Judgment Narayan, J. 1. This appeal is directed against an order of the Subordinate Judge, first Court, Muzaffarpur, dismissing a petition of objection filed by the J. Ds. in an execution proceeding. The objection was to the effect that the application for execution was time barred. 2. A preliminary decree for partition had been passed on 23-12-1931, & this decree was made final on 23-12-1935. An appeal was preferred to this Court against the preliminary decree on 13-3-1936, & this appeal was dismissed on 12-1-1939. The D. Hs. applied for the execution of the decree on 5-6-1942 & the J. Ds. filed an application under Sec. 47, Civil P. C. objecting to the maintainability of the execution petition on the ground that it had not been filed in time. The petition was rejected by the Court of first instance, but on appeal this Court by its order dated 10-11-1944 held the execution to be time barred. 3. While the matter was pending before this Court delivery of possession in pursuance of the final decree was given to the parties in June, 1943. On 8-11-1943, however, deft. 3 p in a petition for the amendment of the decree, & the amendment was allowed on 2-2-1944. The present application for execution was filed on 6-12-1945, & an objection was taken that the application for execution could not be deemed to be in time because no fresh terminus a quo was available to the D. H. on account of the amendment of the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that a fresh terminus a quo was available to the D. H. on account of the amendment of the decree & accordingly he held that the application for execution was within time. In my opinion, the view taken by the Subordinate Judge is correct, & now there is a preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view which he has taken. In Magan Lal y. Sitaram, 16 Pat 290; Wort, J, after reviewing the authorities on the point came to the conclusion that where a decree was amended more than three years after it was passed & the J. D. objected to the execution of the amended decree, the terminus a quo would be deemed to be the amendment & not the original decree. His Lordship further pointed out that it was not open to the executing Court to go behind the order of amendment & to enquire if the decree was really barred on the date of amendment or not. 4. In Rameshwar Narain V/s. Raghunandan, 16 Pat 453, Fazl Ali, J. (as he then was) and Madan, J. no doubt expressed some doubt as to whether in all cases of amendment of the decree, a fresh terminus a quo was available to the D. H. for the execution of the decree. But with the utmost respect, I would point out that whatever their Lordships have said in this case must be regarded as obiter dicta. Their Lordships ultimate decision on the merits of that particular case was that the amendment, on the basis of which the D. H. claimed that he had a fresh starting point of limitation, was no real amendment. While referring to Clause (4) of Article 182, Limitation Act, his Lordship, Fazl Ali, J. observed that this provision had been somewhat unhappily drafted & was liable to present some difficulties, but their Lordships in this ease did not finally lay down any principle which can be deemed to be in conflict with the principles laid down in other cases, namely cases of the Calcutta High Court as well as of the Madras High Court in all of which reliance has been placed on the following observations of the Privy Council in the case of Nagendra V/s. Suresh, 60 Cal : "Their Lordships think that nothing would be gained by discussing these varying authorities in detail. They think that the question must be decided upon the plain words of the Article : Where there has been an appeal, time is to run from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. There is, in their Lordships opinion, no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the words mean just what they say. The fixation of period of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, & may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place, & the strict grammatical meaning of the words is their Lordships think, the only safe guide. The fixation of period of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, & may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place, & the strict grammatical meaning of the words is their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that, so long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution, which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor, in such a case as this, is the J. D, prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, &, if he is virtuously inclined, there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court. But whether there be or be not a theoretical justification for the provision in question, their Lordships think that the words of the Article are plain, & that there, having been in the present case an appeal from the mortgage decree of 24-6-1920, time only ran against the appellants from 24-8-1922, the date of the appellate Courts decree." Undoubtedly, their Lordships were not dealing with a case under Clause (4) of Article 182, Limitation Act, but the rule of construction which their Lordships have laid down is binding on us & has been applied in several authorities to a case under Clause (4) of Article 182. 5. Relying on this Privy Council decision, the Lahore High Court in a very recent case Imam Din V/s. Peoples Instalment & Saving Bank, Ltd., Lahore, AIR (28) 1941 Lah 131, held that "it is not the function of the executing Court to question the correctness or propriety of the amendment of the decree. That is a matter which should be agitated before the Court, which amended the decree, at the time when proceedings for amendment were going on." 6. That is a matter which should be agitated before the Court, which amended the decree, at the time when proceedings for amendment were going on." 6. In a Calcutta case Manohur Chandra V/s. Sudhi Priya, 41 CWN 1330, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that under Article 182, Clause (4), Limitation Act, time for the execution of a decree, which was amended, ran from the date of the amendment & that it was absolutely beyond the competence of the executing Court to decide as to whether the order for the amendment of the decree was proper or not, even though the amendment was made beyond three years of the date of the decree. 7. A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in Lakshmikanta Rao V/s. Rarnayya, AIR (22) 1935 Mad 97 & their Lordships in this case also relied on the observations of Sir Dinshah Mulla in the Privy Council case referred to above. 8. In a recent case of this Court in Kesho Singh V/s. Bhuneshwari, AIR (29) 1942 Pat 478, Agarwala, J. (as he then was) held that where the amendment was of a substantial nature, it resulted in time running against the J. Ds. from the date it was made & not from the date of the original decree. 9. Even if, however, a question can arise, in spite of the Privy Council decision referred to above & the other authorities on the point, whether only a substantial amendment can create a fresh terminus a quo for the D. H., in this particular case we have no doubt that the amendment was a substantial one. The order in the final decree runs as follows : "Let the suit be decreed finally & on judicial stamp being filed, a final decree be prepared. The Commissioners report, map & the takhta-bandi will form part of the decree. Costs of commission should be proportionately borne by the parties. Other cost is lost." 10. This order means that only the costs of commission had to be proportionately divided between the parties, & so far as the remaining costs of the suit were concerned they were treated "as lost". It, however, appears that Rs. 285 had to be spent on stamp duty & this amount was shown as payable by the plffs. defts. 1 to 7 & defts. 8 to 10 in proportion to their shares! It, however, appears that Rs. 285 had to be spent on stamp duty & this amount was shown as payable by the plffs. defts. 1 to 7 & defts. 8 to 10 in proportion to their shares! Deft. 3 put in a petition for the amendment of the decree on 8-11-1943, & his contention was that in view of the order passed at the time of the final decree, the entire amount of costs incurred on account of stamp duty should be payable by the plffs. This contention was accepted & an amendment was allowed & Rs. 142-8-0 was knocked off. from the account of defts. 1 to 7, & Rs. 71-4-0 was knocked off from the account of defts. 8 to 10. It can by no means be held that this amendment was not of a substantial nature. It cannot be deemed to be an ordinary clerical amendment, for the question was as to who would be liable for the stamp duty that had to be paid for making the decree final. In this view, I am of opinion that even if we adhere to the view that only a substantial amendment can furnish a fresh terminus a quo to the D. H. for execution of the decree the amendment on which the D. Hs. are relying in this particular case must be deemed to be a substantial one. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Imam, J. 11 I would refer to the observations of Fazl AH, J. (as he then was) in Rameshwar Narain V/s. Raghunandan, 16 Pat. 453 : "Having regard, however, to the words of Clause (4) of Article 182 it is difficult to distinguish these cases in principle. It appears to me that if Clause (4) of Article 182 is to be literally construed there can be no escape from the conclusion that the amendment of a decree provides a fresh starting point for limitation & it is immaterial whether the application for amendment was made within three years of the date of the decree or more than three years after it. At the same time upon reading Article 182 as a whole it appears to me to be doubt ful whether it was contemplated by the Legislature that a decree which is barred under Clause (1) should be revived by mere amendment. At the same time upon reading Article 182 as a whole it appears to me to be doubt ful whether it was contemplated by the Legislature that a decree which is barred under Clause (1) should be revived by mere amendment. In ray opinion CL (4) of Article 182 has been some what unhappily drafted & if in fact the Legislature did not contemplate that a decree which was barred under Clause (1) could be revived by an order of amendment, the clause should be suitably amended by providing that it will be applicable only if either the amendment or the application for the amendment is made within three years of the decree." & also to the following observations : "Coming now to the merits of the present case, it appears to me that the amendment which gives a fresh start to limitation must be an amendment in the real sense of the term that is, of some substance as affecting the rights of the parties, & not merely the correction of a clerical error or a trifling arithmetical mistake such as the Court might at any time correct of its own motion." In the appeal before us, there can be no doubt that by the amendment in question, the rights of the parties were affected with reference to the costs of the non-judicial stamp duty for the preparation of the final decree. This is not a case where the amendment sought is to correct an arithmetical mistake, & as the rights of the parties were affected by the decree not being in conformity with the judgment. I must regard the amendment made as one of substance. It is conceded on behalf of the appellant, that if the amendment is one of substance, it is the consistent view of this Court that a fresh period of limitation starts from the date of the amendment of the decree. In such circumstances, the present application was within time, & the view taken by the Subordinate Judge was correct. 12 I agree that the appeal be dismissed with costs as suggested by my learned brother.