Judgment Agarwala, J. 1. This appeal under the Letters Patent is by the defts. & arises out of a suit for recovery of produce rent for the years 1350-1351 fasli, in respect of plots 327 & 328. The defence was that the defts holding consisted of three plots 326, 327, & 328, but that the plffs. had dispossessed the defts. from plot 326 by executing a patta in favour of defts under-raiyat & realising rent from the latter. The first Court found that plot 326 formed no part of the defts holding, &, alternatively, that the defts. were not entitled to suspension of the rent because the rent was not indivisible. The suit was, therefore, decreed, but not at the rate claimed by the plffs. In appeal by the defts. the appellate Court admitted additional evidence in the form of the survey khatian & held that plot 326 is a part of the defts holding. The appellate Court dismissed the suit holding that the defts. since they were dispossessed from plot 326 were entitled to suspension of rent. The plffs. appealed to this Court, The appeal was heard by Ray J. who set aside the decision of the appellate Court & restored that of the Munsif. Ray, J. accepted the finding of the appellate Court that the defts. had been dispossessed from plot No. 326, but held that in the case of a holding held on produce rent, the deft, is not entitled to suspension of rent if he is dispossessed from a part of the holding. The learned Judge was of Opinion that the question had been set at rest by the decision of the Privy Council in Katyayani Debi V/s. Udoy Kumar Das, 52 IA 160 that the decisions of this Court Sn Sham Narayan Singh V/s. Chandra Sekhar Prasad, 36 IC 528, & Bhuneshwar Nath v, Gudar Nath, 17 PLT 356, were not applicable as in those cases the holdings were held on a lump sum cash rental. 2. 2. The right of a tenant to suspension of rent in certain circumstances, when his landlord has failed to deliver to him possession of the entirety of the demised land, or dispossessed him from a portion of it, has been recognised & enforced in Bengal & Bihar for almost eighty years since the decision of Sir Barnes Peacock, C. J., in Gopanund Jha V/s. Lalla Gobind Pershad, 12 WR 109. 3. In England the rule appears to be well established that, where lands are let at as entire rent, & the lessee has been unable to obtain possession of some part of the land demised owing to the lessors default, the lessee is entitled to suspension of payment of the whole rent, See Neale V/s. Mackenzie, (1836) 1 M & W 747; Holgate V/s. Kay, (1844) 1 Car & K. 341; and Watson V/s. Ward, (1853) 8 Ex. 335. Where, however, land is let at so much per acre, & the lessee is able to obtain possession of only a portion of it, he is not entitled to total suspension of rent but to an apportionment. With regard to eviction of the lessee by the lessor from a portion of the land, the English Common Law appears to make no distinction between a case where the rent is a lump sum & a case where it is at a certain rate per acre or bigha, the principle being in such cases that the rent issues from every part of the land demised & that the landlord cannot apportion his own wrong. I have been unable to find any statement of the reason for this difference between the failure of the landlord to deliver possession to the lessee of a part of the demised lands & eviction of the lessee by a lessor from a part of the demised lands after the lessee has entered into possession. There is, however this difference between the two cases which is noticeable. In a case where the lessee is unable to obtain possession of the entirety of the lands demised, it is open to him to refuse to take possession of the remainder. & avail himself of other remedies which the law provides, such as, repudiation of the contract & : damages for its breach or specific performance of it. In a case where the lessee is unable to obtain possession of the entirety of the lands demised, it is open to him to refuse to take possession of the remainder. & avail himself of other remedies which the law provides, such as, repudiation of the contract & : damages for its breach or specific performance of it. In a case, however, where he has been evicted by the lessor from a part of the demised land after taking possession, the circumstances may be such as to render it impracticable for him to repudiate the contract altogether, for he may have effected improvements & spent money on the property. If this be the reason why a lessee is entitled to suspension of rent in a case where he has been evicted by the landlord after obtaining possession of the demised land, it is obvious that there is no justification for drawing any distinction between land leased at an entire rent & land leased at so much per acre or bigha. 4. The decision of the Privy Council referred to by Ray, J. is no authority for the proposition for which the learned Judge has relied on it as will be apparent from an examination of the facts of that case. On 27-11-1871 the proprietor granted a reclamation lease of waste lands at the rate of 13 annas per bigha of the area included in the lease, which included 61 acres, to which a third party had established a paramount title against the lessor in 1875, that is to say, prior to the execution of the lease. The lessees rights under the lease were sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained against him in 1894. The purchaser obtained possession of all the lands included within the lease, except the 61 acres already referred to, & a larger area of which the purchasers husband had taken possession about 1888 & of which he was still in possession at the date of the auction sale despite the original lessees efforts to eject him. From the date of the purchase until 1917 the purchaser paid without objection the entire rent of Rs. 4,300 per annum, which was the amount fixed as between the lessor & the original lessee. From the date of the purchase until 1917 the purchaser paid without objection the entire rent of Rs. 4,300 per annum, which was the amount fixed as between the lessor & the original lessee. In 1917, in defence to a suit for rent by the lessor, the purchaser pleaded that she was entitled to an abatement of rent in respect of such portions of the demised lands of which she was not actually in possession. It was conceded that with regard to the 61 bighas, to which her husband had established a paramount title prior to the execution of the lease, she was entitled to abatement. The question on which the parties were at issue, therefore, was confined to the, area of which the defts husband had taken possession in 1884 & to which she had obtained a title by adverse possession prior to the institution of the suit for rent in 1917. It was contended by the purchaser that the lessor had a title to eject the trespasser, & that if he did not do so, the trespasser obtained a title by limitation against him as well as against the lessee, & that as the latter was deprived of the possession of the lands, she was entitled, in a suit by the lessor, to an abatement of rent. It was held that in the case of a permanent lease, such as the one in question in that instance, it was the duty of the lessee to protect herself against illegal encroachment by others on the lands of which she had the exclusive possession, & that her failure to do so could not prejudice the lessors claim lor rent. This, therefore, was not a case of an eviction by the landlord during the pendency of the lease, but a case of eviction by a third party. There was, however, an observation that "The doctrine of suspension of payment of rent, where the tenant has not been put in possession of part of the subject leased, has been applied where the rent was a lump rent for the whole land leased treated as an indivisible subject. There was, however, an observation that "The doctrine of suspension of payment of rent, where the tenant has not been put in possession of part of the subject leased, has been applied where the rent was a lump rent for the whole land leased treated as an indivisible subject. It has no application to a case where the stipulated rent is so much per acre or bigha." That observation, however does not refer to a case where the lessee has been put in possession of the entire demised lands, but has been subsequently evicted from a part of it. It has since been held by the Privy Council that in India even in the case of a lump sum rent, a lessee who has been unable to obtain possession of the entirety of the demised lands is entitled only to abatement & not total suspension of the rent; Ram Lal Dutt V/s. Dhirendra Nath, ILR (1943) 1 Cal 372. On the question before us there is no decision of the Privy Council. 5. On the other hand, there are a series of decisions of this Court by which we are bound, that where a landlord wrongfully evicts his tenants from a part of the tenancy lands the* tenant is entitled to suspension of payment of the entire rent. The earliest of these cases is Sham Narayah Singh V/s. Chandra Sekhar Pra-sad, 36 IC 528, where it was held that if a landlord evicts his tenant from a portion of his holding, he shall recover no rent for any part of the holding until he has restored to him the land which, he has forcibly taken. In other words, where there has been diminution ol the holding by dispossession by a landlord, there can be no apportionment of rent. This rule was held to apply to all classes of tenancies. That view has been consistently followed in this Court, see Hira Lal V/s. Rinkauri Singh, 15 PLT 21; Dalip Narayan Singh V/s. Surai Narayan, 14 Pat 323; Khub lal V/s. Ishri Pra-sad, 15 Pat 443; Buneshwar Nath V/s. Gudar Nath, 17 PLT 356; & Mt. Deoki Kuer V/s. Shiva Prasad Singh, 20 PLT 378. That view has been consistently followed in this Court, see Hira Lal V/s. Rinkauri Singh, 15 PLT 21; Dalip Narayan Singh V/s. Surai Narayan, 14 Pat 323; Khub lal V/s. Ishri Pra-sad, 15 Pat 443; Buneshwar Nath V/s. Gudar Nath, 17 PLT 356; & Mt. Deoki Kuer V/s. Shiva Prasad Singh, 20 PLT 378. The rule is also supported by an observation of the Full Bench in Jeonandan Singh V/s. Janki Singh, 17 Pat 451 at p. 459, although the point does not appear to have arisen directly for decision in that case. It is also interesting to observe that in 1947 the Legislature adopted this view in the Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act of that year by introducing into the Tenancy Act Section 52 B which provides : "where a landlord dispossesses a tenant from his holding or part thereof, the landlord shall not be entitled to any rent in respect of the holding or any part thereof, for the period of such dispossession." This section, however, does not govern the present case as it was not enacted until after this litigation had been instituted. 6 It has been contended, however, that in all the Patna decisions the lands were held on a lump sum rental & are not authorities in a case where the land is held at so much per acre or bigha. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sajjad Ahmad V/s. Trailakhya Nath, 55 Cal 464, which however is not an authority for the proposition contended for. In thaf case the landlord sued for recovery of rent for the years 1325 to 1328 B. S. at the rate of Rs. 18/5/9 pies a year. The defence was that the plff. had dispossessed the defts. from 5 bighas & 8 kathas of their holding, which consisted of 25 bighas at a rental of Rs. 15/6/11 gandas, & the defts. were, therefore, entitled to a suspension of the payment of rent. It appeared that after the final publication of the record of rights the landlords initiated a proceeding under Sec.105, Tenancy Act, & the settlement officer settled Rs. 18/5/9 pies as a fair rent of the lands as from the beginning of the year 1326. 15/6/11 gandas, & the defts. were, therefore, entitled to a suspension of the payment of rent. It appeared that after the final publication of the record of rights the landlords initiated a proceeding under Sec.105, Tenancy Act, & the settlement officer settled Rs. 18/5/9 pies as a fair rent of the lands as from the beginning of the year 1326. The order of the Revenue officer, which had the force of a decree, showed that the tenants were in possession of only 21 bighas & 5 kathas, & that the fair rent assessed on this area was Rs. 18/5/9 pies. It was held that the order of the Revenue officer was conclusive between the parties, both as to the area of the holding & the rent of the holding, & that so long as that order stood, the tenants were bound to pay the rent fixed by the Revenue officer in respect of the area found in their possession by him. In other words, it was held that the effect of the decision was to determine that the defts. were tenants of the plff, in respect of only 21 & odd bighas of land, for which they were liable to pay Rs. 18/5/9 as fair & equitable rent. 7. I have already indicated above that I can see no reason in principle why, if a tenant is entitled to suspension of rent on eviction from a part of the land by the landlord, there should be any difference between land held on a lump sum rental & land held at a rate of s o much per bigha or acre. The rule of suspension of payment of rent in such cases was stated in Bacons Abridgment, Tit. The rule of suspension of payment of rent in such cases was stated in Bacons Abridgment, Tit. Rent (M) "Where a lessor enters forcibly into part of the land, there are variety of opinions whether the entire rent shall not be suspended during the continuance of such tortious entry, & it seems to be the better opinion, & the settled law at this day, that the tenant is discharged from the payment of the whole rent till he be restored to the whole possession, that no man may be encouraged to injure or disturb his tenant in his possession, whom by the policy of the law he ought to protect & defend." It is true that that observation was made in respect of a rule of law which prevails in a country whose land laws originated in feudalism. But it seems to me that it is equally applicable elsewhere, for it must always be the duty of a landlord to abstain from a tortious eviction of his tenant to whom he has con tracted to let his land. It will be observed too that the abridgment makes no mention of any distinction between land held on a lump sum rental & land held otherwise. This view is supported by the observation in Gilbert on Rents, page 178 : "If it (eviction by the landlord from a part of the demised lands) were not attended with a total suspension of the rent until he makes restitution of the land, it would be in the power of the lord or lessor to resume any part of the land against his own engagement & contract, & so, by faking that which lies most commodious for the tenant, render the remainder in effect useless, or put him to expense & trouble to restore himself to such part by course of law." In that view of the matter, it makes no difference whether the rent be cash rent or produce rent. The principle is the same. The unjustness of holding otherwise is made obvious by a simple example. A person may be induced to take a tenancy on produce rent of a holding including both good agricultural land & land of such poor quality that to cultivate the latter . by itself would be uneconomical. The principle is the same. The unjustness of holding otherwise is made obvious by a simple example. A person may be induced to take a tenancy on produce rent of a holding including both good agricultural land & land of such poor quality that to cultivate the latter . by itself would be uneconomical. If in such a case he were not to be entitled to suspension of the whole rent on his eviction by the landlord from the good agricultural land he would be left with the liability to hand over to the landlord the latters share of the produce of land which could not be cultivated except at a loss. On the basis of the F. B. decision in Meonandan Singh V/s. Janki Singh, 17 Pat 451, it was contended that the plaintiff was entitled at least to a decree at the rate admitted by the defts. The facts of that case were that the landlords instituted a suit for rent which was resisted by the defts. on the ground that a part of the holding had not been included in the suit, although they admitted that the rent was due from them. In those circumstances it was held that, although the landlord was not entitled to a rent decree he was entitled to a money decree for the amount admitted by the defts. to be due. In that case, however, it was not alleged by the tenant that he had been dispossessed from any part of the holding. In those circumstances it was held that, although the landlord was not entitled to a rent decree he was entitled to a money decree for the amount admitted by the defts. to be due. In that case, however, it was not alleged by the tenant that he had been dispossessed from any part of the holding. In fact their Lordships observed : "If the finding should be that the tenant has been ejected by the landlord from a portion of his holding, the tenant would be entitled to suspension of the rent until the whole of his holding should be restored to him, but where the finding is that the tenant is in possession of the area which he claims & that there has been no ejectment by the landlord the landlord ought not to be deprived of the rent which the tenant by his defence admits to be payable." The decision of the F. B. that the landlord was entitled to recover at the rate admitted to be due by the tenant even in a suit in which the landlord has omitted to include the entire holding was explained in Ambika V/s. Laxmi, 26 Pat 66, where it was pointed out that in Ram-chandra V/s. Ramgulam, AIR (25) 1938 Pat 305 it had been held that a suit for rent of a part of holding was not maintainable, & that this view had not been dissented from by the F. B. whose decision was confined to an entirely different class of cases namely where there are bona fide errors & omissions in the description of the holding or some dispute as to its exact area. In Ambika V/s. Laxmi, AIR (25) 1938 Pat 305, the suit was based on an allegation that the tenants holding had been split into two separate holdings & it had been found that the allegation was incorrect. The Division Bench held that a suit for rent of part of a holding is not maintainable, & the plff. was not entitled even to a money decree because in such a case the suit is not really brought in respect of the holding at all, but in respect of an alleged different holding which does not in fact exist. 8 In my view this appeal should be allowed, the decree of this Court set aside, & that of the lower appellate Court restored. 8 In my view this appeal should be allowed, the decree of this Court set aside, & that of the lower appellate Court restored. The defts.-appellants are entitled to their costs throughout. Meredith, J. 9 I agree.