Judgment Lord Thankerton.-This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment and decree of the Federal Court of India1, dated 4th December, 1941, reversing a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar, dated 9th September, 1940, which had affirmed a decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Peshawar, dated 8th March, 1940. The Federal Court made a declaration that the respondent’s dismissal was void and inoperative, and submitted the ease to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for consideration of the respondent’s claim for arrears of pay. On 1st March, 1928, the respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police by the Inspector-General of Police, North-West Frontier Province. On 25th April, 1938, the respondent was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, on a charge of copying during a departmental examination. He was therefore dismissed by an authority subordinate in rank to the officer who bad appointed him. After unsuccessful appeals to the Inspector-General of Police and the Provincial Government, the respondent instituted the present suit on 17th June, 1939, in which he claimed a declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal, null and void, invalid and inoperative and that he still retained his office as Sub-Inspector of Police. He further claimed arrears of pay from the date of the order of dismissal up to that date. There was an alternative claim for damages, which no longer survived before this Board. The main question concerns the validity of the order of dismissal, which is challenged on the ground that the dismissing authority was subordinate in rank to the authority by whom the respondent had been appointed. It is sought to be justified on the provisions of the North-West Frontier Police Rules, which are made under the authority of the Indian Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861), and it will be convenient to trace the history of these rules, so far as relevant to the point at issue, and the general statutory provisions which affect them. Section 7 of the Police Act of 1861 provides: “7. Section 7 of the Police Act of 1861 provides: “7. The appointment of all police-officers other than those mentioned in section 4 of this Act shall, under such rules as the Local Government shall from time to time sanction, rest with the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General and District Superintendents of Police, who may, under such rules, as aforesaid, at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same.” Sub-Inspectors are not mentioned in section 4, and there is no restriction excluding dismissal by an officer subordinate in rank to the appointing officer. At the date of the respondent’s appointment in 1928, the North-West Frontier Police Rules, 1917, as amended from time to time were in force; the relevant rule was rule 17-I of Chapter XVII, which had been made by a correction slip on 25th September, 1919, which clearly provided that a Sub-Inspector could only be dismissed by the Inspector-General of Police, or by an officer of higher rank. On 24th January, 1934, by a correction slip, rule 17-1 was amended so as to substitute “Deputy Inspector-General of Police” for “Inspector-General of Police” as entitled to dismiss a Sub-Inspector. Having in view section 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919, and the decision of this Board in Rangachary v. Secretary of State for India1, this amendment of 1934 was clearly invalid and inoperative. Sub-section (1) of section 96-B provided that no person in the civil service of the Crown in India “may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed”, and it was held in Rangachari’s case1 that this was a mandatory statutory restriction, which could not be affected by any rules. Sub-section (1) of section 96-B provided that no person in the civil service of the Crown in India “may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed”, and it was held in Rangachari’s case1 that this was a mandatory statutory restriction, which could not be affected by any rules. Lord Roche, in delivering the judgment of the Board, said (at page 53): “It is manifest that the stipulation or proviso as to dismissal is itself of statutory force and stands on a footing quite other than any matters of rule which are of infinite variety and can be changed from time to time.” The Rules then existing are dealt with in sub-section (4) of section 96-B which provided, “(4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that all rules or other provisions in operation at the time of the passing of the Government of India Act, 1919, whether made by the Secretary of State in Council or by any other authority, relating to the civil service of the Crown in India, were duly made in accordance with the powers in that behalf, and are confirmed, but any-such rules or provisions may be revoked, varied, or added to by rules or laws made under this section.” It follows that the amendment of 1934 was inconsistent with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 96-B and was therefore invalid and inoperative. Before the dismissal of the respondent on 25th April, 1938, the Government of India Act, 1935, had come into operation on 1st April, 1937. Section 240 of that Act, so far as relevant for the present purpose, provided as follows:- “240. (1) Except as expressly provided by this Act, every person who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, or holds any civil post under the Crown in India, holds office during His Majesty’s pleasure. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (3) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.” The proper construction of this section has been fully dealt with in the judgment of this Board just delivered in The High Commissioner for India and the High Commissioner for Pakistan v. Lall1, to which reference may be made. In that case the question arose as to the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 240 and it was held that sub-section (3) was a statutory term of service of the Grown, which qualified the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 240, and was mandatory and not permissive. On the principles of this decision, and the decision in Rangachari’s case2, it is equally clear that sub-section (2) of section 240, though it obviously does not apply in the case of dismissal by the Crown itself, is a statutory term of the service of the Crown, and is mandatory and not permissive. It follows that the dismissal of the respondent by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed would be unlawful and inoperative under that section. But the appellant relies on another section in the same Chapter-(Chapter II)-of the Act of 1935 as releasing it from the obligation prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 240, namely, section 243, which provides, “243. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as may be determined by or under the Acts relating to these forces respectively.” There was no dispute that the respondent held a subordinate rank in the appellant’s police force, and the issue was confined to two questions,: (1) whether the right of dismissal was a “condition of service” within the meaning of section 243 and (2) whether, at the time of the respondent’s dismissal, there was a valid police rule in operation which authorised dismissal of the respondent by the Deputy Inspector-General, although the latter was subordinate in rank to the officer by whom he had been appointed. On the first question, apart from consideration whether the context indicates a special significance to the expression “conditions of service,” their Lordships are unable, in the absence of any such special significance, to regard provisions which prescribe the circumstances under which the employer is to be entitled to terminate the service otherwise than conditions of the service, whether these provisions are contractual or statutory; they are therefore of opinion that the natural meaning of the expression would include such provisions. In the second place, it will be found, on a perusal of Chapter II, which includes sections 240 to 263, that sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 240 are the only provisions of Chapter II to which the introductory words of section 243 can be referable in relation to conditions of service, as every one of the other provisions of the Chapter, with one exception, dealt with special classes of service, just as section 243 deals with a special class. The one exception is sub-section (1) of section 240, but that provides for termination by His Majesty, and there can be no question of delegation of that power by virtue of section 243. Their Lordships need only notice one of these other sections, as it . was referred to in argument by both parties, namely, section 241, sub-sections (2) and (4). The opening words of sub-section (2)- “Except as expressly provided by this Act, the conditions of service of persons serving His Majesty in a civil capacity in India” -relate to the very same persons dealt with in the immediately preceding section 240, and this exclusion from the power of making rules conferred by sub-section (2) of section 241, points unmistakably, in their Lordships’ opinion, to the express provisions of section 240, so as to prevent their alteration by rules. There are, of course, other provisions of the Act which will also fail under the exception provided in sub-section (2) of section 241, but there can be no doubt, in their Lordships’ opinion, that the provisions of section 240 prescribe conditions of service, which are covered by the exception. Sub-section (4) of section 241 contains a similar exception to the powers conferred. Their Lordships are, accordingly, of opinion that the right of dismissal was a condition of service within the meaning of section 243. Sub-section (4) of section 241 contains a similar exception to the powers conferred. Their Lordships are, accordingly, of opinion that the right of dismissal was a condition of service within the meaning of section 243. The second question arises in this way:- The respondent was dismissed on 25th April, 1938, admittedly under rule 16-1 of Chapter XVI of the N.W.F.P. Police Rules, 1937, which authorises the dismissal or removal of Sub-Inspector of Police by the Deputy Inspector-General. That rule is contained in Volume II of these rules, which has the year 1938 on the title page, below a statement that it was printed and published by the Manager, Govt. stationery and printing, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar. There was no indication as to the date when the rules became Hading on the Police Service. At the hearing before the Board, Volume I, which might clear the matter up, was stated to be out of print or unobtainable, and counsel for the appellant asked their Lordships to assume in his favour that that date was subsequent to the 1st April, 1937, when the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force thereby obviating the invalidity of the 1934 correction slip, which would equally apply to the 1937 Rules if issued, before 1st April, 1937. After the hearing was closed, their Lordships thought it right, in view of the difficulties of making such an assumption, and in the true interests of the parties, to suggest to them that further enquiries should be made to see whether Volume I of the Rules could not be made available. The result of these enquiries was that the respondent, at considerable expense, has recovered a copy of the missing volume, and has lodged an affidavit dated 30th December, 1947, as to the relevant passages, and the appellant has agreed that that affidavit should be accepted as evidence before their Lordships, in order to save the time and expense of having the volume transmitted to this country. These passages consist of a verbatim reproduction of the title page and preface, and also a similar reproduction from the title pages of Chapters I and II of the same volume, which adds nothing further that is material. The title page states that they are “The N.W.F.P. Police Rules, 1937. These passages consist of a verbatim reproduction of the title page and preface, and also a similar reproduction from the title pages of Chapters I and II of the same volume, which adds nothing further that is material. The title page states that they are “The N.W.F.P. Police Rules, 1937. Issued by and with the Authority of the Local Government under sections 7 and 12 of Act V of 1861.” The word “Local” has been replaced by the word “Provincial” by a correction slip No.68 which may be taken, on comparison with the dates of correction slips 66 and 73, as having been made in 1939. The name of the Government printer and publisher and year 1938 is at the foot of the page, as in volume II. The preface, which is signed by the Inspector-General of Police on 2nd January, 1937, and refers to the revision as the 1917 edition of the Rules, which had been proceeding since 1933, opens with an important passage as follows:- “The North-West Frontier Province Police Rules as now issued are binding on all police officers and are an authoritative guide to others concerned. No alterations in the Rules may be made except on receipt of correction orders approved and issued by the Provincial Government and after decision by His Excellency the Governor under section 56 of the Government of India Act, 1935.” In the opinion of their Lordships, only one reasonable inference can be drawn from these facts:-viz., that the revision of the 1917 Rules was completed in January, 1937, in view of the coming into operation of the Act of 1935, on 1st April, 1937, and that they were not issued so as to become operative until they had been put Into print and were published in 1938. It may be noted that the first correction slip was dated 14th January, 1939. Accordingly, their Lordships are of opinion that the Rules under which the respondent was dismissed was a valid rule, made by the appellant under the authority conferred on it by section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This conclusion negatives the respondent’s claim for arrears of pay. Accordingly, their Lordships are of opinion that the Rules under which the respondent was dismissed was a valid rule, made by the appellant under the authority conferred on it by section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This conclusion negatives the respondent’s claim for arrears of pay. Following on the remit of the case to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner by the order of the Federal Court dated December 4, 1941, the respondent obtained a decree for payment of Rs.2,283 against the present appellant in respect of arrears of pay from the date of dismissal to the institution of the suit on 17th June, 1939, made by the Court of Judicial Commissioner on 4th July, 1942. Special leave to appeal against the Judgment of the Federal Court, dated 4th December, 1941, was given, inter alia, on condition that the order as to costs of the Federal Court should stand and that the costs of the respondent in the appeal should be borne by the appellant as between solicitor and client in any event. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed that the judgment and decree of the Federal Court dated 4th December, 1941, should be set aside except as to costs, end that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner dated 19th September, in so far as it dismisses the suit, should be restored. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellant will pay the respondent’s costs of this appeal as between solicitor and client. The respondent asked that their Lordships should direct that, having no solicitor and having appeared in person before the Board, the cost of his passage to this country and back to India and his cost of maintenance m London should be treated as costs between solicitor and client. He further asks that he should be entitled to recover the cost of the purchase price of Volume I of the Police Rules, which he states as Rs.500. He further asks that he should be entitled to recover the cost of the purchase price of Volume I of the Police Rules, which he states as Rs.500. While their Lordships feel unable to make any order as asked for, they desire to point out for consideration of the appellant that if the respondent had employed a solicitor and counsel, the outlays would have been recoverable under the condition imposed in granting special leave, and that the recovery of the volume in question may well have been vital to their success on the main point in issue in the appeal. Solicitor for Appellant: Solicitor, India Office. [This appeal was again heard by their Lordships as it was brought to their notice that the relevant Police Rules had not in fact become operative till alter the dismissal of the respondent and the following judgment, Part II was delivered.] B. McKenna for Appellant. Leon Maclaran for Respondent. The Judgment (Part II) of the Court was delivered by Lord du Parcq.-On 18th March, 1948, a judgment was delivered by the late Lord Thankerton, in which their Lordships stated the reasons which led them to the conclusion that they should humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed. Their Lordships do not propose now to repeat what was then said. It suffices to say that the decision of the Board was given on the assumption, which then appeared to be justified and had not, indeed, been questioned, that the Police Rules of 1937, to which the judgment refers, had become operative in the year 1938, and at some date prior to 25th April, 1938, when the respondent was dismissed from the force. Subsequently to the delivery of the judgment, and before their Lordships had tendered their advice to His Majesty, the respondent submitted a petition wherein he prayed that their Lordships might reconsider this decision, mainly on the ground that it had been ascertained that the Police Rules of 1937 were in fact printed and published on 29th April, 1938, that is to say four days after the dismissal of the respondent. Their Lordships accordingly found it necessary to hear further argument on 29th July, 1948, counsel for both parties appeared at their Lordships’ bar. It was then admitted that the Police Rules of 1937 were in truth printed and published on 29th April, 1938, as the respondent alleged. Their Lordships accordingly found it necessary to hear further argument on 29th July, 1948, counsel for both parties appeared at their Lordships’ bar. It was then admitted that the Police Rules of 1937 were in truth printed and published on 29th April, 1938, as the respondent alleged. It follows, in the opinion of their Lordships, that, applying the reasoning contained in the judgment previously delivered, they can only come to the opposite conclusion to that which they had formed on what is now shown to be an erroneous assumption as to a material fact. At the hearing of 29th July of this year counsel for the appellant made an alternative submission to the effect that the rule on which the appellant relies came into force immediately upon its approval by the Governor-in-Council, and stated that, according to his instructions, that approval was signified on April 17, 1935. Assuming these instructions to be correct, and further assuming (though without deciding) that the approval of the Governor-in-Council brought the rules immediately into effect, their Lordships are of opinion that, as against the respondent, the rule in question would nonetheless be inoperative, since the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the rule would have been valid against him, did not come into force until 1st April, 1937, and could not then retrospectively affect the respondent’s position. On 6th August, 1948, their Lordships caused a letter to be addressed to the Solicitor representing the appellant, informing him that their Lordships now proposed humbly to advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and stating that the order as to costs would not be varied. The letter pointed out that if this advice were tendered, and if His Majesty were pleased to accept it, the effect would be that the declaratory judgment of the Federal Court would stand. Finally, the letter referred to the award of Rs.2,283 to the respondent by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner which according to a submission made by the appellant’s counsel was open to challenge and inquired whether the appellant wished to have an opportunity of satisfying their Lordships that the point was open, and of being heard upon it. By their Lordships’ direction, a copy of this letter was sent to the respondent. Their Lordships have now received an intimation that the appellant does not wish to offer any further argument in this case. By their Lordships’ direction, a copy of this letter was sent to the respondent. Their Lordships have now received an intimation that the appellant does not wish to offer any further argument in this case. The respondent, as his counsel stated when the matter was last before the Board, does desire an opportunity of arguing that he shall now be awarded arrears of pay from the date of the institution of his suit on 17th June, 1939. Their Lordships do not propose to deal further with this matter. If, in accordance with their Lordships’ humble advice, the declaratory judgment of the Federal Court is restored, it will be open to the respondent to pursue any remedy which flows from that declaratory judgment in the appropriate Court. Their Lordships must not be understood, however, as expressing an opinion that the respondent was entitled as of right to recover the sum of Rs.2,283 which was awarded to him, or, that he has any claim to a further sum in respect of arrears of pay. It is unnecessary, owing to the very proper attitude of the appellant, to express any view as to the former question, and the latter question does not arise in this appeal, which is from the decision of the Federal Court. If that decision is affirmed the respondent, who did not himself enter an appeal cannot now ask for anything more. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, and that the judgment and decree of the Federal Court dated 4th December, 1941, should be affirmed. The appellant must pay the respondent’s costs of this appeal as between solicitor and client. Solicitor for Appellant: Solicitor, Commonwealth Relations Office. Solicitors for Respondent: Cessavetti Constas & Co. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.