Judgment Ray, J. 1. This is a plffs appeal agaist an order rejecting the plaint for non-payment of ad valorem Court-fees. The plff. valued the relief in the suit at Rs. 1400.00 for the purpose of jurisdiction & paid a fixed fee of Rs. 15/-provided by Schedule 2, Article 17 part 6, Court-fees Act, as the subject-matter of the suit is not capable of being valued in money. The trial Court by its Order No. 52 in title suit No. 14 of 1942 (in the Court of the second Subordinate Judge, Gaya) dated 29-3-44 came to the conclusion that the actual value of the right claimed in the properties can hardly be less than the market value of the lands & any other valuation would be arbitrary. In this view, in consideration of the actual income of the villages in the suit being Rs. 14700.00 & odd, he fixed the market value of the properties at Rs. 147550/-. Accordingly the plff. was directed to correct the valuation stated in the plaint & to pay court-fees thereon by a fixed date. As no court-fees were paid, the plaint was rejected. 2. In order to determine the question at issue the nature of the reliefs sought or the class to which the present suit belongs has to be scrutinised. The dispute properties are admittedly endowed to Sri. Thakurji (plff. 1) at Ajodhya. There was a dispute as to possession of the said properties as between the plff. 2 & the deft, each claiming to be rightful mutwalli in possession. In a proceeding under Sec.145, Criminal P. C., the criminal Court attached the properties under Sec.146, of the Code. Thereupon, both the plff. 2 as well as the deft, instituted suits for establishment of their respective title as mutwalli & for possession of the properties. The defts suit was decreed & the plffs suit was dismissed by virtue of a compromise. Accordingly, the deft, got possession of the properties from the receiver appointed by the criminal Court in pursuance of the order of attachment, already referred to. In the present suit the compromise is impugned as a fraudulent one The plff. claims the following reliefs, namely, (1) declaration that the plff. is the mutwalli of the endowed properties; (2) declaration that the plff. is & the deft, is not entitled to remain in charge of the trust estate & (3) that the deft. In the present suit the compromise is impugned as a fraudulent one The plff. claims the following reliefs, namely, (1) declaration that the plff. is the mutwalli of the endowed properties; (2) declaration that the plff. is & the deft, is not entitled to remain in charge of the trust estate & (3) that the deft. be directed to make over charge of the said estate to the plff. 2. 3. It is obvious that plff. 2 does not claim any beneficial ownership in respect of the properties in suit. It is further quite plain that plff. 2 is nominally a party in order to meet the objection regarding what can be called a technical defect in it, as neither by virtue of the previous compromise nor under the decree obtained by the deft, in his suit, already referred to, title of the deity (plff. 1,) was at all challenged. The conflicting claims as between the parties are as to their respective rights to hold charge of the endowment, or, in other words, the endowed properties. In determining the nature of the suit for the purpose of fixation of Court-fees, the allegations made & the reliefs sought in the plaint are the only relevant materials. The defence set up by the deft, does not come into the picture at all in ascertaining the nature of the plffs suit. In substance, the plffs suit is for recovery of the office of shebaitship which, according to him, has been usurped by the deft, under a colourable compromise decree. As the scheme of the endowment, according to the plffs allegations in the plaint, does not provide for any emoluments being attached to the office of mut-walliship, the aforesaid reliefs are not capable of valuation. Reliance is placed by the appellants learned Counsel on the decision in the case of Maulavi Sayeed V/s. Shah Tafazul Hussain, AIR (21) 1934 Patna 647 in which a Division Bench of this Court held : "Where the subject-matter of the suit is the right to mutwalliship & the office does not carry any salary or any other material enjoyment, it is not capable of monetary valuation & therefore the proper Court-fee is the fixed fee of Rs.15/-provided by Schedule 2, Article 17, Para 6". 4. Mr. 4. Mr. S.K. Mitra appearing for the Crown strenuously urged that the facts of Maulavi Syeeds case are different from the facts of the present case, & therefore, the decision referred to does not apply. No doubt the facts are slightly different in so far as in that case the plff. claimed for recovery of a sum of Rs.151/- being arrears of rent due from deft. 1 in respect of the house in dispute; but the dispute as between the plff. & deft. 2 each of whom were claiming the mutwalliship in rivalry against the other was of exactly the same description as here. Mr. Mitra wanted to distinguish that the house was in occupation of a third person. It is, however, clear that the dispute in that case was with regard to the right to receive rents & profits of the house which was the waqf property, & the occupier of the house pleaded that he had already been sued for the arrears of rent by deft. 2. At any rate, even if the facts are different; the principle laid down is a correct one, if I may say so with great respect. 5. Reliance, however, is placed by Mr. Mitra on two cases, namely, Mohammad Ghouse In re, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 804, and Parsottam-anand Giri V/s. Mayanand Giri, AIR (19) 1932 All 593. The case of Parsottamanand Giri can be distinguished on the simple ground that the relief in that case was for recovery of possession of immoveable properties. It appears from the following quotation that the ratio of the decision consisted in the mode of relief, & the learned Judge made a distinction between the case before him & the case of Girdhari Lal referred to at the Bar. The quotation is as follows: "The case of Girdhari Lal V/s. Ram Lal, 21 All 200, was also a suit under Sec. 539. The plffs. claimed that new superintendents should be appointed for the management of the endowed property & that the property should be taken from the deft. & placed in the possession of the new superintendents. Here again, it was held that the Court-fee was governed by Sec.17, Clause (vi), but the case is distinguishable because the plffs. claimed nothing for themselves personally; they only asked that the trust property should be placed in the possession of the new superintendents whoever they might be. & placed in the possession of the new superintendents. Here again, it was held that the Court-fee was governed by Sec.17, Clause (vi), but the case is distinguishable because the plffs. claimed nothing for themselves personally; they only asked that the trust property should be placed in the possession of the new superintendents whoever they might be. It was not contended that it was a suit for possession of trust property." 6. On principle where a suit is for declaration of any legal character by the plff. & for consequential relief, the valuation for Court-fee would be the valuation at which the plff. valued the relief. The plff. in such cases has some amount of liberty to put his own valuation on the relief. This liberty cannot be curtailed or in any way diminished so long he does not value the relief arbitrarily. The value of the relief certainly depends upon the value of the benefit that is to be derived from it. Under the circumstances, it is only fundamental that the valuation should weigh according as the quantum of the benefit involved in the relief varies. In this view a relief for taking charge of an office or trust estate must be different from recovery of possession of properties though the latter relief is sought by a trustee. The deft, in this case holds the property by virtue of a compromise. There is no knowing that he would retain his wrongful possession of the properties even after the plff. is declared a mutwalli & is given charge of the trust. The necessity of recovery of actual possession of the properties may arise in case the deft, chooses to hold it adversely notwithstanding the plffs success in the present suit. As at present, however, the relief sought for by the plff. is one which is not capable of any money valuation. I am bound by the Division Bench decision of this Court which I consider, if I may say so with great respect, lays down the correct principle applicable to the facts of this case. I should, therefore, hold that the Court-fee paid is sufficient. 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds & is allowed, the order of the trial Judge rejecting the plaint is set aside & the case is remitted back to the Court below for hearing in accordance with law. I should, therefore, hold that the Court-fee paid is sufficient. 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds & is allowed, the order of the trial Judge rejecting the plaint is set aside & the case is remitted back to the Court below for hearing in accordance with law. The appellant is entitled to costs of this appeal. Hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs. Manohar Lall, J. 8 I am of the same view. The plff. is required to pay Court fee upon the allegations which he makes in the plaint & not on what transpires after the reading of the written statement. The plffs case is, as is evident from a perusal of the plaint that the deft, erroneously styled himself as the she-bait of the properties belonging to the deity, & that the compromise decree by which the right of the deft, to that office was acknowledged was fraudulent & not binding upon the plff. I am unable to hold that this suit is a suit for recovery of possession, it is merely a suit for being put in charge of an office. Therefore, the plffs. are entitled to put a reasonable valuation upon the relief which he claims in the plaint. I am unable to hold that Rs. 4,100.00 is an arbitrary valuation. The plff. must pay Court fee on this valuation. 9. The two cases relied upon by the learned Govt. Advocate do not support him and in any case we are bound by the decision of this Court in Maulavi Sayeed V/s. Tafazul Hussain AIR (21) 1934 Pat 647, in which the facts are almost identical. 10. In the case reported in Parshottama-nand Giri V/s. Mayanand Giri, AIR (19) 1932 All 593, the plff. as the duly elected mahant sought for recovery of possession of the properties which were in the possession of the deft. who was alleged to have lost his title to mahantship & to retain possession of the properties. The suit itself was valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at 2 lacs & odd & for the purposes of Court fee at 1 lac & 60 thousand & the Court fee of Rs. 1750 was paid. who was alleged to have lost his title to mahantship & to retain possession of the properties. The suit itself was valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at 2 lacs & odd & for the purposes of Court fee at 1 lac & 60 thousand & the Court fee of Rs. 1750 was paid. Having lost the suit in part he preferred an appeal to the High Court & valued at one lac & 60 thousand, & contended that it was by mistake that an ad valorem Court fee had been paid in the trial Court & the proper C. F. payable was only Rs. 10/-. The learned Judge in overruling the contention of the appellant that he was only asking for such possession as pertains to the office of the mahant & therefore he was not claiming the possession of the property observed that "the suit is for possession of immovable property & that the C. F. should be governed by Section 7, Clause (5)." In this connection it was remarked that the Court fees Act does not make any distinction between a suit for possession as a beneficial owner & a suit for possession as a trustee or as the manager of a religious endowment. The learned Judge then considered the earlier Allahabad cases, Rangoon case & some Madras cases. He relied upon the case of Mahomed Ghouse, In re, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 804. 11. In that case the facts were that the plff. was suing for a declaration that he was the Sajjadanashin of two durgas & for the possession of the durgas & the properties attached thereto. He alleged in the plaint that he. was appointed by the last Sajjada as his successor & he took possession of the durgas & the properties on the death of that Sajjada, but that he was subsequently dispossessed by deft. 1. It was obvious that this was a suit for recovery of possession. The learned Judge distinguished the case of Swaminath Iyer V/s. A. Ramier, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 421, in which the facts were that the plffs. had sued for a declaration that they & deft. 1 were the lawfully appointed trustees of a certain temple, & they prayed for a declaration that defts. The learned Judge distinguished the case of Swaminath Iyer V/s. A. Ramier, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 421, in which the facts were that the plffs. had sued for a declaration that they & deft. 1 were the lawfully appointed trustees of a certain temple, & they prayed for a declaration that defts. 2 & 3 should be made to restore the office of the trustee to them & for an injunction restraining them from interfering with the exercise by the plffs. & deft- 1 of their duties as trustees. It was held that the plffs. were not bound to sue for the possession of the temple properties. 12. In my opinion, both these cases relied upon by the learned Govt. Advocate did not take the view contrary to that taken in Maulvi Sayeed V/s. Tafazul Hussain, AIR (21) 1934 Pat 647, & even if these cases took the contrary view, I am bound to follow the Patna decision. I have read the plaint carefully, & I am unable to hold that the plaint can be treated as a suit for restoration of the office of the shebait- ship of the plffs. For these reasons, I agree that the plaint should not have been rejected & the appeal must be allowed.