Indu Bhushan Deb v. District Magistrate and The Superintendent, Central Jail
1948-04-28
WANCHOO
body1948
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Wanchoo, J. - This is an application u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Indu Bhushan Deb against an order of his detention under U.P. Act IV of 1947 by the Additional District Magistrate of Allahabad. 2. It appears that a report was made by the district intelligence staff on the 5th of February, 1948 with respect to a number of persons including the applicant. It was prayed that the persons against whom that report had been made should be detained. The report did not mention for how long they should be detained. On this report, Mr. Rathor, Additional District Magistrate passed the following order on the 5th of February, 1948:- Detain them for three months. Let detention warrants and notices issue. 3. On the 6th of February, 1948, Mr. Rathor supplied to the applicant the reasons u/s 5 which had led to his detention. The present application was made on the 1st of April, 1948 and the main point that has been urged on behalf of the applicant is that as the order of the 5th of February, 1948 did not specify, in so many words, that the Magistrate was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the applicant for reasons specified in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, the detention of the applicant was illegal. 4. There is no doubt that in the order that was passed on the 5th of February, 1948 the Additional District Magistrate did not say, in so many words, that he was satisfied for reasons mentioned in Section 3 (1) (a) that the applicant should be detained. The question that arises for determination, therefore, is whether that fact will make the detention illegal or whether it is possible to fill up the deficiency later by an affidavit from the officer concerned. Mr. Rathor has filed an affidavit in this Court on the 23rd of April, 1948, in which he says that he passed the order of detention on the 5th of February, 1948 after going through the material against the applicant and satisfying himself that it was necessary to detain him for the purpose mentioned in Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. 5. There is nothing in Section 3(1)(a) which lays down that the order of detention should be in particular form and should show, on the fact of it that the authority passing the order was satisfied.
5. There is nothing in Section 3(1)(a) which lays down that the order of detention should be in particular form and should show, on the fact of it that the authority passing the order was satisfied. of course, the best thing is for the authority passing the order to say specifically that it was satisfied for reasons given in Section 3(1)(a) that the order should he passed. If the recital is there in the order itself, the case would be covered by the following observations of the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court which were quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of AIR 1945 156 (Privy Council) . It is quite a different thing to question the accuracy of a recital contained in a duly authenticated order, particularly where that recital purports to state as a fact the carrying out of what I regard as a condition necessary to the valid and making of that order. In the normal case the existence of such a recital in a duly authenticated order will, in the absence of any evidence as to its inaccuracy, be accepted by a Court as establishing that the necessary condition was fulfilled. The presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the detenu to produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a prima facie case that the recital is not accurate. 6. These observations suggest that the presence or absence of the recital mainly affects the questions of burden of proof. If the recital is there, the burden lies heavily on the detenue to show that it is not accurate. On the other and if the recital is not there, it will not necessarily follow in every case that there was no satisfaction before the order in question was passed and, therefore, it is illegal. It will then be for the authority concerned to show that there was satisfaction before the order was passed and in a proper case, where it appears to this Court that the authority concerned might have been satisfied and merely failed to say so specifically by oversight, this Court can ask the authority concerned to state by an affidavit whether it was in fact so satisfied.
and if the authority concerned does say so by affidavit, the order of detention must be held to have been legally and properly passed. 7. In the present case, it appeared to me that the officer might have been satisfied about the necessity of detention and that words to that effect had been left out from the order of the 5th of February, 1948 by mistake. That is why I called for an affidavit from him. That order in question is in the handwriting of the officer himself on the very report which was made to him by a Sub-Inspector of the district intelligence staff. The report did not say that the persons mentioned therein should be detained for any particular period. But the officer when writing out the order of detention in his own handwriting specified the period, namely, three months. That suggests that he must have exercised his mind and must have been satisfied when he wrote out the detention order in his own handwriting that it was necessary to detain these persons. The very next day, namely, the 6th of February, 1948 the same officer gave the reasons for detention. Now, in obedience to the order of this Court, the officer was sworn an affidavit that he was satisfied before he passed the order. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the formal defect in the order of the 5th of February, 1948 has been cured and the detention cannot be declared illegal on the ground that the officer had not exercised his mind and was not satisfied about the necessity for the detention before he passed the order. 8. The second point that has been urged is that the applicant was illegally arrested on the 3rd of February, 1948 and that, the order of detention was passed two days later on the 5th of February, 1948 and, as such, the detention of the applicant was, under the circumstances, improper. Even if it be that the arrest of the applicant was originally unjustified, this argument is disposed of by the, authority of the Federal Court in the case of AIR 1945 18 (Federal Court) .
Even if it be that the arrest of the applicant was originally unjustified, this argument is disposed of by the, authority of the Federal Court in the case of AIR 1945 18 (Federal Court) . Their Lordships, when dealing with powers of the Court u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed as follows:- The analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings cannot be invoked here. If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at same prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention but whether in the face of the later valid order the Court can direct the release of the Petitioner. 9. I have, therefore, to see whether the detention was legal and proper when the matter came up for hearing. So far as that is concered, there is no doubt that the order in this case cannot be challenged on the ground of illegality or impropriety. 10. I therefore dismiss the application.