JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is a second appeal from a decree of the Court below allowing an appeal from a decree of the trial Court which had decreed the plaintiff's suit for rent. 2. The plaintiff, the Maharajadhiraj Bahadur of Burdwan, brought a suit for the rent of a certain property at the rate of Rs. 14-6-0 with cesses. The defence was that these lands were niskar and no rent wag payable. 3. The current settlement showed that rent was payable and the amount was given as Rs. 14-6-0. The trial Court held that the defendants had not established that the land was niskar and accordingly decreed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate Court held that a plea of res judicata had no foundation. It however held that the presumption of correctness attaching to the entry in the current record of rights had been rebutted. That being so, the learned District Judge was of opinion that the land was niskar and he accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the claim for rent. 4. It appears that in the settlement operations of 1893 there was a proceeding under S. 105, Ben. Ten. Act which proceeding was compromised by the parties. As a result of the compromise, the land in suit was recorded as niskar. In the proceedings leading up to the publication of the present record of rights there was another proceeding under S. 105, Ben. Ten. Act before the Settlement Officer. Apparently, the present appellant did not appear and the claim of the landlord to have this land recorded as rent-paying land was at first dismissed. On a review, however, the Settlement Officer held that the land was rent-paying and rent was assessed at Rs. 14-6-0. That decision was never challenged and has become final. The entry in the record of rights was made showing this to be rent-paying land and actually paying Rs. 14-6-0. The lower appellate Court was of opinion that the decision of the Settlement Officer in the earlier case that this was niskar land did not operate as res judicata. 14-6-0. That decision was never challenged and has become final. The entry in the record of rights was made showing this to be rent-paying land and actually paying Rs. 14-6-0. The lower appellate Court was of opinion that the decision of the Settlement Officer in the earlier case that this was niskar land did not operate as res judicata. There is a conflict of authority in this Court, but it appears to me that the consensus of opinion is in favour of the view that the decision of a Settlement Officer cannot operate as res judicata in a suit heard by a Court and the nature of the suit being such that the Settlement Officer could never try it. 5. Holding therefore that the earlier decision of the Settlement Officer is not res judicata, the question arises whether the learned Judge was right in holding that the presumption of correctness of the present record of rights has been rebutted. He held that it had been rebutted by reason of the entry in the earlier record of rights. The later entries in the present record of rights are presumed to be correct, but there is no presumption of correctness in entries in previous record of rights. Therefore the mere fact that this was entered as niskar in 1893 cannot possibly rebut the presumption relating to the entry in the present record of rights. It was urged however that the entry in the 1893 record of rights was based upon a judgment which became final. It was really based upon a compromise in which the parties admitted that for purposes of that entry the land would be treated as niskar. I do not think that any wider interpretation should be given to the consent of the parties in that case. It was merely a compromise of that particular case. What is now said is that the decision of that case must bind the parties for all time. But how can it when there is a subsequent decision which is final and which is exactly to the contrary? That also would bind the parties for all time. That is a situation which would be absurd if it were permitted to arise. 6. But how can it when there is a subsequent decision which is final and which is exactly to the contrary? That also would bind the parties for all time. That is a situation which would be absurd if it were permitted to arise. 6. It appears to me that the correct way of approaching this case is to see whether or not there was any evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness of the entry of the present record of rights. For the reasons I have given an entry in a previous record of rights would not rebut it and there is really no other evidence. The defendant gave evidence and he said that the land was niskar, but he never said that he never paid rent. Certainly there is no evidence that any predecessor of his held the land without paying rent. Some documents were relied upon which went to show that this land had been dealt with as niskar, but the holders of this land could not create rights in themselves by describing the land as niskar. Had there been a document between the tenant and the landlord in which the property was described as niskar, very different considerations would arise. But there is no such document. In short, the only evidence given to rebut the accuracy of the present entry in the record of rights which was accepted was the previous entry and, as I have said, that can never rebut it. 7. That being so there is no ground upon which this rent claim could be dismissed and I would therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the munsif made in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is entitled to his costs in this Court and in the Courts below.