JUDGMENT : BHIDE J. 1. The material facts of the case for the purpose of this appeal are briefly as follows: 2. The plaintiffs are proprietors of a Cinema house in Indore known as Prabhat Theatre'. This was leased by the plaintiffs to one Adsule for a period of 5 years from 1st October 1939. After sometime Adsule became insolvent and the property vested in the Receivers (who are defendants 1 and 2 in this case) on 22nd February 1940.The Receivers in their turn sub-let the property to Shankarrao Naik (defendant 3) who is the appellant in this case. This sub-lease was objected to by the plaintiffs. Subsequently an agreement was arrived at but no lease was executed as there was difference of opinion as regards its terms. The plaintiffs thereafter served a notice on the defendants, asking them to vacate the property by 30th December 1944 and on their failure to do so, instituted the present suit. The suit was resisted by the defendant on various pleas but the trial Court found most of the material issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the claim for ejectment as well as for arrears of rent and certain miscellaneous expenses, amounting to Rs.1926.11-0. From this decision an appeal was preferred by Shankarrao Naik defendant 3 which was heard by a learned Judge of this Court. The defendants had pleaded inter alia, that they were entitled to renewal of the original lease upto 3 years in accordance with the terms of that lease but the learned Judge found that even this period of 3 years had expired before the suit was decreed by the trial Court. He held that the Court could, in such circumstances, take notice of the events which had occurred even after institution of the suit and as the maximum period of the renewed lease which the defendants claimed bad expired, the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for ejectment which had been granted. He, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal with costs. An appeal against this decision was preferred and has now been heard by a Division Bench. 3. He, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal with costs. An appeal against this decision was preferred and has now been heard by a Division Bench. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge was not justified in dismissing the appeal on a ground which was outside the original pleas of the parties without asking the plaintiff to amend the plaint and allowing the appellant to take up such defences as might be open to him. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council reported in Murlidhar Chatterjee v. International Film Co. Ltd., AIR (30) 1943 P.C. 34: (206 I.C.1). He further pointed out that if he had been given such an opportunity, be could have pleaded that no notice under S.80, Civil Procedure Code, had been given to the Receivers in respect of the new cause of action which arose on the expiry of the period of the renewed lease on which the plaintiffs wanted to rely and therefore, the new cause of action could not be, availed of by them in the present suit. Secondly he urged that on 7th May 1948 an amendment was made in the Indore Rent Control Order by virtue of which its application was extended to houses used for purposes other than residence and that in the circumstances it was open to the appellant to claim that he was not liable to ejectment under the said Rent Control Orders as amended. 4. In reply the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the present appellant being a sub-lessee, had no right of appeal at all as there was no privity of contract as between him and the plaintiffs. It was urged that it was the lessee (the Receiver) and not ha who were adversely affected by the decree and, therefore he had no right of appeal. It was further argued that the appellant was not even a necessary party to a suit for ejectment and is decree for ejectment passed against his lessor„ would have been binding on him even if he had not been impleaded. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Jethanand v. Joint Hindu Family of Udho Das, AIR (18) 1931. Lah.614: (131 I.C. 121) and Yusuf v. Jyotish Chandra, AIR (19) 1932 Cal. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Jethanand v. Joint Hindu Family of Udho Das, AIR (18) 1931. Lah.614: (131 I.C. 121) and Yusuf v. Jyotish Chandra, AIR (19) 1932 Cal. 241: (137 I.C. 139). The ruling in Jethanand v. Joint Hindu Family of Udho Das, AIR (18) 1931 Lah. 614: (131 I.C. 121), is distinguishable as the suit therein was only for arrears of rent. In the present case the plaintiff had sued for ejectment, The appellant was in actual possession of the Cinema-house. It is true that according to Yusuf v. Jyotis Chandra, AIR (19) 1932 Cal. 241: (137 I.C. 139), a decree passed against the lessor would have been binding on the sub-lessee even if he had not been impleaded but at the same time even if the appellant was not a necessary party to the suit, it cannot be said that he was not a proper party as he was in actual possession and the plaintiff's were interested in evicting him. The plaintiffs having chosen to implead the appellant and having got a decree of ejectment against him, it cannot be maintained that the appellant is not adversely affected by the decree. Therefore I am of opinion that the appellant has a right of appeal but the more important question whether the appellant can succeed when the decree of ejectment as against his lessors (the receivers) has become final. The appellant as the sub-lessee derived his rights from the lessors. The Receiver filed no appeal against the decree of the Courts below and the decree has, therefore, clearly become final. The Receivers' lease has, in the circumstances, determined and the sub-lessee cannot, therefore any longer claim any rights, based upon that lease (see Ramkissendas v. Binjraj, 50 Cal. 419: (AIR (10) 1923 Cal. 691).In the circumstances the appellant must be held to be bound by the decree against the Receivers which has become final on the principle of the second part of S.115, Transfer of Property Act. As a result it also follows that the appellant cannot now take up any defences which might have been open to the Receivers if they had appealed. According to Yusuf v. Jyotish Chandra, AIR (19) 1932 Cal. As a result it also follows that the appellant cannot now take up any defences which might have been open to the Receivers if they had appealed. According to Yusuf v. Jyotish Chandra, AIR (19) 1932 Cal. 241: (137 I.C. 139) a decree passed against the Receivers would have been binding on the appellant even if he had not been a party and could have been executed against him under O.21, R.35, Civil Procedure Code. His position can be no better in the present case, as the decree of ejectment against the Receivers has become final. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that he has, at any rate, acquired an independent right to retain possession of the premises in view of the amendment of the Rent Control Order, referred to above, and hence he cannot now be dispossessed except in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Order. But this contention also seems to me to be unsustainable. In the first place cl.18, Rent Control Order, refers to "tenant" and no authority has been cited to show that the sub-tenant is also entitled to claim the benefit of its provisions when the tenant himself had not done so. Secondly the present suit was pending when the amendment in question was made and there is nothing in the amending enactment to show that it was intended to be retrospective and was to apply to pending suits. In a recent case before the Bombay High Court (C.A.No. 147 of 1948), decided on 07-10-1948 which was relied on behalf of the respondents in which a similar question arose, it was stated by their Lordships that it was well established that amendments made in Statute are to be ordinarily taken as a prospective and can be held to have retrospective effect only to the extent, if any, which is provided in the amended Statute and no more. In the present instance, there is nothing in the amending Statute to show that it was intended to be retrospective to any extent and in the circumstances it cannot affect any of the plaintiff's rights which had accrued to him prior to the amendment. 6. For reasons given above, the appeal fails and I would dismiss it with costs. Mehta, J. - I agree.