JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This appeal which challenges the validity of an execution sale involves one much debated question and another which is almost a conundrum. The material facts are the following. On the 21st of July, 1942, the Respondent Provat Kumar Bose obtained a rent decree against the Appellant Nirmala Bala Devi for a sum of rupees four hundred and seven, annas twelve and pies three (Rs. 407-12-3) from the Court of the 3rd Munsif at Diamond Harbour. The decree was put into execution on the 5th October following by Rent Execution Case No. 1257 of 1942 of the same Court and the 8th of January, 1943, was fixed as the date of sale. According to the record of the Execution case, the sale proclamation was issued on the 8th October, 1942, and served on the 28th. The concise statement, sent to the Appellant by registered post, was returned by the Post Office with the endorsement "Refused," bearing the date the 5th January, 1943. On the 8th January, 1943, that is to say, the very date fixed for the sale, the Appellant made an application before the Diamond Harbour Special Debt Settlement Board for settlement of this single debt and had a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act issued immediately. The notice was taken out by an agent of the Appellant herself, but when he reached the executing Court, the sale had already taken place. The holding had been sold for Rs. 424-10-3 Pies and purchased by the Respondent who was the only bidder. On receipt of the notice from the Debt Settlement Board, the executing Court stayed further proceedings with the result that the sale remained unconfirmed. The application under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was, after some time, transferred to the Board at Netra and thence again to the Sarisha Debt Settlement Board and by that Board it was dismissed on the 11th June, 1944, for default. The dismissal was communicated by the Sarisha Board to the Executing Court by a notice dated the 2nd July, 1944, and thereupon the sale was confirmed on the 28th of July. On the 27th August, 1944, the Appellant made an application for review before the Debt Settlement Board which was allowed on the 8th October and the original application was restored. No fresh notice under sec. On the 27th August, 1944, the Appellant made an application for review before the Debt Settlement Board which was allowed on the 8th October and the original application was restored. No fresh notice under sec. 34 of the Act was, however, issued to the executing Court and the Respondent took delivery of possession on the 23rd October, 1944. 2. On the 8th December, 1944, the Appellant made an application under sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and secs. 47 and 151 of the CPC for setting aside the sale and the confirmation order. The grounds taken by her were that the sale ought to be set aside, because all the processes had been suppressed and the property had been sold for a grossly inadequate price; and that the order confirming the sale ought to be held to be void, because by the restoration of the application under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, on review, the notice issued under sec. 34 of the Act had been revived with retrospective effect. In order to make out that the application which was apparently out of time was not really barred by limitation, it was alleged that the Appellant had come to know of the sale only on the 11th November, 1944. 3. The application was opposed by the Respondent who pleaded that all the processes had been duly served and that the sale, including the order for its confirmation, was perfectly valid. He also took the plea of limitation. 4. The trial Court held that all the processes had been duly served and that the Appellant was at least aware of the dale of the sale, if she did not know of the sale itself. Even if she was unaware of the letter--which the Court considered unlikely in view of the visit of her agent to the Executing Court on the date of the sale--she was not entitled to the benefit of sec. 18 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as there had been no fraud on the part of the Respondent. Neither could the Appellant invoke sec. 18 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as there had been no fraud on the part of the Respondent. Neither could the Appellant invoke sec. 52 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, inasmuch as an application for setting aside a sale was not an application "regarding a debt" within the meaning of the section, nor was she "debarred" from making the application during the pendency of her case before the Debt Settlement Board, as the section required, since a proceeding for setting aside a sale was not a proceeding in execution. On the above findings, the trial Court dismissed the application as barred by limitation. 5. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the finding of the trial Court as regards limitation on the same grounds. On the merits, he held that the sale proclamation had been duly served and the service of the concise statement, such as it was, was good service. No question of any injury caused by the sale, therefore, arose. But the learned Judge pointed out that no evidence had been adduced as to the value of the land at the time of the sale and he held that assuming that the apparently low price at which the Respondent had purchased the property was really inadequate, still the inadequacy had not been caused by any fraud or irregularity. The learned judge recorded a further finding that there were no circumstances which might be said to have affected the jurisdiction of the Court so as to make the sale a nullity. It had not been proved that the application before the Debt Settlement Board had been filed before the sale was held, though both took place on the same day, and consequently the position was that neither at the time of the sale, nor at the date of the confirmation order was any application pending before the Debt Settlement Board. In the result, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal. 6. The present appeal was preferred against the above decision and simultaneously an application under sec. 115 of the CPC was filed. 7. At the hearing of the appeal, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the Respondent that no second appeal lay from an order refusing to set aside a sale under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 115 of the CPC was filed. 7. At the hearing of the appeal, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the Respondent that no second appeal lay from an order refusing to set aside a sale under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In view of the alternative application for revision, the objection is of little practical importance, but it may nevertheless be considered on the merits. There can be no question that in so far as the subject-matter of the Appellant's application was covered by sec. 174 (5), no second appeal is competent and her challenge to the sale on the allegations of irregularity and fraud can only be considered in the application for revision. But in so far as the application impugned the confirmation order as being without jurisdiction, it was not covered by sec. 174 (3) and was an application under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It raised a question relating to the execution of the decree; an order passed thereon would not be appealable under the Code as an order; and the order would conclusively determine the rights of the parties as to whether execution was or was not barred at the relevant date [see Nafar Chandra Sardar v. Kalipada Das 44 C.W.N. (sic) (1940) and Abinash Chandra Nag v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bose 44 C.W.N. 587 (1940)]. This part of the application was thus outside sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but within sec. 47 of the Code and as the order passed thereon would operate as a decree, a second appeal clearly lies. 8. But the Appellant cannot proceed further either with the application for revision or with her appeal, if her application before the Executing Court was barred by limitation, as held by the Courts below. On that question I feel bound to hold that the decision must be in the Appellant's favour. So far as her application was one under sec. 47 of the Code, it was plainly within time, since the period of limitation is three years. So far as it was an application under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it was prima facie out of time, having been made more than six months after the sale; and since, on the findings, the Appellant cannot invoke sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, limitation can be saved only if sec. So far as it was an application under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it was prima facie out of time, having been made more than six months after the sale; and since, on the findings, the Appellant cannot invoke sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, limitation can be saved only if sec. 52 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is available to her. The Courts below excluded that section by relying on the decision in Radha Benodini Debi v. Gagan Chandra Bhattacharjee 49 C.W.N 906 (1945). That decision, however, is not concerned with sec. 52 at all and all that was held therein is that a proceeding under Or. 21, r. 90, C.P.C., is not an execution proceeding within the meaning of the Explanation to sec. 34 of the Act. Sec. 52, to quote only the relevant portion, provides that in computing the period of limitation for any application "regarding a debt" which has been the subject of any proceedings under the Act, the time during which such, proceedings continued and the time curing which the applicant was debarred from making the application, shall be excluded. It was held in the case of Subodh Chandra Maity v. Bidhu Bhusan Das 47 C.W.N. 543 (1943) that the section contemplated two distinct periods, one during which proceedings under the Act were pending and one during which recourse to the other tribunal was barred and that the party concerned was entitled to exclude both or to exclude a particular period if it satisfied either test. Again, it was held in the case of Dulichand Bothra v. Rajani Kanta Chakravarty 44 C.W.N. 922 (1940) though in a different context, that an application under Or. 21, r. 90, C.P.C., was a proceeding "in relation to a debt," because upon the result of the sale-set-aside proceeding, the extinction or revival of the decretal debt is primarily dependent. 9. Both are decisions of Division Benches by which, sitting singly, I am bound and the reasoning applied to a proceeding under Or. 21, r. 90 of the CPC would apply equally to a proceeding under sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is true that the second of the decisions uses the phrase "in relation to a debt" which would seem to be slightly wider than the phrase "regarding a debt," occurring in sec. 52. 21, r. 90 of the CPC would apply equally to a proceeding under sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is true that the second of the decisions uses the phrase "in relation to a debt" which would seem to be slightly wider than the phrase "regarding a debt," occurring in sec. 52. But what the learned Judges were deciding was that a proceeding under Or. 21, r. 90 was liable to be stayed on receipt of a notice under sec. 34 and, therefore, they were in fact deciding that such a proceeding was a proceeding "in respect of" a debt as contemplated by the latter provision. There is little difference between "regarding" and "in respect of" and both sec. 34 and sec. 52 clearly contemplate other proceedings concerning a debt which is or was the subject of proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The Appellant's application, so far as it was under sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, must, therefore, be regarded as an application "regarding." the decretal debt and there can be no question that at least from the 8th January, 1943, when she made her application before the Debt Settlement Board, up to the 11th June, 1944, when it was dismissed for default, a proceeding under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, concerning the same debt, was pending. She was thus plainly entitled to exclude at least this period under the first part of sec. 52 and its exclusion is sufficient to bring her application before the Court within six months from the date of the sale. I am accordingly of opinion that no part of the Appellant's application was barred by limitation. 10. Coming now to the merits, it will be convenient to deal first with the application for revision. Under it come questions covered by sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Since the Appellant's application was not barred by limitation, she did not require to establish fraud but had yet to prove such material irregularity as had caused her substantial injury. The only irregularity urged before me was that the concise statement had not been served. Under it come questions covered by sec. 174 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Since the Appellant's application was not barred by limitation, she did not require to establish fraud but had yet to prove such material irregularity as had caused her substantial injury. The only irregularity urged before me was that the concise statement had not been served. Reliance was placed on the decision in Gobinda Chandra Shaha v. Dwarka Nath Patita 19 C.W.N. 489 (1914) and it was contended that since the registered letter had come back, the presumption that it had been delivered in due course to the addressee was rebutted and since the postman had not been examined to prove the endorsement of refusal, there was no evidence that the letter had ever been tendered to the Appellant. The argument is a plausible one, but having regard to the pre-ponderance of authority, I am unable to accept it as correct. The case relied on does not itself go as far as the Appellant contended, for, although there are undoubtedly observations to the effect that the endorsement was not admissible in evidence of the refusal in the absence of examination of the postman or proof that the circumstances contemplated by sec. 32 (2) of the Evidence Act existed, still the ultimate decision is that the endorsement could not prove the date on which the Utter had been tendered and refused. It was essential in that case for the Plaintiffs to prove that the notice to quit had been served on the 29th April, 1911, but that date appeared only in the post mark of the office of destination and formed no part of the endorsement. The case thus contains no final decision that the endorsement, such as it was, could not be taken into consideration, unless the postman was examined. On the other hand, there is the old decision in Lootf Ali v. Pearee Mohun 16 WR 223 (1871) given, it is true, before the Evidence Act, where it was observed that since there was evidence that the letter had been forwarded to the addressee by post duly registered, it was to be presumed that it had been tendered to him and the addressee could not take advantage of his refusal to take it. There is again the decision in Jogendro Chunder v. Dwarka Nath ILR 15 Cal. There is again the decision in Jogendro Chunder v. Dwarka Nath ILR 15 Cal. 681 (1888) where it appears to have been held, merely on proof of posting and production of the registered letter itself, bearing an endorsement of refusal, that there had been sufficient service. This case, it must be mentioned, was sought to be distinguished by Mookerjee and Walmsley, JJ., in Gobinda v. Dwarka 19 C.W.N. 489 (1914) on the ground that there had been before the Court some further evidence of service, the nature of which could not now be ascertained and that there might also have been evidence that the peon was dead or not available. This view of the decision, however, is hardly feasible, since the judgment itself refers to no other evidence and the only basis for the supposition that such evidence existed, appears to be the report of the argument of Mr. Woodroffe who is said to have "pointed out that there was evidence of service of notice." But it is perfectly clear from the report that when Mr. Woodroffe, after referring to Papillon v. Brunton 5 H & N 518 (1860) and Lootf Ali Meah v. Pearee Mohun Roy 16 WR 223 (1871) and sec. 16. III (f) of the Evidence Act, "pointed out that there was evidence of service of notice," he only referred to the despatch of the registered letter and its return with the endorsement of refusal which, according to the authorities cited by him was good and sufficient evidence of service. The decision in Jogendro Chunder v. Dwarka Nath ILR 15 Cal. 681 (1888) cannot, therefore, be distinguished in the manner attempted in Gobinda v. Dwarka 19 C.W.N. 489 (1914). Lastly, there is the decision in Hari Pada Dutta v. Joy Gopal Mukherjee 39 C.W.N. 934 (1931) by Rankin, C.J. and Pearson, J., where it was held that if a registered letter was refused, that in itself, until explained, was prima facie good enough evidence that the addressee had had an opportunity to accept it. In none of these cases does the postman seem to have been examined. 11. The position, as I see it, is this. The matter is governed by sec. 28 of the Bengal General Clauses Act [sec. 168 (5) (c) being an enactment of the Bengal Legislature], sec. 16, Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act and sec. 114 of the same Act, Illustration (f). 11. The position, as I see it, is this. The matter is governed by sec. 28 of the Bengal General Clauses Act [sec. 168 (5) (c) being an enactment of the Bengal Legislature], sec. 16, Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act and sec. 114 of the same Act, Illustration (f). As I tried to explain it elsewhere in another capacity, when the posting of a registered letter is proved, the statutory presumption under sec. 28 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, carries the proof up to due service. Although there may be no evidence of tender and refusal, that gap may be filled, when the endorsement is there, by invoking Illustration (f) to sec. 114 of the Evidence Act, that is to say, by presuming that the common course of business was followed and the postman did tender the letter to the addressee and did write the endorsement of on refusal by the addressee to accept delivery. If the refusal does not come within the ambit of "common course of business," surely the tender does and that itself is sufficient to constitute service. Or it may even be said that the writing of the endorsement comes within "the common course of business" of the postman and, therefore, involves the presumption that it was properly written alter a refusal by the addressee. The fact that the letter came back does not in itself rebut the presumption that it was tendered and, therefore, served. In the case of Harihar v. Ramsashi L.R. 45 IndAp 222 : S.C. 38 C.W.N. 77 (19181) the receipt was signed by a person who was not proved to have had authority from the addressee to receive it, but the Privy Council held that that fact did not rebut the presumption that the letter had reached the addressee. The letter was not delivered to the addressee but was delivered to another person and the gap in the evidence that it did reach the addressee was filled up by the presumption. It was not held that the presumption of due service was rebutted by the proved fact that the letter had been served on another person. 12. The other possible view is that the refusal not being legally proved and the fact of actual non-delivery being evidenced by the return of the letter, the statutory presumption was rebutted and there was thus no evidence of service. 12. The other possible view is that the refusal not being legally proved and the fact of actual non-delivery being evidenced by the return of the letter, the statutory presumption was rebutted and there was thus no evidence of service. The weight of authority is against this view and I must hold that in the facts of the present case, the concise statement must be taken to have been served. 13. I may point out further that even according to the decision in Gobinda v. Dwarka 19 C.W.N. 489 (1914) the presumption of due service is rebutted when the addressee pledges his oath that the letter had never been tendered to him. In the present case, the Appellant did not examine herself. The only evidence adduced on her behalf was that of an officer who stated that the concise statement had not been served. This witness could not have been present by the side of the Appellant every day and all the time and his statement could only have been made on information obtained from the Appellant and was thus hearsay. There was accordingly no legal evidence to rebut the presumption and even the requirement mentioned in the case relied on was not fulfilled. It was for the Appellant to prove the alleged irregularity in publishing the sale and not for the Respondent to prove affirmatively due performance of all the conditions of a good sale. Since the Appellant gave no proper evidence, her allegation remains unproved. 14. Lastly, even assuming that the concise statement was not served, the Appellant could not succeed unless she proved that the irregularity had caused her substantial injury. It could have caused her injury only if it had the effect of keeping her unaware of the coming sale and thus prevented her from averting the sale by paying off the decretal dues. But it is perfectly clear that whether the concise statement was served or not, she was fully aware of the fact that the sale was going to be held on the 8th January, 1943. The notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act gives the fullest particulars of the execution case, including its number, the Court in which it was pending and the date fixed for the sale. These details were obviously supplied by the Appellant herself and, indeed, even in her application under sec. The notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act gives the fullest particulars of the execution case, including its number, the Court in which it was pending and the date fixed for the sale. These details were obviously supplied by the Appellant herself and, indeed, even in her application under sec. 174 (5) she states that she made her application before the Debt Settlement Board on coming to know of the impending execution sale. In the circumstances, it is idle for her to contend that non-service of the concise statement caused her any injury, substantial or otherwise. 15. The Appellant, therefore, cannot succeed on the ground of any material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. 16. As regards the other part of the application which comes under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, the contention before me was that the sale and the order of confirmation were both bad, as contravening secs. 35 and 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. It was urged that in view of the application before the Board, the decree could not be executed at all so long as the application remained pending and the sale held was a nullity under sec. 35. It was next urged that, in any event, on the restoration of the application after its dismissal for default, all ancillary orders made by the Board were also revived and the notice issued under sec. 34 of the Act came to be resuscitated as if it had never expired. The notice must, therefore, be deemed to have been in force when the confirmation order was, made and, accordingly, that order was bad. 17. It may be stated here that the application under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act has again been dismissed. It was dismissed by the Board on the 24th June, 1945, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal on the 17th July following. But the learned Advocate for the Appellant stated that the dismissal had been on the ground that the sale having been confirmed, the debt had ceased to exist and that if he succeeded in getting at least the confirmation order set aside, he might be able to have the application before the Board revived a second time. The question raised under the Debtors Act has not, therefore, lost its importance. 18. In the application for setting aside the sale, no question under sec. The question raised under the Debtors Act has not, therefore, lost its importance. 18. In the application for setting aside the sale, no question under sec. 35 of the Act was raised. In fact, the sale itself was challenged only on the ground of material irregularity and fraud and the attack under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was directed only against the confirmation order on the basis of the notice under sec. 34. Before me, it was sought to be argued that apart from anything else, the sale was a nullity under sec. 35, since the decree could not be executed after the application to the Board. That argument is sufficiently disposed of by the finding of the lower Appellate Court that though the sale was held and the application made on the same day, there was nothing to show that the application had been made before the sale. The sale was not affected even by sec. 34, since the notice under that section reached the Executing Court only after the sale had been held. The sale cannot, therefore, be challenged under either section. As regards the confirmation order, the position under sec. 34 and sec. 35 is, on the argument of the Appellant, practically the same. If the restoration of her application by the Board had the effect of reviving the proceeding to the extent of making it pending throughout since its institution, the order would be bad as contravening sec. 35, whether there was any notice under sec. 34 or not [Jnanendra Nath Basu v. Sm. Profulla Bala Debi 49 C.W.N. 578 (1945)]. It would also be bad as contravening the notice under sec. 34, since the dismissal of the application being wiped off, the notice would be deemed to have remained operative. There is, however, some distinction between a revival of the proceeding itself and the revival of the notice, to which reference will be made later. But, basically, the argument under sec. 34 and that under sec. 35 both depend upon a revival of the proceeding with retrospective effect. 19. In substance, the argument of the learned Advocate for the Appellant was that when an order of dismissal is set aside on review, the position is as if there had never been any dismissal and in the eye of law, the proceeding must be regarded as having always been pending. 19. In substance, the argument of the learned Advocate for the Appellant was that when an order of dismissal is set aside on review, the position is as if there had never been any dismissal and in the eye of law, the proceeding must be regarded as having always been pending. On a restoration of the case, all ancillary orders would automatically be revived. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court in Daggupati Nayudumma v. Sait Sivaraja Dharmachand Kottuvaru AIR (1943) Mad. 515 : S.C. (1943) 1 M.L.J. 408 . 20. The learned Advocate for the Respondent contended that since the sale was valid, no other question arose, because with the sale the debt disappeared. He referred to some old decisions of this Court, regardless of the fact that in order to counteract those decisions, the Act had since been amended and an explanation, added to sec. 34, now provided that the debt would subsist till the sale became absolute. The learned Advocate further referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Achyut Vishnu Patankar v. Tapibai ILR 48 Bom. 210 (1923) which is noticed in the Madras decision. 21. I may complete the apparently relevant citations by referring on my own account to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Tavvala Veeraswami v. Pulim Ramanna ILR 58 Mad. 721 (1934). 22. In my judgment, none of the above decisions has any real bearing on the present case. Fortunately, this case is not complicated by the difference in the position at the different stages of a review application which has been referred to in the cases, cited above. The Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act uses the comprehensive word "review" for all cases of revision by a Board of its own order. The present case is not at all a review case, properly so called, but a simple case of restoration of a proceeding after dismissal for default and the question for consideration is whether acts done by the Civil Court at a time when the proceeding stood dismissed, remain valid after the restoration. That question is not touched by any of the three cases. 23. That question is not touched by any of the three cases. 23. In the Madras case cited by the Appellant, a suit in which an order for attachment before judgment had been passed, was first dismissed and then decreed on a review. Certain third parties purchased the attached property from the judgment-debtor after the suit had been decreed and the question being whether they were affected by the attachment order, it was held that they were, inasmuch as the moment the review application was allowed, the suit was revived, together with the attachment order. That proposition may at once be conceded, but it does not touch the present case. If the purchase had taken place between the dismissal of the suit and the granting of the application for review, and it had yet been held that the purchase was hit by the attachment order, the facts would be parallel to those of the present case and the decision would be applicable. As it was, the purchase was made not merely after the granting of the application for review, but even after the suit had been finally decreed and by then, it may be conceded, the attachment order had come back into force. It is true that the point of time at which the revival was held to have taken place was an earlier point it which the review was granted, but even that does not reach the interval during which the suit stood dismissed, which is the period relevant in the present case. 24. I cannot find any relevancy of any kind in the Bombay decision cited by the Respondent. There, a suit, which had been decreed by the trial Court, was at first dismissed by the District Judge on appeal, but on an application for a review by the Plaintiff, he passed an order, saying that he would hear the appeal over again. Thereafter the Plaintiff died and when about eight months later his heirs applied for substitution, the Judge held that the appeal had abated. On further appeal, the High Court held that the order of the District Judge was wrong, because the effect of the granting of a review was not to reverse the appellate decree and restore that of the trial Court but merely to hold the appellate decree in suspense pending final decision as to whether it should stand or not. On further appeal, the High Court held that the order of the District Judge was wrong, because the effect of the granting of a review was not to reverse the appellate decree and restore that of the trial Court but merely to hold the appellate decree in suspense pending final decision as to whether it should stand or not. The appeal still stood disposed of by the appellate decree already passed, so that there could be no question of any abatement. With great respect, I venture to doubt if this decision was correct, for it seems to me that as soon as the District judge decided that he would hear the appeal over again, he set aside his decree and restored the appeal and any decree thereafter passed would be a new decree, even if the same decree was repeated. But be that as it may, I cannot see for what purpose the learned Advocate for the Respondent cited this decision. If he did so for the reason that the High Court had said that the granting of the review did not restore the trial Court's decree, he overlooked the fact that, in the High Court's view, the review order did not either reverse the Appellate decree in the sense of confirming the decree of the trial Court or even restore the appeal as such. The decision would have been useful to the Respondent if it had held that the review order had the effect of setting aside the appellate decree and restoring the appeal and yet the trial Court's decree was not revived, to abide again the final decision. 25. In the Full Bench case, what was decided was that if an order for attachment before judgment was vacated on a certain person giving security, in terms that if the suit was dismissed, the bond would "get cancelled," and thereafter the suit, being once dismissed for default, was restored to file and ultimately decreed, the Plaintiff would be entitled to proceed against the surety on the basis of the bond. The decision appears to have been based mainly on the ground that the bond had reference to the ultimate issue of the suit, but in the course of the judgment it was observed, approving of an earlier decision of the Court, that if a suit, on being dismissed for default, was restored, it remained as it was on the day when it was dismissed and all proceedings taken up to that date must be deemed to be in force when the dismissal was set aside and all interlocutory orders would be revived. Even this decision is of no help. It may be that when and after the dismissal is set aside, all interlocutory orders made before the dismissal shall be deemed to be in force and to have revived, but the decision does not say that the revival would take effect from any earlier date. 26. In my opinion, assuming that on the restoration of a proceeding, dismissed for default, all orders made before the dismissal, are revived, there is a distinction between revival as at the date of the restoration and revival with retrospective effect. It does not seem to be possible that the revival can have the effect of making interlocutory orders existent during the interval when the proceeding itself was in fact non-existent. It may be that after the proceeding is restored, it is not necessary to pass the interlocutory orders, made before the dismissal, over again, but they will revive automatically and be thenceforward in force. But I am unable to hold that any order of restoration can alter a fact and that orders, which expired with the dismissal of the proceeding, can be brought into operation for and during the period that the dismissal lasted, by restoring the proceeding at a future date. A statutory provision can bring about such a result, but not a mere restoration order. If, for example, an order is passed in a suit, restraining a person from acting in a certain way during its pendency, and on the suit being dismissed for default, he acts in that particular way, and thereafter the suit is restored, it can never be said that the injunction was always in force and that he had violated it. If, for example, an order is passed in a suit, restraining a person from acting in a certain way during its pendency, and on the suit being dismissed for default, he acts in that particular way, and thereafter the suit is restored, it can never be said that the injunction was always in force and that he had violated it. Nor am I able to hold that if it is only the actual existence of a proceeding which is a bar to a party or a Court acting in a certain way, actings during a period when the proceeding was non-existent by reason of its dismissal for default, can be invalidated by a restoration of the proceeding on a subsequent date, on the basis of a fiction that the proceeding must be deemed to have always been existent. Sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to refer only to the relevant part, stays a proceeding in a Civil Court only "until the Board has dismissed the application" before it; and sec. 35 forbids execution of a decree only until the application has been dismissed by the Board." After the application has been dismissed and till it is restored, the Civil Court is free under either section to proceed with the suit or proceeding before it, for there is no bar then in existence. If it so proceeds, I am unable to hold that anything it may do will be invalidated by a subsequent restoration of the application. 27. The above reason would apply to both sec. 34 and sec. 35, but there is a further reason why sec. 34 could not affect any proceeding taken by the Civil Court during the interval. So far as that section is concerned, the pendency of an application before a Board is, by itself, of no consequence and the proceedings before a Civil Court are not affected till a notice is served. It is thus not the application before the Board, but information of it communicated by a notice which can affect proceedings before a Civil Court. Acts done by the Civil Court before it is informed of the application before the Board by a notice are perfectly valid, although there may be an application pending before the Board. It is thus not the application before the Board, but information of it communicated by a notice which can affect proceedings before a Civil Court. Acts done by the Civil Court before it is informed of the application before the Board by a notice are perfectly valid, although there may be an application pending before the Board. If, therefore, the Civil Court is once informed that the application has been dismissed, as it was in the present case, it is impossible to see how proceedings resumed by it could be affected on a restoration of the application, unless a notice was again served or at least the Court was informed that the application had been restored. For it is not the application itself, but the Court's knowledge of its pendency, which constitutes the bar. In the present case, no notice or information of the restoration could have been given before the order of confirmation, because the restoration took place after the order. The fiction of revival cannot possibly suffice, for the essential requisite being the Court's knowledge, such knowledge could not be created by a fiction, particularly when the thing of which knowledge was necessary was non-existent at the time. 28. I am accordingly of opinion that neither sec. 34, nor sec. 35 affects the validity of the order confirming the sale which was made on the 27th July, 1944, after the application before the Board had been dismissed on the 11th June and before it was restored on the 8th October. 29. For the reasons given above, the appeal and the application for revision are both dismissed. The Respondent will have the costs of the appeal, but there will be no order for costs in the application for revision. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.