Judgment Manohar Lall, J. 1. This is an appeal by the defendant 4th party who is aggrieved by the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur, dated the 16th February 1944, by which he has decreed the suit of the plaintiffs respondents. The only question for decision is whether the appellant is entitled to claim a lien to the extent of Rs. 2000 on the principle of salvage. 2. The facts are these: On 24th May 1929 the ancestor of defendant first party executed a mortgage bond for Rs. 4,363 in favour of the plaintiffs, who had instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal on the 24th April 1942 for enforcement of this mortgage bond -- four properties were given in mortgage out of which we are informed that the 1st, 3rd and 4th properties have already been sold in execution of either a rent decree or a decree obtained by previous mortgagees, so that the plaintiffs seek to recover their dues only from sale of property No. 2. The only contesting defendant out of the second party defendant was defendant No. 4, who contested the suit on the allegation that the mortgage bond in suit was not genuine or for consideration and that it was a farzi document. The learned Subordinate Judge has answered these two issues in favour of the plaintiffs, and these findings were not seriously challenged before us. The evidence in support of the mortgage bond being genuine and for consideration, is overwhelming and also in support of the finding that the bond was not a farzi document. The learned Subordinate Judges findings on these two issues must, therefore, be affirmed. 3. The serious contention advanced, however, was that defendant No. 4 is entitled to salvage lieu to the extent of Rs. 2,000 in these circumstances. It was pleaded that property No. 2 had already been sold in execution of a rent decree obtained by the Banaili Raj on the 4th March 1929. But before this could be confirmed the judgment-debtors, namely, the mortgagors made an application to have the sale set aside; these proceedings, however, were compromised between the judgment-debtors and the Banaili Raj on the decree-holder auction purchasers agreeing to accept Rs. 2000.00 to be paid by the judgment-debtors within certain time, and then the sale would be set aside. But before this could be confirmed the judgment-debtors, namely, the mortgagors made an application to have the sale set aside; these proceedings, however, were compromised between the judgment-debtors and the Banaili Raj on the decree-holder auction purchasers agreeing to accept Rs. 2000.00 to be paid by the judgment-debtors within certain time, and then the sale would be set aside. The appellants case is that in order to set aside the sale he advanced Rs. 2000.00 to the mortgagors on their executing a deed of conditional sale in favour of the defendant 2nd party on the 14th February 1930. It is, therefore, claimed that to the extent of Rs. 2000 together with interest thereon the appellant should be granted a lien, as the amount Rs. 2000.00 had been advanced by him to save property No. 2 to the mortgagors and also to the plaintiff mortgagee of 1929. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge has overruled this contention because in his view the payment of Rs. 2000 did not go to save the property, as it was not in danger of being destroyed, and also because this amount was not advanced for saving the interest of the plaintiffs. Hence, the appeal to this Court. 5. It is argued strenuously by Dr. D. N. Mitter that the case attracts the operation of the principle upon which salvage lien is enforced, and he relies upon Sourendra Mohan V/s. Jogendra Narain, A I R (26) 1939 Pat 467 and Suchand Ghosal V/s. Balaram Mardana, 38 Cal 1. 6. In my opinion, the principle of salvage lien cannot apply in this case, because the appellant had no interest in the properties before he made this advance of Rs. 2000.00 indeed his interest in the property accrued because he paid the consideration for the conditional sale deed, of which Rs. 2000 was a part. The matter would have been different if the appellant was in possession or had any interest in the property which he was thus seeking to save. It may also be looked upon as a payment not by the appellant but by the mortgagor himself, who had received this Rs. 2000 as a part of the sale price by which he conveyed to the appellant his equity of redemption in property No. 2 and his rights in other properties not covered by the mortgage bond of the plaintiffs. 7. 2000 as a part of the sale price by which he conveyed to the appellant his equity of redemption in property No. 2 and his rights in other properties not covered by the mortgage bond of the plaintiffs. 7. The only Privy Council case which I have been able to discover in which the principle of salvage lien was applied is the case of Dakshina Mohun Roy V/s. Saroda Mohan, 20 Ind App 160. Their Lordships observed at page 163 that it seemed to them "to be common justice that when a proprietor in good faith pending litigation makes the necessary payments for the preservation of the estate in dispute, and the estate is afterwards adjudged to his opponent, he should be recouped what he has so paid by the person who ultimately benefits by the payment, if he has failed through no fault of his own to reimburse himself out of the rents. ......The claim is in the nature of salvage; and it is to be observed that the law relating to sales for arrears of Government revenue recognises an equity to repayment in the case of a person who not being properitor pays the Government revenue in good faith to protect a claim which afterwards turns out to be unfounded." In the present case the appellant did not make the payment to save the property, while he had any interest therein or when he bona fide believed that he had some interest in the property. AS I have stated above, his interest in the property arose only after he obtained a sale deed from the mortgagors, and Rs. 2000 was a part of the consideration for that sale deed. I am also unable to discover any equity in favour of the appellant. He has purchased with eyes open the property which is subject to the mortgage of the plaintiffs and he has also purchased a number of other properties of his vendor which are not subject to the mortgage of the plaintiffs. 8. The Calcutta case relied upon by Dr. Mitter was a case decided under Section 70 of the Contract Act. He has purchased with eyes open the property which is subject to the mortgage of the plaintiffs and he has also purchased a number of other properties of his vendor which are not subject to the mortgage of the plaintiffs. 8. The Calcutta case relied upon by Dr. Mitter was a case decided under Section 70 of the Contract Act. In that case the deposit was made by co-tenant who was not a party to the decree which had been obtained by the landlord for arrears of rent, in execution of which the entire tenure was sold; a tenant who was not a party to the rent suit deposited the amount and the sale was set aside. It was found that he made the deposit with the approval of the Court and lawfully with the object of protecting his own interest in the holding. On these facts no doubt, equity arose in his favour, that is to say, he made the payment in order to protect his interest and also this resulted to the benefit of the other defendants who were thus liable to be sued to contribute ratably to the persons who made the payment. This case is of no assistance to the appellant. 9. In the Patna case the question arose in an administration proceeding, and it was held that a Court while administering an estate through a receiver has power to order that the priority of the mortgages already created on the estate may be altered in favour of a debt incurred by the receiver under its orders, if such a person has advanced the money for the protection of the estate itself so that the advances have resulted in the benefit of the prior mortgagees, as well, and an instance was given, where the money advanced was to pay the government revenue or the rent due to the superior landlord which, if not paid, will entail forfeiture of the: property free from encumbrances of the prior mortgagees. This principle has no application to the present case, because the present case does not arise out of any administration proceedings, and in the case before the learned Judges the property was in the hands of the receiver and the estate was being administered. The Court had, no doubt, power to pay the debts in any order which appeared reasonable, just and equitable to that Court. The Court had, no doubt, power to pay the debts in any order which appeared reasonable, just and equitable to that Court. This case also has no application in the present case. 10. Rai Paras Nath has drawn our attention to the old Calcutta case of Hurri Mohun V/s. Girish Chunder. 1 Cal L R 152, where it was held that a person who advanced money to another for the purpose of saving a mehal of the latter from sale: for arrears of rent has no lien on the property for the amount so advanced. The facts in that case are almost identical with the facts of the present, case. In that case there was a prior mortgage and the property was about to be sold for arrears of rent when the plaintiffs advanced to the son of the mortgagor a sum of Rs. 3000 with interest, and the amount was actually applied for the payment of rent which was then due in respect of the property given in mortgage, so that the sale of the property was prevented -- it was clear that this was the intention of the parties who entered into the loan transaction. In these circumstances, the learned Judges refused to extend the principle, which was sought to be found in Baboo Dutt Jha V/s. Pearee Kaunt, 18 W R 404 and Syud Enayet Hossein V/s. Muddun Moone Shahoon, 22 W R 411, to a case where a person, having no interest in the matter, comes forward to discharge a burden upon the property. The learned Judges pointed out that the case would nave been different where the plaintiff had some interest in the property which he saved, e.g. a co-sharer who advanced the money in order to pay the Government revenue due upon the property. I respectfully, agree with the decision of this early Calcutta case, and that is in accordance with the view which I have expressed above. I respectfully, agree with the decision of this early Calcutta case, and that is in accordance with the view which I have expressed above. I may also refer to Nugender Chunder Ghose V/s. Kaminee Dossee, 11 Moo Ind App 241, where their Lordships at page 258 observed as follows: "Considering that the payment of the revenue by the mortgagee will prevent the talook from being sold, their Lordships would, if that were the sole question for their consideration, find it difficult to come to any other conclusion than that the person who had such an interest in the talook as entitled him to pay the revenue due to the Government, and did actually pay it, was thereby entitled to a charge on the talook, as against all persons interested therein, for the amount of the money so paid." The result is that I would dismiss the appeal with, costs. Ray, J. 11 I am of the same opinion. I expressed myself, in course of the argument, that the appellant who advanced the money in lieu of a subsequent mortgage in his favour in order to discharge the liability which the mortgagor had undertaken to the auction-purchaser for securing a release of the property was no better than the mortgagor himself with reference to his claim for recognition of a lien as against the prior mortgagee in respect of the sum advanced by him. I am further strengthened in my view on reading the judgment of my learned brother. As the question is of some importance and the applicability of the doctrine of salvage lien is, a question of doubtful simplicity and as it owes, its origin to English maritime law and has been extended to cases in relation to other properties, I have taken some time to consider the same. I am thoroughly convinced that the appellant has no case, I will refer to two decisions of the English Courts in support of my view. In the case of Falcke V/s. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., (1887) 34 Ch D 234 E mortgaged a policy of life assurance to F., and later filed a petition in bankruptcy for liquidation. He ultimately obtained his discharge. The policy mortgaged was not affected by the proceeding in bankruptcy. In the case of Falcke V/s. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., (1887) 34 Ch D 234 E mortgaged a policy of life assurance to F., and later filed a petition in bankruptcy for liquidation. He ultimately obtained his discharge. The policy mortgaged was not affected by the proceeding in bankruptcy. After discharge E entered unto an agreement with D who professed to be P.s (mortgagees) agent for the purchase of F.s interest in the policy, but no such purchase was ever carried out and there was no evidence in the case that D had any authority to enter into any agreement on behalf of P. E persuaded by D paid the premiums in order to keep the policy on foot. On Fs death Mrs. F. brought an action to enforce her security and the policy was sold for much less than the amount of the mortgage debt. E claimed a lien on the sale proceeds and wanted to be repaid therefrom, the residue only being due to Mrs. F. Bacon V/s. C. held E entitled to be repaid out of the proceeds of sale the premiums which he had paid, and that the residue only must be paid to Mrs. F. On appeal, it was held that the whole proceeds of sale must be paid to Mrs. F. without deducting the premium, and that the maritime doctrine of salvage lien had no application to the payment. Cotton, L. J. has made some observations in course of the judgment which, in my view, will make the position clear as to applicability of the doctrine of salvage lien. He says at page 241: "Now let us see what the general law is. It is not disputed that if a stranger pays a premium on a policy that payment gives him no lien on the policy. A roan by making a payment in respect of property belonging to another, if he does so without request, is not entitled to any lien or charge on that property for such payment..... .If here there had been circumstances to lead to the conclusion that there was a request by Falcke that this premium should be paid by Emanuel, then there would be a claim against Falcke or his representative for the money, and I do not say that there might not be a lien on the policy...... An express request is not suggested. An express request is not suggested. Was there an implied request? I think that in a case of this sort, when money is paid in order to keep alive property which belongs to another, a request to make that payment might be implied from slight circumstances, but in my opinion there is no circumstance here in evidence from which such a request can be implied." Coming to the facts of the present case, the lien is sought to operate as against the prior mortgagees interest and under the circumstances there having been absolutely no privity as between him and the appellant, no circumstances could be quoted in this case from which an implied request proceeding from him (prior mortgagee) could be deduced. The Lord Justice has also said: "It would be strange indeed if a mortgagor expending money on the mortgaged property could establish a charge in respect of that expenditure in priority to the mortgage... .It must be considered, in my opinion, that he paid it not so as to get any claim in priority to the incumbrancer, but in order to retain the benefit of the interest which would come to him if the property proved sufficient to pay off the previous incumbrancers." There is no reason why the interest that the subsequent mortgagee (the appellant) was intending to save was not identically the same "as the benefit of the interest" referred to in the aforesaid passage. Referring to Lord Justice Frys view in Saundera V/s. Duman, (1878) 7 Ch D 825 at p. 829 while interpreting the decision as based upon a different consideration, the Lord Justice said: "if the Master of the Rolls meant to express an opinion that a person having no interest in a policy can by payment of the premiums acquire a lien on the policy, I am bound to say that I differ from that view." Bowan, L. J. who was of the same opinion as Cotton, L. J. has made some very weighty observations with regard to extension of the doctrine of salvage lien to other cases. Those observations are worth quoting; "The general principle is, beyond all question, that work and labour done or money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the property of another do not according to English law create any lien upon the property saved or benefited, nor, even if standing alone, create any obligation to repay the expenditure. Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs any more than you can confer a benefit upon a man against his will. There is an exception to this proposition in the maritime law. I mention it because the word salvage has been used from time to time throughout the argument, and some analogy is sought to be established between salvage, general average, and contribution, the maritime law differs from the common law. That has been so from the time of the Roman law downwards. The maritime law, for the purposes of public policy and for the advantage of trade, imposes in these cases a liability upon the thing saved, a liability which is a special consequence arising out of the character of mercantile enterprises, the nature of sea perils, and the fact that the thing saved was saved under great stress and exceptional circumstances. No similar doctrine applies to things lost upon land, nor to anything except ships or goods in peril at sea." This Lord Justice in another part of his opinion says: "The cases in equity were examined by Lord Justice Fry in In re Leslie, (1883) 23 Ch D 552 and the general rule is the same in equity as at law.... Does the mere fact that the owner of the equity of redemption paid premium to keep live the policy give him a right against the mortgagees to have the moneys which he so expended paid in priority to their debt? He had paid in his own interest: he did not pay in the interest of the mortgagees." Lord Justice Fry was also a party to this judgment. I could not resist the temptation of quoting a passage from the concluding portion of his Lordships judgment at page 254: "With regard to salvage in the case of ships and maritime perils we know its meaning. I could not resist the temptation of quoting a passage from the concluding portion of his Lordships judgment at page 254: "With regard to salvage in the case of ships and maritime perils we know its meaning. It appears that the expression salvage money as we are informed by one of the learned counsel for the appellant, and I dare say he is quite right, first occurs in the report of the case of In re Tharp, (1852) 2 Sin & G. 578, which was before Lord St. Leonards in 1852, where he seems to have used the expression as one familiar to the Irish Courts in certain cases. I certainly wish that the expression had remained on the other side of the channel where it seems to have arisen. I doubt whether any doctrine which is expressed by the word salvage applies to cases of this description." 12. In the case of In re Leslie V/s. French, (1883) 23 Ch D 552 which has mostly been accepted as a leading authority on the subject, there is a comprehensive summary of the cases to which the doctrine of lien can apply. It is at page 560 of the report: "In my opinion a lien may be created upon the moneys secured by a policy by payment of premiums in the following cases: First, By contract with a beneficial owner of the policy. Secondly. By reason of the right of trustees to an indemnity out of their trust property for money expended by them in its preservation. Thirdly. By subrogation to this right of trustees of some person who may at their request have advanced money for the preservation of the property. Fourthly. By reason of the right vested in mortgagees or other persons having a charge upon the policy, to add to their charge any moneys which have been paid by them to preserve the property." Besides the above summary, I should like to quote another passage occurring at page 563 of the report as the reasons given therein apply mutatis mutandis to the facts of the present case: "In the next place, with regard to payments made by a part owner, it appears to me that, except by contract such payments give no title to the person making them against the other part owner or part owners of a policy. That payments madeby a mortgagor, who is in equity a part owner with the mortgagee, create no lien as against the mortgagee, was determined by Lord Romilly, M. R., in the case of Norris V/s. Saledonian Insurance Co., (1869) 8 Eq. 127. And, generally speaking, it is clear that money laid out by a tenant for life in improvements on the estate creates no lien against the remainderman. Again, in Pennell V/s. Millar, (1857) 23 Beav 172, Lord Romilly, M. R., had to deal with a case in which A, the owner of policies, had, as part of a transaction voidable for fraud, assigned them to B and had covenanted to keep them up. B claiming under this assignment, had paid premiums. A instituted a suit to set aside the transaction on the ground of fraud, and the Master of the Rolls determined that the assignment was a valid security for the moneys actually advanced and not for the premiums paid by B, his payment being a voluntary payment. In this case it is evident that, until the transaction was avoided, A and B were both possessed of interests in the policies, and yet the payment by one of the persons so interested was held to create no lien as against the other." In the case just cited, right to lien was also claimed as justifiably based upon right to contribution. This was also abnegated with the following observation: "In the next place, it is plain that the right to contribution is a personal right and the remedy is a personal remedy, and that there is no lien for the amount of the moneys in respect of which the right to contribution arises." 13. It is clear from the facts of this case that the appellant was a stranger to this property when he made the advances except if he be considered to be the subsequent mortgagee by virtue of this payment. Even if it be assumed that he is a man having interest to save the property from auction sale, his very acceptance of a subsequent mortgage is destructive of any lien which he should have otherwise been entitled to. The law in this connection has been well summarised in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. Even if it be assumed that he is a man having interest to save the property from auction sale, his very acceptance of a subsequent mortgage is destructive of any lien which he should have otherwise been entitled to. The law in this connection has been well summarised in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 20, page 584: "If security be taken for payment at a future date of a debt for which the creditor has a lien upon property of the debtor, the lien is in some cases destroyed. The mere taking of a security does not necessarily destroy the lien; there must be something in the facts of the case or in the nature of the security taken which is inconsistent with, and destructive of the lien." Applying the principle to the "facts of the present case, the appellant by accepting the position of a subsequent mortgagee, under the provisions of the T. P. Act, postponed his lien assuming that he had acquired one to the prior charge in favour of the prior mortgagee. The circumstances in which a subsequent mortgagee can acquire a position in priority to the prior mortgagee have been defined in the Act. To allow the subsequent mortgagee to enforce a lien, in the circumstances of this case, against the prior mortgagee would be acting in the face of the statute. This is not a payment to save his interest as subsequent mortgagee but to acquire an interest as a subsequent mortgagee. He, if at all, acquired a Hen against the equity of redemption in the hands of the mortgagor which by contract between the parties was converted into a security. To this transaction the prior mortgagee cannot be charged either with acquiescence or standing by. 14 With these observations, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.