JUDGMENT Majumdar, J. - The Petitioners Fatehchand Murlidhar are the sellers and the Respondents S. Debidutt & Co., Ltd. are the buyers of 1200 bales Cuban Sugar bags of Megna Mill in a contract No. 3636 dated 8th February, 1948. The Petitioners failed to deliver the goods; admitted their liability for non-delivery and requested the Respondents in writing to buy the goods on their account and send them the bill for the difference, if any. The buyers did not buy the goods but under the arbitration clause in the contract submitted the dispute to the Tribunal of arbitration. The disputes under the contract were stated by the Respondents in their letter of the 7th November, 1946. The Arbitrators made their award on the 26th May, 1947, by which the Petitioners were directed to pay Rs. 1,53,600 (rupees one lakh fifty-three thousand and six hundred) in full settlement of the claim of the Respondents and costs. The Petitioners have applied for setting aside that award on the ground that the Arbitrators have exceeded their jurisdiction inasmuch as the question which required their decision was whether the Petitioners should be directed to specifically deliver the goods which they have wilfully and wrongfully failed to deliver. 2. The question, therefore, is what were the disputes in respect of which the arbitrator's decision was required, Gentle, J., in the case of Re: Arbitration: The Bengal Jute Mills 45 C.W.N. 957 (1942) held the view, with which I am in complete agreement that when parties set out specifically what disputes have arisen and what relief is sought in consequence of the alleged default by one party they are the only matters upon which the arbitrator is required to enquire and adjudicate. 3. The letter of the 7th November, 1946, addressed to the Registrar of the Tribunal of Arbitration, on behalf of the Respondents, mentions that the subject-matter of the dispute is in connection with the non-delivery of the entire 1200 bales. After setting out therein the substance of the correspondences between the parties in connection with non-delivery, the Respondents complained that the Petitioners had shown no valid reason for withholding delivery which they were bound to do under a Circular No. G. 16 of 1946 dated 16th July issued by the Gunny Trades Association of which the Petitioners are members. After setting out therein the substance of the correspondences between the parties in connection with non-delivery, the Respondents complained that the Petitioners had shown no valid reason for withholding delivery which they were bound to do under a Circular No. G. 16 of 1946 dated 16th July issued by the Gunny Trades Association of which the Petitioners are members. The relief they claimed was for an award ordering the Petitioners to deliver the goods which had been wrongfully and wilfully withheld. In answer, the Petitioners contended that there was no dispute as is contemplated by the contract inasmuch as they had admitted their liability for damages; the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an order for specific performance of the contract for the delivery of the goods and as such the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the submission made by the Respondents. 4. On the 8th March the Respondents repeated their demand before the Tribunal for an order for delivery of the goods. 5. It seems clear that the dispute between the parties which was referred to was whether the Petitioners were bound to deliver the specific goods and not whether they were liable to pay damages. In the circumstances the award ordering damages must be without jurisdiction. 6. Mr. P.B. Mukherjee has argued that under r. 26 of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Rules of the Tribunal of Arbitration the arbitrators could order anything to be done by the parties which they think fit. That rule provides that the Court may make an interim award, and may, by any award, order and determine what it shall think fit to be done by either of the parties, respecting the matters referred to. 7. In my judgment r. 26 should be read with r, 30 and the words in the former rule should be construed in the light of the words in the latter rule, the result of which is that under r. 26 what the Tribunal could order and determine either of the parties should do in the matter of delivering or taking delivery of the goods and things of that description. Making an order for payment of damages in my judgment would not come within the language of r. 26. I, therefore, set aside the award. The Respondents are to pay the costs of this application.