JUDGMENT Mootham, J. - The Appellant, Shubrat Shah, has been found guilty of an offence punishable u/s 354 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 6 of the United Provinces Communal Disturbances Prevention Ordinance, 1947, and he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the term of five years and to a fine of Rs. 500 or in default, rigorous imprisonment for the further term of one year. He now appeals to this Court under the provisions of Section 19 of that Ordinance. 2. The appeal has been laid before a Full Bench as it appeared to involve the question whether certain sections of the Ordinance were within the legislative powers of the Governor, but in view of the conclusion which we have reached on the facts the larger question as to the validity of the Ordinance, in whole or in part, does not arise. 3. The learned Magistrate has found that at about 8 30 p.m. on the evening of the 15th August, 1947, the Appellant placed his arm round the neck of one Mst. Phulwati and placed his hand upon her breast with intent to outrage her modesty. It appears that on that evening there were illuminations in the village of Kosi Kalan, in the district of Mathura, where Mst. Phulwati resided and that she with the members of her family had gone out in the streets to celebrate the occasion of Independence Day. In the press of the crowd she became separated from the other members of her family and turned towards the Sarai which, although an illuminated area, was less frequented by people. On her way she thought that she had been pushed by somebody, but assumed that this was done accidentally; and when she got, near the Sarai she was assaulted by the Appellant in the manner we have indicated. She immediately raised an alarm, and although the Appellant ran away he was almost immediately seized by Kedar Nath, who in the course of his evidence said that he had been coming along the street behind Mst. Phulwati and the Appellant, and had seen him first push the girl and then subsequently lay his hands upon her. Two other persons were attracted to the scene by Mst. Phulwati's shouts. Phulwati and the Appellant, and had seen him first push the girl and then subsequently lay his hands upon her. Two other persons were attracted to the scene by Mst. Phulwati's shouts. Ram Swarup and Ramji Lal, who both saw the Appellant being seized by Kedar Nath and who say that as soon as he was brought before Mst. Phulwati she identified him as the man who had put his hand on her breast. Kedar Nath ascertained the name of Mst. Phulwati's father and sent for him, and then he with the two witnesses Ram Swarup and Ramji Lal went at once to the police station and made a report. This is in substance the case for the prosecution which has been accepted by the learned Magistrate. 4. The Appellant's defence was that he had come from the neighbouring mosque for the purpose of buying oil for the illuminations, and that he had been implicated because he was a Mohammadan and was in the neighbourhood when Mst. Phulwati was assaulted. He called witnesses who deposed to the fact that he had left the mosque for the purpose of purchasing oil, but such evidence does not of course negative the prosecution case. 5. The prosecution evidence has been subjected to detailed criticism by counsel for the Appellant, who has contended that Kedar Nath, the principal witness for the prosecution, was on bid terms with the Appellant and that he seized the opportunity to implicate him in his offence for which he was in no way responsible. We have however no reason to think that Mst. Phulwati Was not speaking the truth when she identified the Appellant as the man who had assaulted her, and that she did so identify him is established by the evidence of Ramji Lal and Ram Swarup; nor do we think that there are sufficient ground for disbelieving Kedar Nath when he says that he saw the assault. The learned Magistrate had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and he was satisfied that their account of what occurred was correct; and we see no reason to disagree with his conclusion. We are of opinion therefore that the Appellant's conviction for an offence punishable u/s 354 of the Indian Penal Code was right; but we still have to consider whether the circumstances ware such as. We are of opinion therefore that the Appellant's conviction for an offence punishable u/s 354 of the Indian Penal Code was right; but we still have to consider whether the circumstances ware such as. to make that offence subject to the enhanced punishment for which provision is made in Section 6 of the Ordinance. 6. Section 6 of the Ordinance provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code, whover "in the course of or arising out of or due to any communal disturbance or communal activity," commits one of the offences mentioned in the schedule to the ordinance shall, if over fifteen years of age, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not, in the case of an offence u/s 354, be less than five years; and it has been contended on behalf of the Appellant that no such circumstances were in this case proved to exist as would attract the provisions of this section. We think this contention is well founded. The learned Magistrate has not found that the offence of which the Appellant was convicted was committed by him either "in the course of or arising out of or due to any communal disturbance or communal activity," but he has held the provisions of Section 6 to be applicable because the village of Kosi lies within an area which has been declared by the Provincial Government under Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Ordinance to be a "communally disturbed area", and because, also he had some reason to apprehend a riot as a result of what the Appellant has done. 7. Now the Provincial Government had power to declare an area to be a "communally disturbed area" when in that area a communal disturbance had either broken out or was threatend, and "communal disturbance" is defined in Section 2(4) of the Ordinance as meaning "any disturbance or breach of peace due to or arising out of differences between any two or more communities or class of person on account of caste, religion, creed or colour". It is therefore apparent that an area may properly be declared to be a "communally disturbed area" if a disturbance or breach of the peace due to communal causes is threatened but has not broken out, and consequently it does not follow that because an area had been declared to be a communally disturbed area that any offence which is subsequently committed in that area is necessarily committed "in the course of or arising out of or due to" any communal disturbance-for there may at the time be none. It is further clear that the apprehension of a future disturbance is not sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 6 of the Ordinance. It was faintly suggested in argument that the act of the Appellant, itself constituted "communal activity", and as such was sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 6. We think that there is no substance in this suggestion, for in our opinion that act of an isolated individual cannot in any circumstances be the activity of a "community or class of persons" within the definition of "communal activity" in Section 2(3) of the Ordinance. 8. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the provisions of Section 6 have no application in the present case, and that in consequent the punishment for the offence which the Appellant has committed is that provided in the Indian Penal Code, namely rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or fine or both. 9. The Appellant has been in prison since the date of the Magistrate's order, namely the 29th November, 1947 and prior to that he was in custody from the 15th August, of that year. In the Circumstances we set aside the sentence of fine and reduce the period of imprisonment to that which the Appellant has already undergone. The Appellant will therefore be released forthwith unless required in connection with some other offence.