JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The principal question involved in this appeal fell to be considered by me in S.M.A. No. 120 of 1946, decided on the 9th of February last. Since reported, 52 C.W.N. 625, (1948) ante. It has been argued more fully on the present occasion, but not so fully as one might have wished. The Appellant is resisting the execution of a rent decree and the facts on which his objections are based are as follows. He held a tenure under the Respondents who obtained against him successively three rent decrees for three consecutive periods. The first decree was obtained in Rent Suit No. 1208 of 1930 for Chaitra, 1334 to Baisakh, 1337 B.S.; the second in Rent Suit No. 765 of 1935 for Jaistha, 1338 to 1341; and the third in Rent Suit No. 1512 of 1940 for 1342 to 1346 B.S. The Respondents first put into execution the first decree and at the sale held on the 15th April, 1941, purchased the tenure themselves. They did not, however, either deposit or credit the Appellant with the amounts mentioned in cl. (b) of sec. 168A (1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the result was that the sale was not confirmed. Next, they put into execution the third decree and again purchased the tenure on the 8th April, 1942. This sale was duly confirmed on the 11th May following. On the 27th June, 1944, they applied for execution of the second decree against certain other properties of the Appellant and were met by him with an objection under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is out of this petition of objection that the present appeal arises. 2. The first rent suit was instituted in May, 1931. As the sale in execution of the decree passed in that suit took place on the 15th April, 1941, the period between the institution of the suit and the sale covered the periods for which the two subsequent rent decrees were obtained. 3. The Appellant put forward two objections, one by reference to each sale. He pointed out that sec. 168A had come into force on the 9th January, 1941. 3. The Appellant put forward two objections, one by reference to each sale. He pointed out that sec. 168A had come into force on the 9th January, 1941. Consequently, when the Respondents purchased the tenure at the first sale, they themselves became liable to pay the rent accruing due between the date of the first suit and the date of the confirmation of the sale and necessarily liable to pay the rent up to the earlier date on which the sale was held. The liability for the rent for both the periods for which the two subsequent decrees were obtained had thus fastened itself on them. They could not avoid that liability by the device of abandoning the first sale and had no right to execute the second decree against the Appellant. 4. The second objection was that, in any event, by the sale of the tenure in execution of the third decree and purchase by the Respondents themselves, the liability for antecedent rents had been extinguished. 5. The learned Munsif held that since the first sale had never been confirmed, it must be regarded as "of no effect or worth at all" and any question of rights and liabilities on the basis of that sale was entirely beside the point. As regards the second objection, he made an extensive review of reported cases and ultimately held that while a purchase of a tenure or holding by the landlord at a money sale might transfer the tenant's liability for antecedent rents to him and thus extinguish it, a purchase at a rent sale could not have such effect. 6. Against this decision there was an appeal, but the judgment of the Appellate Court is of no importance. The learned District judge mentioned the two points in a very superficial way without dealing with them in any manner and nothing more need be said of his decision than that he dismissed the appeal. 7. The same two points were urged in the present appeal, but Dr. Sen Gupta who appeared for the Appellant also mentioned a third to which some reference is to be found in the trial Court's judgment. It was contended that if the first sale was ineffective, the result was that the tenure had not ceased to exist and, consequently, the Respondents were not entitled to proceed against other properties of the Appellant. Sen Gupta who appeared for the Appellant also mentioned a third to which some reference is to be found in the trial Court's judgment. It was contended that if the first sale was ineffective, the result was that the tenure had not ceased to exist and, consequently, the Respondents were not entitled to proceed against other properties of the Appellant. But the tenure was, in any event, extinguished by the second sale which took place before the present application for execution and, therefore, the failure of the first sale furnishes no ground for contending that the tenure still existed. 8. The first point was put by Dr. Sen Gupta in the following way. He argued that sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act clearly intended that if a tenure or holding was brought to sale in execution of a rent decree, the tenant was no longer to be harassed for any subsequent rent and such rent would have to be paid by the auction-purchaser. Sub-sec. (1) (b) of the section provided that the purchaser would be liable to pay the rent for the period between the institution of the suit and the confirmation of the sale and sub-sec. (3) provided that if the amount of such rent was not deposited, the sale would not be confirmed. If the purchaser did not have the sale confirmed by depositing such rent, the consequence would be that the sale would be called off and another sale held, but it would be a sale in execution of the same decree. Whoever purchased at the second sale would similarly be liable to pay the rent which had become payable between the date of the suit and the date of the confirmation of that sale, so that the liability for the rent accruing due after the institution of the suit would always be a liability of the auction-purchaser and in no circumstances of the tenant. If the landlord purchased the property, the liability would be his. But if the landlord, after he had purchased the property, was allowed to abandon the sale and then put into execution not the same decree, but a decree for a subsequent period, he would escape a liability which the statute imposed upon him, while, on the other hand, the tenant would be saddled with a liability of which the statute intended him to be relieved. For the landlord to proceed in that manner would be to commit a fraud upon the law which could not be permitted. 9. It may be pointed out that if Dr. Sen Gupta's second contention is sound, the first, in the facts of the present case, is of little importance. The second contention is that if a landlord, holding a number of rent decrees, puts into execution the last of them and purchases the property himself, the liability under the prior decrees is extinguished. If that be so, it follows that even if a landlord abandons the sale held in execution of a prior decree and puts a subsequent decree into execution, purchasing the property himself, he can realise only the dues under the second decree. Whether the first sale is completed or it is abandoned and a fresh sale is held in execution of a subsequent decree, the tenant, on Dr. Sen Gupta's contention, is liable in either case to pay the amount of only one of the decrees, at least directly. He is prejudiced only if the amount of the subsequent decree is higher. Indeed, he would seem to be in a worse position if the first sale is proceeded with and completed, for in view of the provisions of sec. 168A (1) (b), the bid at that sale would naturally take into account the subsequent arrears of rent so that, indirectly, the tenant would have to pay them in all, except where the property is not of sufficient value. 10. To return to the first point, I do not think that the implications of sec. 168A can be pushed so far as Dr. Sen Gupta contended. Sitting singly, I am bound by the decision in Phani Bhusan Mukherjee v. Purna Chandra Bagchi 48 C.W.N. 210 (1943) and must accept the position that the word "purchaser" in sec. 168A (1) (b) includes a landlord purchaser. But speaking with the utmost respect, I must say that I find it difficult to agree that the view taken of the clause in that decision is correct. Weighty reasons in favour of a contrary view have been given in the case of Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghose Bahadur v. Bhawani Charan Law 49 C.W.N. 552 (1945) but apart from those reasons, it seems to me that the words of the clause are plain. Weighty reasons in favour of a contrary view have been given in the case of Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghose Bahadur v. Bhawani Charan Law 49 C.W.N. 552 (1945) but apart from those reasons, it seems to me that the words of the clause are plain. When the clause directs that the purchaser shall be liable to "pay" to the "decree-holder" certain of his dues and certain costs incurred by him, it contemplates, in my opinion, a duality of the purchaser and the decree-holder. The primary provision is contained in sub-sec. (1) (b) which is a provision for "payment" to the decree-holder; sub-sec. (3) which prescribes a deposit is mere machinery; and the analogy of sec. 169, it seems to me, is of no assistance, since the payment, referred to there, is payment by the Court out of the sale proceeds, so that no question of an identity of the payor and the payee arises. Be that as it may, assuming, as I must, that a landlord purchaser also must pay or write off the rent fallen due since the date of the suit, it is to be noticed that the liability is not absolute. As sub-sec. (3) indicates, discharge of the liability is only a condition precedent to a confirmation of the sale and the penalty for a failure to discharge the liability is provided for by the section itself which is nothing more than that the sale shall not be confirmed. If a third party purchaser does not deposit the amount, the landlord cannot realise it from him, nor can the tenant recover it from him by way of re-imbursement or compensation, if the landlord makes him pay. There is no reason why a landlord purchaser should be in a worse position. If the position of landlord and stranger purchasers under sec. 168A (1) (b) be exactly the same, it must be the same for all purposes: if the liability be the same, its extent must be the same too. I cannot, therefore, see that if a landlord, after purchasing a tenure or holding in execution of a rent decree, does not proceed with the sale but proceeds to execute a decree for a subsequent period, any question of a fraud upon the statute arises. Nor can I see that there is any fraud in fact or any prejudice to the tenant. Nor can I see that there is any fraud in fact or any prejudice to the tenant. The sale not having been confirmed, the property remains his, the tenancy subsists and the position is as if the sale never took place. His liabilities remain exactly as they were before the sale. If a sale, at which the purchaser is a stranger, falls through, the landlord is not bound to proceed with the execution and it is not correct to say that there must always be a re-sale in execution of the same decree. Again, there can be no question that if a landlord, holding several decrees, puts one of them into execution but drops the proceeding before the property is brought to sale, he is at perfect liberty to execute thereafter another and a subsequent decree. The argument of Dr. Sen Gupta involves that the position is different, if the property is brought to sale. But unless it can be said that the moment a tenure or holding is sold at a rent sale, a right vests in the tenant to have all rents fallen due since the date of the suit in which the decree was passed, paid by the auction-purchaser, whether he be the landlord or a third party and- whether the sale be confirmed or not, the argument cannot possibly succeed. I cannot find in sec. 168A any such absolute right, arising from the mere holding of a sale. Nor can I agree that if a landlord does not complete a rent sale at which he himself purchased the property, but thereafter does no more than seek to recover from the tenant the rent for a subsequent period during which the tenant was in possession of the property, the landlord can be regarded as committing a fraud. 11. The first contention of Dr. Sen Gupta must accordingly fail. I may add that if this contention is sound, it is curious that it was not put forward at the time the third decree was put into execution when also the position was exactly the same. 12. The nature of the second contention has already been indicated. In developing the contention, Dr. Sen Gupta sought to support it by the following steps of reasoning: Under sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, rent is a first charge on the tenure or holding. 12. The nature of the second contention has already been indicated. In developing the contention, Dr. Sen Gupta sought to support it by the following steps of reasoning: Under sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, rent is a first charge on the tenure or holding. At a rent sale, the tenure or holding itself passes. Therefore, the charge also passes to the purchaser along with the property. When the purchaser is the landlord himself, the tenure or holding merges in the superior interest and with the merger of the property charged, the charge disappears. If the charge disappears, the liability disappears also, because the two are inseparable. Consequently, when the Respondents purchased the tenure in execution of the third decree, the Appellant's liability under the first and the second decrees was extinguished. 13. In my opinion, this argument proceeds on a view of sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act which is not correct. The question raised was debated in some old cases, more or less in the same form, but it was never sought to be revived in recent years. On the other hand, in cases decided under sec. 168A itself, a decree for antecedent rents has been held to be capable of execution against other properties of the tenant even after a purchase of the tenure by the landlord himself in satisfaction of his claim for rent for subsequent years. In Sree Sree Iswar Radha Ballav Jew Thakur v. Mahima Ranjan Roy 49 C.W.N. 629 (1945) the landlord, who had already purchased a putni tenure at a certificate sale for arrears of rent, was seeking to execute an antecedent rent decree for an antecedent period against other properties of the tenure-holder. It was held by Mukherjea and Ellis, JJ., that if a merger of the putni had occurred, he was entitled to proceed. Again, in Lakshan Chandra Roy Choudhary v. Birendra Kumar Singha 48 C.W.N. 837 (1944), a landlord who had previously purchased a putni taluk at a putni sale, was similarly seeking to execute an antecedent rent decree against other properties of the putnidar. It was held by Mitter and Sharpe, JJ., that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the putni must be taken to have merged and since the tenure had ceased to exist, there was no bar to execution of the previous decree against other properties. It was held by Mitter and Sharpe, JJ., that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the putni must be taken to have merged and since the tenure had ceased to exist, there was no bar to execution of the previous decree against other properties. It is true that the present question was not raised in those cases and the purchase by the landlord had also not been at a rent sale held under the Bengal Tenancy Act. But the decisions are relevant at least as showing that even after a merger of the tenancy, the landlord was held entitled to execute a prior rent decree against other properties of the tenant. 14. As far as I understand the matter, the provision contained in sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act that the rent is a first charge on the tenure or holding, only means that a sale held in execution of a decree for arrears of rent will produce the effect mentioned in Chapter XIV of Act [Royzuddi Sheik v. Kali Nath Mookerjee ILR 33 Cal. 985 (1906)], that is to say, the tenure or holding itself will pass and not merely the right, title and interest of the defaulting tenant.. The provision does not mean that the tenant has no personal liability for the rent and that the rent can be realised only from the security, i.e., the tenure or holding. Sec. 168A itself recognises this principle, for it provides by the proviso to sub-sec. (i) (a) that a decree for rent can be executed against other properties of the tenant after the tenure or holding has ceased to exist. As held in several decisions, one of the ways in which a tenancy may cease to exist is by merger on a purchase by the landlord. It is thus not possible to contend that the tenant's liability for rent is bound up or co-extensive with the charge or that the charge constitutes a security by enforcing which only rent can ever be realised. 15. Again, the provision for a charge in sec. 65 means that the rent falling due during the time that a tenure or holding belongs to a particular tenant is a first charge on the tenancy only so long as it is his and has not been sold away for arrears of rent [Faez Rahaman v. Ramsukh Bajpai ILR 21 Cal. 169 (1893)]. 65 means that the rent falling due during the time that a tenure or holding belongs to a particular tenant is a first charge on the tenancy only so long as it is his and has not been sold away for arrears of rent [Faez Rahaman v. Ramsukh Bajpai ILR 21 Cal. 169 (1893)]. The charge as follows from the decision of the Privy Council in Forbes v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh L.R. 41 I.A. 91 : S.C. 18 C.W.N. 747 (1913) and as explained by the Special Bench in Krishnapada Chatterjee v. Manada Sundari Ghose 36 C.W.N. 518 (1932) is of a provisional or relative character, being dependent on the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the creditor and the debtor. It follows that when the tenancy has passed from the tenant and vested in another person, whether he is the landlord or a third party, there is no longer any charge. In the former case, apart from there being no longer any relationship of landlord and tenant, the thing charged has itself disappeared. Consequently, it follows further that even if the effect of sec. 65 be to limit the landlord to the charge so long as the charge lasts--and that is now expressly provided in sec. 168A--there is nothing so to limit him when the charge has ceased to exist. 16. There is no meaning in saying that a purchaser at a rent sale takes the tenure or holding with the charge for antecedent rents and that even a landlord purchaser does so. No such charge passes or can pass to the purchaser. Sec. 65 merely provides that the rent shall be a first charge "on the tenure or holding," which means the tenure or holding as held by the tenant who is liable for the rent. The very conception of a charge involves this, for a charge is nothing more than a security for a particular person's liability. The rent is the tenant's debt and a charge for it can be imposed only on some property belonging to him and sec. 65 imposes it on his tenancy. The charge created by the section is not an absolute liability, running with the land, to whomsoever it passes. A purchaser at a rent sale does not take the property, subject to its liability for previous arrears [Faez Rahaman v. Ramsukh Bajpai ILR 21 Cal. 65 imposes it on his tenancy. The charge created by the section is not an absolute liability, running with the land, to whomsoever it passes. A purchaser at a rent sale does not take the property, subject to its liability for previous arrears [Faez Rahaman v. Ramsukh Bajpai ILR 21 Cal. 169 (1893)] or, as was observed in a case where the facts were almost exactly similar, a tenure, when sold in execution of the last of three rent decrees, passes to the purchaser, free of the landlord's charge under the prior decrees and cannot be sold again [Satya Sankar Ghosal v. Monomohan Guha 22 C.W.N. 131 (1917), per N.R. Chatterjea, J.]. Dr. Sen Gupta did not contend that the charge under the first two decrees was subsisting in the present case, but in so far as he contended that it first passed to the Respondents and was only then extinguished by merger, I cannot accept his contention as correct. No charge under the first two decrees passed to the Respondents at all. 17. If no charge for antecedent rents survives a rent sale and none passes to the purchaser, the argument that when the purchaser is the landlord, the tenant's liability for such rents is extinguished by merger of the charge, must be negatived. The only other way in which extinction of the liability can be made out is by saying either that there is no liability at all apart from the charge or that, apart from the charge, it cannot be enforced or that the liability, as distinguished from the charge, passes to the purchaser, so that when the purchaser is the landlord, the liability is extinguished by reason of the debtor and the creditor becoming the same person. The first of these contentions has already been answered above. The second also is covered by that answer, but a special point sought to be made by Dr. Sen Gupta may be dealt with. He contended that since what sec. 65 created was a "charge," it could be realised only from the charged properties by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that most of the grounds on which a charge under sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was distinguished from a charge under sec. He contended that since what sec. 65 created was a "charge," it could be realised only from the charged properties by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that most of the grounds on which a charge under sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was distinguished from a charge under sec. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act in the old case of Fotick Chunder Dey Shear v. Foley ILR 15 Cal. 498 (1887) have now disappeared, because of amendments of both the Acts. But assuming that the incidents of a charge under sec. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are now practically the same as those of charges contemplated by sec. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the approximation is of no assistance to the Appellant. It may be that by reason of the provisions of sec. 168A, the landlord has now to proceed first against the tenancy, just as by reason of sec. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act, read with sec. 100, as also Or. 34, r. 15 of the Civil Procedure Code, the holder of a charge must first exhaust his remedies against the property charged, unless otherwise permitted by the Court. But where there is also a personal liability, as there is in the case of a tenant under the Bengal Tenancy Act, the holder of a charge can, under the Transfer of Property Act as well, enforce that liability after his remedies against the property charged have been exhausted. It follows that when the tenancy has been sold away in enforcement of the charge, there is no bar under the Transfer of Property Act against enforcement of the personal liability and neither is there any bar under the Bengal Tenancy Act when the tenancy has not only been sold away but has also ceased to exist and thus the special condition laid down in that Act has been satisfied. Lastly, it may be added that the principle invoked by Dr. Sen Gupta applies only to realisation of the same debt by enforcing the personal liability or by following the charge and it has, strictly speaking, no application where what is being sought to be realised is not the same debt but another. Lastly, it may be added that the principle invoked by Dr. Sen Gupta applies only to realisation of the same debt by enforcing the personal liability or by following the charge and it has, strictly speaking, no application where what is being sought to be realised is not the same debt but another. The position in the present case is that the landlord, holding two separate charges on the same property under two separate decrees and having sold and purchased the property in enforcement of one, is trying to realise the other from other properties of the debtor. There is nothing in any law to prevent him from doing so. 18. The last question, viz., whether the personal liability of the tenant for antecedent rents passes to the purchaser of the tenancy at a rent sale is easily answered. It is true that, at a money sale, the liability passes and the reason is obvious, because what is sold is only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor [Sailaja Prosad Chatterjee v. Gyani Das 18 C.L.J. 29 (1912) and Midnapore Zamindary Co., Ltd. v. Mrinal Kanti Roy 42 C.W.N. 967 (1938)]. But a rent sale conveys the tenure or holding itself and the personal liabilities of the tenant are left behind with him [Mathura Mohan Saha v. Nabin Chandra Dutta 20 C.W.N. 749 : S.C. 24 C.L.J. 34 (1916)]. A money sale held under the provisions of the CPC passes the property, subject to the incumbrances which must be notified [Or. 21, r. 66 (2) (e)]; but a rent sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act passes an occupancy holding with power to avoid all incumbrances and a tenure, subject to, or with power to annul, incumbrances according to the conditions of the sale (secs. 164-166). The distinction in the last case has no bearing on the liability for antecedent rents, for such rents are not an incumbrance, as defined in sec. 161 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This liability does not pass to the purchaser. 164-166). The distinction in the last case has no bearing on the liability for antecedent rents, for such rents are not an incumbrance, as defined in sec. 161 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This liability does not pass to the purchaser. It is true that in one case, Haradhan Chattoraj v. Kartik Chandra Chattopadhyaya 6 C.W.N. 877 (1902) even a purchaser at a rent sale was held liable for antecedent rents, but that was on the ground that the sale had been with an express notification of the liability, though such notification was not permitted by law, and the purchaser had, in consequence, paid a price which left a provision for the previous arrears. While so holding, the Court at the same time emphasised that, normally, upon a sale of a tenure or holding for its own arrears of rent, the liability for previous arrears could not and did not pass to the purchaser. The Appellant in the present case cannot, therefore, contend that his liability under the first two decrees passed to the Respondents when they purchased the tenure in execution of the third decree and was thereupon extinguished. 19. Although I have discussed Dr. Sen Gupta's contentions at some length, it seems to me that the proviso to sec. 168A (1) (a), read with cl. (b), is almost a complete answer to the whole of his argument. If on an expiry of the tenancy, the landlord can proceed to execute a decree for rent against other properties of the tenant and if, as now well-established, a tenancy may expire by purchase by the landlord at a rent sale, the proviso obviously contemplates that even after extinction of the tenancy by merger, the tenant's liability for antecedent rents remains. 20. In the result, upon principle, upon statutory provisions and, so far as the cases go, upon authority, I am of opinion that the Appellant's liability under the second decree has not been extinguished and that in the events that have happened, there is no bar to the Respondents executing the said decree against other properties of the Appellant. Both the contentions urged by Dr. Sen Gupta thus fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, but I make no order as to costs.