Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 54 of 1944) from a judgment and two decrees of the High Court (December 11, 1941) modifying a preliminary and a final decree of the Subordinate Court of Cocanada (March 7, 1937 and March 25, 1938). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. In 1923 there was pending a litigation between the Maharaja of Pithapuram (respondent in the first two of these consolidated appeals and appellant in the cross-appeal) and the plaintiffs in the present suit (appellants respectively in the first two appeals and respondents in the cross-appeal), in which the Maharaja claimed that he was the nearest reversioner entitled to succeed to the estate of Gollaprolu. The Maharaja held a decree pronounced in his favour by the District Judge of Rajahmundry but the present plaintiffs had appealed against it to the Madras High Court. While that appeal was pending the Maharaja, on November 10, 1923, applied to the collector of Gadavari to be recognized as the landholder of the estate for the purposes of the Madras Estates Land Act subject to the ultimate result of the litigation then pending. After sundry procedure not germane to the present issue the collector, on January 12, 1924, made an order under s. 3, sub-s. 5, of the Madras Estates Land Act by which he recognized the Maharaja as the landholder for the purposes of the Act. The Maharaja accordingly entered into possession of the estate and collected the rents and profits. The litigation pending between him and the present plaintiffs was protracted and was not finaly brought to an end till the Order in Council of July IS, 1935, the effect of which was to find that the present plaintiffs were entitled to the estate. On September 7, 1935, the collector of Gadavari cancelled his previous order of January 12, 1924, and recognized the present plaintiffs as the landholders of the estate. The plaintiffs brought the present suit in October, 1935, for recovery of the rents and profits received by the Maharaja during the period of his possession and management of the estate. The Maharaja pleaded that he had been in wrongful possession of the estate during the whole period and that the suit for mesne profits for more than three years from the date when the profits were received was barred by the Indian Limitation Act, sch. I., art. 109. The Maharaja pleaded that he had been in wrongful possession of the estate during the whole period and that the suit for mesne profits for more than three years from the date when the profits were received was barred by the Indian Limitation Act, sch. I., art. 109. The trial judge held that the Maharajas possession of the estate under the order of January 12, 1924, had not been wrongful, and that he had collected the rents and profits as a quasi-trustee for the benefit of the plaintiffs and was bound to account to them for the rents and profits received in the full period of his possession. By a preliminary decree he directed the Maharaja to render accounts; and after the accounts were taken he granted a final decree on March 25, 1938. Appeals were preferred to the High Court (Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri JJ.), who agreeing with the trial judge, held that the Maharajas possession had not been wrongful and consequently that art. 109 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act did not apply. But, differing from the trial Judge, the High Court held that a right to sue the Maharaja had accrued to the plaintiffs each time he had received the rents and profits. Accordingly, the High Court, in para. No. 1 of their decree of December 11, 1941, disallowed the plaintiffs claim to recover rents and profits received more than six years before the commencement of the suit, as being barred by art. 120 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act. The question for determination in this appeal was whether, or to what extent, the Indian Limitation Act Law. Rep. 75 Ind. App. 101 ( 1947- 1948) Raja Inuganti Venkatarajagopala v. Maharaja of Pithapuram 57 affected the plaintiffs claim against the Maharaja of Pithapuram for payments of sums amounting to Rupees 7,38,000 received by him as rents from the Gollaprolu Zamindari estate during the period from January 12, 1924, to September 7, 1935. Articles 109 and 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provide Description of Suit. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. Article 109. (Three years) When the profits are For the profits of immovable property received. belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant. Article 120. (Six years) When the right to sue Suit for which no period of limitation is accrues. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. Article 109. (Three years) When the profits are For the profits of immovable property received. belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant. Article 120. (Six years) When the right to sue Suit for which no period of limitation is accrues. provided elsewhere in this schedule. By the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 Section 3, sub-s. 5. " ‘Landholder means a person owning " an estate or part thereof and includes every person entitled " to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate " by virtue of any transfer from the owner or his predecessor “in title or of any order of a competent court or of any " provision of law. " Where there is dispute between two or more persons as to " which of them is the landholder for all or any of the purposes " of this Act or between two or more joint landholders as to " which of them is entitled to proceed and be dealt with as H such landholder, the person who shall be deemed to be the " landholder for such purposes shall be the person whom the " Collector subject to any decree or order of a competent Civil "Court may recognize or nominate as such landholder in "accordance with rules to be framed by the (Provincial "Government) in this behalf.” Section 67.—"Where rent is due to a landholder, the receipt " for any payment on that account of the person recognized "or nominated under sub-section (5.) of section 3 as landholder for the purpose of receiving rent (or of the person "authorized to receive the rent) shall be a sufficient discharge " for the rent, and the person liable for the rent shall not be " entitled to plead in defence to a claim by a person so " recognized or nominated that the rent is due to a third person. "But nothing in this section shall affect any remedy which "any such third person may have against the landholder so "recognized or nominated.” 1947. Dec. 15, 16. Rewcastle K.C. and Chinna Durai for the appellant in the first appeal, who was second respondent in the second appeal and in the cross-appeal. "But nothing in this section shall affect any remedy which "any such third person may have against the landholder so "recognized or nominated.” 1947. Dec. 15, 16. Rewcastle K.C. and Chinna Durai for the appellant in the first appeal, who was second respondent in the second appeal and in the cross-appeal. Rewcastle K.C. and Chinna Durai for the appellant in the second appeal, who was also second respondent in the first appeal and first respondent in the cross-appeal. Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C, Subba Row and B. Sen for the appellant in the cross-appeal, who was also first respondent in the first two appeals. 1948. January 20. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD NORMAND, who stated Law. Rep. 75 Ind. App. 101 ( 1947- 1948) Raja Inuganti Venkatarajagopala v. Maharaja of Pithapuram 58 the facts set out above and continued In the argument addressed to their Lordships the plaintiffs supported the finding of the trial judge and the High Court that the Maharajas possession and his collection of rents and profits had not been wrongful, and therefore that the present suit was not within the terms of art. 109 of the Limitation Act a suit " for the profits of immovable property "belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received "by the defendant." They also maintained that no right to sue accrued while the order of January 12, 1924, was in force, and therefore that the six years limitation provided by art. 120 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act barred no part of their claim. The Maharaja cross-appealed and relied on art. 109 and the three years limitation therein provided. Alternatively, he maintained that the judgment of the High Court should be affirmed. Their Lordships are of opinion that the decision of these appeals depends on the meaning and effect of the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act and of the rules made thereunder, which are set out in the judgment of the High Court, and they desire to adopt the comment of the High Court on these provisions. Their Lordships are of opinion that the decision of these appeals depends on the meaning and effect of the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act and of the rules made thereunder, which are set out in the judgment of the High Court, and they desire to adopt the comment of the High Court on these provisions. The learned judges say " It is manifest " that the object underlying these provisions is to provide " machinery for the smooth management of an estate pending " settlement of disputes relating thereto by a competent Civil " Court so as, on the one hand, to enable the rents falling due " during the pendency of the disputes to be duly collected " without being allowed to get time-barred and on the other, " to enable the tenants to obtain a valid discharge on payment "of the rent, whichever party may ultimately succeed in "establishing his claim in the Civil Courts. For this purpose, "the Collector is empowered to make a summary inquiry “under the rules made in that behalf and recognize as land-holder the person who is prima facie entitled to the present "possession of the estate, and the person so recognized is “authorized to demand and collect the rent giving a valid "discharge therefor. In other words, the person who is " recognized " by the Collector as landholder for all or " any of the purposes of the Act becomes thereby clothed with " full authority to do all acts required to be done for such " purpose or purposes, and such acts are made binding upon " whichever party is ultimately held by a Civil Court to be " entitled to the possession of the estate." Their Lordships agree with the learned trial judge and with the High Court that, as the Maharaja had statutory authority for collecting the rents and profits during the whole period of his possession, it is impossible to hold that his receipt of them was wrongful. It follows that art. 109 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is inapplicable. But their Lordships are further of opinion that the plaintiffs could not competently have sued the Maharaja for an account of rents and profits each time that rents or profits were received. It follows that art. 109 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act is inapplicable. But their Lordships are further of opinion that the plaintiffs could not competently have sued the Maharaja for an account of rents and profits each time that rents or profits were received. What was said by counsel for the Maharaja was that the plain tiffs would have been entitled to sue as beneficiaries under a quasi trust. This is, however, not consistent with the Maharajas right under s. 3, sub-s. 5, of the Madras Estates Land Act to receive the rents and profits as statutory landholder . His interest as such landholder was adverse to the claims of the plaintiffs, and he did not collect the rents and profits as trustee for them. The High Court held that the proviso to s. 67 of the Madras Estates Land Act was in itself sufficient to support the contention that the plaintiffs might have sued the Maharaja as often as he collected the rents or profits. Section 67 makes the receipt for rents granted by a person recognized as the landholder under s. 3 a valid discharge in the hands of the person paying them. The proviso that nothing in the section shall affect any remedy which a third person may have against the landholder cannot preserve or restore to third parties remedies which are inconsistent with the landholders rights and powers under s. 3, sub-s. 5, of the Act. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the plain tiffs had no right of suit for the rents or profits while the possession was under the order of January 12, 1924. It was only after that order was cancelled in consequence of the decision of this Board that a right of action to recover rents and profits accrued to the plaintiffs, and that right is preserved to them by the proviso to s. 67. The High Courts judgment recognizes that if suits had been brought each time that rents or profits were received they could have made no progress, but must have been stayed till the final determination of the question of title. In their Law. Rep. 75 Ind. App. The High Courts judgment recognizes that if suits had been brought each time that rents or profits were received they could have made no progress, but must have been stayed till the final determination of the question of title. In their Law. Rep. 75 Ind. App. 101 ( 1947- 1948) Raja Inuganti Venkatarajagopala v. Maharaja of Pithapuram 59 Lordships opinion one of the purposes of s. 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act is to regulate possession pendente lite and to prevent the multiplication of unnecessary suits. They will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed to the effect that the paragraph numbered 1 of the decree of the High Court, dated December 11, 1941, be deleted. The defendant in the suit must pay the costs of these consolidated appeals.