JUDGMENT Malik, CJ. - This is a Plaintiff's application in revision, and the only point raised by learned Counsel is that the lower appellate Court was not right in its view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to arbitration and was, therefore, not justified in setting aside the decree on the basis of the award. The Plaintiff had filed an application for redemption of a mortgage u/s 12 of the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief of Act (XXVII of 1934). This application was filed in the Court of the learned Munsif of Deoria. During the hearing of the case the parties agreed that one Babu Gorakh Prasad should be appointed an arbitrator in the case. The Court appointed B. Gorakh Prasad an arbitrator and in due course the arbitrator gave an award. An objection to the validity of the award was filed on behalf of some of the Defendants. On the date fixed for hearing of the objection the objectors were not present and the objection was dismissed and a decree was passed in terms of the award. 2. Against that decree an appeal was filed in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge of Gorakhpur and it was urged that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to arbitration as the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act did not apply to proceedings u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The objection is based on the ground that Section 21 of the Arbitration Act (X of 1940) lays down that Where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may at any lime before judgment is pronounced apply in writing to the Court for an order of reference. 3. It is urged that a proceeding u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relies Act is not a suit. The word "suit" he not been defined either in the Genera Clauses Act or in the Arbitration Act. Though there is no definition of the term "suit" in the CPC also, Section 25 of the Code, provides that Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. 4. The word "suit" he not been defined either in the Genera Clauses Act or in the Arbitration Act. Though there is no definition of the term "suit" in the CPC also, Section 25 of the Code, provides that Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. 4. On behalf of the Defendant stress is laid on the words "by the presentation of a plaint" while the rest of the section "in such other manner as may be prescribed" is attempted to be slurred over. It may be that proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act are not started by the presentation of a plaint but by the presentation of an application, but the words "in such other manner as may be prescribed" in Section 26 of the Code is, to my mind, wide enough to include an application u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. 5. Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act. Defines a 'Court' and provides that 'Court' means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the reference if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings u/s 21, include a Small Cause Court. 6. That the Tribunal before which an application u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act is filed is a Court is clear from the provisions of Section 2, Sub-section (5) of the Agriculturists' Relief Act which says that a "Court" means a Civil Court. In view of that definition the word "Court" in Section 12 of the Act before which an application under that Section is to be filed must be deemed to be a Civil Court. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act are proceedings in a suit before a Civil Court to which the Arbitration Act is applicable. 7. It is not necessary to set out the various provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act which make it clear that the proceedings u/s 12 resemble in every respect a suit. u/s 23 of the Act an appeal is provided and the law is now well settled that on such appeals advalorem Courts fees are payable, These appeals are registered as civil appeals and not as appeals from orders. u/s 23 of the Act an appeal is provided and the law is now well settled that on such appeals advalorem Courts fees are payable, These appeals are registered as civil appeals and not as appeals from orders. u/s 26 the period of limitation for an application as well as for appeals and for execution of orders passed u/s 12 are the same as for suits in Civil Courts. Section 27 provides that the procedure is to be the same as prescribed in the CPC for suits. 8. The question then arises why should the Legislature have used the word "application" in Section 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act and the order passed therein as an "order". Ordinary suits for redemption are provided for under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Legislature was making a special provision for agriculturists for redemption of mortgages and was taking away the right of second appeal given under the right of second appeal given under the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be that to keep the distinction and to save the payment of court-fees which would have been payable on the plaint under the Court Fees Act that Section 12 was drafted in the manner indicated above. In any case, the decision of the question whether proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act are "suits" or not would not depend merely on the fact that the proceedings u/s 12 are initiated by an "application". 9. Section 27 of the Agriculturists Relief Act provides that The provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in regard to suits shall be followed, so far as they can be made applicable, to all proceedings under this chapter, and all orders passed under this chapter shall be executed in the manner prescribed for execution of Civil Court decrees. 10. On the date that the Agriculturists' Relief Act was passed in the year 1934, Schedule II of the CPC and Section 89 and Clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 104 were all in force and presumably they were all applicable to proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. At any rate, it was never doubted that under the CPC such proceedings could be referred to arbitration. These provisions were repealed by Section 49(1) of the Arbitration Act. At any rate, it was never doubted that under the CPC such proceedings could be referred to arbitration. These provisions were repealed by Section 49(1) of the Arbitration Act. By reason of the provisions of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) where any Act, "made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, repeals and reenacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted." If, therefore, Section 89, Section 104 and Schedule II of the CPC applied to proceedings under the Agriculturists' Relief Act before 1940 by virtue of the provisions of Section 27 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act I do not see why the corresponding provisions of the Arbitration Act should not now be held applicable in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act. 11. About the applicability of the provisions of Section 82 of the CPC nothing has been said by learned Counsel for the opposite-party. Section 89 provides: Save in so far as is otherwise provided by the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, or by any other law for the time being in force, all references to arbitration whether by an order in a suit or otherwise, and all proceedings thereunder, shall be governed by the provisions contained in the Second Schedule. 12. It would appear from what I have said above that Section 89 refers not only to an order of reference in a suit but also to proceedings other than a suit, and to all those references the provisions of the Second Schedule are made applicable. 13. The language of paragraph 1 of Schedule II is very similar to the language of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Second Schedule was as follows:- Where in any suit all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them shall be referred to arbitration, they may, at any time before judgment is pronounced, apply to the Court for an order of reference. 14. I have looked into the older Acts and I find that even in the CPC of 1859 (VIII of 1859) Section 312 makes a provision for reference to arbitration in "suits". 14. I have looked into the older Acts and I find that even in the CPC of 1859 (VIII of 1859) Section 312 makes a provision for reference to arbitration in "suits". Learned Counsel has urged that Section 89 and Schedule II of the CPC were the only provisions that gave jurisdiction to the Civil Courts to refer a case to arbitration and to pass a decree in terms of an award. I find it difficult to accept this argument. It is true that the Legislature has provided Tribunals for decision of the civil matters which are in dispute between the parties, but there is no prohibition against parties entering into a compromise except in cases where a person labours under a disability and provisions are made for safeguarding his interest. Where a party has filed a suit before a Civil Court it does not need any legislative authority to enable him to come to a settlement With the opposite-party out of Court and to inform the Court that he has settled the dispute, and if the dispute is thus settled there is Order 23 of the CPC under which the parties, or any of them, can ask the Court to pass a decree in accordance with the agreement between the parties. Arbitration is nothing more than this that, while in a private compromise the parties settle their disputes themselves, in an arbitration they agree that the dispute shall be settled for them by a third person. The authority that an arbitrator derives flows from the parties and is based on their agreement, and even if no part of the Second Schedule or the Arbitration Act were applicable to them. I do not see why the parties, or any of them, should not have a right to insist under Order 23 that a settlement should be recorded in terms of an award where an award has been given. 15. When the word "suit" has not been defined in the General Clauses Act, I see no reason why a restricted meaning should be given to that word so as to take away the rights of the parties to have their disputes settled by a Tribunal of their own choice. The first Arbitration Act is of the year 1899 and it provided for reference to arbitration of future disputes. Even before the Arbitration Act, arbitrations were common. The first Arbitration Act is of the year 1899 and it provided for reference to arbitration of future disputes. Even before the Arbitration Act, arbitrations were common. The Regulations for the administration of justice passed in the year 1787 empowered the Courts to refer certain suits for decision to a third person without the consent of either party. The discretion was given to the Judge to select any one he liked. Bengal Regulation XVI of 1793 for referring suits to arbitration and submitting certain cases to the decision of the Nazim, for the first time provided an elaborate machinery for reference to arbitration of certain types of suits with the consent of the parties. It also provided that an award was not to be set aside except on proof of corruption or partiality and if the award was not set aside decrees had to be passed in conformity with the award, Bengal Regulation XV of 1795 extended the Regulation of 1793 to the Province of Braces and Bengal Regulation XXI of (Sic) extended it further to the provinces coded by the Nawab Vizier to the Hon'ble East India Company. Bengal Relation VI of 1813 made the provisions of the Regulation of 1793 applicable to suits relating a land etc. It is not necessary to set out the various other Regulations that gradually extended or modified the provisions of the Regulation of 1793 till ultimately these provisions were codified by the CPC of 1859 (Act VIII of 1855). We find, therefore, that almost from the beginning of the British rule in India there were statutory provisions for reference to arbitration. It cannot, how over he urged that the rights of the parties to agree to refer matters to a third person when they could not themselves decide their disputes, had to depend on any Regulation or Act. 16. Learned Counsel has pleaded before us certain decisions which lay down that proceedings u/s 144 of the CPC cannot be referred to arbitrators as they are not suits-see Ram Gopal v. Shanti Lal 1941 A.W.R. (H.C.) 302. In the case of Shukrullah v. Rahmat Bibi 1941 ALR 445 a Bench of this Court held that an appellate Court has no right to refer a case to arbitration as an appeal is not a suit. The nature of the proceedings before us is entirely different. In the case of Shukrullah v. Rahmat Bibi 1941 ALR 445 a Bench of this Court held that an appellate Court has no right to refer a case to arbitration as an appeal is not a suit. The nature of the proceedings before us is entirely different. If it were necessary, I would have referred his matter to a larger Bench. The decision is Shukrullah's case has been appeared against to the Federal Court and was still no doubt have an authoritative pronouncement from that Tribunal. In the case of Ram Gopal the reference itself was bai as one of the parties was a juristic. The case was also, if I may say so, not fully argued. 17. In proceedings u/s 144 of the CPC a decree is passed. A decree is defined as conclusively determining the rights of the parties in a (Sic). An order u/s 144 has been included in the definition of a decree and the decree is appealable as each. There does not seam to be any logical ground for refusing the parties opportunity to have their disputes decided by arbitration. As I have already said, even if it were held that the provisions of the Code were not applicable. I do not see why the award should not be taken as an adjustment under Order 23 of the Code. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this revision must be allowed, the order passed by the lower appellate Court set aside and the order passed by the trial Court upheld with costs in all Courts. Bind Basni Prasad, J. - I gree and desire to add a few words. Apart from other consideration mentioned by the learned Chief Justice it seems to me that Section 27 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act 1934 is conclusive on the print raised in this revision. It provides: The provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in regard to suits shall be followed, so far as they can be made applicable, to all proceedings under this chapter, and all orders passed under this chapter shall be executed in the manner prescribed for execution of Civil Court decrees. 2. It provides: The provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in regard to suits shall be followed, so far as they can be made applicable, to all proceedings under this chapter, and all orders passed under this chapter shall be executed in the manner prescribed for execution of Civil Court decrees. 2. It is important to note that all the provisions of the CPC in regard to suits have been made applicable to proceedings under Chapter III of the Agriculturists' Relief Act except in so far as the provisions of the Act are in consistent with those of the Code. Is there anything in the Agriculturists' Relief Act which renders the provisions in the CPC in respect of Arbitration inapplicable to proceedings u/s 12 of the Act? I find none. This will be evident from an examination of Chapter III of the Act. The sections in the chapter which make some special provisions as regards the procedure are Sections 10, 13 to 16 and 23. None of these sections makes the provisions as regards arbitration in applicable to proceedings u/s 12. When the Agriculturists' Relief Act was passed in 1934 the provisions relating to arbitration were contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. In 1940 the Arbitration Act was passed and then the provisions in the CPC in respect of arbitration were repealed and they were reenacted in the Arbitration Act some with and some without modifications. By virtue of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the provisions reenacted with or without modifications in the Arbitration Act are now applicable to the proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. 3. Mr. Kanhaiya Lal Misra, counsel for the opposite party, contends that paragraph 1 of Schedule II conferring right upon a party to refer a dispute to arbitration is a substantive law and not a law of procedure. He further contends that when the CPC was applied by Section 27 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act to proceedings u/s 12. It was only the law of procedure as contained in the Code which was intended to be applied and not any substantive law contained in it. He further contends that when the CPC was applied by Section 27 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act to proceedings u/s 12. It was only the law of procedure as contained in the Code which was intended to be applied and not any substantive law contained in it. In the first place, the provisions relating to reference of disputes in pending suits to arbitration is not a substantive law but a law prescribing the procedure for one of the manners in which a dispute between the parties may be settled. Assuming, however, that it is a substantive law, there is nothing in Section 27 of the Agriculturists' Relief act to limit the application of the Code only to procedural law. It applies the entire Code to proceedings u/s 12 except only in so far as the provisions of the Code may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. As already shown above, there is nothing in the Act inconsistent with the provisions of the Code so far as the provisions in respect of arbitration are concerned. 4. I am clearly of opinion that the reference of the dispute in this case to arbitration was in accordance with law and that the view of the lower appellate Court to the contrary is wrong. By the Court. 1. The revision is allowed, the order passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside and the order passed by the trial Court is restored with costs in all the Courts.