JUDGMENT B.K. Mukherjea, J. - This is a rule granted on an application under S. 115, C.P. Code, and is directed against a judgment of Mr. B.P. Bakshi, Judge, Fourth Bench, Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta, made in an action in ejectment. The material facts are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows: - The plaintiff opposite party Bankim Chandra Banerjee is the owner of premises Nos. 10/1 (A) and 10/2 (B) Indian Mirror Street, Calcutta, and both these premises are in occupation of the petitioner as a monthly tenant under the plaintiff. On 31st May 1945, the plaintiff served a notice to quit on the defendant, asking the latter to vacate the demised premises on the expiry of the month of June following. As the defendant did not quit the premises in spite of the notice, the plaintiff applied to the Rent Controller, Calcutta, under para. 9(A), Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943, for permission to institute a suit for eviction against the tenant. The Rent Controller dismissed the application. An appeal was taken against that order to the District Judge, Alipur, who was the appellate authority constituted by the Rent Control Order and the learned District Judge, by his judgment dated 23rd September 1946, granted permission to the plaintiff subject to this condition that the suit should not be instituted prior to 1st February 1947. On 30th September 1946, the Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943 ceased to be operative and a new Ordinance known as the Calcutta Rent Ordinance of 1946 was passed by the Governor of Bengal, which came into operation on and from 1st October 1946. On 5th February 1947 the plaintiff instituted the present suit, on the strength of the permission obtained by him under the House Rent Control Order of 1943. The claim for eviction was resisted by the defendant substantially on the ground that the suit was not maintainable without a permission obtained in accordance with the provision of S. 13(3) of the new Ordinance. The learned Small Cause Court Judge overruled this contention and gave the plaintiff a decree. The defendant has now come up in revision to this Court. The learned Small Cause Court Judge overruled this contention and gave the plaintiff a decree. The defendant has now come up in revision to this Court. The only point for our consideration in this rule is whether the suit for ejectment could be instituted on 5th February 1947, without a fresh permission under S. 13(3) of the Calcutta House Rent Ordinance of 1946. 2. Now the House Rent Control Order of 1943, was in the nature of an executive order promulgated by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred on him by R. 81(2)(bb), Defence of India Rules. It was a temporary measure and unless there is an expression of intention to the contrary it would cease to have any binding effect as soon as it expired, and no proceeding could be instituted upon it (vide Craies on Statute Law p. 347). Of course it does not follow that on expiry of the Order all rights acquired under it would expire also. But to what extent the rights acquired would survive will depend upon the intention expressed by the promulgated authority. Section 26 of the new Ordinance which makes the saving provisions runs as follows: Any proceedings commenced under any provision of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, or of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942, or of the Bengal Hotels and Lodging Houses Control Order, 1942, shall on the said Orders ceasing to be in operation be continued and be, as far as may be deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance and any appointment made under any of the said Orders shall for the purpose of the said proceedings be deemed to have been made under this Ordinance as if this Ordinance was inoperative when the said proceedings were commenced or such appointment was made. The section does not say that a permission for filing a suit obtained under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943 would be deemed to be valid permission under the corresponding provision of the new Ordinance and on the other hand S. 13(1) of the new Ordinance expressly makes it a condition precedent for the entertainment of a suit for eviction by a Court that a permission in writing must have been obtained from the Controller under sub-s. (3) of the same section. 3. We are unable to agree with Mr. 3. We are unable to agree with Mr. Chakravarty that as under the permission granted to the plaintiff by the District Judge under the Control Order of 1943 no suit could be instituted prior to 1st February 1947, it should be assumed that the proceeding under the old Order was still continuing. The proceedings has ended as soon as the order was made and the mere fact that the order is a conditional one would not in our opinion make any difference. The promulgated authority has expressly saved pending proceeding an appointment made under the old Rent Control Order. It not only says nothing about permissions already granted but makes it a condition precedent to the institution of a suit under the new Ordinance that permission must be obtained under the specific provisions of the Ordinance. A right to evict a tenant undoubtedly exists under the general law, but these Control Orders and Ordinances raise a bar, which has got to be lifted up in accordance with the provisions contained in them. 4. Having regard to the clear provisions of S. 13 of the new Ordinance, we cannot but hold, that a fresh permission under sub-s. (3) of S. 13 was necessary before the suit for eviction could be entertained by a Court. 5. This rule is made absolute. We set aside the order of the Court below and dismiss the suit on the ground that it is not entertainable in law. There will be no order as to costs either in this Court or in the Court below. G.N. Das, J. 6. I agree.