JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is a petition for revision of an order of a learned District Judge allowing an application for revision of an order of an Appellate Officer made under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. 2. To appreciate the point of issue, it will be necessary shortly to set out the facts. The present petitioner filed an application before the Debt Settlement Board under S. 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The respondent to this application raised an objection that the petitioner was not an agriculturist and the debtor within the meaning of that Act. It appears that the Debt Settlement Board which heard this application held that the applications failed because the present petitioner was not a debtor. Later, an application was made to review this order of the Board and the Board reviewed its earlier decision and held that the petitioner was a debtor within the meaning of the Act. There was an appeal to the Appellate Officer and a revision filed before the learned District Judge. The Appellate Officer upheld the decision of the Board, but his order was set aside by the District Judge who held that there were no grounds for review and that the Board could not interfere with their earlier decision. The present petitioner then filed a petition for revision in this Court which was heard by a Bench consisting of Mukherjea and Sharpe JJ. this Court was of opinion that the Debt Settlement Board could validly review their earlier order and hold upon the materials before them at the second hearing, that the present petitioner was a debtor. That being so, this Court set aside the order of the learned District Judge and sent the case back to the Debt Settlement Board to proceed with it in accordance with law. 3. When the matter was before this Court an affidavit was filed on behalf of the present respondent. In that affidavit, it was stated that the petitioner had no property or residence within the jurisdiction of the Debt Settlement Board concerned and accordingly it was contended that Debt Settlement Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. It is to be observed that this point had been taken before the learned District Judge but the learned District Judge having decided against the present petitioner on another ground, did not deal with this point of jurisdiction. It is to be observed that this point had been taken before the learned District Judge but the learned District Judge having decided against the present petitioner on another ground, did not deal with this point of jurisdiction. this Court, however, was in favour of the petitioner on the competency of the review and therefore the present respondent's only hope of success was to place before this Court the allegation that the Debt Settlement Board had no jurisdiction at all in the matter. It is to be observed that the judgment of this Court is silent upon this point. The point was either abandoned or not pressed with any vigour. The result was that the revision was allowed and the matter sent back to the Debt Settlement Board to proceed in accordance with law. Had it been pointed out to this Court that the Debt Settlement Board had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the matter, this Court would have been bound to take some action. It certainly would not have taken the action it did; it would at least have called upon the Debt Settlement Board for a finding of fact upon which this question of jurisdiction could be decided first by the Board and later by the Appellate Officer and the District Judge. All that this Court, however, did was to allow the revision and direct the case to proceed. I cannot for a moment believe that if this point as to jurisdiction had been pressed with any vigour this Court would have directed the Debt Settlement Board to proceed. Before it would have done that I feel sure it would have ordered an investigation into this question of jurisdiction. It appears to me that this point of jurisdiction was abandoned or not pressed in this Court. 4. The present revision is from an order of the learned District Judge reversing an order of a Special Officer and the Appellate Officer directing possession to be given to the judgment-debtor. 5. The judgment-debtor had made an application under S. 37A and it had been held eventually that he was entitled to relief under that section. 6. A debtor who is entitled to relief under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act must of course pay what the Board finds is still due to the decree-holder in respect of the debt. Provision for such payment is made in sub-ss. 6. A debtor who is entitled to relief under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act must of course pay what the Board finds is still due to the decree-holder in respect of the debt. Provision for such payment is made in sub-ss. (4) and (5) of the section. Sub-section (4) provides that if the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder cannot amicably agree as to the amount due then the Board must proceed to find what is due and make provision for its payment. The Board has to estimate the average annual gross receipts deemed to have been derivable from the property sold during the period beginning on 1st January 1934, and ending on 31st December 1338, and after making an estimate direct repayment in instalments of one half of the value of such average annual gross receipts. 7. In ascertaining the amount of the debt in order to make provision for its payment in the award the Court must proceed in accordance with sub-s. (7) and sub-s. (7) provides that the debt shall be the amount of the decree with certain additions after deducting therefrom in respect of each year during which the decree-holder remained in possession of the property, an amount equal to half the average annual gross receipts estimated under sub-s. (4). 8. In the present case the parties failed to agree as to the amount due and the Special Officer who had replaced the Board went into the matter. He found that after deducting from the decretal debt and certain other additions half the annual average gross receipts estimated under sub s. (4) for the period during which the decree-holder was in possession there was nothing due from the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. The Board therefore held that there was nothing due to the decree-holder and directed the decree-holder to restore possession to the judgment-debtor. Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen on behalf of the respondent has urged that as there was nothing due from the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder the special officer could not direct possession to be given to the judgment-debtor. Mr. Sen has to admit that it the special officer had found that some amount was still due from the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder no matter how small, restoration of possession could be ordered. Mr. Sen has to admit that it the special officer had found that some amount was still due from the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder no matter how small, restoration of possession could be ordered. This view appears to have been taken by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Bonamali Pramanik and Others Vs. Radhagobinda Ghosh, AIR 1947 Cal 388 . But I find it difficult to accept such a view. The construction given to this section by the learned single Judge in this case reduces the section to an absurdity. What he has held in effect is that if the judgment-debtor still owes the decree-holder a large sum of money be is entitled to recover possession. But if he has paid off all his dues he is not entitled to such possession. The position has only to be stated to be shown to be without foundation. 9. The provisions of sub s. (5) of S. 37A of the Act are inserted in order to safeguard the decree-holder. The decree-holder is not to be compelled to give up possession unless provision is made for payment of his dues. That does not mean that the Debt Settlement Board or the special officer cannot direct restoration of possession where all the dues have been paid. If possession can be given when money is still owing by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder, a fortiori it can be given when that debt has been wiped out. To hold, as Mr. Sen asks us to hold would amount to giving the decree-holder the whole of his debt and the property which he has purchased to discharge that debt. In my view upon a true construction of S. 37A there is nothing to prevent the Court making an award as to the restoration of possession when it finds that the decree-holder has recovered all that was due to him by possession of the property purchased by auction in execution of the decree. 10. Mr. Sen has further argued that the Court below has not taken into account a payment by the decree-holder of a mortgage said to be of Rs. 800 or thereabouts. It is to be observed that the appellate officer makes no mention of this point and the learned District Judge held that all that was due to the decree-holder had been paid. 800 or thereabouts. It is to be observed that the appellate officer makes no mention of this point and the learned District Judge held that all that was due to the decree-holder had been paid. It was for that reason that the District Judge held that restoration of possession could not be ordered. There is clearly a finding of fact that all the dues of the decree-holder have been paid. Mr. Sen has urged that the Courts have entirely overlooked this mortgage, but it is quite clear that that point was before the Courts and they have held that everything was paid. It may be that the Courts below were of opinion that this mortgage debt was not an amount which had to be considered in making an award under S. 37A. What Mr. Sen alleges is that after his client had purchased in execution of the decree he redeemed the mortgage. If that is so, the mortgage is no longer in existence and nice questions might arise as to whether even if this amount had been paid whether the judgment-debtor was liable at all to pay it to the decree-holder. In any event, this Court cannot go into that matter in revision as both the Appellate Officer and the District Judge have held that the whole of the decree-holder's debt had been discharged from the usufruct of the property and that there was no debt as defined in sub-s. (7). 11. For these reasons the order of the learned District Judge cannot be sustained and must be set aside and the orders of the Special Officer and the Appellate Officer restored. 12. The petition is therefore allowed and the rule is made absolute with costs. Blank, J. 13. I agree.