Judgement Appeal (No. 38 of 1945), by special leave, from a judgment and decree of the Federal Court of India (December 4, 1941) reversing a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar (September 19, 1940) which in turn had affirmed a decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Peshawar (March 8, 1940). The following facts and statutory provisions are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. On March 1, 1928, the respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police by the Inspector-General of Police, North-West Frontier Province. On April, 25, 1938, the respondent was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, on a charge of copying during a departmental examination. He was there fore dismissed by an authority subordinate in rank to the officer who had appointed him. After unsuccessful appeals to the Inspector-General of Police and the Provincial Government, the respondent instituted the present suit on June 17, . 1939, in which he claimed a declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal, null and void, invalid and inoperative and that he still retained his office as Sub-Inspector of Police. He further claimed arrears of pay from the date of the order of dismissal up to that date. There was an alternative claim for damages which no longer survived before this Board. The Federal Court (Gwyer C.J., Varadachariar and Zafrulla Khan JJ.) made a declaration that the respondents dismissal was void and inoperative, and submitted the case to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for consideration of the respondents claim for arrears of pay. By s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 " 240. (1) Except as expressly provided by this Act, " every person who is a member of a civil service of the Crown " in India, or holds any civil post under the Crown in " India, holds office during His Majestys pleasure. " (2.) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from " the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate "to that by which he was appointed. "(3.) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or " reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable " opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed " to be taken in regard to him." By s. 243 " 243. "(3.) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or " reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable " opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed " to be taken in regard to him." By s. 243 " 243. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the conditions of service of the " subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India " shall be such as may be determined by or under the Acts " relating to those forces respectively." 1947. July 16, 17, 21, 22. Sir Andrew Clark K.C. and B. MacKenna for the appellant. Before the coming into effect of the Government of India Act, 1919, the only relevant Act was the Police Act, 1861, unqualified by any provision such as s. 96B of the Act of 1919, and under s. 7 of the Police Act there is an express power for a Deputy Inspector-General to dismiss, inter alios, a Sub-Inspector, subject to any rules which were made. That was the position before the passing of the Act of 1919. On that Act coming into force, which was the position at the date of the respondents appointment, s. 96b must be looked at to see whether the position was altered, and it is submitted that it was not, because s. 96b, sub-s. 4, preserves the existing position the Police Act of 1861 is, it is submitted, within the meaning of that sub-section, and its effect is to confirm s. 7 of the Police Act so as to continue the power to make rules under that section. Assuming that the Police Act is untouched, then the position after the Act of 1919 is that s. 7 of the Police Act is in force under which rules can be made authorizing an Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-General, etc., to dismiss, but so that no person shall be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, because otherwise it would be repugnant to s. 96b of the Act of 1919. The position, therefore, at the date of the respondents appointment would be that he could be dismissed by the Inspector-General and not by the Deputy Inspector-General. The next position is that in 1934 an amendment to the North-West Frontier Police Rules, 1917, was made which provided that a Deputy Inspector-General may dismiss a Sub-Inspector. The position, therefore, at the date of the respondents appointment would be that he could be dismissed by the Inspector-General and not by the Deputy Inspector-General. The next position is that in 1934 an amendment to the North-West Frontier Police Rules, 1917, was made which provided that a Deputy Inspector-General may dismiss a Sub-Inspector. On the face of it there is nothing wrong with making such an amendment, but it cannot affect the respondent because he is a statutory exception under s. 96B of the Act of 1919; he having been appointed by an Inspector-General could not be dismissed under that rule as amended because if it were applied to him it would have been repugnant to s. 96b. That was the position when the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force on April 1, 1937. That Act repealed the Act of 1919, and thenceforward the position fell to be determined under the Act of 1935, and s. 240, sub-ss. 1 and 2, in substance re-enacted the provisions of s. 96b, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919. If the Act of 1935 had ended there the position would have been unchanged, but it did not, because s. 240, sub-s. 1 which has to be read in conjunction with sub-s. 2 of s. 240, provides that " except as expressly provided by this Act . . . . "and one of the express exceptions is to be found in s. 243, which provides that " notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions " of this chapter, the conditions of service of the subordinate " ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as " may be determined by or under the Acts relating to these "forces respectively." The Acts relating to these forces referred to in that section meant the Police Act of 1861— there is no other Act relating to them. The Government of India Act, 1919, would not be an Act relating to the police force within the meaning of s. 243, and in any case it cannot have been contemplated by the section because the Act of 1919 was repealed by the Act of 1935. Therefore, as from April 1, 1937, the position comes to be governed by the Police Act, 1861, so far as regards subordinate ranks of the police. Therefore, as from April 1, 1937, the position comes to be governed by the Police Act, 1861, so far as regards subordinate ranks of the police. Then comes the question of "conditions of service" in s. 243; that must mean all the conditions on which a man serves, and they must include, inter alia, the tenure of his service and the method by which he may be dismissed or reduced in rank. There is nothing in the Act to give the words " conditions of service " any other meaning. It is submitted that s. 243 excludes s. 240 altogether, but if that is not accepted, then the Judicial Commissioner put it correctly when he said " the Act which " concerns the appellant is the Indian Police Act, V of 1861. " Our interpretation of s. 243 of the Government of India Act is that if anything were contained in the Indian Police Act "which was inconsistent with s. 240 of the Government of " India Act, then s. 240 of the Government of India Act would "not apply to that extent." Even if the Federal Court were right in their view that " conditions of service " did not include provisions as to dismissal, there are still the North-West Frontier Province Police Rules of 1937 under which, in r. 16 (1.), a Sub-Inspector may be dismissed by a Deputy Inspector- General. [Reference was made to Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India (( 1936) L.R. 64 I. A. 40.) and R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India (( 1936) L.R. 64 I. A. 55.).] Those cases are not of much value on the main point—the construction of the Act—but have some bearing on the subsidiary points. The effect of the latter case is to say that the rules were not a restriction on the delegation—that once you have got the delegation no rules could cut down the power of dismissal. There are one or two subsidiary points; s. IS, sub-s. 2, of the Government of India (Commencement and Transitory Provisions) Order, 1936, provides that u until other provision " is made under the new Act, the conditions of service applicable " to any person .... appointed to serve His Majesty .... " in India shall be the same as were applicable to that person " . . . . appointed to serve His Majesty .... " in India shall be the same as were applicable to that person " . . . . immediately before the commencement of Part III "of the new Act." That sub-section, it is submitted, has no application to someone whose conditions of service were not going to be provided for in the new Act. Secondly, s. 38, sub-s. 2, of the Interpretation Act, 1889, provides that "where " this Act or any Act passed after the commencement of this " Act repeals any other enactment, then unless the contrary "intention appears, the repeal shall not—. . . . (c) affect " any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, " or incurred under any enactment so repealed; . . . . " It is submitted that a contrary intention does appear in the Act of 1935, namely, s. 243. Lastly, the decree and order of the Federal Court were wrong and ought to be discharged and the suit dismissed, but the appellant is not asking for any variation of the orders made as to costs. It is submitted further that in accordance with the judgment in Lucas v. Lucas and High Commissioner for India ([ 1943] P. 68.) even if the Federal Court was right in declaring that the respondents dismissal was void and inoperative, that would be merely a declaratory judgment from which no further actionable claim could arise; there could be no action for arrears of salary and therefore there should be no remission back. The respondent, Suraj Narain Anand, appeared in person. A Deputy Inspector-General was not the proper person to dismiss me, and I was not given a proper opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken for dismissal against me. It was not within the jurisdiction of the Pro-vincial Government to withhold my memorial to the Governor-General in Council—to do so was itself a contravention of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919, s. 241, sub-s. 5. The ruling in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India (L. R. 64 I. A. 55.) is not applicable to my case—it is admitted that the Secretary of State could dismiss me. My case turns on the interpretation of the words " conditions of service" in s. 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The ruling in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India (L. R. 64 I. A. 55.) is not applicable to my case—it is admitted that the Secretary of State could dismiss me. My case turns on the interpretation of the words " conditions of service" in s. 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Those words should be interpreted in a restricted sense, and should not be deemed to include the following two matters (a) the person who can dismiss, and (b) the manner in which the person can be dis missed. That submission is based on the following grounds (1.) The marginal notes to ss. 240, 241 and 247 indicate it was the intention of Parliament that what was stated in s. 240, sub-ss. 1, 2 and 3, should not be included in the words " conditions of service" as used in the remaining two sections, ss. 241 and 247. That is, the legislature having made provisions for tenure of service, which included the person who can dismiss and under what conditions he can do so, did not intend to make provision for these two matters again. Therefore, the words " conditions of service " as used in s. 243 should have the same meaning as they have in ss. 241 and 247. (2.) An examination of ss. 166, 170 and 257 of the Act of 1935, and s. 96b, sub-s. 2 (ii.), and proviso c to s. 130 of the Act of 1919, show that the tenure of service was treated in these two Acts separately and differently from the " conditions of "service." The argument is that the intention of the legislature in so doing was not to include the tenure of service in the general expression " conditions of service." The object of s. 243 was not to exclude me from the provisions of sub-ss. 2 and 3 of s. 240, but to secure my conditions of service. Conditions of service do not include dismissal in any way. (3.) The effect of the construction contended for by the appellant is that the subordinate ranks of police are deprived of the benefit of the provisions of sub-ss. 2 and 3 of s. 240 of the Act of 1935, which are available to almost all other servants of His Majesty in India. (3.) The effect of the construction contended for by the appellant is that the subordinate ranks of police are deprived of the benefit of the provisions of sub-ss. 2 and 3 of s. 240 of the Act of 1935, which are available to almost all other servants of His Majesty in India. That could never have been the intention of Parliament, because a reference to s. 108 of the Act of 1935 shows that it was the intention of Parliament to give special protection to the police force in general. (4.) In making Classification Rules under s. 96b, which are fundamental rules, the Secretary of State did net mean the term " conditions of service" to include conditions as to dismissal. (5.) That expression was not understood in this sense by the Inspector-General of Police. (6.) The words " conditions of service " in the Police Rules, 1937; are given under the head "Appointments" and not under "Dismissals." (7.) In short, the substance of my submission is that s. 240 deals with tenure of office, which means the person who can terminate such tenure, that is, dismissal from office, and the conditions under which he can do so. Other matters, such as pay, pension, leave, etc., were included in the term “conditions of service" and left to be provided for by rules made by the administrative head. The words of s. 243 " notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter/ etc., would not be sufficient to exclude the operation of s. 240, because they can only extend to s. 241, sub-ss. 2, 3 and 4, and s. 242. [On the meaning of " conditions of service " reference was made to Ryder v. Foley (( 1906) 4 C. L. R. 422, 433-4.) and Fletcher v. Nott (( 1938) 60 C. L. R. 55, 65.).] Points of distinction between this case and Shenton v. Smith ([ 1895] A.C. 229, 233.) are that my tenure was permanent; and he had an opportunity to go to the highest authority whereas I was stopped. On the question of salary, s. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains the principle that the salary of a civil servant can be attached by a judgment creditor of his. If that is so, the civil servant must be able to sue for his salary. On the question of salary, s. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains the principle that the salary of a civil servant can be attached by a judgment creditor of his. If that is so, the civil servant must be able to sue for his salary. This point was considered by the Federal Court recently in Punjab Province v. Pandit Tarachand ([ 1947] F. C. R. 89.) where it is said in the headnote that " if a servant of the Crown is dismissed in contravention of the " directions laid down in sub-s. 2 or sub-s. 3 of s. 240, he has a " right to maintain an action against the Crown for the "recovery of arrears of pay which have become due to him." I made a claim for pay from the date of dismissal to the date of the institution of the suit, or, in the alternative, for damages to the extent of Rs. 75,000. In view of the provisions of s. 60 of the Civil Procedure Code the judgment in Reilly v. The King ([ 1934] A. C 176, 179.) does not apply to me. It may also be pointed out that in fact the total value of the relief on which the Board have now to adjudicate is Rs. 138. Assuming that the submission for the appellant that s. 15, sub-s. 2, of the Transitory Provisions Order of 1936 is correct, it is not clear how the amendment to the Police Rules made in 1934 was validated by any provision of the Act of 1935. The principle of repugnancy which was contained in s. 84 of the Act of 1919 is preserved in s. 293 of the Act of 1935, and the intention of that section is that there shall be no provision in any Indian Act repugnant to any provision of the Act of 1935. The amended rule of 1934 would still be repugnant to s 240, sub-s. 2, as it was repugnant to s. 96B, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1919, and would be invalid to the extent of the repugnancy. Sir Andrew Clark K.C. replied. The short point is whether "conditions of service" in s. 243 include conditions as to dismissal. It is submitted that they do. Sir Andrew Clark K.C. replied. The short point is whether "conditions of service" in s. 243 include conditions as to dismissal. It is submitted that they do. On the question whether accrued salary is a recoverable debt, the general principle is stated in Ansons Law and Custom of the Con stitution, 4th ed., vol. 2, Pt. 2, pp. 335-6. That is correct and well-established by authority, and that rule applies unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. The effect of that citation from Anson is that for the respondent to maintain an action for his accrued salary he has to show some statutory provision to that effect. Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not an enactment saying that his salary shall be attachable; it says provided that the first Rs. 100 and a half of the remainder shall not be attached; it leaves the whole question, open. As to how much effect should be given to a proviso see West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society ([ 1897] A. C 647, 652.). If part of the salary cannot be attached the necessary inference is that the rest can be, but the legislature has not said that. A mere statement that a debt is attachable cannot turn into a debt something which is not a debt. 1948. March 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Thankerton, who stated the facts set out above and continued The main question concerns the validity of the order of dismissal, which is challenged on the ground that the dismissing authority was subordinate in rank to the authority by whom the respondent had been appointed. It is sought to be justified on the provisions of the North-West Frontier Police Rules, which are made under the authority of the Indian Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861), and it will be convenient to trace the history of these rules, so far as relevant to the point at issue, and the general statutory provisions which affect them. It is sought to be justified on the provisions of the North-West Frontier Police Rules, which are made under the authority of the Indian Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861), and it will be convenient to trace the history of these rules, so far as relevant to the point at issue, and the general statutory provisions which affect them. Section 7 of the Police Act of 1861 provides " The appointment of all police-officers other than those "mentioned in section 4 of this Act shall, under such rules as " the Local Government shall from time to time sanction, rest " with the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General, " Assistant Inspectors-General and District Superintendents " of Police, who may, under such rules as aforesaid, at any time " dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer whom they shall " think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or " unfit for the same." Sub-Inspectors are not mentioned in s. 4, and there is no restriction excluding dismissal by an officer subordinate in rank to the appointing officer. At the date of the respondents appointment in 1928, the North-West Frontier Police Rules, 1917, as amended from time to time were in force; the relevant rule was r. 17 (1.) of chapter XVII, which had been made by a correction slip on September 25, 1919, which clearly provided that a Sub-Inspector could only be dismissed by the Inspector-General of Police, or by an officer of higher rank. On January 24, 1934, by a correction slip, r. 17 (1.) was amended so as to substitute " Deputy Inspector-General of Police" for " Inspector-General "of Police" as entitled to dismiss a Sub-Inspector. Having in view s. 96b of the Government of India Act, 1919, and the decision of this Board in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India (( 1936) L. R. 64 I. A. 40.), this amendment of 1934 was clearly invalid and inoperative. Sub-section 1 of s. 96b provided that no person in the civil service of the Crown in India " may be dismissed " by any authority subordinate to that by which he was "appointed," and it was held in Rangacharis case (( 1936) L. R. 64 I. A. 40.) that this was a mandatory statutory restriction, which could not be affected by any rules. Lord Roche, in delivering the judgment of the Board, said (Ibid. Lord Roche, in delivering the judgment of the Board, said (Ibid. 53.) "It is manifest that the stipulation or " proviso as to dismissal is itself of statutory force and stands " on a footing quite other than any matters of rule which are of " infinite variety and can be changed from time to time. “ The rules then existing are dealt with in sub-s. 4 of s. 96b, which provided—" (4.) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby " declared that all rules or other provisions in operation at the u time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919, " whether made by the Secretary of State in Council or by any " other authority, relating to the civil service of the Crown "in India, were duly made in accordance with the powers in “that behalf, and are confirmed, but any such rules or " provisions may be revoked, varied, or added to by rules or "laws made under this section." It follows that the amend-ment of 1934 was inconsistent with the provisions of sub-s. 1 of s. 96b, and was therefore invalid and inoperative. Before the dismissal of the respondent on April 25, 1938, the Government of India Act, 1935, had come into operation on April 1, 1937. Section 240 of that Act, so far as relevant for the present purpose, provided as follows. [His Lordship read s. 240, sub-ss. 1, 2 and 3 and continued] The proper construction of this section has been fully dealt with in the judgment of this Board just delivered in The High Commissioner for India and the High Commissioner for Pakistan v. Lall (Ante p. 225.), to which reference may be made. In that case the question arose as to the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of sub-s. 3 of s. 240, and it was held that sub-s. 3 was a statutory term of service of the Crown, which qualified the provisions of sub-s. 1 of s. 240, and was mandatory and not permissive. On the principles of this decision, and the decision in Rangacharis case (L. R. 64 I. A. 40.), it is equally clear that sub-s. 2 of s. 240, though it obviously does not apply in the case of dismissal by the Crown itself, is a statutory term of the service of the Crown, and is mandatory and not permissive. On the principles of this decision, and the decision in Rangacharis case (L. R. 64 I. A. 40.), it is equally clear that sub-s. 2 of s. 240, though it obviously does not apply in the case of dismissal by the Crown itself, is a statutory term of the service of the Crown, and is mandatory and not permissive. It follows that the dismissal of the respondent by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed would be unlawful and inoperative under that section. But the appellant relies on another section in the same chapter—(Chapter II)—of the Act of 1935 as releasing it from the obligation prescribed in sub-s. 2 of s. 240, namely, s. 243, which provides. [His Lordship read that section and continued] There was no dispute that the respondent held a subordinate rank in the appellants police force, and the issue was confined to two questions, (1.) whether the right of dismissal was a " condition of service " within the meaning of s. 243, and (2.) whether, at the time of the respondents dismissal, there was a valid police rule in operation which authorized dismissal of the respondent by the Deputy Inspector-General, although the latter was subordinate in rank to the officer by whom he had been appointed. On the first question, apart from consideration whether the context indicates a special significance to the expression "" conditions of service", their Lordships are unable, in the absence of any such special significance, to regard provisions which prescribe the circumstances under which the employer is to be entitled to terminate the service as otherwise than conditions of the service, whether these provisions are con-tractual or statutory; they are therefore of opinion that the natural meaning of the expression would include such provisions. In the second place, it will be found, on a perusal of Chapter II, which includes ss. 240 to 263, that sub-ss. 2 and 3 of s. 240 are the only provisions of Chapter II to which the introductory words of s. 243 can be referable in relation to conditions of service, as every one of the other provisions of the chapter, with one exception, deal with special classes of service, just as s. 243 deals with a special class. 2 and 3 of s. 240 are the only provisions of Chapter II to which the introductory words of s. 243 can be referable in relation to conditions of service, as every one of the other provisions of the chapter, with one exception, deal with special classes of service, just as s. 243 deals with a special class. The one exception is sub-s. 1 of s. 240, but that provides for termination by His Majesty, and there can be no question of delegation of that power by virtue of s. 243. Their Lordships need only notice one of these other sections, as it was referred to in argument by both parties, namely, s. 241, sub-ss. 2 and 4. The opening words of sub-s. 2—"Except as expressly provided " by this Act, the conditions of service of persons serving His " Majesty in a civil capacity in India "—relate to the very same persons dealt with in the immediately preceding s. 240, and this exclusion from the power of making rules conferred by sub-s. 2 of s. 241, points unmistakably, in their Lordships opinion, to the express provisions of s. 240, so as to prevent their alteration by rules. There are, of course, other provisions of the Act which will also fall under the exception provided in sub-s. 2 of s. 241, but there can be no doubt, in their Lordships opinion, that the provisions of s. 240 prescribe conditions of service, which are covered by the exception. Sub-section 4 of s. 241 contains a similar exception to the powers conferred. Their Lordships are, accordingly, of opinion that the right of dismissal was a condition of service within the meaning of s. 243. The Federal Court set aside the order of dismissal of the respondents suit by the courts below, on the ground that the bearing of s. 240, sub-s. 2, had not been sufficiently realized by them, and that, on a proper construction of ss. 240 and 243, the dismissal of the respondent was void and inoperative. The construction of s. 240 by the Federal Court was similar to that expressed by the Federal Court in Lalls case (Ante p. 225.) and is fully dealt with in the judgment of the Board in that case, to which reference may be made. 240 and 243, the dismissal of the respondent was void and inoperative. The construction of s. 240 by the Federal Court was similar to that expressed by the Federal Court in Lalls case (Ante p. 225.) and is fully dealt with in the judgment of the Board in that case, to which reference may be made. On construction of s. 243, the Federal Court held that " conditions of service" did not include provisions as to dismissal, a view contrary to that just expressed by their Lordships. The second question arises in this way The respondent was dismissed on April 25, 1938, admittedly under r. 16 (1.) of Chapter XVI of the N.-W.F.P. Police Rules, 1937, which authorizes the dismissal or removal of a Sub-Inspector of Police by the Deputy Inspector-General. That rule is contained in Vol. II of these Rules, which has the year 1938 on the title page, below a statement that it was printed and published by the Manager, Government Stationery and Printing, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar. There was no indication as to the date when the Rules became binding on the Police Service. At the hearing before the Board, vol. I, which might clear the matter up, was stated to be out of print or unobtainable, and counsel for the appellant asked their Lordships to assume in his favour that that date was subsequent to April 1, 1937, when the Government of India Act of 1935 came into force thereby obviating the invalidity of the 1934 correction slip, which would equally apply to the 1937 Rules, if issued before April 1, 1937. After the hearing was closed, their Lordships thought it right, in view of the difficulties of making such an assumption, and in the true interests of the parties, to suggest to them that further inquiries should be made to see whether vol. I of the Rules could not be made available. The result of these inquiries was that the respondent, at con siderable expense, has recovered a copy of the missing volume, and has lodged an affidavit dated December 30, 1947, as to the relevant passages, and the appellant has agreed that that affidavit should be accepted as evidence before their Lordships, in order to save the time and expense of having the volume transmitted to this country. These passages consist of a verbatim reproduction of the title page and preface, and also a similar reproduction from the title pages of Chapters 1 and 2 of the same volume, which adds nothing further that is material. The title page states that they are u The N.-W.F.P. Police "Rules, 1937. Issued by and with the Authority of the Local "Government under sections 7 and 12 of Act V of 1861." The word " Local has been replaced by the word " Pro-" vincial" by a correction slip No. 68, which may be taken, on comparison with the dates of correction slips 66 and 73, as having been made in 1939. The name of the Government printer and publisher and year 1938 is at the foot of the page, as in vol. II. The preface, which is signed by the Inspector-General of Police on January-2, 1937, and refers to the revision of the 1917 edition of the Rules, which had been proceeding since 1933, opens with an important passage as follows " The North-West Frontier Province Police Rules as now issued " are binding on all police officers and are an authoritative " guide to others concerned. No alterations in the Rules may " be made except on receipt of correction orders approved and " issued by the Provincial Government and after decision by "His Excellency the Governor under section 56 of the Government of India Act, 1935." In the opinion of their Lordships, only one reasonable inference can be drawn from these facts namely, that the revision of the 1917 Rules was completed in January, 1937, in view of the coming into operation of the Act of 1935 on April 1, 1937, and that they were not issued so as to become operative until they had been put into print and were published in 1938. It may be noted that the first correction slip was dated January 14, 1939. Accordingly, their Lordships are of opinion that the rule under which the respondent was dismissed was a valid rule, made by the appellant under the authority conferred on it by s. 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This conclusion negatives the respondents claim for arrears of pay. Accordingly, their Lordships are of opinion that the rule under which the respondent was dismissed was a valid rule, made by the appellant under the authority conferred on it by s. 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This conclusion negatives the respondents claim for arrears of pay. Following on the remit of the case to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner by the order of the Federal Court dated December 4, 1941, the respondent obtained a decree for pay ment of Rs. 2283 against the present appellant in respect of arrears of pay from the date of dismissal to the institution of the suit on June 17, 1939, made by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner on July 4, 1942. Special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Court dated December 4, 1941, was given, inter alia, on condition that the order as to costs of the Federal Court should stand and that the costs of the respondent in the appeal should be borne by the appellant as between solicitor and client in any event. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, that the judgment and decree of the Federal Court dated December 4, 1941, should be set aside except as to costs, and that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner dated September 19, in so far as it dismisses the suit, should be restored. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellant will pay the respondents costs of this appeal as between solicitor and client. The respondent asked that their Lordships should direct that, having no solicitor and having appeared in person before the Board, the cost of his passage to this country and back to India and his cost of maintenance in London should be treated as costs between solicitor and client. He further asks that he should be entitled to recover the cost of the purchase price of vol. I of the Police Rules, which he states as Rs. 500. He further asks that he should be entitled to recover the cost of the purchase price of vol. I of the Police Rules, which he states as Rs. 500. While their Lordships feel unable to make any order as asked for, they desire to point out for consideration of the appellant that if the respondent had employed a solicitor and counsel, the outlays would have been recoverable under the condition imposed in granting special leave, and that the recovery of the volume in question may well have been vital to their success on the main point in issue in the appeal. 1948. July 29. The appeal came before the Board for further hearing pursuant to a petition by the respondent alleging that the North-West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1937, were in fact printed and published on April 29, 1938, four days after his dismissal on April 25. B. MacKenna for the appellant. Leon MacLaren for the respondent. Nov. 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DU PARCQ. On March 18, 1948, a judgment was delivered by the late Lord Thankerton in which their Lordships stated the reasons which led them to the conclusion that they should humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed. Their Lordships do not propose now to repeat what was then said. It suffices to say that the decision of the Board was given on the assumption, which then appeared to be justified, and had not, indeed, been questioned, that the Police Rules of 1937, to which the judgment refers, had become operative in the year 1938, and at some date before April 25, 1938, when the respondent was dismissed from the force. Subsequently to the delivery of the judgment, and before their Lordships had tendered their advice to His Majesty, the respondent submitted a petition wherein he prayed that their Lordships might reconsider their decision, mainly on the ground that it had been ascertained that the Police Rules of 1937 were in fact printed and published on April 29, 1938, that is to say, four days after the dismissal of the respondent. Their Lordships accordingly found it necessary to hear further argument, and on July 29, 1948, counsel for both parties appeared at their Lordships bar. It was then admitted that the Police Rules of 1937 were in truth printed and published on April 29, 1938, as the respondent alleged. Their Lordships accordingly found it necessary to hear further argument, and on July 29, 1948, counsel for both parties appeared at their Lordships bar. It was then admitted that the Police Rules of 1937 were in truth printed and published on April 29, 1938, as the respondent alleged. It follows, in the opinion of their Lordships, that, applying the reasoning contained in the judgment previously delivered they can only come to the opposite conclusion to that which they had formed on what is now shown to be an erroneous assumption as to a material fact. At the hearing on July 29 of this year counsel for the appellant made an alternative submission to the effect that the rule on which the appellant relies came into force immediately on its approval by the Governor in Council, and stated that, according to his instructions, that approval was signified on April 17, 1935. Assuming these instructions to be correct, and further assuming (though without deciding) that the approval of the Governor in Council brought the rules immediately into effect, their Lordships are of opinion that, as against the respondent, the rule in question would none the less be inoperative, since the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the rule would have been valid against him, did not come into force until April 1, 1937, and could not then retrospectively affect the respondents position. On August 6, 1948, their Lordships caused a letter to be addressed to the solicitor representing the appellant, informing him that their Lordships now proposed humbly to advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and stating that the order as to costs would not be varied. The letter pointed out that if this advice were tendered, and if His Majesty were pleased to accept it, the effect would be that the declaratory judgment of the Federal Court would stand. Finally, the letter referred to the award of Rs. 2,283 to the respondent by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner which, according to a submission made by the appellants counsel, was open to challenge, and inquired whether the appellant wished to have an opportunity of satisfying their Lordships that the point was open, and of being heard on it. By their Lordships direction, a copy of this letter was sent to the respondent. By their Lordships direction, a copy of this letter was sent to the respondent. Their Lordships have now received an intimation that the appellant does not wish to offer any further argument in this case. The respondent, as his counsel stated when the matter was last before the Board, does desire an opportunity of arguing that he shall now be awarded arrears of pay from the date of the institution of his suit on June 17, 1939. Their Lordships do not propose to deal further with this matter. If, in accordance with their Lordships humble advice, the declaratory judgment of the Federal Court is restored, it will be open to the respondent to pursue any remedy which flows from that declaratory judgment in the appropriate court. Their Lordships must not be understood, however, as expressing an opinion that the respondent was entitled as of right to recover the sum of Rs. 2,283 which was awarded to him, or that he has any claim to a further sum in respect of arrears of pay. It is unnecessary, owing to the very proper attitude of the appellant, to express any view as to the former question, and the latter question does not arise in this appeal, which is from the decision of the Federal Court. If that decision is affirmed the respondent, who did not himself enter an appeal, cannot now ask for anything more. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and that the judgment and decree of the Federal Court dated December 4, 1941, should be affirmed. The appellant must pay the respondents costs of this appeal as between solicitor and client.