JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is a petition for revision of orders of the Courts below convicting the petitioner of offences under Ss. 453 and 341, Penal Code. He was sentenced to detention until the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 200; in default of payment of the fine he was to undergo a period of two months' rigorous imprisonment. This sentence was passed under S. 453, Penal Code and no separate sentence was passed under the other section. 2. The case for the prosecution was that the petitioner had broken into a shop belonging to the complainant and then wrongfully removed from the shop the complainant's goods. After such removal, it is said, that the petitioner had the door of the shop padlocked, thus preventing access to it by the complainant. 3. It is clear that the petitioner was a durwan who had shortly before been employed for the first time by the owner of these premises in which the shop was situate. The complainant was a tenant of the landlord. It is found that either in September or November 1945, the tenant left and there was no sign of him. He paid no rent and as months passed the landlord might well have assumed that the tenant had either died, disappeared or abandoned his tenancy. 4. The landlord, by the petitioner, applied to a Magistrate for permission to break open the shop, which was the subject-matter of the tenancy. Of course the learned Magistrate could not authorize such an act, but he passed an order directing the police to accompany the landlord and to see that there was no breach of the peace. The evidence is that the present petitioner in the presence of the landlord and a police officer forced the door of these premises and found certain articles therein. These articles were removed and stored and a new padlock placed on the door. Sometime afterwards the tenant appeared and instituted these proceedings. 5. In the first place the guilty person, if there was really any guilt, would be the landlord. It is clearly established that what the petitioner, who was the durwan, did was to carry out the orders of his master. On the other hand, it is no defence to a criminal charge to plead that the person accused was acting under the orders of his master. It is clearly established that what the petitioner, who was the durwan, did was to carry out the orders of his master. On the other hand, it is no defence to a criminal charge to plead that the person accused was acting under the orders of his master. However, the position of the person accused is important when the offences involve a certain intent. 6. Section 453 is the section providing punishment for the offences of lurking house-trespass or house-breaking. What was alleged in this case was that the petitioner had been guilty of house-breaking. House-breaking is defined in S. 445 of the Code and the offence involves an offence of house-trespass, which is denned in S. 442 of the Code. Again, house-trespass involves criminal trespass which is defined in S. 441. In order to commit a criminal trespass the person entering upon another's property must do so with a certain intention, or if he has lawfully entered he must remain on the property with a certain intention. There can be no criminal trespass unless the person entering or remaining on the premises intends to commit an offence or to intimidate or insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. 7. Can the petitioner he said to have had such an intent? On the plain facts of the case the petitioner might well have assumed that the tenancy was at an end owing to abandonment. That seems to have been the landlord's view. If the petitioner was of that opinion, as he well might have been, then he would merely enter these premises so that the landlord could resume possession. That seems to be the natural inference to be drawn from the facts, and in such a case he could not possibly have had the intent necessary to constitute criminal trespass as defined in S. 441 of the Code. There is nothing in this case to suggest that in opening these premises which was done quite openly in the presence of the police, the petitioner had an intention either to intimidate, insult or annoy the tenant. Obviously he could not have had an intention to commit an offence, as he was opening up the premises in the presence of the police. His intention clearly was to open up the premises so that the landlord could resume possession. Obviously he could not have had an intention to commit an offence, as he was opening up the premises in the presence of the police. His intention clearly was to open up the premises so that the landlord could resume possession. If it was thought that the tenant had abandoned the premises quite obviously there never was an intention to annoy, intimidate or insult him. 8. In my judgment, it was not established in this case that the petitioner had any of the intents necessary to constitute house-breaking and therefore he was wrongly convicted. 9. As to the conviction under S. 341 learned advocate for the complainant has to concede that charge would fail if the charge under S. 453 failed. Section 341, Penal Code, provides punishment for wrongful restraint. A wrongful restraint is defined in S. 339 of the Code in these terms: Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. 10. It is quite clear that there can only be a wrongful restraint where a person voluntarily obstructs another. I do not think it can be said that there was wrongful restraint when it was thought that the tenant of these premises had abandoned them altogether. There was no intention to restrain him and if there was any restraint it was purely accidental. 11. This case is one which should never have been brought in a criminal Court. If any wrong had been done to the tenant his proper course was to sue for ejectment and damages for trespass in the civil Court. 12. In the result therefore this petition is allowed, the convictions and sentence are set aside and the petitioner is acquitted. The fine, if paid, must be refunded. The rule is accordingly made absolute. Blank, J. 13. I agree.