to sec. 12B (1) of the Act. On the 28th May, 1948, the income tax Officer, Companies District IV, Calcutta, wrote to the Petitioner to say that its application had been forwarded to him and that it was not entitled to the exemption claimed. The officer observed further that the "possession" contemplated by the second proviso to sec. 12B (1) of the Act was actual physical possession which the Petitioner had not had in either the property proposed to be sold or the other properties already sold and that, consequently, it was liable to be taxed on the profits made from all the sales. The letter ended by asking the Petitioner to furnish a statement of the profits made on the sales of the other properties. 42. The Petitioner replied to this letter on the 8th June. 1948, but the reply was addressed to the Inspecting Assistant Com missioner of income tax, Range II, Calcutta. It was stated in the reply that the Petitioner had taken legal opinion and had been advised that the view of " possession," indicated in the letter of the income tax Officer, was untenable. It was stated further that the Petitioner was not liable to be taxed on the profits made on any of the sales and the request for the grant of a certificate was repeated. 43. It was stated further that the Petitioner was not liable to be taxed on the profits made on any of the sales and the request for the grant of a certificate was repeated. 43. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner replied to the Petitioner's letter by a letter, dated the 21st June, 1948. While the income tax Officer had given only one ground for holding the Petitioner liable to tax the Assistant Commissioner gave two. He referred to advice obtained apparently legal advice, and repeated the Department's view that " possession" in the second proviso to sec. 12B (I) meant actual pos session. He put it even more forcibly by saying that the possession contemplated was possession of a tangible material object, vie., land and buildings, and not of an abstract right of title or ownership. In addition he staled that the word " assessee " in the same proviso was restricted to a human being and did not include a company, inasmuch as it contemplated an assessee who could have a parent. The Petitioner, which was a company, could not have a parent and could not, therefore, claim the benefit of the proviso and in that view the Assistant Commissioner asked it to furnish the statement which had already been demanded. 44. Thereupon, the Petitioner moved this Court on the 2nd July, 1948, and obtained the present Rule. 45. The property transferred in the present case is a "partly two-storied and partly three-storied message or dwelling house, together with a piece or parcel of revenue-redeemed land." It is, therefore, a "building and land appurtenant thereto" which is chargeable to tax under sec. 9 of the Act. The Petitioner purchased it on the 28th January, 1941, and has since been in enjoyment of its rents and profits by letting it out to tenants. At the time of the proposed transfer it had thus been the owner of the property for over seven years and in "possession " for that period, as the term is ordinarily understood. On these facts, the second proviso to sec. 12B would prima facie seem to be attracted; and prima facie, the view of the department that the proviso does not apply, because the assessee contemplated by it is a human assessee and the possession, physical possession, would seem to require a good deal of explanation. 46. On these facts, the second proviso to sec. 12B would prima facie seem to be attracted; and prima facie, the view of the department that the proviso does not apply, because the assessee contemplated by it is a human assessee and the possession, physical possession, would seem to require a good deal of explanation. 46. The learned Advocate-General who appeared for the Respondent contended that although it might be that if he was required to support the department's view of the proviso, he would not find it an easy task to do so, this Court had no jurisdiction to go into the matter at all on the present application. Its jurisdiction was plainly barred by sec. 226 (I) of the Government of India Act. It was contended further that the reliefs prayed for in the petition were entirely misconceived and could not possibly be given. 47. In my opinion, both these contentions are correct. 48. Sec. 226 (I) of the Government of India Act is in the following terms :-- Until otherwise provided by an Act, of the appropriate legislature, no High Court shall have any original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act, ordered or done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force. 49. The history of this section has often been, told and need not be repeated. Its continuance to-day certainly appears anomalous, but so long as it remains on the statute-book and the Indian Legislature, although empowered to repeal it, does not do so, it is useless to cavil at its existence. Under its mandatory provision, the High Court shall not have original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue. That income tax is revenue cannot, for one moment, he doubted. The position in the present case is that the Petitioner is demanding the issue of a certificate under the Ordinance without making any Further payment as income tax, while the revenue authorities are contending that it is liable to pay a large amount as tax before the certificate prayed for can be granted. If this Court now takes it upon itself to decide whether tax is or is not payable, it will certainly be exercising jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue. It is immaterial what its decision may be. If this Court now takes it upon itself to decide whether tax is or is not payable, it will certainly be exercising jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue. It is immaterial what its decision may be. If it directs the Respondent to issue a certificate as prayed, it will be compelling the revenue authorities to abandon their claim to a large amount of revenue, for they must certify that no tax is due from the Petitioner whereas, according to them, a large amount of tax is due and payable. Exercise of jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue would, in such case, be patent. But even if the Court decides against the Petitioner, it will be exercising jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue by going into the matter at all. 50. The argument that "revenue" in sec. 226 means what is legally chargeable as revenue and not any illegal or pretended claim and that, therefore, the High Court has an initial jurisdiction to enquire whether the claim is a legal revenue-claim so as to attract the bar of the section, can no longer be advanced. It was finally laid to rest by the decision of the Federal Court in The Governor-General in Council v. The Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. (1944) F.C.R. 229: S.C. 48 C.W.N. (F.B.) 78. It was there held that " the bar is absolute, if the dispute concerns revenue, taking the word ' revenue ' in its ordinary sense." 51. It was, however, contended by Mr. P.B. Mukherjee who appeared for the Petitioner that sec. 226 only barred exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court, but the jurisdiction exercised under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act was not that jurisdiction. It was argued that the view that the jurisdiction was original jurisdiction had been taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Chief Commissioner of income tax v. North Anantapur Gold Mines ILR 44 Mad. 718 (1921), but the decision was expressly overruled by the Privy Council in Alcock Ashd Own and Company v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay L.R. 50 IndAp 227: S.C. 28 C.W.N. 762 (1923). 52. I am clearly of opinion that this view of the effect of the decision of the Privy Council is incorrect. 718 (1921), but the decision was expressly overruled by the Privy Council in Alcock Ashd Own and Company v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay L.R. 50 IndAp 227: S.C. 28 C.W.N. 762 (1923). 52. I am clearly of opinion that this view of the effect of the decision of the Privy Council is incorrect. Both in the Madras case and the case before the Privy Council, the question was whether the revenue authority could be compelled by an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act to state a case for the opinion of the High Court. To adopt the language of their Lordships, the objection to jurisdiction was put before them " broadly " and it was contended that even if the revenue authority had a duty under the income tax Act to state a case, the Court could not require him to exercise it, inasmuch as to do so would be to disregard the exclusion of matters of revenue from the jurisdiction of the Court. In support of that contention, reliance was placed upon the decision in the Madras case and on sec. 106 (2) of the then Government of India Act which was practically in the same terms as the present sec. 226 (I). In the Madras case it had been held that the issue of an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act was an exercise of original jurisdiction and that to require the revenue authority to state a case would be to exercise that jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue. 53. Lord Phillimore, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed that their Lordships could not assent to the broad proposition that if a public officer, even a revenue officer, refused to do what he was bound to do under the law, the Specific Relief Act would not be applicable and that the Court could have no power to compel him to give relief to the subject. His Lordship next proceeded to consider sec. 106 (2) of the then Government of India Act which was said to bar the making of an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act by reason of proviso (h) to the section. His Lordship next proceeded to consider sec. 106 (2) of the then Government of India Act which was said to bar the making of an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act by reason of proviso (h) to the section. The proviso forbids the High Court to make any order under the section " which is otherwise expressly excluded by any law for the time being in force." It was held that to order the revenue officer to do his duty would not be to exercise original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue and that it was unnecessary to consider the latter part of sec 106 (2) which related to collection of revenue, because the proceedings in the case had not reached that stage. 54. As I read the decision of the Privy Council, it overrules the Madras decision only so far as it held that to require the revenue authority to state a case would be to exercise jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue, but does not overrule it in so far as it held that to make an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act would be to exercise original jurisdiction. Indeed, the Privy Council itself seems to me to have proceeded on the same view of jurisdiction, for otherwise, there could be no point in its holding that to direct a case to be stated would not be to exercise original jurisdiction in a matter concerning the revenue and would not he to offend against sec. 106 (2). If it was not original jurisdiction, sec. 106 (2) would not be in the way at all. 55. That the jurisdiction exercised under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is original jurisdiction appears to me to be beyond argument. In the case of Memani v. Banvarilal Roy L.R. 74 IndAp 120 : S.C. 51 C.W.N. 716 (1947) the Privy Council had occasion to consider the adjectives "ordinary," "'original" and "civil" and held that the issue of a writ in a civil case was an exercise of the Court's Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. It is true that their Lordships were considering the terms of the High Courts Act and the Letters Patent and that the jurisdiction exercised under sec. 45 is jurisdiction conferred by a later enactment. Nor is an order made under sec. 45 a writ. It is true that their Lordships were considering the terms of the High Courts Act and the Letters Patent and that the jurisdiction exercised under sec. 45 is jurisdiction conferred by a later enactment. Nor is an order made under sec. 45 a writ. But the reasons given by their Lordships are of a general character and apply to the present question as well. Besides, the section itself states that the High Court can require an act to be done or foreborne only within the local limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; and sec. 48 provides that an order made under sec. 45 may be appealed from as if it were a decree made in exercise of that jurisdiction. This may not, by itself, be conclusive, but if the jurisdiction is not original jurisdiction, it should be possible to say what else it is. Mr. Mukherjee suggested that it was revisions] jurisdiction, but a revisional jurisdiction can only be exercised under sec. 115 of the CPC and that jurisdiction is over Courts. It was next suggested that in making an order under sec. 45, the High Court exercised its power of superintendence, but the only power of superintendence which the Court now possesses is a power of administrative superintendence. In truth, there is no jurisdiction other than original jurisdiction to which exercise of the power under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act can be referred. As was observed in the Madras case, it starts a proceeding originating in the High Court and operates directly by an order made by the Court as a Court of first instance. The jurisdiction exercised under it is clearly original jurisdiction such as contemplated by sec. 226 of the Government of India Act and since in the present case the jurisdiction is invoked in connection with a matter concerning the revenue, its exercise is clearly barred. 56. It was lastly contended by Mr. Mukherjee that in view of the order made in The Alcock Ashdown case L.B. 50 I.A. 227 : S.C. 28 C.W.N. 762 (1923) it ought to be held that in spite of the bar contained in sec. 226 (7) of the Government of India Act, the High Court had power to give relief in an income tax matter by an order under sec. 226 (7) of the Government of India Act, the High Court had power to give relief in an income tax matter by an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, Reference was made to the observation of Lord Phillimore that the revenue authority could be compelled " to give relief to the subject." But the relief there contemplated is only relief by way of compelling the revenue authority to perform his statutory duty, that is, to state a case and not relief by way of compelling him to decide a matter, lying in his decision, in a particular manner. In the present case, to make the order asked for would be to intervene in a matter concerning the revenue and impose the Court's decision on the revenue officer or substitute its own decision for his. Such exercise of the Court's power is clearly barred by sec. 226 (I) and is warranted by nothing which the Privy Council said in The Alcock Ashdown case L.R. 50 IndAp 227 : S.C. 28 C.W.N. 762 (1923). 57. As this finding is quite sufficient for the disposal of the case, it is not necessary to consider whether the application is also barred under sec. 67 of the income tax Act or sec. 5 of the Ordinance itself. 58. The above finding makes it unnecessary to consider any other question in the case. But I may point out that the prayers made by the petition are entirely misconceived and in no event can it be possible to grant any of them. The Petitioner prays for an order on the Respondent, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of income tax, Range II, Calcutta, directing him to issue a certificate under sec. 3 of Ordinance III of 1948, "certifying that the proposed sale of the said property is exempted from the capital gains tax" and an order directing the same officer "to issue a certificate allowing the registration of the document set out in Annexure 'A' to the petition." The rest of the prayers are of a formal character. It seems to have been completely overlooked that the certificate contemplated by the Ordinance is not a certificate that the profits of any particular sale are exempt from the capital gains tax. It seems to have been completely overlooked that the certificate contemplated by the Ordinance is not a certificate that the profits of any particular sale are exempt from the capital gains tax. It is a certificate, leaving aside the case of persons who are not liable to taxation, that the transferor has paid, or made arrangements for paying, all existing or anticipated tax liabilities or that the income tax authority is otherwise satisfied that registration of the deed should be allowed. No order can, therefore, he made in terms of the first prayer, for thereby the Petitioner asks for a certificate unknown to the Ordinance. Again, the second prayer is equally misconceived. It seems to have been modelled on the last clause in sec. 3 of the Ordinance, but it was apparently not appreciated that the last clause had reference only to a case where the income tax authorities did not consider it necessary to insist on immediate payment of all taxes, due and anticipated, or on arrangements to be made for payment. The clause has no reference to a case where the assessee is insisting that no taxes are due while the income tax authorities are insisting not only that taxes are payable but also that they must immediately be paid. If the Petitioner's case had been that he admitted liability but only prayed that the document might be allowed to be registered without insisting on prior payment of all taxes or on arrangements to be made for payment, then the last clause might have application. 59. It appears from Annexure "A" to the application for a certificate that since the accounting year 1944, the Petitioner has not even filed a return and that no subsequent assessment has been completed, although substantial payments have been made under sec. 18A of the Act and also, it would seem, on account. But the exact liability of the Petitioner for several years remains undetermined. In the second place, the Petitioner has made several other sales since the 14th August, 1947, and has not yet furnished the information demanded by the income tax authorities in order to be able to decide what, if any, taxes are payable on account of those sales. In such circumstances, no certificate under sec. In the second place, the Petitioner has made several other sales since the 14th August, 1947, and has not yet furnished the information demanded by the income tax authorities in order to be able to decide what, if any, taxes are payable on account of those sales. In such circumstances, no certificate under sec. 3 can issue at all, unless the income tax authorities, in the exercise of their discretion, choose to allow registration under the last clause of the section. Still less can a certificate ever issue stating that a particular sale is exempt from the liability to capital gains tax, nor can a certificate, allowing registration without payment of tax, issue when there is a dispute as to the liability to tax. 60. In my opinion, apart from the fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application, the prayers made cannot possibly be allowed, as the certificates asked for are unknown to law, and the application is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 61. The learned Advocate-General raised some further objections to the issue of an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. He contended that an order could not be made for two reasons, first because to make it would be to command the Crown and thus to offend against proviso (g) to the section and, secondly, because the Petitioner had another adequate legal remedy in the chain of ordinary assessment proceedings and, therefore, to make the order asked for, would be to offend against proviso (d). In view of my decision on the main question, I do not consider it necessary to deal finally with these objections. I would only observe that, as at present advised, I am not impressed by either of them. In my view, sec. 3 of the Ordinance implies that if the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied, it shall be the duty of the income tax authorities to issue a certificate. To make an order on the basis of such a provision cannot, therefore, be to command the Crown, but is only to enforce a duty which the law has laid on servants of the Crown to be performed towards the public. R. v. Secretary of State for War (1801) 2 Q.B. 326 C.A. and R. v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners, ex parte Dr. R. v. Secretary of State for War (1801) 2 Q.B. 326 C.A. and R. v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners, ex parte Dr. Barnardo's Homes National Incorporated Association (1920) 1 K.B. 26 at p. 38. Nor, I think, has an assessee an adequate alternative remedy in such a case. A certificate required by the Ordinance must state that all taxes due up to date has been paid or that their payment has been arranged for. A transfer, however, will hardly ever be made on the very last day or towards the very end of an accounting year, but will generally be made on some date near the beginning or the middle and the transferor will require a certificate within a short time in order that registration of the deed may not be time-barred, if not also for other reasons. But at such time an assessment proceeding relating to the assessee can, at the utmost, cover the year immediately preceding and will be of no assistance to the assessee in respect of the current year. The period required to be covered by a certificate and the period which can possibly be covered by an assessment proceeding pending at the time can, therefore, never be co-extensive. Even if the question involved can conveniently be raised in an early assessment proceeding, which can be possible only in very rare cases, it will require a great deal of time before an appeal can reach the Appellate Tribunal or a reference can reach the High Court. On the other hand, the need for a certificate must necessarily be urgent. A decision in the chain of ordinary assessment proceedings which cannot possibly be had till a very distant date cannot, therefore, be an adequate remedy when the certificate is withheld. 62. Some discussion took place at the Bar as to the proper scope of an order that can be made under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. It is not necessary to come to or record any decision on that question. 62. Some discussion took place at the Bar as to the proper scope of an order that can be made under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. It is not necessary to come to or record any decision on that question. But I may observe that it will well settle now that where the duty lying on an inferior Court or a public officer is a duty of deciding a question and of acting according to the decision, a superior Court can, by an order in the nature of a mandamus, only require the Court or public officer concerned to decide the matter but cannot require it to be decided in a particular manner. Nor can the superior Court require the inferior authority to revise a decision already taken, if it was taken in a proper manner, for the procedure by way of mandamus is not procedure by way of appeal. Rex v. General Income Tax Commissioners 27 T.L.R. 358 (1911) and Ex parte Cook in re: Dyson (1860) 29 L.J. (Q.B.) 68, per Cockburn, C. J. In the present case, the income tax authorities have decided the question and whether the decision is right or wrong, it is not alleged that the decision was not properly arrived at. 63. Mr. Mukherjee contended in the last resort that even if we could not entertain the application and make an order in favour of his client, we should express our views on the merits of the question in order that the income tax authorities might have proper guidance in deciding it, although the decision might lie at the present stage only with them. I do not consider it possible to accede to that request. We cannot on the one hand hold that we have no jurisdiction to decide the matter on the present application and at the same time pronounce on the merits of the question. Any observation made by us will not only be mere obiter dicta, but will also be without jurisdiction and can only create embarrassment when the question comes up at a future date in a properly constituted proceeding, whether at the instance of an assessee or of the department. Mr. Mukherjee instanced the example of the English Court of Appeal in the case of The Queen v. The Vestry of St. Mr. Mukherjee instanced the example of the English Court of Appeal in the case of The Queen v. The Vestry of St. Paneras (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 371 and contended that we should explain the law, as the Court did in that case. But Mr. Mukherjee overlooked that although both Esher, M.R. and Fry, L. J., expressed their views on the law, it was eminently proper that they should have done so, because the Court did issue a mandamus in that case on the ground that the vestry had not properly considered the matter and it was, therefore, necessary to indicate what were the proper matters to be considered. The case relied on by Mr. Mukherjee is no precedent for a procedure of making observations on a question after holding that jurisdiction to consider it does not exist. 64. But although we cannot entertain the application and give any relief to the Petitioner even indirectly, I desire to point out that the absence of any provision for immediate relief against an order made by the income tax authorities on an application under sec. 3 of the Ordinance, creates great hardship and a situation of great difficulty. As I have pointed out, relief in an ordinary assessment proceeding can only come after long delay and is useless for all practical purposes, since a certificate must necessarily be urgently required for registration of the document within the law of limitation and for completing the transaction of sale. Thousands of bona fide transferors who require their transfers to be completed early in order that they may adjust their affairs are liable to bud themselves in great difficulty if a certificate is refused, because there is no provision for any appeal or revision against the order. In my view, the Ordinance requires urgently to be amended so as to include at least a provision for an immediate appeal of the same kind as an appeal from an assessment order, if not an immediate reference to the High Court. 65. But so far as the present application is concerned, it must fail and I agree with my Lord that the Rule should be discharged with costs. Chatterjee, J. 66. I concur in the order proposed to be made. But I ought to add a few words on sec. 226 of the Government of India Act and the Ordinance in question. But so far as the present application is concerned, it must fail and I agree with my Lord that the Rule should be discharged with costs. Chatterjee, J. 66. I concur in the order proposed to be made. But I ought to add a few words on sec. 226 of the Government of India Act and the Ordinance in question. Every Court in India, however, inferior, every Munsif or Subordinate Judge, has jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue of the country and can grant relief in appropriate cases. But the Judges of the three High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, have been deprived of original jurisdiction in such matter. This was due to historic necessity which has long ceased to exist. In the celebrated "Cossijurah case" Mr. Justice Hyde issued a writ against the Raja of Cossijurah, a Zemindar of the Company and a revenue-farmer. The writ was resisted and the Sheriff of the Supreme Court went to enforce the writ and Warren Hastings and his Council sent the Company's sepoys to arrest the Sheriff's men. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, after a careful investigation of the whole case, declared that in the Cossijurah case " the Council acted haughtily, quite illegally and most violently." This cleavage between the Supreme Court and the Council led to the enactment of the Act of 1781 (21 Geo. III (70) and by sec. 7 of that Act the Supreme Court was deprived of "jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue " or its collection. This fetter on jurisdiction ultimately took the shape of sec. 106 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915. It was condemned by Coutts Trotter, C. J., as an " antiquated fossil on the statute book." Govindarajulu Naidu v. Secretary of State ILR 50 Mad 449 (1926). Still this section has been re-enacted as sec. 226 (1) of the Constitution Act of 1935. The section can be repealed by the Dominion Legislature as well as by the Provincial Legislature under sec. 226 (2) of the Government of India Act as adapted by the India (Provincial Constitution) Order, 1947. So long as the sec. 226 (I) is on the statute book, the three High Courts have to abide by it There is no justification now for its continuance in any shape or form. 226 (2) of the Government of India Act as adapted by the India (Provincial Constitution) Order, 1947. So long as the sec. 226 (I) is on the statute book, the three High Courts have to abide by it There is no justification now for its continuance in any shape or form. Its introduction was necessitated in order to enable a commercial Corporation to realise the highest revenue without being fettered by the highest Court of the country and it is a complete misfit in the present set-up. 67. This sec. 226 can work hardship in particular cases. If the applicant had chosen to institute an action in the Court of a Subordinate Judge situate in this very town functioning at a distance of a couple of miles, then the revenue authorities could not urge this plea of jurisdiction. The commercial community in the Presidency Towns may be seriously affected if the law still puts an embargo on the jurisdiction of the High Court in revenue matters, specially in view of the progressive taxation and the increasing demands; of the state for additional revenue. This High Court has no power even to examine the circumstances of a case to see if the action of the taxing authorities was lawful or unlawful and, however preposterous or fantastic may be the demand of the taxing authorities, this High Court is powerless if its original jurisdiction is invoked. In The Raleigh case (1944) F.C.R. 229 : S.C. 48 C.W.N. (F.R.) 73 the Federal Court held, reversing the judgment of the Special Bench of this High Court, that sec. 226 of the Constitution Act of 1935 imposes an absolute bar, if the dispute concerns revenue, taking the word "revenue" in its ordinary sense, although the taxing clause or section may be ultra vires the legislature. The Judicial Committee on appeal affirmed the judgment of the Federal Court on an altogether different ground. Lord Uthwatt in his judgment did not throw any doubt on the construction put upon sec. 226 by the Federal Court. Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council L.R. 74 IndAp 50 : S.C. 51 C.W.N. 763 (1947). The Government of India Act explicitly declares in sec. 212 that the law declared by the Federal Court shall be binding on and shall be, followed by the High Courts and by other Courts in any Governor's Province. 68. Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council L.R. 74 IndAp 50 : S.C. 51 C.W.N. 763 (1947). The Government of India Act explicitly declares in sec. 212 that the law declared by the Federal Court shall be binding on and shall be, followed by the High Courts and by other Courts in any Governor's Province. 68. It is not necessary to hold that every application under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act necessarily invokes the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this High; Court. Sec. 226 uses the expression "original jurisdiction" in the matter of revenue and in the collection thereof. It has been contended by Mr. P.B. Mukherji for the applicant that the jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is a special jurisdiction conferred by that statute. It is pointed out that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under sec. 66 of the In-come-Tax Act of 1922 is a special jurisdiction and forms no part of its original or appellate jurisdiction. Prabhat Chandra Barva v. Emperor ILR 52 Cal. 546 (1924) and Commissioner of income tax v. Hungerford In-vestment Trust, Ltd. ILR 62 Cal 671 (1935). Lord Phillimore in Alcock Ashdown v. Chief Revenue Anthony, Bombay L.R. 50 IndAp 227: S.C. 28 C.W.N. 762 (1928) disapproved of the judgment of the Madras High Court in Chief Commissioner of income tax. v. North Anantapur Gold Mine ILR 44 Mad. 718 (1921) where it was held that an application under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act in the nature of a mandamus is an exercise of "original jurisdiction" within sec. 106 (2) of the Government of India Act of 1915. Before the Judicial Committee, Mr. Dunne on behalf of the Respondent urged that sec. 106 (2), expressly excludes jurisdiction in "any matter concerning the revenue." That argument was negatived by the Judicial Committee and the judgment of the Board is no authority for the proposition that an order under sec. 45 would not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction. All that their Lordships pointed out was that an order on the revenue authority to do its statutory duty of stating a case to the High Court would not be the exercise of "original jurisdiction" in any matter concerning the revenue. 69. 45 would not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction. All that their Lordships pointed out was that an order on the revenue authority to do its statutory duty of stating a case to the High Court would not be the exercise of "original jurisdiction" in any matter concerning the revenue. 69. In Nomani v. Bonwarilal Roy L.R. 74 IndAp 120 : S.C. 51 C.W.N. 716 (1947) the Judicial Committee held that any Original Civil jurisdiction possessed by the High Court and not in express terms conferred by Letters Patent or later enactments falls within the description of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. It cannot be disputed in view of the Privy Council judgment in the Howrah case L.R. 74 IndAp 120 : S.C. 51 C.W.N. 716 (1947) that the issue of a writ of mandamus was a matter of original jurisdiction. Therefore, an order in the nature of a mandamus under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is also a matter of Original Jurisdiction and thus this application falls within the mischief of sec. 226 of the Constitution Act of 1935. 70. Then comes the question of the Ordinance III of 1948. As the preamble makes it clear, this Ordinance was enacted to provide for the payment of taxes before the registration of a deed of transfer of property. It is an emergency measure enacted in exercise of the powers conferred by see. 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947. Sec. 2 expressly provides that notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of the Ordinance shall have effect throughout the areas to which it applies. Sec. 3 is the relevant section which needs consideration. Under that section no registration of any deed of sale shall be made, unless a certificate is produced showing (a) that the vendor is not liable to taxation, or (b) that be has paid or made satisfactory provision for all existing or anticipated liabilities under the income tax Act, Excess Profits Tax Act and the Business Profits Tax Act, or (c) that the Revenue Officer is otherwise satisfied that registration of the document should be allowed. 71. Although the preamble of the Ordinance shows that its object is to provide for the payment of taxes, sec. 71. Although the preamble of the Ordinance shows that its object is to provide for the payment of taxes, sec. 3 seems to go further and enables the taxing officer to withhold the certificate even in view of merely prospective liability. The scheme of the income tax Act and other taxing statutes is such that it will be almost impossible for any business firm to say that at any point of time it has no liability for taxation, actual or prospective. In this case objection has been taken on behalf of the taxing authority (a) that the applicant was not in possession of the property because it was leased out and (b) that a company can be assessed under the Act but cannot claim exemption under the Act, because it is not a natural person and has no parent. The contentions seem to be startling. However unreasonable or arbitrary the objections may be, an assessese can have really no relief and by the time the stage is reached when sec. 66 of the income tax Act can be invoked, the assessee may be met by the plea of liability which has already accrued or which is anticipated. Therefore, the properties of a business firm or a company carrying on business may become in effect inalienable. The object of the Ordinance was undoubtedly to penalise the taxdodgers. Rut from the language of its provisions it may seriously affect bona fide transactions put through by men of moderate means who want to avail of the present market to liquidate their debts or encumbrances. The Ordinance should be suitably amended in order to enable the assessee to compel the revenue authorities to state a case to determine the validity of the grounds on which a certificate is withheld by the income tax Officers. In view of the finding that sec. 226 of the Constitution Act is a bar to the maintenance of the application, it is not necessary to consider what relief, if any, could be given to the applicant. One argument was advanced by the learned Advocate-General that the applicant had other specific and adequate legal remedy and thus the application cannot be entertained under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. In my opinion, the mere possibility of a right of action or an application at a later stage under sec. One argument was advanced by the learned Advocate-General that the applicant had other specific and adequate legal remedy and thus the application cannot be entertained under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. In my opinion, the mere possibility of a right of action or an application at a later stage under sec. 66 of the income tax Act is not enough to bar the resort to sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act.