JUDGMENT G.N. Das, J. - This is an appeal by Defendants Nos. 2-3 against the decision of R. S. Trivedi, Esq., learned District Judge, Murshidabad, whereby he confirmed the decision of R. N. Datta, Esq., learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Jangipur decreeing the Plaintiffs suit. Plaintiffs case in substance was that they were occupancy raiyats under the Defendant No. 1 in respect of the disputed properties. Defendant No. 1 obtained an ex parte decree for rent against the Plaintiffs and in execution of the decree purchased the disputed lands on 26th September, 1936, by suppression of. the sale processes. The Defendant No. 1 took possession through Court and in Jaistha, 1344 P. S., the Defendant No. 1 settled the disputed land with the Defendants Nos. 2-3 and granted a dakhila. The Plaintiff on coming to know of the sale filed an application under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, making Defendant No. 1 alone as a party. The application was allowed on 20th December, 1937, and the sale was set aside. On 22nd December, 1939, the Plaintiffs filed an application under secs. 144 and 151, CPC but this was dismissed on 7th May, 1941, on the ground that Defendants Nos. 2-3 being third parties and strangers to the proceeding under sec. 174 (3), Bengal Tenancy Act no order for restitution could be made. The Plaintiffs accordingly brought the suit for declaration of their title as raiyats and for recovery of possession of the disputed lands. 2. The Defendants Nos. 2-3 contested the suit, disputing the Plaintiff's title and raising a plea of special limitation under Article 3, Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 3. The trial Court held that the settlement with Defendants Nos. 2-3 was not genuine or at any rate was not made before Jaistha, 1345 B. S., i.e., May-June, 1938, i.e., not before the filing of the application under sec. 174 (3), Bengal Tenancy Act for setting aside the sale. In this view, no notice was necessary to be. given to the Defendants Nos. 2-3 in the sale set-aside proceedings and the Plaintiffs got a good title. On the question of special limitation, the Court found that the Defendant No. 1, the landlord, took actual possession in execution and continued to possess as such till the settlement with Defendants Nos. In this view, no notice was necessary to be. given to the Defendants Nos. 2-3 in the sale set-aside proceedings and the Plaintiffs got a good title. On the question of special limitation, the Court found that the Defendant No. 1, the landlord, took actual possession in execution and continued to possess as such till the settlement with Defendants Nos. 2-3 when the Defendant No. 1 continued to be in constructive possession by receipt of rents from Defendants Nos. 2-3. The Court held that after the sale was set aside, the landlord Defendant No. 1 did not dispossess the Plaintiffs, and as such the suit was not barred under Article 3, Schedule III, Bengal Tenancy Act. 4. The Defendants Nos. 2-3 preferred an appeal.--On the question of title, the lower Appellate Court held that Defendants Nos. 2-3 were not necessary parties to the application for setting aside the sale and the setting aside of the sale as against the landlord Defendant No. 1 was binding on the Defendants Nos. 2-3 and the Plaintiffs acquired a valid raiyati right when the sale was set aside. On the question of special limitation the lower Appellate Court held that as the plaintiffs title accrued when the sale was set aside we have to consider dispossession since that date and not from an earlier date and as there was no dispossession by the landlord Defendant No. 1 thereafter, Article 3. Schedule III, Bengal Tenancy Act did not apply. 5. Defendants Nos. 2-3 have appealed. Mr. Mukherji re-iterates the two points canvassed in the Courts below. 6. On the question of title, Mr. Mukherji relies on the decisions in Manajuddin Biswas v. Toam Mondal I. L. R. 39 Cal. 881 (1911) and Endaj Ali Biswas v. Arjun Chandra Biswas 62 I. C. 704 (1920). 7. Before I deal with the cases cited, it is necessary to find out the facts. 8. In the written statement the contesting Defendants stated that they took settlement in Jaistha, 1344 B. S. They produced a dakhila Ex. A (1) and proved its counter part Ex, A. The oral evidence of the Defendants, however, contradicts the said documentary evidence. D. W. 1 the Gomostha of the landlord Defendant No. 1 and D. W. 2, the Defendant No. 2 both say that the settlement took place in 1345 B. S. The documentary evidence cannot, therefore, be relied upon. A (1) and proved its counter part Ex, A. The oral evidence of the Defendants, however, contradicts the said documentary evidence. D. W. 1 the Gomostha of the landlord Defendant No. 1 and D. W. 2, the Defendant No. 2 both say that the settlement took place in 1345 B. S. The documentary evidence cannot, therefore, be relied upon. The oral evidence is supported by the fact that in the proceedings under secs. 144, 151, Civil Procedure Code, the possession of Defendants Nos. 2-3 was admitted. Relying on the oral evidence I find that the Defendants Nos. 2-3 came into possession in Jaistha, 1345 B. S., on a settlement granted by the Defendant No. 1 9. In the case of Manajuddin Biswas v. Toam Mondal I. L. R. 39 Cal. 881 (1911), the facts were that Arjun Mondal was the original tenant. In execution of a mortgage decree against Arjun Mondal, the Plaintiff auction-purchased the holding. The landlord thereafter obtained a decree for rent against Arjun Mondal, the original tenant. The Plaintiff was not made a party to the decree. In execution of the decree, the landlord auction-purchased the holding and settled the same with the Defendant Toam Mondal. The Plaintiffs then applied for setting aside the sale. The landlord was made a party but Toam Mondal who was in possession was not made a party. The sale was set aside. The Plaintiffs then brought the suit for declaration of title and for possession. It was held that the setting aside of the sale as against the landlord was not effective as against the Defendant Toam Mondal and no declaration of the Plaintiffs' title could be made. In the present case, I have found that the Defendants Nos. 2-3 had not taken any settlement when the application for setting aside the sale was made, as such they were not necessary parties to the application; the order setting aside the sale as against their lessor, Defendant No. 1 was binding on them. 10. In the case of Endaj Ali Biswas v. Arjun Chandra Biswas 62 I. C. 704 (1920) the point was conceded at the bar. 11. The above discussion leads me to hold that the Plaintiffs acquired a good title as against the Defendants Nos. 2-3 when the sale was set aside. The first contention of Mr. Mukherji, therefore, fails. 12. The second question has now to be considered. Mr. 11. The above discussion leads me to hold that the Plaintiffs acquired a good title as against the Defendants Nos. 2-3 when the sale was set aside. The first contention of Mr. Mukherji, therefore, fails. 12. The second question has now to be considered. Mr. Mukherji broadly contends that as the landlord took actual possession in execution of the decree for rent obtained by him against the Plaintiffs, dispossession commenced when possession was so taken and as this was beyond two years of the suit, the suit was barred under Article 3. Schedule III, Bengal Tenancy Act. 13. Mr. Roy Choudhury appearing for the Plaintiffs Respondents contends on the other hand that as the Plaintiffs could not have successfully sued for declaration of title and possession till the sale was set aside, time would run from that date. He further argues that Article 3, Schedule III, Bengal Tenancy Act would not apply as there was no dispossession by the landlord thereafter; he also contends that even assuming that the previous dispossession by the landlord had continuing effect, the time taken by the proceedings under secs. 144, 151, Civil Procedure Code, viz., from 22nd December, 1939 to 3rd May, 1941. should be excluded under sec. 14. Indian Limitation Act and if the period is excluded, the suit which was filed on 16th April, 1942, would be in time. 14. Article 3, Schedule III, Bengal Tenancy Act runs as follows:-- Description of suit Period of Limitaion Time from which periods begins to run To recover possession of land claimed by the plaintiff as a raiyat or under raiyat. 2 Years The date of dis possession 15. In the present case, the Plaintiffs were dispossessed by the landlord Defendant No. 1 when he took possession as an execution purchaser in execution of his decree for rent. This was much beyond two years of the suit. The application of the article would, therefore, be fairly free from difficulty but for the consideration presented on behalf of the Respondents. 16. It is said that the delivery of possession through Court which occasioned the dispossession was not by the landlord as such, i.e., not qua landlord but as auction-purchaser. It may be conceded that the decisions of this Court on the point are not uniform. 16. It is said that the delivery of possession through Court which occasioned the dispossession was not by the landlord as such, i.e., not qua landlord but as auction-purchaser. It may be conceded that the decisions of this Court on the point are not uniform. I respectfully agree with what was said by Rankin, C. J., though an obiter, in the case of Satish Chandra Banerji v. Hasheemali Kaji I. L. R. 54 Cal. 450 (471) (1927). As regard the contention that in order to avoid the operation of Article 3, it is sufficient to say that the landlord came into possession as auction-purchaser in the capacity of auction-purchaser and not qua landlord, there again, it seems to me that the words of the legislature are being seriously distorted. It is not a question of capacity but of incapacity. The Plain-tiffs' case is and what alone matters is the real character of the Plaintiffs' suit and that the landlord's entry was wrongful. Whether the landlord wrongfully claimed to re-enter for one reason or another is a matter which can only be imported by force into the words winch the Legislature has employed. 17. The cases bearing on the point were reviewed by Ran and Biswas, J., in the case of Khatun Jinnat Sahabani v. Ishaprokash Ganguli I. L. R. (1944) 1 Cal. 11. Their Lordships observed that insertion of sec. 48E in 1928 and its amendment in 1938 threw a new light on the subject and concluded by saying that the most the scheme of the Act requires is that we should read the entry in the third column of Article 3 as if it ran. The date of dispossession, provided that the dispossession was by a person who at that date was a landlord of the holding to which the land is claimed by the Plaintiff to appertain, irrespective of whether the dispossession was affected directly or through the instrumentality of a Court or otherwise. 18. In the present case, there was actual dispossession by the landlord Defendant No. 1 and this was much beyond two years of the suit, the fact that the landlord had also auction-purchased the holding was not material. 19. Mr. Roy Chowdhury for the Respondents argues that limitation did not run as against the Plaintiffs till the sale was set aside and their right to sue accrued. 19. Mr. Roy Chowdhury for the Respondents argues that limitation did not run as against the Plaintiffs till the sale was set aside and their right to sue accrued. This contention is opposed to the plain words of the statute which provides that time would run from the date of dispossession and not from any other date. On the allegation made in this case, the Plaintiffs could have sued for possession with a prayer for setting aside the sale. 20. In the case of Satish Chandra Banerji v. Hasemali Kaji I. L. R. 54 Cal. 450 (471) (1927) the co-sharer landlords Defendants Nos. 1-2 instituted a suit for rent against the tenants, viz., the Plaintiffs who were minors and Defendants Nos. 3, 4. The Plaintiffs were represented by their mother as guardian hut her consent to her appointment as guardian was not taken. The suit was decreed ex parte, on 19th November, 1914. In execution of the decree the disputed properties were sold and purchased by the landlords Defendants Nos. 1-2. The latter took actual possession sometime before 22nd November, 1916. The suit was filed on 25th July, 1919. A contention that the suit was barred under Article 3, Schedule III. Bengal Tenancy Act was raised and given effect to. The Plaintiffs sought to avoid the bar first on the ground that the dispossession was not by the landlord as such. I have dealt with this point. 21. Another question fell to be considered, viz., whether the decree and the resultant sale was void or voidable, presumably on the ground that if it was voidable the Plaintiffs were not raiyats till the sale was avoided and no question of limitation arose. It was pointed out by Rankin, C. J., that this consideration is immaterial. What matters is whether the Plaintiffs were claiming a subsisting raiyati or under-raiyati right as against the Defendants. This had to be gathered from the plaint. In the present case, the Plaintiffs' definite case is that the Plaintiffs had a raiyali right and in fact they prayed for such declaration. On the setting aside of the sale it must be taken that the Plaintiffs' raiyati right continued from the beginning down to the date of the suit. The case of Ram Kinkar Tewary v. Stithi Ram Panja 27 C. L. J. 528 (1917) on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Plaintiffs Respondents is distinguishable. On the setting aside of the sale it must be taken that the Plaintiffs' raiyati right continued from the beginning down to the date of the suit. The case of Ram Kinkar Tewary v. Stithi Ram Panja 27 C. L. J. 528 (1917) on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Plaintiffs Respondents is distinguishable. That case arose out of proceedings to set aside the sale. I do not see how the application of Article 3, Schedule III Bengal Tenancy Act was relevant in that case. The cryptic observation at p. 530, viz., "Indeed, so long as the sale remains in force the possession of the landlord auction-purchaser cannot possibly be challenged by way of a suit " must be read along with the facts of the case and was not meant to lay down the broad proposition as contended for, on behalf of the Respondents. On the other hand the decision in Endaj Ali Biswas v. Arjun Chandra Biswas 62 I. C. 704 (1920) supports the Appellant. 22. It was also urged that sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act would apply to cases governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act. This may be conceded in view of the decisions in Raja Satiprosad Garga Bahadur v. Gobinda Chandra Shee 33 C. W. N. 227 (1928). But sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act has no application in the facts of the present case. The proceeding under secs. 144 and 151 of the CPC was a misconceived one and the Failure of the applicant cannot be attributed to anything connected with the jurisdiction of the Court. Moreover if the period taken up by those proceedings be deducted, the suit was filed beyond two years of the date of dispossession by the landlord. 23. The above discussion leads me to hold that the suit is barred under Article 3, Schedule III Bengal Tenancy Act. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the Plaintiffs' suit dismissed. The Appellant will get his costs in this Court. There will be no order for costs in the Courts below.