JUDGMENT Bhargava, J. - These appeals, which arise out of an insolvency proceeding, have been filed by Mr. H.C. Mukerjee. On 10th January 1939 the appellant had obtained a decree for arrears of rent against the insolvent P.D. Torpey, who was running a hotel on the premises belonging to the appellant. The decree was based on a compromise. The appellant contended that, in view of the conditions mentioned in the decree, a charge was created on the insolvent's property and that he should be declared a secured creditor of the insolvent. On behalf of the other creditors, it was pointed out that there was no term in the compromise indicating that a charge was, in fact, created on the property of the debtor and that no property was specified in the compromise although such specification was necessary for the creation of the charge. The insolvency Court upheld the appellant's contention and declared him as a secured creditor. On appeal, the learned District Judge of Allahabad held that the compromise decree fell short of actually creating a charge on the property of the insolvent. 2. In these appeals, again it has been urged that the decree created a charge on the property of the insolvent and the appellant should have been declared a secured creditor. A secured creditor, according to S. 2, Provincial Insolvency Act, is a person holding a mortgage, charge or lien on a property of debtor, or any part thereof, as a security for a debt due to him from the debtor. We have, therefore, to see whether the appellant held any charge on the insolvent's property. 3. The word 'charge' has been defined in S. 100, Transfer of Property Act as follows : Where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property. The determination of the question whether a charge is or is not created depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the words used in a particular document. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the terms of the compromise. In the first clause of the compromise the decretal amount is mentioned. The determination of the question whether a charge is or is not created depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the words used in a particular document. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the terms of the compromise. In the first clause of the compromise the decretal amount is mentioned. Under the second clause the debtor agreed to pay a certain sum every month as rent for the premises in his occupation by the prescribed date and in consideration thereof the creditor agreed to accept the payment of the decretal amount in half-yearly instalments. The third clause provided that, in the event of default in payment of rent or any of the instalments by the date fixed, the creditor would have the right to recover the entire decretal amount. Clause 4 is as follows : That the defendant judgment-debtor shall not remove or dispose of in any manner any of his stock-in-trade until the entire decretal amount is paid up, and in the event of any attempt of the defendant to remove or dispose of any of the stock-in-trade the plaintiff decree-holder will be entitled to take out immediate execution for the entire decretal amount due. According to the appellant's contention this clause created a charge on the stock-in-trade. Under this clause the debtor was, no doubt, prohibited from removing or disposing of in any manner the stock-in-trade until the payment of the entire decretal amount; but it contained a further provision that, in the event of any attempt to remove or dispose of the stock-in-trade, the creditor would be entitled to take out immediate execution for the entire decretal amount due. Consequently, there was a prohibition against alienation of the property followed by a clause providing penalty in case there was any alienation of the property. The clause, read as a whole, means that so long as the stock-in-trade remained in the premises, the debtor would be allowed to pay the decretal amount in instalments, and if he made any attempt to remove the same the concession would be withdrawn. The creditor (Mr. Mukerjee is a lawyer; and if it was intended that on the occurrence of such an event there would be a charge upon the stock-in-trade, a clear provision to that effect must have been made. 4. In order to gather the intention of the parties cls. The creditor (Mr. Mukerjee is a lawyer; and if it was intended that on the occurrence of such an event there would be a charge upon the stock-in-trade, a clear provision to that effect must have been made. 4. In order to gather the intention of the parties cls. 5, 6 and 7 of the compromise are also relevant. They are as follows : 5. That the defendant shall not quit the premises without previously informing the decree-holder and the Court, and without furnishing adequate security for the amount due to the plaintiff on the date of Quitting the premises. 6. That in the event of the defendant quitting the premises as provided above, the instalments mentioned in para 2 above shall be payable at the rate of Rs. 600 (Rupees rive hundred) quarterly instead of six-monthly, commencing from the date of quitting, provided that in case the date of payment of the next six monthly instalments falls earlier, that date shall be deemed to he the date for the payment of the 1st Quarterly instalment and each subsequent quarter shall commence from that date. 7. That in case of breach of any of the conditions mentioned in para. 5 above or in default of payment of any of the quarterly instalments mentioned in para 6 the decree-holder shall be entitled to take out immediate execution for the entire amount due. It appears from the wordings of cl. 5 that if the debtor wanted to quit the premises, in that event he would be required to furnish adequate security for the amount due. Under cl. 6, if the debtor left the premises after informing the creditor and after giving security, the amount of each instalment was to be reduced from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 500 and, instead of each instalment being payable half yearly it would become payable quarterly. It was provided in cl. 7 that, in case the debtor left the premises without notice and without furnishing security or in case he committed default in payment of any of the quarterly instalments, the creditor would be entitled to take out immediate execution for the entire amount due. It was provided in cl. 7 that, in case the debtor left the premises without notice and without furnishing security or in case he committed default in payment of any of the quarterly instalments, the creditor would be entitled to take out immediate execution for the entire amount due. If it had been the intention of the parties that the stock-in-trade should be treated as security for the payment of the decretal amount that intention must have been clearly expressed in the compromise; and the fact that the creditor was a lawyer and had actually used the word 'security' in cl. 5 goes to show that under cl. 4 the debtor was only prohibited from removing or otherwise disposing of the stock-in-trade, if he wanted to avail himself of the concession allowed under the decree. The occasion for furnishing security as contemplated by the compromise was to arise when the debtor intended to quit the premises and remove the stock-in-trade. It is significant that there was no prohibition against the debtor removing the stock-in-trade while be was quitting the premises, on furnishing adequate security. 5. On behalf of the appellant reliance has been placed upon certain decisions of this Court; but as we will presently show they are clearly distinguishable from the present case. The first case is reported in Ramsidh Pande v. Balgobind and others, 9 ALL. 158:(1887 A.W.N. 15). In that case the obligor of a bond acknowledged therein that he had borrowed Rs. 163 from the obligee at the rate of Rs. 1-8-0 per cent, per mensem interest and promised to pay the principal with interest at the agreed rate upon a date named. It was also provided in the bond that to secure the money the obligor pledged his wealth and property in favour of the creditor. There being a clear provision by which the wealth and the property was pledged for satisfaction of the debt, it was rightly held that a charge was created on the said property. 6. The next case is reported in Jawahir Mal and others v. Indomati and others, 36 ALL. 201 : (A.I.R. 1914 ALL. 187). There being a clear provision by which the wealth and the property was pledged for satisfaction of the debt, it was rightly held that a charge was created on the said property. 6. The next case is reported in Jawahir Mal and others v. Indomati and others, 36 ALL. 201 : (A.I.R. 1914 ALL. 187). In that case also, the Court was considering the terms of a deed, under which a certain sum of money had been borrowed and the debtor bad agreed not to transfer his property by way of sale, mortgage or gift, etc., so long as the loan was not repaid. In the deed before the Court the word 'hypothecate' or anything equivalent thereto was not used and it was thought that that was possibly an' accidental omission. Having regard to the terms of the deed, the Court held that the intention of the parties was to create a charge on the property mentioned therein. 7. In the third case reported in Allahabad Trading and Banking Corporation Limited Vs. Ghulam Muhammad and Others, AIR 1915 All 279 the owners of a printing and publishing business, who owed money to a bank had entered into an agreement with the bank under which all books then in stock and all books to be published thereafter were to be made over at once to the bank and commission at a certain rate was to be allowed to the bank on the sale of the books. It was also provided that the sale proceeds of the books were to be credited to the debtor's loan account every month after deducting the commission due to the bank. The intention of the parties was clearly expressed in the agreement and consequently the bank could be considered as a secured creditor. 8. The fourth case is of Nathan Lal and Others Vs. Durga Das, AIR 1931 All 62 There it was pointed out that in order to constitute a charge it was not necessary to employ any technical terms and a charge does not involve the transfer of the interest in the property subject thereto and arises from the circumstance that certain property movable or immovable, or any interest in such property, is indicated with certainty as the fund out of which a certain claim is to be met or satisfied, the fund BO indicated being the security for the claim. In the present case the stock-in-trade was not indicated with certainty as the fund out of which the decretal amount could be satisfied and the security for satisfaction of the same was to be furnished when the debtor quitted the premises. 9. The fifth case is reported in Munna Lall and Sons Vs. Official Receiver, AIR 1932 All 550 . In that case there was a simple mortgage of the goods in the shop of the debtor, which were to constitute security for the loan. In the decree on the mortgage, it was provided that the debtor would not be entitled to sell the goods mentioned in the mortgage and which had been attached by the Court. Hence, there was clearly a charge on the property. 10. The last case is reported in Narain Dass and another v. Murli Dhar and another, AIR 1999 Oudh 539 : (121 I.C. 81). There, in somewhat similar circumstances, in the compromise decree it was stipulated that the defendant will not dispose of in any way his share in the Premier Aerated Company at Hazaratganj until the satisfaction of the decretal amount and it was held that a charge was created on the share mentioned in the compromise decree. There it was rightly pointed out that the law does not prescribe any particular form of words which might be necessary to create a charge, that the determination of the question in all such cases rests upon the intention to make a particular property the security for payment of a debt and that the intention had to be gathered from the language of the instrument. We have discussed the terms of the document before us and we find that, apart from the clause prohibiting the debtor from transferring the stock-in-trade, a penalty was also provided in case any attempt was made to alienate the property. It was also mentioned in the compromise when the debtor would be required to furnish security. The grounds on which the learned Judges, who decided that case, distinguished the cases cited before them are indicative of the fact that general stipulations not to alienate property are to foe treated differently. They observed at page 450: The first two cases are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as they contain only general stipulations not to alienate property. The grounds on which the learned Judges, who decided that case, distinguished the cases cited before them are indicative of the fact that general stipulations not to alienate property are to foe treated differently. They observed at page 450: The first two cases are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as they contain only general stipulations not to alienate property. In the absence of any expressions making any specific) property liable, the general covenant not to transfer any property could not establish the charge with regard to any particular property. In the last case cited the construction placed upon the compromise was that it did not contain any expression of intention to create an interest in the plaintiff's favour. In the compromise before us, there was a general prohibition about alienation of the stock-in-trade, which was not expressly made liable for the payment of the decretal amount. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that, in view of the provisions contained in cl. 4 of the compromise, the creditor was empowered to seize the entire stock-in-trade; but that does not appear to be the intention of the parties. The creditor was only given power to execute his decree for the entire amount remaining due. Before he could proceed against the property he had to apply for attachment. In the meantime, the debtor could remove the property and in that case the creditor would not have been entitled to follow it in the hands of a third person. 12. In our opinion, therefore, the learned District Judge was right in holding that the compromise fell short of actually creating a charge on the stock-in-trade and that the appellant could not be declared a secured creditor. The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs.