JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This Rule arises out of certain proceedings under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act which were commenced in 1939 and were terminated by the order complained of only in January, 1947, at a time when they had not got far beyond the initial stage. Quite naturally, the facts have become a tangled mass but in unravelling them I have been much assisted by the petition presented to this Court which is marked by great clarity and precision. It appears that the Petitioner is one of three persons who obtained a loan of Rs. 5,500 upon a mortgage from the Opposite Party on the 30th of September, 1945. On that mortgage the Opposite Party brought a suit, viz., T. S. No. 103 of 1939, on the 8th of September of that year, claiming Rs. 7,365-12. Thereupon the three debtors made three applications under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act before the Daspara Debt Settlement Board and the usual notice under sec. 34 of the Act was issued for the stay of the mortgage suit. The applications to the Board were made on the footing that the three debtors were liable severally for proportionate parts of the mortgage debt. On the 5th of September, 1940, the Board dismissed the applications on the finding that it had no jurisdiction but it also held that the Petitioners before the Board were not debtors within the meaning of the Act. The order for stay having thus been vacated the mortgage suit was resumed and on the 4th of February, 1941, a preliminary decree was passed for a sum of Rs. 7,784-6. I understand that it was a decree passed under the Bengal Money-Lenders Act and provided for five instalments none of which has up till now been paid. 2. The next move of the debtors was to make fresh applications before the Special Debt Settlement Board at Alipore and again they obtained an order under sec. 24 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The applications, however, were transferred to the Maheshtala Board and that Board, by an order passed on the 18th of January, 1942, sent up the applications to the Collector for his sanction in the view that the debts exceeded Rs. 5,000. 24 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The applications, however, were transferred to the Maheshtala Board and that Board, by an order passed on the 18th of January, 1942, sent up the applications to the Collector for his sanction in the view that the debts exceeded Rs. 5,000. The Additional District Magistrate, by an order dated the 17th of April, 1942, returned the applications to the Board and directed it to determine first the amount of the debt payable in the case of each debtor and if it was found that the amount exceeded Rs. 5,000, to apply immediately for sanction. He also stated that if the question of the debtors' status had not been decided, that also should be decided at once as it was an essential preliminary to all further proceedings being taken under the Act. 3. I may now go at once to an important order passed by the Maheshtala Board on remand round which much argument centered. It was an order passed on the 7th of February, 1943, by which the Board decided that the debtors were agricultural debtors within the meaning of the Act. The Opposite Party, as one of the creditors, applied for a review of that order but his application was rejected on the 28th of August, 1943. Thereafter the Board took up the question of determining the amount of debts and on the 26th of December, 1943, it came to the conclusion that in neither case did the amount of the debt exceed Rs. 5,000. This conclusion was reached on the basis that the liability owing to Opposite Party No. 1 under the mortgage debt could be split up as between the several joint debtors. The Opposite Party appealed against the order of the 26th of December, 1943, but did not appeal against the earlier order passed on the 7th of February. There were necessarily three appeals as there were three cases and they were ultimately decided by the Appellate Officer on the 17th of June, 1944. The Appellate Officer took the view that the mortgage debt could not be split up and since it was manifestly a debt exceeding Rs. 5,000 sanction of the Collector had to be applied for. There were necessarily three appeals as there were three cases and they were ultimately decided by the Appellate Officer on the 17th of June, 1944. The Appellate Officer took the view that the mortgage debt could not be split up and since it was manifestly a debt exceeding Rs. 5,000 sanction of the Collector had to be applied for. The Appellate Officer also observed that he was not called upon to decide the question of the status of the debtors, inasmuch as there was no appeal before him with respect to that matter. It was, however, added that in considering whether sanction ought or ought not to be given the Collector would be free to consider the question of the status of the applicants as much as any other question which he might consider, relevant. 4. Against this order of the Appellate Officer one of the debtors moved the District Judge in revision under sec. 40A of the Act, and the case came to be numbered as Revision Case No. 52 of 1944. This case was disposed of on the 20th of October, 1944, and the learned District Judge upheld the order of the Appellate Officer to the effect that the mortgage debt could not be split up. He too added an observation that the question of the status of the debtors could not be gone into by him inasmuch as there had been no appeal on that question. The applications, when they came back to the Maheshtala Board, were numbered 293, 284 and 285 of the year 1944, but later, when that Board ceased to function, they were transferred to the Special Debt Settlement Board at Alipore where they had been first filed and cases Nos. 48, 49 and 5O of 1945 came to be commenced upon them. The Special Debt Settlement Board at Alipore, on taking up the consideration of the cases, took the view that it had first to decide the exact scope of the proceedings which it was entitled to take and that for that purpose it was necessary to examine the order made by the learned District Judge. It is not necessary to refer to certain intermediate orders passed by the Board. It is not necessary to refer to certain intermediate orders passed by the Board. On the 5th of September, 1945, the Board came definitely to the conclusion that the question of the status of the debtors which had been decided by the Maheshtala Board could not be re-opened before it, since the Alipore Board had been directed only to conclude the proceedings and not to retry the cases de novo. It came ultimately to the conclusion that the Board ought to proceed with the cases as from the stage to which they had been brought by the order of the Maheshtala Board as amended and modified by the order of the Appellate Officer, subsequently upheld by the District Judge. 5. Again, it is not necessary to refer to certain orders which followed till we reach the 28th of November, 1945. It is only necessary to mention that before that date some applications were made by the Opposite Party and another creditor, charging the debtors with abusing the process of the Act with a view to defrauding the creditors. On the 28th of November, the Board seems to have considered all the applications which had been made in the proceedings at various stages and it recorded its final order, dismissing the applications for relief under the Act under sec. 17 (1) (b) (ii) on the ground that the debtors were attempting to use the provisions of the Act with a view to defrauding their creditors. The Petitioner and his co-debtors preferred appeals to the Appellate Officer against this order and having lost there, moved the learned District Judge in revision, before whom also they were unsuccessful. Thereupon the Petitioner moved this Court and obtained me present Rule. 6. On behalf of the Petitioner, Mr. Chatterjee has taken before me two grounds. He has argued that the Alipore Board having rightly taken the view on the 5th of September, 1945, that the question of the status of the debtors had been concluded by the order of the Maheshtala Board and that what was left to be completed was only a determination of the amount of the debt and matters relating thereto, was wrong and indeed acted without jurisdiction in entering upon the question of debtor's status on the 28th of November, 1945. The second ground urged was that in any event the Alipore Board had no jurisdiction to pass an order under sec. 17 (1) (b) (ii) on the ground they did, in the absence of any materials on record and virtually on the ground that the applicants before the Board were debtors. 7. Mr. Das Gupta who appeared on behalf of the Opposite Party contended that there was no bar in law to the Alipore Board re-determining the question of status at the stage they did and that in any event the final order of the Board could be construed as an order passed on the basis that the applicants before the Board were in fact debtors, but still came within the mischief of sec. 17 (1) (b) (ii). 8. It appears to me that this case can be disposed of on a short ground but having regard to the thoroughness with which the matters in issue were argued before me, I would briefly indicate my opinion thereon. As regards the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the status of the debtors having been determined by the Maheshtala Board on the 7th of February, 1943, could not be re-opened by the Alipore Board, I agree that such would be the position if the Maheshtala Board in making the finding it did, had acted with jurisdiction. It is true that sec. 17 speaks of making an order contemplated by that section "at any stage of the proceedings," but that can only mean that the Board is not bound to make an order at the beginning of its proceedings and cannot mean that after deciding a question at one stage the Board can reopen and re-decide it at a subsequent stage. Although the Board is empowered to make an order at any stage, it is entitled to make an order only once, but the real answer to Mr. Chatterjee's argument is to be found in Rules 144 and 145 of the Rules framed under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The Act, taken by itself, confers jurisdiction on Debt Settlement Boards only in respect of cases where the amount involved is Rs. 5,000 or less. If the amount is larger, the Act by itself does not suffice to confer jurisdiction but must be supplemented by the sanction of the Collector. The Act, taken by itself, confers jurisdiction on Debt Settlement Boards only in respect of cases where the amount involved is Rs. 5,000 or less. If the amount is larger, the Act by itself does not suffice to confer jurisdiction but must be supplemented by the sanction of the Collector. It will appear from the language of the rules to which I have referred that in cases to which they apply, the sanction of the Collector must be obtained before any ether action is taken. In the present case in view of the ultimate finding of the Appellate Officer and the District Judge and indeed as is clear from the facts of the case--the amount of the debt was clearly larger than Rs. 5,000. Prior to making the order of the 7th of February, 1943, the Maheshtala Board had not obtained the sanction of the Collector. It is thus clear that the order passed by the Maheshtala Board on that date was one without jurisdiction and cannot be set up as a bar to the Alipore Board deciding the same question over again. 9. With regard to the second contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the Board acted in the absence of any proper materials, I am unable either to accept it as correct in fact or as furnishing any ground for interference in revision. As I have stated already, there were at least two applications by two creditors accusing the debtors of fraudulent conduct. Mr. Chatterjee, it seems to me, was not right in saying that the order of the 28th of November, 1945, proceeded on the basis that the Alipore Board was free to re-open the question of the status of the debtors. It re-iterates at the beginning of that order and also towards the end that it was not so free and keeping that disability in mind, it still decides that the applications ought to be dismissed by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the debtors. It is true that one of the instances of fraud relied upon by the Alipore Board seems to be the claim put forward by the debtors to be agriculturists; but to record that as one of the matters for consideration for the purpose of deciding a question under sec. 17 (1) (b) (ii) is a very different thing from reversing a previous finding of a predecessor Board in the same proceeding. 17 (1) (b) (ii) is a very different thing from reversing a previous finding of a predecessor Board in the same proceeding. At any rate, the Board had other materials before it to which it expressly referred and I cannot interfere with its order in revision on the ground that it had acted on insufficient materials. The other facts of the case, such as they are, might well have induced the Board to take the view it did. It is noticeable that sec. 17 does not provide for the dismissal of a case on the ground that the applicant is not a debtor, but mentions other grounds and an application may be dismissed under the section even if the applicant is a debtor. 10. There is, however, one fundamental ground on which the order made by the Board must be held to have been passed without jurisdiction. As I have stated already it has been finally decided and it could not have been decided otherwise--that the amount of debt involved in this case exceeds Rs. 5,000. The Appellate Officer in passing his order dated the 17th of June, 1944, clearly indicated that sanction of the Collector had to be obtained. Such sanction has not been obtained up till now. It follows that just as the Maheshtala Board must now be held to have had no jurisdiction to make the order it did on the 7th of February, 1943, so had the Alipore Special Board no jurisdiction to make any orders in the case till it asked for and obtained the sanction of the Collector. The order complained of and indeed all the orders passed by the Alipore Debt Settlement Board on and from the 5th of September, 1945, must be held to be and to have been without jurisdiction. The first thing which the Alipore Board had to do on taking up the same and after apprising itself of the nature of the proceedings already had, was to apply for and obtain a sanction from the Collector. That step must now be taken and all orders passed by the Board on the merits of the case must be declared to be nullities. 11. That step must now be taken and all orders passed by the Board on the merits of the case must be declared to be nullities. 11. It is necessary to add that the Collector, when a reference is made to him for sanction, will not be debarred from considering for himself the question of the status of the debtors in deciding whether sanction ought or ought not to be granted. The Act does not lay down any principles on which he is to exercise his discretion and clearly what has happened so far before the Board and other authorities will not preclude him in any way from considering the question of status on his own account. It may also be added that up till row there is no finding made by any competent Board that the applicants are or sire not debtors. 12. In the result this Rule is made absolut and the order by the District Judge on the 15th of January, 1947, that of the Appellate Officer passed on the 11th of May, 1946, and all orders of the Alipore Debt Settlement Board passed on and after the 5th of September, 1945, are set aside. The District Judge is directed to send the case back to the Alipore Special Debt Settlement Board for disposal in accordance with the observations made in this judgment. If the Collector grants sanction, the question under sec. 17(I) (b) (ii) and any other question of arising in the case including the question of staus and decide such questions in the way it may deem fit and proper. There will be no order for costs in this Rule. The order for ad interim stay passed at the time of issuing the Rule expires with this decision.