Judgment.- These are two connected appeals against two orders made in E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 and in E.A. No. 2530 of 1946 by the Principal City Civil Judge, Madras. Until 1st October, 1946, the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, was in force. From that date its place was taken by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946). The date when the prior order expired and the new enactment came into force is of importance in this case having regard to the contentions raised both in the 1ower Court and before me on behalf of the appellant in respect of a shop No. 339, Esplanade, G.T., Madras, which belongs to a charitable trust the trustee of which is Mullangi Lakshmana Perumal Chetti, the petitioner in E.P. No. 1257 of 1946. The petitioner filed an application before the Rent Controller under section 7-A (2) (iii) (a) of the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, on the ground that the appellant had sublet the premises without the written consent of the landlord and that consequently under the provision cited above he was liable to be evicted. Upon that application an order of eviction was made on the 27th May, 1946, by the Rent Controller against the respondent in favour of the petitioner. Time was given in that order until 22nd August, 1946. The respondent filed an appeal to the Collector of Madras which was dismissed on 22nd July, 1946. Since the order of eviction thus became final under the terms of the Rent Control Order, the petitioner filed E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 on 6th September, 1946, in the City Civil Court to evict the respondent from the premises by executing the order of eviction which has the effect of a decree enforceable by that Court. To this application the respondent filed a counter on 11th October, 1946, urging that his sub-tenant who was in the premises had not yet vacated and wanted two months further time to get him to quit the premises and to deliver possession. It must be noted that by this time the House Rent Control Order had been substituted by the new Act which came into force on 1st October, 1946. It must be noted that by this time the House Rent Control Order had been substituted by the new Act which came into force on 1st October, 1946. On the same date, nth October, 1946, the City Civil Court Judge directed the issue of a warrant for the delivery of possession of the premises to the landlord but, as it seems to me, according to the practice in that Court he gave a further direction that the warrant was to be issued after 28th October, 1946, returnable by 12th November, 1946. It is significant to note that on the very same date, nth October, 1946, the respondent was able to get delivery of the non-residential premises from his sub-tenant Singaravelu and appears to have himself got into it in order apparently to surmount in that manner the objection upon which the tenancy had been sought to be terminated and the order of eviction had been made. In the meantime some other proceedings for review, etc., seem to have gone on before the Rent Controller as well as before the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes and in those proceedings orders of stay had been obtained by the respondent. The result was that on 28th November, 1946, the City Civil Judge adjourned E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 to 20th December, 1946, pending final orders upon those petitions which had been filed before the Rent Controller and the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes. By 29th November, 1946, however, all obstructions were removed by the dissolution of orders of stay so that there was no further impediment in the matter of enforcing execution of the order of eviction. At this stage, having exhausted all conceivable venues, the respondent took the step of filing E.A. No. 2530 of 1946 on the 30th November, 1946, praying under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code that E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 should be rejected on certain legal grounds which have been developed both in the lower Court and in this Court by his counsel. On 15th January, 1947, the learned City Civil Judge allowed E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 directing delivery of possession by 22nd January, 1947, and dismissed E.A. No. 2530 of 1946. On 15th January, 1947, the learned City Civil Judge allowed E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 directing delivery of possession by 22nd January, 1947, and dismissed E.A. No. 2530 of 1946. C.M.A. No. 24 of 1947 is against the order allowing E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 and C.M.A. No. 25 of 1947 is an appeal against the order dismissing E.A. No. 2530 of 1946. Mr. Ch. Raghava Rao raised the legal contention based upon the language of Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946) that the appellant is a tenant within the meaning of that Act and that under that Act since there was no sub-tenant any longer in the premises it was necessary for the respondent landlord to file a fresh application for eviction under the new Act as both E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 and all proceedings taken prior thereto by the Rent Controller under the House Rent Control Order of 1945 had lapsed, and there was no execution proceeding, legally speaking, after 1st October, 1946, in which the tenant could be ejected. The learned City Civil Judge went into this contention with reference to the language of the relevant provisions of the Act and held that in spite of the Act having come into effect on 1st October, 1946, the prior proceedings including the order of eviction dated 27th May, 1946, were in force and could be executed by the City Civil Court. He also pointed out with reference to what transpired subsequent to 1st October 1946, itself in his Court that on the nth October, 1946, an order had been passed in the presence of both parties directing the issue of a warrant for delivery of possession within a certain time and this was based on the counter filed by the appellant on the same date saying that he wanted two months time to get the premises vacated by his sub-tenant and to deliver vacant possession thereof to the landlord. The learned City Civil Judge held that this order had become final between the parties and the appellant could not go behind it. In answer to this finding Mr. The learned City Civil Judge held that this order had become final between the parties and the appellant could not go behind it. In answer to this finding Mr. Raghava Rao has put forward the same legal objection which I have set out above that there being no legally enforceable order of eviction and the execution petition itself having lapsed there was no proceeding before the Court in winch any eviction could be ordered and that being so all proceedings which were subsequently taken in that execution petition were nugatory. To deal with these contentions it is necessary to appreciate the general scheme of Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The expression "tenant" is defined in section 2 (4) as meaning any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a budding and includes a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. We need not pause to examine the question whether the appellant is a tenant within the meaning of this definition as he is a person who admittedly has continued by sufferance of party as well as by sufferance of the Court in occupation of the premises asking on each occasion more and more time for vacating it. In fact although the eviction order was passed on 27th May, 1946, he is still occupying the premises. The most important sections for the purpose of these appeals are sections 7 and 18. Sub-section (2) of section 7 so far as is material to this case runs thus: "A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied..... (ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act without the written consent of the landlord - (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire budding or any portion thereof,.........." The rest of the section is not of importance here. (ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act without the written consent of the landlord - (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the entire budding or any portion thereof,.........." The rest of the section is not of importance here. Section 18 is in these words: "(1) All proceedings commenced and action taken under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945 and the Madras Non-Residential Building Rent Control Order 1945, and pending at the commencement of this Act shall, so far as may be be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and be continued subject to the provisions of this Act. (2) All orders passed or deemed to have been passed under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, and the Madras Non-Residential Bui ding Rent Control Order 1945, and in which fair rent has been fixed, shall continue in force until they are superseded or modified under this Act by the authority competent to do so." The point of Mr. Raghava Rao’s argument based upon these sections is that under section 18 which provides for he continuing in force of existing proceedings, orders etc., it is enacted that those proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act shall be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act subject to two important qualifications, (1) "so far as may be" (the concise scope of this qualification was however not expatiated upon by the learned advocate) and (2) their continuance will be "subject to the provisions of this Act". As far as I am able to see these two restrictive expressions occurring in the section do not have on a true interpretation of the section, the effect or result of a together wiping out all prior proceedings which were in existence before the commencement of the Act. Then, asks Mr. Raghava Rao, why introduce the condition "subject to the provisions of this Act in section 18 (1). For this purpose it is necessary to refer to certain other provisions of the Act as well as the Madras House Rent Control Order. Then, asks Mr. Raghava Rao, why introduce the condition "subject to the provisions of this Act in section 18 (1). For this purpose it is necessary to refer to certain other provisions of the Act as well as the Madras House Rent Control Order. It would be seen that while under the House Kent Control Order the authorities constituted for entertaining appeals and revision applications were respectively the Collector of Madras and the Provincial Government, under the present Act appeals lie to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes and no further revision lies to this Court as it has been held by this Court that the appellate powers were conferred upon the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes as a persona designata. Unless there was a restriction in section 18 to the effect that the continuance of the proceedings shall be subject to the provisions of this Act there would be an anomaly with regard to this matter. To cite another instance the House Rent Control Order applied to the whole Province but the Act applies only to the City of Madras, the Municipalities and certain notified areas. To indicate the limited territorial application again it was necessary to insert such a qualification. Possibly such instances can be multiplied. Apart from this general argument what appears to me to be a clinching way of looking at the matter is this. Under section 18 (1) the language employed is that proceedings commenced and action taken, etc., pending at the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. It is a settled doctrine that when the expression "deemed to have been commenced or taken" is used in statutory enactments it is not to be read as if it was in actual fact commenced or taken under that new provision but must by a fiction be for the purpose of the statute deemed to have been so commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. Now the order of eviction was passed under section 7-A (2-A) of the Madras House Rent Control Order and it was continued by the City Civil Court under section 7-A, 2-A (iii) for purpose of execution. Now the order of eviction was passed under section 7-A (2-A) of the Madras House Rent Control Order and it was continued by the City Civil Court under section 7-A, 2-A (iii) for purpose of execution. When we reach that position it will be necessary to give effect to the language of section 18 (1) which says that proceedings commenced and action taken under the House Rent Control Order (and these were proceedings commenced and action taken under that order) and which were pending at the commencement of this Act (admittedly the execution petition was pending at the commencement of this Act) shall be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act, these corresponding provisions being section 7 for passing an order of eviction and section 9 for execution of that order. The expression "so far as may be" and "subject to the provisions of this Act" as I have already discussed above do not affect this interpretation. The construction sought to be placed upon this section by Mr. Raghava Rao would, in my opinion, virtually render section 18 (1) altogether ineffective. He draws attention to the phrase "after the commencement of this Act" occurring in section 7 (2) (ii) of the Act where it is stated that the tenant should have transferred his right under the sub-lease after the commencement of this Act without the consent of the landlord and upon the strength of this expression it is urged that the sub-letting ought to be after the commencement and that section 18 (1) does not in any manner affect the scope and effect of the expression "after the commencement of this Act" in that provision. The only answer to this contention is that section 18 (1) must in the context be held to override section 7 (2) (ii). Another argument advanced by Mr. Raghava Rao is that the object of the Act was to retain in force only such orders as had been passed for the determination of fair rent under the House Rent Control Order. That case is however provided for under section 18 (2) specifically and it is clear that while section 18 (2) applies to orders which had become final under the operation of section 10, section 18 (1) deals with proceedings commenced and action taken and pending at the commencement of the Act. That case is however provided for under section 18 (2) specifically and it is clear that while section 18 (2) applies to orders which had become final under the operation of section 10, section 18 (1) deals with proceedings commenced and action taken and pending at the commencement of the Act. If this view is correct it must be held that the order of eviction, dated 27th May, 1946 and E.P. No. 1257 of 1946 which was filed on 6th July, 1946, must be deemed to have been passed or filed respectively under this Act after the commencement of this Act. It follows from this conclusion that the order, dated 11th October, 1946, directing the issue of a warrant for delivery of possession is one which is binding upon the appellant and it is not open to him to go behind it. The order of the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is upheld and these civil miscellaneous appeals are dismissed with costs - two sets. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by The Officiating Chief Justice.- The facts which give rise to these two connected appeals are fully set out in the judgment of Yahya Ali, J., and therefore need not be repeated. On the date when Madras Act XV of 1946 came into force, i.e., on the 1st October, 1946, there was a valid execution application pending before the Principal Judge of the Madras City Civil Court to execute an order for eviction obtained by the respondent. Under section 18, sub-section (1) of the Act: "all proceedings commenced and action taken under the Madras House Rent Control Order’ 1945, and the Madras Non-Residential Buildings Rent Control Order, 1945, and pending at the commencement of this Act, shall so far as may be, be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and be continued subject to the provisions of this Act." The execution filed by the respondent was certainly a proceeding which was so pending and must be deemed to have been commenced or taken under section 9 of the Act. Mr. Mr. Raghava Rao, the learned advocate for the appellant, sought to call to his aid the words "so far as may be" and "subject to the provisions of this Act" which occur in section 18 (1) of the Act to support a contention that by the time the execution application came to be finally disposed of, the ground on which the original order of eviction was passed, viz., that the tenant had sub-let the premises without the consent of the landlord, had disappeared. We do not consider that there are any facts in this case to prevent the proceeding in execution which had been commenced by the respondent from being continued subject to any of the provisions of the Act. The words “subject to the provisions of this Act” cannot mean that an order validly obtained under the provisions of the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, could be attacked retrospectively in proceedings taken to execute such an order. It is only the further continuance of the proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Act that the provisions of the Act would govern. Nor is there anything in the words “so far as may be” to prevent the execution proceedings from being continued. Reliance was placed on sub-section (2) of section 18 and section 9 of the Act and the decision in Banmul Soanmul v. Harackchand Roopchand1 in which these provisions were construed. What follows from these provisions as construed by the learned Judges in that decision is only this: If there is a final order of eviction passed under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, but no proceedings had been taken to execute that order and no proceeding in execution was pending on the date when Madras Act XV of 1946 came into force, then, after the commencement of the Act, no action can be taken to execute the order so obtained. This appears to follow inevitably from the language of section 9, because under that section it is only an order under section 7 or section 8 or an order passed on appeal under section 12 of the Act that can be executed. The effect of section 18 (2) is that except an order for fair rent, other orders including orders for eviction, will not continue in force after the coming into force of Madras Act XV of 1946. The effect of section 18 (2) is that except an order for fair rent, other orders including orders for eviction, will not continue in force after the coming into force of Madras Act XV of 1946. But in this case the feature which distinguishes it from the case in Banmul Soanmul v. Harackchand Roopchand1 is that a valid proceeding in execution of the order obtained under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, was pending at the commencement of the Act. We therefore agree with the judgment of Yahya Ali, J., and dismiss the appeals with costs (one set). Appeals dismissed.