Judgment Reuben, J. 1. This appeal by the deft in a suit for ejectment arises in the following circumstances. 2. The suit relating to a house in Nabinagar Bazar was instituted by the pltf. as a suit for the ejectment of a tenant on the termination of his tenancy by a notice to quit. The case of the pltf. as stated in the plaint, is that he had a room with a verandah in Nabinagar Bazar; the building collapsed in the earthquake of January 1934, & the deft. who wanted a house for establishing a shoe shop, agreed to reconstruct the building at an estimated cost of Bs. 200 & to remain in the building as a tenant at an annual rental of Rs. 40, the cost of the building to be set off against the rental payable for the first five yeara. The pltf. alleged that the deft. reconstructed the building in accordance with the agreement & the cost of the reconstruction was completely satisfied by setting off against it the rent up to 31-12.1939. Thereafter, the deft. agreed to pay a rent of Rs. 42 per annum but, in fact, made no payment whatever. In addition to the prayer for ejectment, the pltf. asked for arrears of rent up to the date of the expiry of the notice to quit & damages thereafter. 3. The deft. in his written statement, denied the relationship of landlord & tenant & set up a title in himself. He pleaded that the property in question belonged to one Mathura Saran, a member of the same family as the pltf. that Mt. Champa Kuer, widow of Mathura Saran, said the property to one Lachhmi Prasad Upadhyay by a registered sale deed dated 4-9-1931, in the farzi name of Hakim Missir, a servant of Lachhmi Prasad Upadhyay: & that this deft. purchased it from Lachhmi Prasad Upadhyay by a registered sale deed dated 1-3-1936. He denied the allegation in the plaint about the agreement to rebuilt the house & to hold it at a rent of Bs. 40, & also the allegation about the subsequent agreement to pay rent at Rs. 42. 4. The parties went to trial on the following issues : "1. Has the pltf. any cause of aetion or right to sue ? 2. Is the suit as framed maintainable ? 3. Is the Ct.-f. paid sufficient ? 4. 40, & also the allegation about the subsequent agreement to pay rent at Rs. 42. 4. The parties went to trial on the following issues : "1. Has the pltf. any cause of aetion or right to sue ? 2. Is the suit as framed maintainable ? 3. Is the Ct.-f. paid sufficient ? 4. Is the suit barred by the law of limitation? 5. Is the pltf. entitled to claim rent & damages for the room & osara and. also recovery of possession of the same as mentioned in the plaint ? 6. Has the pltf. got any right & title to the land over which the room & osara stand ? 7. Did the deft. agree to set off Rs. 200 being the cost of rebuilding the room & osara after the earthquake against their rent ? 8. Is the kebala dated 1-3 36 propounded by the deft. valid, genuine & for consideration ? 9. To what relief, if any, is the pltf. entitled ?" 5. In his judgment, however, the Munsif of Muzaffarpur considered only two issues, observing: "He (the deft.) has taken several other pleas in the written statement, & several issues were originally framed. But the decision of the suit rests on the following two issues only, 1. Is there relationship of landlord & tenant between the parties ? If so, is the pltf. entitled to realise arrears of rent & damages ? 2. Was the notice to quit served on the deft duly ? In the Munsifs order-sheet, there is nothing to show that the issues were amended by him before evidence was adduced by the parties, & the indications are that the issues as stated in his judgment were framed by him either at the time of writing the judgment or during the course of the trial. 6. On the first issue, as framed by him, the Munsif found the evidence adduced by the pltf. insufficient to establish the relationship of landlord & tenant. Hence, he dismissed the suit without coming to any finding on the second issue. 7. The pltf. appealed against this decision. This appeal (Title Appeal No. 118 of 1943) was disposed of by the Subordinate Judge, first Ct.Muzaffarpur, on 9-2-1944. He agreed with the Munsif that the evidence of the pltf. was insufficient to establish the relationship of landlord & tenant. 7. The pltf. appealed against this decision. This appeal (Title Appeal No. 118 of 1943) was disposed of by the Subordinate Judge, first Ct.Muzaffarpur, on 9-2-1944. He agreed with the Munsif that the evidence of the pltf. was insufficient to establish the relationship of landlord & tenant. In view of the decision in Ramdahin Lohar V/s. Ramdhani Mahto, A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat. 379 : (199 I. C. 9l), however, he considered that the Munsif ought to have decided the issue regarding the pltfs. title to the property, & if he decided directed the deft. to deliver possession of it to the pltf. He remanded the case to the Munsif for further trial & for a finding on the issue regarding the subsistence of valid title in the pltf. observing : "A specific issue on the question of title was raised to that effect (vide issue No. 6 of the issues framed by the lower Ct. on 24-4-41). So in view of the ruling cited above Bamdahin Lohars case, A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat. 379 : (199 I. 0. 91) the pltf. is entitled to recover possession of the rent claimed land & room in suit if he is found to have a subsisting title to the same. Parties also adduced some evidence in proof of their respective title to the disputed room and site thereof. But the same do not seem to have been fully considered by the learned Munsif. Since the deft. is admittedly in possession of the land and room, it would not be sufficient to investigate and decide merely the question of title to the land and room bat also the issue as to whether the pltf. was in possession of the land and room within 12 years before the date of the institution of this suit. In the circumstances the only course open before us is to remand the case to the Court below for a clear finding on the issue as to whether the pltf. has a subsisting title to the disputed land and the room thereupon. The parties may be given an opportunity to adduce further evidence on the said question at issue if any of them so desires." The issue of limitation mentioned by the Subordinate Judge is not a new one, being issue No. 4 of the issues as originally framed. 8 The deft. The parties may be given an opportunity to adduce further evidence on the said question at issue if any of them so desires." The issue of limitation mentioned by the Subordinate Judge is not a new one, being issue No. 4 of the issues as originally framed. 8 The deft. came up in appeal against this decision in Second Appeal No. 255 of 1944 which was disposed of by Beevor, J. on 29-8-1945. His Lordship set aside the order of remand because, in his opinion, the circumstances did not justify a remand for further evidence. He pointed out that, even if the pltf. had a right to succeed on his title, this would give him no right to adduce any evidence in addition to the evidence already adduced by him in the trial Court. It was sought before him to challenge the correctness of the- view taken in the case of Bamdahin Lohar, (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat. 379 : 199 I. c 91) as to the possibility of giving the pltf. relief on title in a suit brought to eject a tenant. His Lordship refused to consider the point as it would only arise after the pltf. was found to have established a subsisting title. 9. Under the direction of Beevor J. the appeal has now been reheard by the Subordinate Judge, first Court, Muzaffarpur, who has found that the pltf. has a subsisting title to the property and has decreed the suit for ejectment and has allowed damages at the rate of Bs. 40 per year from the period of the commencement of the deft.s occupation of the property. Hence, the present appeal. 10. Mr. Hareshwar Prasad Sinha for the applt. has contended strenuously that the proposition of law enunciated in Bamdahin Lohars case, (A. I. E. (29) 1942 Pat. 379 : 199 I. C. 9l) is incorrect. He relies on Qovindakumar V/s. Mahini Mohan, 57 cal. 349 : (a. I. R. (17) 1930 cal. 42) which, he urges, was approved of in an F. B. decision of this Court reported in Narayan Jha v. 829 S. B.) and on Chennaverasawmy V/s. satyanarayana, 21 I. c. 560 (Mad.). 11. Govindakumar Sur, (57 cal. 849 : a. I. R. (17) 1930 cal. 42) was a case of an action in ejectment brought by the pltfs. after the expiry of a notice to quit served on the tenants defts. 11. Govindakumar Sur, (57 cal. 849 : a. I. R. (17) 1930 cal. 42) was a case of an action in ejectment brought by the pltfs. after the expiry of a notice to quit served on the tenants defts. The question which arose before their Lordships was that of the valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and of jurisdiction. Their Lordships held that the suit came within the provisions of S. 7, cl. xi, sub-cl (cc), Court-fees Act, and that the term "tenant" in this section includes in the case of such a suit an ex-tenant, whose tenancy has been terminated by a notice to quit. In the course of this decision, they dealt with an earlier decision of Oammiade J. reported in Gobinda Bam V/s. Dulupuda Dutta, 32 c. w. N. 1113 : (A. I. R (15) 1928 cal. 753), in which it had been held that the ex-tenant in such a suit is not a tenant within the meaning of S. 7, cl. xi, sub-cl. (cc) and, therefore, the valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction should be on the basis of the market-value of the property in suit. Their Lordships pointed out that, though the interpretation put by Cammiade J. on the term "tenant" was not correct, his decision was nevertheless correct on the facts of the case, because, in a previous rent suit brought by the pltf. and fought up to the H. C, the pltf. had been defeated on the issue as to the relationship of landlord and tenant. They, however, remarked that the "proper course would have been to dismiss the suit, when it was found that there had been no contraot of tenancy between the parties and not to convert it to a suit of another naturea declaratory and possessory suit__the cause of action in the two suits being different, giving rifle to different issues." This remark was in the nature of an obiter dictum. 12 The case of Narayan Jha (A.I. R. (21) 1934 Pat. 184 : 13 Pat. 329 S. B.) was similarly one in which the question of valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction arose. 12 The case of Narayan Jha (A.I. R. (21) 1934 Pat. 184 : 13 Pat. 329 S. B.) was similarly one in which the question of valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction arose. It was disposed of by the Pull Bench on the basis that, under s. 11, Suits Valuation Act, the objection could not be raised beoause it had not been raised at the earliest opportunity and because the lower appellate Court had not recorded that there was any prejudice by reason of the incorrectness of the valuation. In the course of this decision, the F. B. referred to the case of Govindakumar Sur (57 cal. 849 : A. I. R. (17) 1930 Cal. 42) and observed that, if the question of title is raised by the deft and it is found as a fact that there was no contract of tenancy, the proper course would be to dismiss the suit and not to convert it into a declaratory and possessory suit "which is of another nature entirely." This observation was clearly a obiter dictum. 13. The facts upon which the case of Chennaverasawmy, 21 I. C. 560 (Mad.) was decided, do not appear from the law report. The suit as framed was brought on the basis of a tenancy for the ejectment of the tenant. Both the Courts below found against the tenancy and it was contended that the applt was nevertheless entitled to have his title to the land adjudicated on, and, if it were proved, to get a decree for the ejectment of the deft. as a trespasser. Ayling and Oldfield JJ. agreed with the reasons given by the Subordinate Judge in his judgment for refusing to go into the question of title, but they did not state in their judgment what the reasons were. The case of Balmakund V/s. Dalu, 25 ALL. 498 : (1903 A. W. N. 112 P. B.), which was relied on by Agarwala J. (as he then was) in Bamdahin Lohars case, (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat 379 : 199 I. C. 91) was cited before their Lordships on behalf of the applt. The case of Balmakund V/s. Dalu, 25 ALL. 498 : (1903 A. W. N. 112 P. B.), which was relied on by Agarwala J. (as he then was) in Bamdahin Lohars case, (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat 379 : 199 I. C. 91) was cited before their Lordships on behalf of the applt. In distinguishing that case, their Lordships observed : "It would be impossible in this case to enquire fully into the title to the property on the pleadings as they stand." Evidently, it was a case in which the question of title had not been fully raised in the pleadings and, therefore, could not be investigated. 14 The decision in Bamdahin Lohars case, (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat. 379 : 199 I. c 9l) is based upon a decision of an F. B. of the Allahabad High Court in Balmakunds case, (25 ALL. 498 : 1903 A. W. N. 112 p B.). There is another decision of an F. B. decision of the Allahabad H. C. reported in the case of Abdul Ghani V/s. Mt. Babni, 25 ALL. 256 : (1903 A. W. N. 18 F. B.). One or the other of these decisions has formed the basis of all the reported decisions of this Court to which our attention has been drawn. I will, therefore, deal with these two cases before coming to the cases of this High Court. 15. In Abdul Ghanis case, (25 ALL. 256 : 1903 A. W. N. 18 P. B.), the pltf. sued tD recover possession of a house which was in the possession of the deft. The pltf. alleged in his plaint that, about eight years previously, the deft. had hired the house from him at a monthly rent of one rupee, and that the deft. failed to pay rent for a period of ten months, and that the pltf. had given her notice to quit. The pltf. claimed possession of the house and damages but made no claim for arrears of rent. The defence set up was tat the deft. and her sons had been in adverse possession of the house in question for a period of 17 years. The deft. denied that she had ever hired the house from the pltf. and alleged that she had purchased the land which formed the site of the house and had built the house thereon. and her sons had been in adverse possession of the house in question for a period of 17 years. The deft. denied that she had ever hired the house from the pltf. and alleged that she had purchased the land which formed the site of the house and had built the house thereon. On these pleadings, issues were joined, among others, whether the, pltf. was the owner of the house in dispute and whether the deft had been in possession of the house for more than twelve years. The Court of first instance found that the pltf. had not succeeded in proving the tenarcy alleged by him, but that the pltf. had all along been in proprietary possession of the house, and that the deft.a possession was merely permissive. The Munsif accordingly deareed the pltf.s claim. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed the decision on the sole ground that, in as much as it had been established that the deft.s possession of the house was permissive, and the pltf. had not come to the Court on the allegation that the deft.s possession was permissive, he could not succeed in the suit. On a remand by the H. c. for the trial of the issues : (1) What was the nature of the occupation of the house in dispute by the deft ? and (2) Was the deft.s possession adverse or permissive ? If adverse, for how long did the deft, hold such possession ?, the lower appellate Court found that the pltf. was the owner of the house, and that the deft. occupied the house as a friend with his permission, and, further, that the deft. had never before asserted a title to the house in dispute, and that her possession was permissive. The F. B. set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and restored that of the Munsif, observing: "It is now contended before us by the learned vakil for the reap. notwithstanding these findings, that inasmuch as the pltf. did not establish the case which he set up, namely, that there had previously been a subsisting tenancy, his suit must fail. We cannot accede to this contention. It is clear that the deft. was not taken by surprise. She clearly understood the case which she had to meet, namely, the case set up by the pltf. that he was the owner of the house .... We cannot accede to this contention. It is clear that the deft. was not taken by surprise. She clearly understood the case which she had to meet, namely, the case set up by the pltf. that he was the owner of the house .... We think that there was nothing in the claim & the issues whichwere raised which could possibly have taken the deft. by surprise, & now that the true facts have been ascertained by the Ct. the technical difficulty which has been relied upon cannot, we think, be allowed to defeat the pltfs.s claim." 16. In Balmakunds case, (25 ALL. 498 : 1903 A.W.N. 112 F. B ) the pltf. came into Ct. alleging that he was the owner of a certain Cattle shed, which he had built at his own expense; that the deft. had rented from him a portion of this shed ; that after a while he had ceased to pay rent, & that, when the pltf. asked him to vacate the shed, he refused to do so. He alleged termination of the tenancy by the service of a notice to quit & asked for two reliefs: (1) that a decree be passed against the deft. for five months arrears of rent for the shed, & (a) for ejectment of the deft. from the shed. The deft. traversed the allegations in the plaint. He pleaded that the pltf. was not the owner of the cattle shed, & that he (the deft.) had been in proprietary & adverse possession of it for several years. The Ct. of first instance framed only one issue, namely, whether the deft. had rented from the pltf. a part of the cattle shed in question. Notwithstanding this, evidence as to title was adduced on both sides, & the Munsif oame to the conclusion that, although the pltf. had failed to prove the lease, there probably had been a lease of some sort, &, in any case, the oattle shed belonged to the pltf. & he was entitled to eject the deft. therefrom. The Ot. accordingly decreed the pltf.s claim for ejectment but not for rent. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the pltf. could succeed only if he succeeded in proving the tenancy. Agreeing with the Munsif that the pltf. had failed to prove the lease, he dismissed the pltf.s claim altogether. The pltf. therefrom. The Ot. accordingly decreed the pltf.s claim for ejectment but not for rent. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the pltf. could succeed only if he succeeded in proving the tenancy. Agreeing with the Munsif that the pltf. had failed to prove the lease, he dismissed the pltf.s claim altogether. The pltf. came up in appeal to the H. 0. & as the two Judges who heard the appeal were divided in opinion, the decree of the Subordinate Judge stood. Against this decree, the matter oame up in Letters Patent appeal to the If. B. In proposing the order of the F. B. reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge & directing a trial by him on the evidence already upon record of the issue, who is the owner of the cattle shed, the subject matter of the suit & a return of his finding thereon to the H. 0., Stanley 0. J. observed : "It is obvious from this that the question of title to the property was definitely raised. & it is dear from the evidence in the case that this question was determined after an examination of the evidence which was adduced on both sides upon this question .... The question of title was clearly raised in the pleadings, & the evidence on both sides was directed to it. The deft. could not be, & was not, taken by surprise in regard to it." He dealt with the observation of Knox J. in the second appeal, in supporting the decision of the Subordinate Judge, that the pltf. having come to Ot. on a false case was not entitled to any relief, & pointed out that on the findings of the Munsif it did not at all follow that the pltf. had put forward a false case. In agreeing to the order proposed by his Lordship the Chief Justice, Banerji J. drew attention to an observation of Chamier J. in Haji Khan V/s. Baldeo Das, 1901 A. W. N. 188 : (24 ALL. 90) to the effect that, if a Ot. sees that the pltf. is entitled to the relief which he claims, although on grounds other than those put forward in his claim, the Ct. should grant such relief if the defts. were not thereby taken by surprise. 90) to the effect that, if a Ot. sees that the pltf. is entitled to the relief which he claims, although on grounds other than those put forward in his claim, the Ct. should grant such relief if the defts. were not thereby taken by surprise. He pointed out that, in the case before the F. B., the question of title was properly raised & arose for investigation. 17. The case of Balmakund, (25 ALL. 498: 1903 A. W. N. 112 P. B.) was followed by Wort J. in Mohammad Yusuf V/s. Mohd. Waheed, a.I.R. (23) 1933 Pat. 147 : (161 I. C 585). In this case a claim for adverse possession was set up by the deft. & it was found by the Cts. of fact that the pltf. was in possession of the suit property within twelve years of the institution of the suit. His Lordship stressed the remarks in the judgment of Banerji J. to which I have refd. to above, &, referring to the facts of the case before him, remarked: "They (the defts.) in fact claimed adverse title in contradiction to title by adverse possession & they invited the Cts. below to investigate it. Both Cts. have come to the conclusion that they have not established that title. Now it would be a matter of surprise to me if at this time of the day in India a pltf. who has established facts which would entitle him to the particular form of relief claimed, should be debarred from obtaining that relief merely because the allegations or some of them had not been established in their entirety." In Bamdahin Lohars case (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat 379 : 199 I. C. 9l), Agarwala J. (as he then was) followed the decision in Balmakunds case (25 ALL. 498: 1903 A. W. N. 112 F.B.) pointing out that there was no suggestion that the deft. was taken by surprise, that in fact the deft. had produced a parwana on which he relied, & the question of title "was thoroughly investigated by the trial Ct. on evidence which the deft. placed before the Ct." To the same effect is the decision of Beevor J. in the case of Saral Sonar V/s. Sudama Singh, A. I. R. (33) 1946 Pat. 103 : (226 I. C. 137), where his Lordship folld. the decision in Abdul Ghanis case (25 ALL. on evidence which the deft. placed before the Ct." To the same effect is the decision of Beevor J. in the case of Saral Sonar V/s. Sudama Singh, A. I. R. (33) 1946 Pat. 103 : (226 I. C. 137), where his Lordship folld. the decision in Abdul Ghanis case (25 ALL. 256 : 1903 A. w. n. 18 F. B.) and in that of Mohammad Yusuf, (A. I. E. (23) 1936 Pat. 147 : 161 I. C. 585). 18. In support of his contention, Mr. Hareshwar Prasad Singh has referred also to Jhari Singh v. Pirthi Nath, 2 Pat. L. J. 69: (A. I. B. (3) 1916 Pat. 50) and Mt. Walihan V/s. jogeshwar, 7 c. L. J. 44 : (35 cal 189 P. a). The former case is of a converse nature to the case before us. The pltf. sued for a declaration of his title to the land in dispute, & that he might be put into possession thereof by ousting the defts. & that he might be awarded mesne profits for use & occupation during the period they had been in wrongful possession. The suit was decreed by the Ct. of first instance. In appeal by the defts. the J. C. held that the pltf.s case, so far as it was based on eviction & the right to claim khas possession, had not been established, but that there was a cause of action in reference to the pltf.s title. He accordingly granted a declaration of the pltf.s title & upheld the decree so far as it awarded mesne profits on the basis of rent payable to the pltf, on the foot of a tenancy existing between him & defts. 1 to 3. This decree for rent was set aside by the H. C. on the ground that a pltf. coming into Ct. with one case, & failing to prove it, should not be permitted to succeed upon another, & that directly in antagonism with his primary allegations. Their Lordships pointed out that it is not open to the Ct. to convert one cause of action into a different cause of action, a view also expressed in Mt. Walihans case (7 c. L. j. 44 : 35 cal. 189 P. a). Their Lordships pointed out that it is not open to the Ct. to convert one cause of action into a different cause of action, a view also expressed in Mt. Walihans case (7 c. L. j. 44 : 35 cal. 189 P. a). There is nothing in these two decisions inconsistent with the decisions in the F. B. cases of the Allahabad H. C. I have mentioned above how, in the case of Balmakund (25 ALL. 498: 1903 A W.N. 112 F.B.), Stanley C. J. dealt with the remark of Knox J. that the pltf. had come to Ct. with a false case & pointed out that this conclusion did not follow from the findings of the Munsif. As regards the cause of action, it has been pointed out by Banerji J. in the case of Balmakund (25 ALL 498: 1903 A. w. N. 112 F. B.), as also by Agarwala J. (as he then was) in the case of Bamdahin Lohar (A. I. R. (29) 1942 Pat. 379 : 199 I. C. 9l) that a suit coming within the provisions of S. 7 (xi) (cc), Court-fees Act, is essentially a suit for ejectment on the allegation that the deft. is a trespasser, the tenancy having terminated, &, therefore, there is not really a different cause of action. 19. Nor do I think that there is any conflict between the observations in the cases of Govindakumar Sur (57 Cal. 349: A. I. E. (17) 1930 Cal. 42) and Narayan Jha (A. I. R. (21) 1934 Pat. 184 : 13 Pat. 329 s. B.) & the decisions of the E. B of the Allahabad H. C. All that was observed in the two former cases was that ordinarily, a suit brought as a suit for ejecting an ex-tenant should not be converted into a suit for ejectment on a finding of title. There are several reasons for this. There is, to mention one reason, the question of c-f. A suit of the former kind is visually an easy suit, for it involves only an investigation of the existence of the alleged tenancy & whether the relationship of landlord & tenant has terminated. If the relationship is established, it is not open to the deft. to raise the question of title &, if it is not established, the pltf. will ordinarily fail. If the relationship is established, it is not open to the deft. to raise the question of title &, if it is not established, the pltf. will ordinarily fail. This is one of the reasons why a lesser c.-f. is charged for a suit of this kind than is charged for a suit for ejectment on title. This is not merely a question of c.-f. bub also affects jurisdiction. The higher valuation, placed upon a suit of the latter kind means that, if the property is of value, the decision of such a suit will go to a Ct. of higher jurisdiction, presumably more competent to deal with the questions involved. There is another way in which the question of c.-f. is relevant. If it is laid down as a rule that a pltf. suing to eject an ex-tenant is entitled to succeed on title, if he fails to establish the relationship of landlord & tenant, it will be a temptation for litigations to avoid the payment of higher c.-f. & higher costs by falsely bringing suits for ejectment on title in the form of suits for the ejectment of an ex-tenant. It is in this connection that the remarks made by Knox J. & by the D. B. in the:case of Jhari Singh (3 Pat. L. J. 69 : A. I. R. (3) 1916 Pat. 50) become relevant. 20. It appears to me that the relief which the F.B. of the Allahabad H C. considered the Cts could & shoud give, is an equitable relief entirely within the discretion of the Ct. within the provisions of 0. 7, E. 7, Civil P. C. If the question of title has been raised in the trial of the suit & has been investigated, the parties knowing about it & adducing evidence on the point, & Ct. is in a position to give the pltf. the relief asked for on the basis of his title, there is no reason why the Ct. should drive the pltf. to file another suit in order to get this relief, provided that the pltf. has done nothing to disqualify him from receiving equitable relief, e.g., by coming to Ct. with a false story. In this view of the matter, the question of c.-f. is no bar to the grant of such relief. Nor will the question of pecuniary jurisdiction arise, unless an appellate Ct. has done nothing to disqualify him from receiving equitable relief, e.g., by coming to Ct. with a false story. In this view of the matter, the question of c.-f. is no bar to the grant of such relief. Nor will the question of pecuniary jurisdiction arise, unless an appellate Ct. is able to come to a finding within the meaning of S. 11, Suits Valuation Act, that there has been prejudice caused. It is in the light of these remarks that the case must be examined to see whether the pltf. before us can be given relief on title. 21. Looked at in this light, it seems clear to me that he cannot. It is true that the questions of title wa3 put in issue & that these were the issues on which the parties went to trial. I am not at all sure, however, that it wa3 on these issues that the parties actually adduced evidence. I say this not only from the fast that the Munsif considered only two issues, namely, the issues of the existence of the relationship of landlord & tenant & of the sufficiensy of the notice to quit, but because the order- sheet & the judgment itself indicate that even at the time of the trial the Munsif was proceeding on the basis that these were the only two relevant issues. The question of title was far from simple, as is apparent from a perusal of the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. Nevertheless, the Munsif, having concluded in one day the recording of the evidence, fixed the very next day for delivery of judgment & delivered his judgment on that day. Further, we find from his judgment that a petn. filed by the deft. for examining himself on commission, on the ground that he was ill & unable to come to Ct. was rejected by the Munsif because he considered it unnecessary to examine the deft. "when the evidence adduced by the pltf. falls short of establishing a case for him;" that is to say, the pltf. having failed to make out the relationship of landlord & tenant, the Munsif refused to let the deft. adduce all the evidence which he wished to adduce. "when the evidence adduced by the pltf. falls short of establishing a case for him;" that is to say, the pltf. having failed to make out the relationship of landlord & tenant, the Munsif refused to let the deft. adduce all the evidence which he wished to adduce. That the Munsif did not take all the necessary evidence on the question of title would also appear from the action taken by the Subordinate Judge in appeal in dealing with the question of title. The first Subordinate Judge, before whom the matter came in appeal, considered the evidence recorded as insufficient, & remanded the case to the Munsif for a finding on title after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence thereon. This order, as I have mentioned, was set aside by Beevor J. The matter then came before the successor of the previous Subordinate Judge. He, too, found the evidence on the record inadequate by itself Tor coming to a decision on the point. He, therefore, held a local inspection. It is well established that the purpose of such a local inspection is to enable the Ct. to understand the evidence on the record & not to bring fresh evidence on the record. I am unable to say here that the local inspection has not also been used for the latter purpose. Eor instance, the Subordinate Judge mentions that in his sketch map he has incorporated the admissions of the parties as regards the possession of different persons. Incidentally, I may remark that it is difficult to follow the note of local inspection, as it makes references to certain marks on the Subordinate Judges sketch plan which do not appear in that sketch map. In consequence I have not been able to follow the reasoning in the Subordinate Judges judgment, based upon his memo. of local inspection, by which he has arrived at his conclusion on the point of title characterises the evidence on the point of title as "very meagre." He then proceeds to deal with certain "admitted" facts. It is not quite clear . what admissions were made, whether the admissions are contained in the record as prepared by the Munsif or were made before the Subordinate . Judge. The case of the pltf. It is not quite clear . what admissions were made, whether the admissions are contained in the record as prepared by the Munsif or were made before the Subordinate . Judge. The case of the pltf. depended upon an award said to have been made by arbitrators in relation to the property of the family of which the pltf. & Mathura Saran were members. According to the pltf. the property, which forms the subject matter of the suit, was allotted to the pltf. by this award. The defence challenged the genuineness of this award, but it was held by the Subordinate Judge to be genuine. The insufficiency of the evidence on the point is clear from the ground given by the Subordinate Judge for finding this award to be genuine : "I find from a perusal of the contents of the award, which I shall discuss presently that the genuineness of the award cannot be questioned." And, again, "The contents of the award show that great pains were taken by the arbitrators in giving the award & that the facts stated therein could not have come to light unless there were statements of the parties before them & the arbitrators perused the documents to which they have refd. in the award." This award, be it noted, purports to have been given about three years after the reference to the arbitrators was made, & does not bear the signature of one of the three arbitrators. These points were glossed over, however, because pltf.s witness 3 was not cross examined regarding them. It is on the basis of this award that the Subordinate Judge comes to the conclusion that the property in suit belongs to the pltf. & it is, also, on the basis of this award that he finds that the pltf. was in possession of the property at least till 1933 (vide p. 10 of the brief). 22 In these circumstances, I find it difficult to hold that the question of title has been fairly tried between the parties & that the pltf, is entitled to ask the Ct. in its discretion to grant him relief on title. 23. On the above grounds, I would allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the Subordinate Judge & dismiss the suit. The deft. will get his costs throughout. Shearer, J. 24 I agree. in its discretion to grant him relief on title. 23. On the above grounds, I would allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the Subordinate Judge & dismiss the suit. The deft. will get his costs throughout. Shearer, J. 24 I agree. I must say, however, that I find it difficult to conceive of a case where a pltf. seeking to recover possession of land from the deft. on the footing that the deft is his tenant & his tenancy has been determined, can be entitled to a decree on the footing that the deft. is not a tenant but a mere trespasser. If there is evidence to show the deft. is the latter & not the former, it must have been let in wrongly or by accident. In this particular case, however, there is no such evidence. Where the Ct. is unable to say, on the evidence, whether the deft. the position is quite different & there is no difficulty in passing a decree.