JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is a second appeal preferred by a judgment-debtor from an order of a learned Subordinate Judge affirming an order of the trial Court made in proceedings under S. 47, Civil P.C. 2. In 1936 the respondent obtained a mortgage decree against the appellant and certain other persons and in March 1938 execution of this mortgage decree was started. During the pendency of these proceedings, the appellant filed an application before the Debt Settlement Board for settlement of her debts. On 22nd December 1988, the executing Court received notice of this application from the Debt Settlement Board and stayed the execution proceedings as required by S. 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. On 18th February 1940, the Board dismissed the appellant's application for settlement of her debts. The executing Court was informed of this dismissal and then proceeded with the execution. 13th July 1940 was fixed by the Court for the sale of the property. On this day however, the appellant filed an application asking for stay and adjournment of the sale. The learned Munsif refused to stay and on 15th July, the property was sold. 3. It appears that in the meantime the appellant had filed an appeal from the order of the Board dismissing the application for settlement of her debts. An Appellate Officer set aside the dismissal by the Board and sent the application to another Board for disposal. The Munsif was asked to stay the sale on these grounds, but he refused to do so. He appears to have though that this application to the Appellate Officer was in the nature of a second application to the Board. He thought that a second application for settlement of the debts was not maintainable and therefore the proceedings before the Board were without jurisdiction. He accordingly ignored the proceedings before the Board and on 15th July 1940, the property was sold. On 13th August 1940, the Court received a notice from the Debt Settlement Board which was dated 30th July 1940. The learned Munsif on the day he received the notice held that the notice was bad and would not affect the execution. Accordingly, he confirmed the sale on 22nd August 1940. 4. On 13th August 1940, the Court received a notice from the Debt Settlement Board which was dated 30th July 1940. The learned Munsif on the day he received the notice held that the notice was bad and would not affect the execution. Accordingly, he confirmed the sale on 22nd August 1940. 4. On 15th September 1941, the decree-holder respondent applied for delivery of possession and on that date the judgment-debtor applied under S. 47, Civil P.C., praying that delivery of possession be stayed as the sale was null and void and gave the decree-holder no title whatsoever. 5. The learned Munsif who heard this application under S. 47 held that such an application did not lie. On appeal, however, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that proceedings under S. 47 would lie and remanded the case to the trial Court for reconsideration. There was a second appeal to this Court; but it is to be observed that there was no stay of the remand order. Before this Court decided the second appeal the Munsif decided the case on remand. He held that the sale was invalid and directed it to be set aside. this Court, however, in second appeal from the order of remand upheld the order of remand and directed the learned Munsif, who they were told had decided the case to rehear it in the light of certain observations which they made. Whether that order could validly be made cannot now be questioned, because it has become final. The learned Munsif accordingly reheard the matter and came to the conclusion that he could not set aside the sale. In his view the order of the learned Munsif refusing to stay proceedings might be an invalid order, but even if it was, it did not render the sale a nullity. The remedy of the judgment-debtor was to appeal against the order. If the order though had became final, the sale could not be challenged in proceedings under S. 47, Civil P.C. On appeal the lower appellate Court upheld this view; hence this second appeal. 6. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the view of the lower Courts cannot be sustained. It is conceded that if the case fell within S. 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act a notice would be required. 6. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the view of the lower Courts cannot be sustained. It is conceded that if the case fell within S. 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act a notice would be required. It is, however, urged that even if no notice was given the sale would still be bad by reason of S. 35 of the Act. 7. Section 33 of the Act provides: ...no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain a suit, application or proceeding against the debtor in respect of, (a) any debt included in an application under S. 8 or in a statement under sub-s. (1) of S. 13, proceedings in connection with which are pending before a Board or an Appellate Officer or a District Judge or an Additional District Judge...... Section 35 provides: ....no decree of a civil Court.....shall be executed, (i) for the recovery of a debt included in an application under S. 8 or in a statement under sub-s. (1) of S. 13, until certain events have happened. Section 34 provides: When an application under S. 8 or a statement under sub-s. (1) of S. 13 includes any debt in respect of which a suit or other proceeding is pending before a Civil or Revenue Court, or when an Appellate Officer entertains an appeal or a District Judge or an Additional District Judge entertains an application for revision, relating to such a debt, the Board or the Appellate Officer or the District Judge or the Additional District Judge, as the case may be, shall give notice thereof to such Court in the prescribed manner and thereupon the suit or the proceeding shall be stayed until the Board has either dismissed the application in respect of such debt or made an award thereon...... 8. Section 34 in terms applies to cases whore applications are made to a Debt Settlement Board when proceedings are pending in the Civil Court. In such a case the Debt Settlement Board can give notice to the civil Court and if such is done the civil Court must stay proceeding. 9. Sections 33 and 35 are framed widely enough to cover proceedings in the civil Court instituted after proceedings in the Debt Settlement Board and proceedings pending in the civil Court when proceedings are instituted before a Debt Settlement Board. However, if these three sections be read together Ss. 9. Sections 33 and 35 are framed widely enough to cover proceedings in the civil Court instituted after proceedings in the Debt Settlement Board and proceedings pending in the civil Court when proceedings are instituted before a Debt Settlement Board. However, if these three sections be read together Ss. 33 and 35 cannot be applied to cases where proceedings were pending in a civil Court when an application is first made to a Debt Settlement Board. Learned Advocate for the appellant has urged that though S. 34 requires a notice, nevertheless if no such notice is given execution proceedings cannot proceed by reason of S. 35. He has to admit that this construction of S. 35 makes S. 34 a nullity in so far as execution proceedings are concerned. Similarly S. 33 would render S. 34 a nullity as far as suits are concerned. The effect would be that to give Ss. 33 and 35 the construction urged for by learned advocate for the appellant would mean wiping out S. 34 from the statute altogether. In my view, however, it is unnecessary to decide what is the true construction of S. 35 of the Act, because the present case is covered by two Bench decisions of this Court which are binding upon us. The first of those cases is Chowdhury Mohammed Ibrahim and Others Vs. Saburjan Bewa and Others, AIR 1943 Cal 624 in which a Bench of which my learned brother was a member held that that a civil Court before which an application for execution of a decree is pending has jurisdiction to determine whether a notice issued to it, under S. 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is valid and to ignore it if is of opinion that it is not so. If the Court erroneously decides the question, it is for the appropriate appellate or revisional authority to correct the decision: the order or decision cannot be treated as or held to be a nullity in an independent proceeding. 10. The same view was taken by another Bench of this Court of Abinash Chandra Biswas Vs. Nakul Ruhidas and Another, AIR 1945 Cal 192 . The effect of these two cases is that an order of an executing Court directing an execution case to proceed in spite of a notice under S. 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is good until it is set aside. Nakul Ruhidas and Another, AIR 1945 Cal 192 . The effect of these two cases is that an order of an executing Court directing an execution case to proceed in spite of a notice under S. 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is good until it is set aside. If it is not set aside the sale will stand and cannot be set aside or treated as a nullity in proceedings under S. 47, Civil P.C. If the judgment-debtor desires to challenge the order directing execution proceedings to continue he must challenge that particular order by appropriate appellate or revisional proceedings. 11. It has been urged that there are decisions of this Court to the contrary and reliance has been placed upon two cases decided by a single Judge of this Court, namely, Abdus Samad v. Baidyanath Nandi, 48 C.W.N. 606 and Jnanendra Nath Basu v. Sm. Profulla Bala Debi, 49 C.W.N. 578. In the latter case the learned Judge held that a sale held in contravention of S. 35, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is a nullity although a notice under S. 34 has not been given to the Court before the sale. This case appears to be in conflict with the Bench decisions to which I have made reference. But the Bench decisions do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge. In so far as this case is at variance with the Bench decisions it must be regarded as overruled and of no force. The former case of Abdus Samad v. Baidyanath Nandy, (48 C.W.N. 606) does not appear to be in conflict with the Bench decisions to which I have referred and the appellant can obtain no assistance from it. 12. In my judgment this Bench is bound to follow the Bench decisions to which I have made reference and they compel me to hold that the order of the learned Munsif directing a confirmation of this sale, in spite of the notice from the Debt Settlement Board, became final because it was never challenged. It might have been erroneous, but an erroneous decision is binding inter partes if not challenged. The effect of the Bench decisions is that the Munsif has jurisdiction to decide whether the sale should go on or should be stayed. It might have been erroneous, but an erroneous decision is binding inter partes if not challenged. The effect of the Bench decisions is that the Munsif has jurisdiction to decide whether the sale should go on or should be stayed. If he erroneously decides that it should proceed, the sale will be valid unless that order is successfully challenged. It cannot be treated as a nullity and declared to he so in subsequent proceedings under S. 47, Civil P.C. 13. In the result therefore there is no force to this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs, the hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs. Sen, J. 14. I agree.