Thadani J. - This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the Special Sub-Judge, Assam Valley Districts, dated 17th August 1944, by which he reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court which has decreed the plaintiff's suit with costs. [2] The suit under appeal will be referred to in this appeal as the present suit aa distinguished from a prior suit between the same parties in­stituted in 1987, which will be referred to as the-suit of 1937. [3] The present suit was instituted by one Jagodeb Adhikar against five defendants for a de­claration of title to and possession of certain movable property which was said to be in the custody of the defendants. The plaintiff's case was that he was the Satradhikar of the religious institution called Namati Katonipar Satra, the defendants who were the sons of the late Deka Adhikar, himself a junior Adhikar of the said institution, were the Dekas, that is to say mem­bers of the institution in 1930, on the death of his father he became the Adhikar of the institu­tion in accordance with the custom prevailing in the Satra and has since continued to occupy that position; all the properties of the Satra vested in him and he became the owner of them; offerings made to the institution ; the initiations of the sons of the disciples, contributions in money or in kind were all made to or through him alone ; one of the duties of the defendants was to run the institution in the absence of the plaintiff on tour; the defendants could not inter, free with the properties of the institution with-out his permission; for three years prior to the institution of the suit in 1941, however, the defendants at the instigation of the enemies of the Satra were interfering with the Satra and had caused disunion in the institution. [4] The defendants' case in the present suit was that all the properties mentioned in the schedule Ka and Kha of the plaint were not the property of the Satra; in 1932 a Satra librarywas established pending the framing of rules for the management of the Satra property, namely books and other articles of moveable property which were, for the time being, allowed to remain in the custody of the plaintiff, the library, how­ever, failed to materialise because of a quarrel between the parties; none of the books men­tioned in the schedule Ka were the property of the Satra, the books belonged to both parties; a book called Ratna Gurubali was taken out by defendant 1; but as the library did not mate­rialise, he did not return it to the institution; in any case they were entitled to use the books according to the rules of the library. [5] Upon the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues in the present suit: 1. Whether the properties mentioned in schedule Ka of the plaint were Satra properties and taken by the defendants from the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint ? 2. Whether the properties mentioned in schedule Kha of the plaint form Satra properties ? 3. Whether the properties mentioned in schedule Ka and Kba of the plaint were taken by the defendants as alleged by the plaintiff or were with them from before as trustee and liable to be returned to the plaintiff ? 4. Whether the present suit is barred under 0. 2, K. 2, Civil P. C. or barred by res judicata ? 5. To what other relief is the plaintiff entitled ? 6. Whether the suit is time barred under Art. 48 or 49, Limitation Act ? [6] We will now briefly refer to the suit of 1937 in which the parties were identical. The suit of 1937 was instituted by the same plaintiff for a declaration and injunction in respect of the management of the same religious institution. As regards the right to initiate the sons of disciples and to collect contributions made to the Satra, the plaintiff in the suit of 1937 alleged that he as the Adhikar had alone the right to initiate the sons of disciples and to collect contribution made by them to the Satra to the exclusion of the defendants. As regards the right to initiate the sons of disciples and to collect contributions made to the Satra, the plaintiff in the suit of 1937 alleged that he as the Adhikar had alone the right to initiate the sons of disciples and to collect contribution made by them to the Satra to the exclusion of the defendants. [7] The defendants' case in the suit of 1987 was that the Adhikar had no such right as claimed by the plaintiff and that the property of the Satra belonged to the Goswamis and Bhakats of the Satra; they were entitled to use the property of the Satra for religious purposes without the permission of the Adhikar; as regards the initia­tion of the sons of the disciples and collecting contributions from them, they could exercise these rights during their allotted tours (pro-bashes); at the installation ceremony called Nirbandha the assembly formulated a set of rules in which these rights of the defendants were admitted and recognised; an agreement to this effect des­cribed as Nirbandha was drawn up; the plaintiff agreed to be bound by these rules. [8] The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit of 1937. Against the decision of the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal and the appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the plaintiff's suit. Against the decision of the lower appellate Court the defendants preferred an appeal to the High Court at Calcutta. [9] For the purposes of the decision, it is neces­sary to refer only to one point in the judgment of the Calcutta High Court while dealing with the respective rights of the parties in the suit of 1937. The first appellate Court in the suit of 1937 had held: "It is clear from the weight of evidence in this case that Adhikar is the supreme head in a Satra and that all the properties in a Satra vest in him as such as a trustee and that the functions performed at the Namghar and Monikut are performed with the express or im­plied permission of the Adhikar." The Calcutta High Court in second appeal accepted these findings of the first appellate Court and affirmed the decree as passed by the first appellate Court. [10] In the present suit, the plaintiff's claim is for the recovery of certain moveable property mentioned in the schedules Ka and Kha and which he alleges had vested in him as the trustee of the institution. From the facts in the suit of 1937 to which we have referred, it is clear that the defendants did not then dispute the position that the plaintiff was the custodian of the pro­perties of the Satra. All that they alleged in the suit of 1937 was that the plaintiff alone was not entitled to their use; they claimed that they too were entitled to use the properties of the Satra in common with the plaintiff. No adverse possession was set up by the defendants in the suit of 1937. It is true, the question of adverse possession did not then arise as the plaintiff's suit was one for a declaration and injunction in respect of his rights as a trustee. The question of the possession of the books and their return arose only in the present suit. In the present suit the defendants alleged that they had taken out certain books from the Satra in 1932 but as the library did not materialise they did not return the books and it is their case that from that moment the books became their property. [11] The present suit was decreed by the trial Court on the basis of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court which had held that all the pro­perties of the Satra had vested in the plaintiff. That the property in the present suit was trust property, at any rate, until 1932 is by implica­tion admitted by the defendants. The lower appellate Court accepted the finding of the trial Court in the present suit that all the properties of the Satra were trust property and as such had vested in the plaintiff as the Adhikar. Bat it has taken the view that as the defendants in 1932 claimed the property adversely to the plaintiff and no suit was brought for its recovery within three years, the suit was barred by Art. 48 or 49, Limitation Act. We think the learned Judge has misapplied the Articles to the facts of this case. Article 48, Limitation Act has clearly no applica­tion. It contemplates specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft, or dishonest misap­propriation or conversion. We think the learned Judge has misapplied the Articles to the facts of this case. Article 48, Limitation Act has clearly no applica­tion. It contemplates specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft, or dishonest misap­propriation or conversion. It was not the case of the defendants that they had acquired the moveable property in the present suit by any of the ways mentioned in Art. 48, Limitation Act. The defendants themselves were co- beneficiaries under the trust and the nature of their possession was the same as that of the plaintiff. Moreover we cannot see how the terms of column 3 of Art. 48 can apply to the facts before us. Under Art. 48 time begins to run from the first knowledge of possession. The defendants' own case in the written statement filed in the suit of 1937 was that the plaintiff and the defendants had equal rights as regards the use of the books. There was therefore no question of first knowledge of posses­sion as contemplated by Art. 48, Limitation Act. [12] As regards the application of Art. 49, Limitation Act, we need only refer to the follow­ing observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gossami Sri Gridhariji v. Roman, lalji Gossami, son and representative of Purushottam Gossami and others, 17 Cal. 3 at p. 23 : (16 I. A. 137 P. 0.) : "With respect to the bar by lapse of time, their Lordships do not consider this suit to be one in which the plaintiff is seeking merely personal relief. Even apart from paras 6 and 7 of the plaint, which ex­pressly put forth his spiritual character as the founda­tion of his claim, the nature of the suit is for the proper conduct of the Thakur's worship. It rests quite as much on the right of the Thakur to have the con­duct of his worship and his own custody placed in the right hands as upon the personal right of the plaintiff to property. The suit would rather fall under Art. 124 or Art. 144 than Art. 49. But under whichever of the three articles it falls, the starting point of time is un­lawful possession or adverse possession." [13] In the Privy Council case the plaintiff had joined two causes of action, one relating to a claim to religious office and the other to the recovery of a portrait belonging to the trust property. But under whichever of the three articles it falls, the starting point of time is un­lawful possession or adverse possession." [13] In the Privy Council case the plaintiff had joined two causes of action, one relating to a claim to religious office and the other to the recovery of a portrait belonging to the trust property. It seems to us-and it is only our inter­pretation- that their Lordships apparently took the view that where two claims are properly joined and one claim is governed by an article of limitation prescribing a longer period than that prescribed for the other claim, the longer period would govern the whole suit. Whether it is a correct interpretation of their Lordships' view, it is of no importance in this case as we will presently indicate. [14] According to the plaintiff, wrongful pos­session of the property in the present suit took place some three years before the institution of the suit in 1941, As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council Art. 49 has no application, where a claim is made in a representative capacity as in this case by a trustee against the beneficiaries. The plaintiff sought to recover certain moveable property belonging to the trust for the trust and not for himself. We think the only other articles of Limitation Act applicable to the facts of this case apart from Art. 124 and we must observe that in the case before us there is no joinder of claims, is Art. 120, which pre­scribes a period of six years from the time when the right to sue accrues. [15] The lower appellate Court apparently did not sufficiently take into consideration the plead­ings and certain documents before applying Art. 48 or 49, Limitation Act. By Ex. 3, the defendants have themselves declared that certain items of the Satra property, which were in their possession, were to be treated as common Satra property and that they would be entitled only to the use of that property. Assuming as true that the defendants took possession of the property in the present suit in 1932, it was a possession to which they were entitled as beneficiaries. [16] It is not disputed that prior to 22nd July 1932 the properties mentioned in schedules Ka and Kha were in the possession of the plaintiff as Adhikar. Assuming as true that the defendants took possession of the property in the present suit in 1932, it was a possession to which they were entitled as beneficiaries. [16] It is not disputed that prior to 22nd July 1932 the properties mentioned in schedules Ka and Kha were in the possession of the plaintiff as Adhikar. It appears that when the defendants took out certain items of the property mentioned in schedule Ka they passed a receipt in which they stated that these items would be returned whenever the plaintiff called upon them to do so. The items of property mentioned in schedule Kha were taken from the plaintiff at different times during a period of four or five years from the establishment of the institution some time before 1930. The plaintiff's case was that he called upon the defendants, who were members of a joint family, to return the items mentioned in schedules Ka and Kha in 1937; that even after the judgment of the High Court in 1941 in the suit of 1937, the defendants refused to return them. [17] From the facts as alleged by the plaintiff it is clear that he made a demand for the return of the items from the defendants in 1937 and we will assume that the demand was refused by the defendants in 1937; the plaintiff could have filed the present suit in 1943; he filed it in 1941, two years before the time prescribed by Art. 120. [18] The trial Court held that by reason of S. 10, Limitation Act, no question of limitation arises in a suit instituted by a plaintiff as trustee against the beneficiaries. This aspect of the case was not fully argued before us and we do not propose to deal with the case from the point of view of S. 10, Limitation Act. [19] In our view the facts of the case are, governed by Art. 120, Limitation Act. The suit having been filed within six years of the refusal by the defendants to return the trust property, it was within time. This was the only issue argued before us; the question of the application of O. 2, S. 2, Civil P. C., was abandoned at the hearing. [20] The result is that we set aside the judg­ment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. This was the only issue argued before us; the question of the application of O. 2, S. 2, Civil P. C., was abandoned at the hearing. [20] The result is that we set aside the judg­ment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. The appellant will get his costs of the lower appellate Court and of this Court. Lodge C. J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.