JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This rule has been obtained by the plaintiff whose application for possession of certain premises made before the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta, under S. 41, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, has been rejected. 2. The plaintiff brought his suit on the ground that he required the premises for his own use and occupation by reason of the fact that his wife was ill and that it was necessary to bring her to Calcutta for treatment. He served notice of ejectment on the defendant and then applied to the Rent Controller to institute the present application in accordance with the provisions of S. 13, Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946. The Rent Controller passed an order holding that upon the evidence before him "a prima facie case" had been made out and granted him permission to file a suit in ejectment on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for his own use. This order of the Rent Controller was upheld on appeal. The plaintiff then proceeded with his application for possession before the Court of Small Causes. That Court held that it was not satisfied that the premises were required bona fide by the plaintiff. It held that having regard to all the circumstances of the case the "alleged bona fide requirements" were not proved. On this ground the claim for possession was rejected having regard to the provisions of S. 12, Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946. 3. The plaintiff who, as I have said before, obtained this Rule, urged first that the rent controller having held in favour of the plaintiff on the question of bona fide requirement it was not open to the Court of Small Causes trying the suit to go into this question again. In my opinion this contention is not sound. All that the Rent Controller has to decide is whether the petitioner before him for permission to institute a suit has shown sufficient cause which would entitle the Rent Controller to hold that the petitioner required the premises bona fide for his own use. The words used are "sufficient cause to hold" and these words are significant. They indicate, in my opinion, that the finding of the Rent Controller is not conclusive so far as the Court deciding the suit for ejectment or application for ejectment is concerned. The words used are "sufficient cause to hold" and these words are significant. They indicate, in my opinion, that the finding of the Rent Controller is not conclusive so far as the Court deciding the suit for ejectment or application for ejectment is concerned. All that the Rent Controller has to decide is whether a prima facie case has been made out before him which would entitle him to grant permission to the landlord to sue. He merely, as it were, removes the bar which is imposed by the Calcutta Rent Ordinance to the entertainment of such suits by the Court. The bar having been removed it is still open to the Court to decide whether or not the landlord requires the premises bona fide. It is the Court which passes a decree for ejectment and not the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller, in fact, is not a Court, and the Court will not pass a decree in ejectment unless it is satisfied that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for his own use and occupation. This is quite clear from the provisions of S. 12(1) read with its proviso of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946. In sub-s. (1) of S. 12 it is laid down that no order or decree shall be made for the recovery of possession of any premises as long as a tenant pays rent etc. in spite of or notwithstanding anything contained in the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, T.P. Act or the Contract Act. This order or decree is one which is to be made not by the Rent Controller but by the Court trying the suit. Sub-section (1) of S. 12 applies to the Court trying the suit or application for ejectment. The proviso to sub-s. (1) must also apply to the Court trying the suit or application for ejectment; the proviso says in cl. (d) that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall apply where the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for his own use or occupation etc., or "where the landlord can show any cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court." It is therefore quite clear that it is the Court which has to decide whether the elements mentioned in cl. (d) of the proviso exist. The fact that the Rent Controller has decided this question is not sufficient. (d) of the proviso exist. The fact that the Rent Controller has decided this question is not sufficient. The Court must come to its own conclusion on this point. The Rent Controller's decision merely removes the bar to the entertainment of the suit. It does nothing further. There is therefore no substance in the contention of the petitioner that the Court was in error in considering this question. 4. The next point which arises is whether the Court has decided this question erroneously. I am unable to hold that there has been any such erroneous decision of this question as would justify interference under S. 115, Civil P.C. The Court has considered the evidence and has come to the finding that the story of bona fide requirement is not true. I do not decide in this application whether it is necessary for the landlord to show that he required the premises bona fide at the time when the decree is about to be passed because I find that the decision of the Court of Small Causes is that both at the time of the application before the Rent Controller and at the time of the institution of the application for ejectment the case of bona fide requirement was not proved. That is how I read the judgment of the learned Court of Small Causes. 5. The last point argued is that the Court is bound to record a memorandum of the evidence so as to enable this Court to decide whether its decision was correct and that the failure to so record the evidence amounts to an error which would attract the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. In my opinion, this contention also must fail. Section 9, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act lays down that the High Court shall prescribe the procedure to be followed and the practice to be observed by the Small Cause Court by making rules, Rules have been made and R. 114 lays down that the portions of the Code set forth in the schedule annexed to the rules and marked A are extended to the Court of Small Causes. Looking at this schedule I find that Rr. 1, 2 and portion of R. 16 of O. 18, Civil P.C. have been made applicable to the Court of Small Causes. Looking at this schedule I find that Rr. 1, 2 and portion of R. 16 of O. 18, Civil P.C. have been made applicable to the Court of Small Causes. Rule 13 which makes it obligatory upon the Court in non-appealable cases to make a memorandum of the substance of the deposition of a witness is not extended to the Court of 'Small Causes. Nor are rules under O. 18 which require the Court to record the evidence of a witness in extenso made applicable. That being so, I hold that it is not incumbent upon the Judge of the Presidency Small Cause Court to record the evidence or a memorandum thereof. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on S. 48, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act which is in the following terms: In all proceedings under this Chapter, the Small Cause Court shall, as far as may be and except as herein otherwise provided, follow the procedure prescribed for a Court of first instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. It was argued that this section attracts the operation of O. 18, Civil P.C. in its entirety. I am unable to accept this view inasmuch as it is clear from the words of the section itself that if part of the procedure prescribed by the CPC is otherwise excepted in the Act that exception shall prevail. 6. Having regard to the views which I have taken above I must uphold the decision of the Court below and discharge this rule with costs hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.