JUDGMENT Malik, C.J. - This appeal has been filed by the decree-holder. The only question in this appeal is whether the application for execution filed on 17th November 1943, was within time. The final decree in Suit No. 597 of 1928 obtained by Bhagwati Prasad decree-holder against one Misri Lal on the basis of a mortgage was passed on 25th May 1929. The decree includes two items of property which are to be sold in satisfaction of the amount due. Item 1 is Khata Khewat No. 1 in village Kunwarpur, area 55 bighas 11 biswas, and item 2 is a share in Khata Khewat No. 2 in the same village. 2. In execution of a simple money decree against Misri Lal the property in Khata Khewat No. 1 was sold and was purchased by Kishan Sahai on 20th December 1929. There is no evidence on the record that the share in Khata Khewat No. 2 was sold or was purchased by any one. The decree-holder executed his decree from time to time and a portion of the property in Khata Khewat No. 1 which Kishan Sabai had purchased was sold in execution of the decree and was purchased by the decree-holder, Bhagwati Prasad. In the year 1937 the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (X [10] of 1937) was passed by the United Provinces Legislature. It came into force on 1st January 1938 and remained in force up to 31st December 1940. Under S. 3 of this Act: all proceedings in execution of a decree for .... sale in enforcement of a mortgage passed by a civil Court on the basis of a liability incurred before the passing of this Act, in which a judgment-debtor or any one of the judgment-debtors is, at the date of the passing of this Act, an agriculturist shall be stayed during the period this Act shall remain in force .... It is admitted that the judgment-debtor, Misri Lal, being an agriculturist, provisions of S. 3 would apply even though Kishan Sahai, the auction-purchaser, may not have been one. It is admitted that the judgment-debtor, Misri Lal, being an agriculturist, provisions of S. 3 would apply even though Kishan Sahai, the auction-purchaser, may not have been one. Under S. 5 of the said Act the period during which the execution of a decree remained stayed by reason of S. 3 has to be excluded from the period of twelve years provided by S. 48, Civil P.C., (Act V [5] of 1908) unless the case comes under S. 6 (c), Temporary Postponement of Decrees Act. 3. The decree-holder claims that if the three years, from 1st January 1938 to 31st December 1940, the period during which his decree remained stayed, is added to the period of twelve years provided by S. 48, Civil P.C., the application for execution filed by him on 17th November 1943, must be held to be within time. 4. It is urged on behalf of the son of the auction-purchaser Kishan Sahai, Kishan Sahai being dead, that the decree could be executed by reason of the provisions of section 6 (c) of the said Act and that therefore the three years' period cannot be excluded and it must be held that the application for execution was barred by limitation. Section 6 (c), Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, provides that nothing herein contained shall apply to a mortgage decree sought to be executed by sale of the mortgaged property in the hands of a subsequent transferee who has taken the transfer subject to the mortgage on the basis of which such decree has been obtained. This sub-section has been the subject-matter of interpretation in a number of cases. Learned counsel for the transferee respondent has urged that the decision of the Full Bench in Radha Kishan Vs. Umrai Singh, AIR 1943 All 316 is in his favour and it must be held that the decree is barred by time. In that case, it was not clear whether the whole or a part of the mortgaged property was purchased by a subsequent transferee, Umrai Singh. The decree-holder, however, bad proceeded only against Umrai Singh and the property in his hands. Their Lordships held that under S. 6 (c) the decree could be executed against a transferee and he was not protected by the provisions of the United Provinces Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act. 5. The decree-holder, however, bad proceeded only against Umrai Singh and the property in his hands. Their Lordships held that under S. 6 (c) the decree could be executed against a transferee and he was not protected by the provisions of the United Provinces Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act. 5. In the case before us, the decree is being executed not only against the subsequent transferee but against the original mortgagor Misri Lal and the prayer in the application for execution is that the portion of khewat No. 1 which remained unsold and the share in khewat No. 2 should both be sold. The facts of the Full Bench case being materially different it is not possible to predicate what the decision of that Bench would have been if the execution had been taken out not only against the transferee but against the original judgment-debtor. It may be mentioned that stress has been laid in that judgment in more places than one on the fact that the execution was only against the mortgaged property in the hands of the subsequent transferee and the mortgagor was not even a party to the proceedings. The point came to be again considered in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Singh v. Chaoli, 1946 A.L.J. 377 : (A.I.R. 1947 ALL. 27 (F.B.)). In that case after a simple mortgage had been executed by an agriculturist on the basis of which the decree for sale had been' obtained a usufructuary mortgage was executed of a portion of the mortgaged property in favour of one Ram Chandar Sahai. The question was whether such a usufructuary mortgagee could be called a subsequent transferee. The decree-holder had applied for execution both against the original mortgagor as well as against the usufructuary mortgagee. The facts of that case were therefore more like the facts before us, but the decision of the Full Bench proceeds on the ground that a usufructuary mortgagee is not a transferee within the meaning of S. 6 (c), Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act. In the judgment delivered by me in that case I expressed an opinion that S. 6 (c) would apply only to a case where the entire mortgaged property had been transferred and not to a case where there was a transfer of a portion only. In the judgment delivered by me in that case I expressed an opinion that S. 6 (c) would apply only to a case where the entire mortgaged property had been transferred and not to a case where there was a transfer of a portion only. The question directly arose before a Division Bench, of which I was a member, in the year 1947 : see Ashfaqul Nabi Khan Vs. K.B. Syed Raza Hussain and Others, AIR 1948 All 62 I see no reason to change the opinion expressed in that case and I need not therefore repeat the reasons set out in that decision. I may, however, mention further that it would lead to a great anomaly if it is held that the decree could be executed against the original mortgagor but not against the transferee. This appears to be contrary to the provisions of S. 3. In case it is held that the decree was executable against the transferee but not against the original mortgagor, the result would be that the decree would be within time against the agriculturist debtor while it would be barred by limitation against the subsequent transferee which is a result not contemplated by law. The further anomaly would be that if the decree-holder chooses not to proceed against the subsequent transferee but to wait, he can make the agriculturist debtor liable for the entire decretal amount because the fact that the decree could not be executed against the original judgment-debtor would not entitle the agriculturist to plead that there should be a rateable reduction in the amount of the decree and the agriculturist debtor would have to pay the whole amount due under the decree. 6. After having carefully considered the matter, I am of opinion that the decision in the case of Ashfaqul Nabi Khan Vs. K.B. Syed Raza Hussain and Others, AIR 1948 All 62 lays down the correct law and must be followed. Bind Basni Prasad J. 7. I agree and desire to add a few words. The Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (X [10] of 1937) was a remedial-statute and it is one of the fundamental principles of interpretation of such statutes that they should be construed so as to advance their object. Bind Basni Prasad J. 7. I agree and desire to add a few words. The Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act (X [10] of 1937) was a remedial-statute and it is one of the fundamental principles of interpretation of such statutes that they should be construed so as to advance their object. The preamble of this Act runs as follows : Whereas it is expedient to provide for the temporary postponement, pending further legislation for granting relief from indebtedness to agriculturists, of the execution of certain decrees passed against agriculturists by civil Courts. If the interpretation urged on behalf of the respondents is placed upon the provisions of cl. (c) of S. 6, then the intended remedy will be denied to the agriculturists. 8. Another consideration is that the interpretation sought to be placed upon S. 6 would lead to various anomalies as pointed out by His Lordship the Chief Justice. 9. I agree that the appeal should be allowed. 10. By the Court- The appeal is allowed with costs.