JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed by the Court of Small Causes. Certain facts have to be stated for the proper understanding of this matter. The tenancy which forms the subject-matter of the suit commenced in April, 1943. On the 11th September, 1945, the joint Receivers of the property in suit applied before the Rent Controller under the provisions of the Calcutta Rent Control Order of 1943 for permission to sue in ejectment on the ground that they required the premises bona fide for their own use and occupation. The application was treated by the Rent Controller as an application by Ganesh Dhar, a mother of one of the applicants. Ganesh Dhar gave evidence to the effect that he had no place to live in and that he required the premises in question for his own use. He relied upon certain orders passed by this Court in other proceedings wherein he (Ganesh Dhar) was treated as a beneficiary in respect of these premises. The learned Rent Controller found that if Ganesh Dhar did not vacate the premises of which he was in occupation he would have to pay an exhorbitant amount of rent, viz., Rs. 150 a month whereas the rent of the premises which he wanted to occupy was much less. Thereupon he passed an order giving permission to the applicants to file a suit in ejectment. The order admittedly is somewhat irregular inasmuch as the premises were required bond fide not by the applicants but by Ganesh Dhar. Be that as it may, the applicants were given permission to sue and that order of the Rent Controller was upheld on appeal and it stands as a valid order. On the 8th July, 1946, the joint Receivers were discharged and the tenant was asked to attorn to the Plaintiff Ganesh Dhar. The tenant complied. On the 18th July, 1946, a notice of ejectment was served on the tenant by Ganesh Dhar directing him to vacate the premises by the end of August. On the 8th July, 1946, the joint Receivers were discharged and the tenant was asked to attorn to the Plaintiff Ganesh Dhar. The tenant complied. On the 18th July, 1946, a notice of ejectment was served on the tenant by Ganesh Dhar directing him to vacate the premises by the end of August. On the 13th September, 1946, a suit in ejectment was filed by Ganesh Dhar in the Court of Small Causes, In that suit Ganesh Dhar alleged that he was entitled to get a decree in ejectment on the ground of notice to quit inasmuch as the Rent Control Order did not bar such a decree where the premises were required bond fide by the landlord for his own occupation. Thereafter on the 1st October, 1946, the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 came into force. The Plaintiff Ganesh Dhar then applied for amendment of his plaint and by the amendment he sought recovery of possession on the ground of notice to quit on the footing that the Defendant had sublet the premises without the consent in writing of the landlord and had thereby disentitled himself to the protection of sec. 12 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946. The ground of bond fide requirement by the landlord of the premises was given up. This is shown both by the order of the learned Court of Small Causes and by the amended plaint wherein those paragraphs were struck out. According to the plaint as amended the suit was one for ejectment of the Defendant on the ground that the tenancy had been terminated by a notice to quit. It was stated that the tenant could not get the advantage of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 as he had sublet the premises thereby attracting the operation of Proviso (b) to sec. 12 (1) of the aforesaid Rent Ordinance. The learned Judge took evidence both on the ground of bona fide requirement and on the ground of subletting. Thereafter he parsed a decree in ejectment. He has not stated the ground on which the decree has been passed nor has he recorded the evidence. The provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act do not require him either to record the evidence or to write a judgment in which the grounds of his decision are stated. 2. Thereafter he parsed a decree in ejectment. He has not stated the ground on which the decree has been passed nor has he recorded the evidence. The provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act do not require him either to record the evidence or to write a judgment in which the grounds of his decision are stated. 2. The Plaintiff having struck out the averments regarding bona fide requirements I am of the opinion that no decree can be passed in favour of the Plaintiff on the ground that Proviso (d) to sec. 12 (1) of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance applied to this case and rendered nugatory the provisions of sec. 12, sub-sec. (1) whereby the landlord is debarred from getting a decree in ejectment so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable by this Ordinance and performs the conditions of the tenancy inspite of anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act of 1882, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act of 1882 and the Indian Contract Act of 1872. 3. The next question for decision is whether the decree in ejectment can be justified on the ground that the tenant cannot avail himself of the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 12 by reason of the operation of a Proviso (b) to sec. 12 (1). The proviso is in the following terms:-- Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply, (b) where in the absence of any contract to the contrary the tenant has without the consent in writing of the landlord, sublet the premises in whole or in part. 4. Subletting must have been found by the learned Court of Small Causes. The subletting, however, was done in 1943 long prior to the coming into force of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946. This fact also appears from the papers which have been placed before me in this case and it is not denied. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the tenant contends that the landlord should not be given the advantage of Proviso (6) because that would amount to giving the Act retrospective effect. This contention is that Proviso (b) to sec. 12 (1) disentitles a tenant from getting the protection of sec. 12 (1) only when the tenant has sublet the premises after the Ordinance has come into force. This contention is that Proviso (b) to sec. 12 (1) disentitles a tenant from getting the protection of sec. 12 (1) only when the tenant has sublet the premises after the Ordinance has come into force. He draws my attention to the well-known principle that an Act is not to be given retrospective effect unless the words of the Act expressly or impliedly indicate that such effect is to be given. If it does so impliedly the implication must be perfectly clear. Formally the Court should construe an Act as having effect from the date on which it comes into force. There can be no doubt regarding the soundness of this principle and in deciding this matter I keep this principle in mind; but 3 hold that on the facts of the present case Proviso (b) does not protect the tenant and in holding this I do not think I am offending against the principle enunciated above. I am not giving the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 any retrospective effect, either in respect of the landlord or the tenant. Under the ordinary law the landlord is entitled to eject a tenant of this description on the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice to quit which has been given. The Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 protects a certain class of tenant from such ejectment by virtue of the provisions of sec. 12 (1). The protection is, however, restricted by the proviso to sub-sec. (1). Sub-sec. (1) says that a tenant who pays his rent to the full extent allowable by the Ordinance and performs the conditions of the tenancy shall be protected from ejectment. The provisos seek to restrict this protection and they say in effect, that although a tenant may be protected by reason of the provision of sec. 12 (1) such protection shall not be extended to a tenant if he comes within the mischief of any of the provisos. If therefore, a tenant comes within the mischief of Proviso (6) he cannot get the protection which is afforded to him by sub-sec. (1). Inasmuch as valuable rights of the landlord are being taken away by sec. 12 and inasmuch as the general law is also being altered by it the section must be tons trued as strictly and as literally as possible. (1). Inasmuch as valuable rights of the landlord are being taken away by sec. 12 and inasmuch as the general law is also being altered by it the section must be tons trued as strictly and as literally as possible. Courts should be careful not to make inroads into the rights of the subject granted by the ordinary law unless they are compelled to do so by the express words of an Act. Proviso (b) says that the inroad made into the rights of the landlord by sub-sec. (1) shall not be permitted where the tenant has, without the consent in writing of the landlord, sublet the premises in whole or in part, in the absence of any contract to the contrary. Here there was no contract to the contrary. There is no evidence given nor is there any allegation to the effect that any consent in writing of the landlord to sublet has been obtained. All the elements of Proviso (b) are, therefore, present and in my opinion it prevents the tenant from obtaining the benefit of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 12. In this view I am supported by a decision of this Court in Purusottam Lal Sarogi Vs. Mt. Hawi Bai, AIR 1947 Cal 401 . 5. In these circumstances I am unable to hold that the decision of the Court below is against the law and I must, therefore, discharge this Rule. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, I think that the parties should bear their own costs.