Order The Officiating Chief Justice.-This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras and quash its order, dated 22nd January, 1948, purporting to allow an appeal by N.V. Bashyam Reddiar and cancelling the order passed in favour of the petitioners by the Regional Transport Authority, Vellore. The subject-matter of this application is a transport service from Cuddalore to Pondicherry, and the petitioners applied on 1st October, 1946, for permits to run two buses on that route. On 21st July, 1947, the Regional Transport Authority permitted the petitioners to run two buses on the route for a period of four months. On the expiry of the period covered by these permits again on 3rd December, 1947, two temporary permits were issued for the period from 4th December, 1947 to 3rd April, 1948. Meanwhile, one Bashyam Reddiar, proprietor of another transport service, preferred an appeal to the respondent Board against the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, dated 21st July, 1947 and the respondent, as already mentioned, purported to allow this appeal. The petitioners state that the appeal was not competent and the respondent Board had no jurisdiction to entertain and allow it. The main question for consideration is, assuming that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction, whether this Court can issue a writ of certiorari in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi1 . Dr. John, the learned advocate for the petitioners, contended that the decision of the Privy Council need not stand in the way of this Court issuing the writ. Having regard to section 212 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, the learned advocate had necessarily to abandon the position which he was inclined to take up in the first instance that the decision of the Privy Council as such is not binding on this Court. But he contended that each case was only an authority for which it actually decided and that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved in that case, relying upon the speech of the Earl of Halsbury, L.C., in Quinn v. Leathem2. But he contended that each case was only an authority for which it actually decided and that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved in that case, relying upon the speech of the Earl of Halsbury, L.C., in Quinn v. Leathem2. It appears to us, however, that, what the Judicial Committee decided in the Parlakimedi case1was as regards the limitation on the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise powers which devolved on it from the Supreme Court. Their Lordships went into the question elaborately and pronounced on. the scope of the jurisdiction which the Supreme Court itself possessed and which this Court as its inheritor now possesses. In the case before their Lordships, the Board of Revenue whose order was sought to be quashed was situated within the limits of the Presidency town, but that circumstance was not held to be the deciding factor on the question of jurisdiction. There are two passages in the judgment of Viscount Simon, L.C., which in our opinion contain the decision of the Privy Council in that case: “The Board of Revenue has always had its offices in the Presidency town, and in the present case the Collective Board, which made the order complained of, issued this order in the town. On the other hand, the parties are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the High Court and the estate of Parlakimedi lies in the north of the Province .... Their Lordships think that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to claim jurisdiction over such a matter as the present by issuing certiorari to the Board of Revenue on the strength of its location in the town. Their Lordships think that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to claim jurisdiction over such a matter as the present by issuing certiorari to the Board of Revenue on the strength of its location in the town. Such a view would give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, in the matter of settlement of rents for ryoti holdings in Ganjam between parties not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction, which it would not have had over the Revenue Officer who dealt with the matter at first instance.” Learned counsel argued that though this decision may be binding in respect of orders passed by the Board of Revenue, it would not apply to a case where the order is passed by a body like the Central Road Traffic Board, because, though this may logically follow, law is not always logical. But we do not agree that it is only by a logical extension of the rule laid down in the Parlakimedi case1, that this Court can be held not to have jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in the present case. It is by the actual application of what was decided in the case before the Privy Council that such a conclusion follows. What was decided by their Lordships was the scope and conditions of the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court in the matter of prerogative writs. That decision must, therefore, govern all cases where there are applications for the issue of such writs, and this is certainly One such case. Applying, therefore, the tests laid down by their Lordships, it is clear that in this case though the respondent Board has its office in the Presidency town, the subject-matter is entirely outside the original jurisdiction of this Court, as it relates to a transport service in the mofussil. We hold, therefore, that the decision in the Pdrlakimedi’s case1, directly precludes us from issuing the writ of certiorari which the petitioners seek in this application. The application is therefore dismissed. Petition dismissed.