JUDGMENT MEREDITH, J. These are two references by the Board of Revenue under Section 21(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act (Act VI of 1944). As the questions referred in both cases are substantially the same it is convenient to deal with both in the same judgment. I shall take them in turn. Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 127 of 1947. - In this case the following three questions have been referred to the Court :- "(1) Whether Rule 36(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1944, framed by the Provincial Government under Section 26 of the Act is consistent with the express provisions of Sections 6 and 10 of the Act." "(2) Whether the provisions of Rule 36(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1944, are mandatory". "(3) Whether the award of costs by the Board (and incidentally by other courts) in sales tax cases is lawful". The period of sale in regard to which the assessment with which we are concerned has been made is the last quarter of 1944, and this was the first quarter after the introduction of the Act. The Sales Tax Officer determined the gross turnover of the assessee at Rs. 94,346-5-6, and out of this he held that Rs. 58,185-13 was taxable turnover. The assessee contended that Rs. 81,928-5-3 out of the gross represented sales of non-taxable goods, and that the taxable turnover was only Rs. 8,914-14. The Sales Tax Officer refused to accept this as the cash memos, that were produced in support of the contention, contained entries of sale of both taxable and non-taxable good, and, with regard to the credit sales, no bills were produced. The evidence produced by the dealer, in his opinion, was not in accordance with Rule 36(1) of the Sales Tax Rules. The dealer appealed to the Assistant Commissioner who upheld the assessment. It was also upheld by the Commissioner in revision. In second revision the Board held that the petitioner was rightly refused exemption in respect of credit sales as the credit memos had not been produced before the Sales Tax Officer, but later, and no reliance could be placed upon them. It was also upheld by the Commissioner in revision. In second revision the Board held that the petitioner was rightly refused exemption in respect of credit sales as the credit memos had not been produced before the Sales Tax Officer, but later, and no reliance could be placed upon them. In regard to the cash sales, as it was the first quarter after the Act came into force, they took the view that as a concession strict compliance with Rule 36(1) need not be insisted upon where there was other reliable evidence to support the assessee's claim to exemption. They, therefore, remanded the case to the Sales Tax Officer for scrutiny of the such memos, and other papers available, for a fresh assessment upon the evidence. The assessee, dissatisfied, asked the Board for a reference to the High Court upon no less than 10 alleged questions of law, and the Board referred the three questions which I have already set out. Rule 36(1) is as follows :- "36. Claims for deduction from gross turnover under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 5. - (1) A dealer who wishes to claim deduction from his gross turnover under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act shall produce, in support of such claim, duplicate copies of the relevant cash receipts granted to the purchasers or bills, as the case may be, showing the articles sold and the sale price received or receivable by him. Cash receipts or bills of articles declared tax-free under Section 6 shall not contain entries of any article liable to tax and shall bear consecutive serial numbers." In order to consider whether it is consistent with the provisions of Sections 6 and 10, it is necessary to consider the scheme of the Act. In Section 2(i) "turnover" is defined as "the aggregate of the amounts of sale prices received and receivable by a dealer in respect of sale or supply of goods or carrying out of any contract effected or made during a given period". It is clear, therefore, that it means the total turnover both of taxable and non-taxable goods. In Section 2(i) "turnover" is defined as "the aggregate of the amounts of sale prices received and receivable by a dealer in respect of sale or supply of goods or carrying out of any contract effected or made during a given period". It is clear, therefore, that it means the total turnover both of taxable and non-taxable goods. Section 5 provides that the tax payable shall be levied on the taxable turnover; and "taxable turnover" is defined in Section 5(2) as that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after a number of specified deductions; and amongst those deductions we find the sale of any goods declared from time to time as tax-free under Section 6. Section 6 says that no tax shall be payable under this Act on the sale of any goods or class of goods specified in this behalf by the Provincial Government by notification in the official Gazette, subject to such conditions and exceptions, if any, as may be mentioned in the notification. In the Bihar Gazette of the 12th of July, 1944, Notification No. 7567-1, dated the 8th July, 1944, was published whereby the Governor of Bihar was pleased to direct that no tax shall be payable on the sale of a number of different varieties of goods specified in the notification. Certain conditions and exceptions were specified none of which concerns us. Section 10(1) provides that if the Commissioner is satisfied without requiring the presence of a registered dealer or the production by him of any evidence that the returns furnished in respect of any period are correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax due form the dealer on the basis of such returns. But, if he is not satisfied without requiring the dealer's presence or the production of evidence that the returns in respect of any period are correct and complete, he shall serve on the dealer a notice in the prescribed manner requiring him on a date and at a place to be specified therein either to attend in person or to produce or to cause to be produced there any evidence on which such dealer may rely in support of such returns. On the day specified in the notice or as soon afterwards as may be, the Commissioner after hearing such evidence as the dealer may produce and such other evidence as the Commissioner may require on specified points, shall assess the amount of tax due from the dealer. Sub-section (3) provides that if a registered dealer, having furnished returns in respect of a period, fails to comply with all the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2), the Commissioner shall assess, to the best of his judgment, the amount of the tax due from the dealer. This is evidently what happened in the present case. The argument advanced before us on behalf of the assessee is that Section 6 is mandatory, and says in effect that no tax shall be payable on the sale of goods specified as non-taxable, and, if the Act says you cannot tax the sale of such goods, Rule 36 cannot make them taxable for non-compliance with its provisions as to the manner in which cash receipts and bills are to be prepared. This argument is quite clearly correct so far as it goes. Rule 36 is evidently made under Section 26(1) and Section 26(2)(q), and in so far as it is a rule for carrying out the purposes of the Act, it is all right. If, however, it purports to make non-taxable goods taxable, it is ultra vires. I do not read it, however, as purporting to do anything of the sort. It is a mere rule of evidence specifying the nature of the evidence which the Commissioner will require under Section 10(2) in support of a plea that any portion of the gross turnover represents sales of non-taxable goods. Breach of the rule will no doubt make the dealer liable to any penalty prescribed by the Government under Section 26(3). It will not and cannot made non-taxable goods taxable; but I see no warrant for an inference that it attempts to do so. It is for the dealer to show that any portion of his gross turnover represents sales of non-taxable goods, and unless and until he does so, the assessing officer is entitled to treat the total turnover as sales of taxable goods. It is surely open to the Government to specify under Rule 36 the kind of evidence which should be produced in support of such a plea. It is surely open to the Government to specify under Rule 36 the kind of evidence which should be produced in support of such a plea. It would clearly be impracticable in the case of a large dealer for the Sales Tax Officer to examine individually vast numbers of cash memos, to pick out those items which might relate of taxable goods from those relating to non-taxable goods. The Sales Tax Officer in the present case did not hold that a portion of the turnover represented sales of non-taxable goods, and then refused the reduction because Rule 36 had not been complied with. He held, on the contrary that it had not been established before him that the proportion of the turnover claimed as tax-free actually represented sales of non-taxable goods. Regarded as a mere rule of evidence, and, I think, it must be so regarded, I find nothing inconsistent between Rule 36(1) and the provisions of Sections 6 and 10. Accordingly question (1) must be answered in the affirmative. As the question (2), Rule 36(1) is clearly mandatory since the word used is "shall", and there is no reason why it should not be mandatory once its scope is properly understood. The third question arises out of the fact that costs were allowed against the assessee in the appellate and revisional courts because the Board considered that it was his failure to produce reliable evidence in support of his claim for exemption before the Sales Tax Officer within the specified time that caused unnecessary trouble to the Sales Tax Department. In support of this the Board merely says that it habitually passes orders awarding costs in all classes of cases that come before it because natural justice requires it to do so, and hitherto its power to do so has not been questioned. The Board has assumed its competence, by virtue of the inherent powers of the Court, to award costs in Sales Tax Act cases, though there is no express provision in the Act in this behalf. The learned Advocate-General concedes that there is nothing in the Act authorising any of the sales tax authorities to award costs. The Board has assumed its competence, by virtue of the inherent powers of the Court, to award costs in Sales Tax Act cases, though there is no express provision in the Act in this behalf. The learned Advocate-General concedes that there is nothing in the Act authorising any of the sales tax authorities to award costs. The only provision in the Act with regard to costs is that contained in Section 21(6) which provides that where a reference is made to the High Court under this section the costs, including the disposal of the fee referred to in sub-section (1), shall be in the discretion of the Court. The learned Advocate-General, who was given a full opportunity to do so, has also failed to produce anything in any provision of law relating to the Board generally which gives it the power to award costs. He relies merely on an inherent jurisdiction and a long course of decisions in which the Board has from time to time allowed costs without challenge. It is, however, the first time I have heard that a Tribunal or Court can acquire a special power by a cursus curiae of its own decisions. Even if it be assumed that the Board is a Court, it is still a statutory Court of limited jurisdiction, with no powers beyond those conferred by the relevant statute or statutes. It has no inherent powers. Even had the Sales Tax Act contained no provision regarding costs at all, that would be the position. The fact that it does contain a single provision with regard to costs, and that relating only to the High Court, reinforces the view that apart from that provision there is no power to award costs. In regard to Income-tax cases, a Bench of this Court has held in Miscellaneous Judicial Case 175 of 1947, decided on the 10th of October, 1947, that, except within the limited scope of the express provision in the Income-tax Act, not even the High Court has any power to award costs in Income-tax cases. That decision is binding upon his Bench. I am clearly of opinion that the award of costs by the Board and officers subordinate to it was not lawful, and the third question must be answered in the negative. Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 61 of 1947. That decision is binding upon his Bench. I am clearly of opinion that the award of costs by the Board and officers subordinate to it was not lawful, and the third question must be answered in the negative. Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 61 of 1947. - This may now be very briefly dealt with in the light of the above discussion. The questions referred are :- "(1) Whether Rule 36(1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1944, framed by the Provincial Government under the rule making powers conferred on it by Section 26 of the Act, is ultra vires". "(2) Whether Rule 36(1) circumvents are operation of Sections 6 and 10 of the Act." It will be clear from what I have already said that Rule 36(1), if properly construed, is not ultra vires, and does not circumvent the operation of Sections 6 and 10 of the Act. Both questions must, therefore, be answered in the negative. In the first case the assessee has succeeded only with regard to the question of costs. In the second case the answer to both the questions is against the contentions of the assessee. I am of opinion, therefore, that the Department is entitled to its costs, but since both these cases relate to the very first quarter after the introduction of the Act, I would limit the hearing fee to the sum of Rs. 100 in deposit in each case. I agree.