Judgment Das, J. 1. These are two appeals by the plain-tiff from two orders of the learned Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga, passed on the accounts submitted by the present appellant as receiver for one period and by a Board of Receivers, of which the appellant was a member, for another period. By the orders complained against, the appellant was directed to deposit certain sums of money as due from him and these sums of money were then paid out of the security money, which the appellant had deposited when he was appointed receiver, in one case, and in the other out of a sum of RS. 1378-2-0 standing to the credit of the appellant. 2. The short facts are the following. There was a cinema house at Darbhanga belonging to two parties, one represented by Babu Krishna Prasad Singh (called defendants first party) and the other represented by Babu Ram Prasad Singh (called defendants second party). One Ganga Prasad Singh had two sons, Mahamaya Prasad Singh and Saraswati Pragad Singh. Mahamaya Prasad Singh had & son called Maksudan whose son is Babu Krishna Prasad Singh. Saraswati Ptasad Singh had two sons of whom Babu Ram Prasad Singh is one. It was stated that on 31st August 1939, the appellant took a lease of the cinema house for five years. On 14th April 1944, there was an agreement between the defendants first party and the present appellant by which the defendants first party contracted to sell their half share in the property to the appellant for a consideration of Rs. 10,000. This agreement led to a suit for specific performance (Title Suit No. 86 of 1944). The suit was decreed by the first Court, but dismissed on appeal. It is stated that an appeal to the Federal Court is pending. On the same day, that is, 14th April 1944, there was another agreement between the defendants second party and the appellant by which it was stated that the defendants second party agreed to lease their half share to the appellant till the 30th August 1951. This gave rise to another title suit (Title Suit No. 44 of 1946) for specific performance which the appellant lost throughout. Title Suit No. 86 of 1944, to which I have already made a reference, was instituted on 31st August 1944, The present appellant was appointed receiver in that suit on 16th April 1945. This gave rise to another title suit (Title Suit No. 44 of 1946) for specific performance which the appellant lost throughout. Title Suit No. 86 of 1944, to which I have already made a reference, was instituted on 31st August 1944, The present appellant was appointed receiver in that suit on 16th April 1945. The suit was decreed on 26th February 1946. On 25th March 1946, First Appeal No. 76 of 1946 was instituted in this Court. The appellant continued to be the sole receiver from 16th April 1945 to 28th January 1946. From 29th January 1946 to 6th May 1946 there was a Board of Receivers consisting of the present appellant, one Jamuna Prasad Singh and Maulavi Halim Raza. Maulavi Halim Raza was the Chairman of the Board of Receivers, and it appears that he was the person appointed as pleader Commissioner to check the accounts which the appellant had 61ed for the period of his sole receivership. Therefore, the two periods with which we are concerned in these two appeals are, (a) the first period between 16th April 1945 and 28th January 1946 during which the appellant was the sole receiver, and (b) the second period from 29th January 1946 to 6th May 1946, during which there was a Board of Receivers of which the present appellant was a member. Miscellaneous Appeal no. 266 of 1946 relates to the first period for which a sum of Rs. 6984-10-0 has been paid to the defendants second party out of the security money of the appellant, on the ground that the profits made for this period were Rs. 13,348-12-3, half of which was payable to the defendants second party. The accounts for this period were checked by Maulavi Halim Baza. An objection was filed by the present appellant which was dismissed by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 29th June 1946. For the second period the learned Subordinate Judge held the appellant liable to the extent of Rs. 453 and odd annas, and this sum was also paid out of another deposit standing to the credit of the present appellant. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 365 of 1946 relates to this second period, the accounts of which were also checked, strangely enough, by Maulvai Halim Raza who was himself the chairman of the Board of Receiver. 3. 453 and odd annas, and this sum was also paid out of another deposit standing to the credit of the present appellant. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 365 of 1946 relates to this second period, the accounts of which were also checked, strangely enough, by Maulvai Halim Raza who was himself the chairman of the Board of Receiver. 3. Before I go on to the merits of the two appeals, it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents. It is contended that no appeals He against the two orders complained of. Under Order 43 Rule 1, Clause (s), Civil P. C., an appeal lies from an order under Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 40 Rule 4 of Order 40 states inter alia that where a receiver fails to pay the amount due from him as the Court directs, the Court may direct his property to be attached and may sell such property and may apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him. In the cases before us, the appellant was not merely directed to pay the amounts due from him, but the amounts were paid out of deposits standing to the credit of the appellant. In substance and effect, the orders passed by the learned Subordinate Judge were orders attaching the property of the appellant and paying the amounts from that property. In this view of the matter, I think that the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeals must be overruled. 4. As to the merits, the main objection taken on behalf of the appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal no. 356 of 1946 is that it was wrong in principle to ask Maulvi Halim Raza to check the accounts which he himself had submitted and for which he was responsible as chairman of the Board of Receivers. In Miscellaneous Appeal no. 266 of 1946, it is contended that the learned Subordinate Judge accepted the report of Maulvai Halim Raza on the accounts submitted by the appellant, though the report of Halim Raza itself showed that he cut down some of the expenses incurred by the receiver on arbitrary grounds. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are correct and that there has really been no proper checking of the accounts. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are correct and that there has really been no proper checking of the accounts. For the first period between the 16th April 1945 and 28th January 1946, the appellant had shown in his account establishment charges to the extent of Rs. 600 and odd per month. According to the defendants, the charges were Rs. 210 only. The Commissioner allowed Rs. 366 per month not on any principle but merely by guess. In his report dated 11th March 1946, Maulvi Halim Baza said as follows : "I had, therefore, to rely upon the paysheet and Attendance Register produced by the representative of the defendant second party. The demand of the receiver is Rs. 589 per month and the paper of the defendant second party shows about Rs. 210 per month Taking into consideration the hard time and the necessity of the number of staff I have allowed Rs. 366 per month," This is an instance of how the pleader commissioner checked the accounts. Learned counsel for the appellant points out that during the second period of receivership when the same pleader commissioner was the chairman of the Board of Receivers, establishment charges were more than Rs. 500 per month. 5 For the second period, it was, in my opinion, wrong in principle to ask Halim Raza to check his own accounts. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Halim Raza submitted different reports on different occasions, and that the reports were not consistent with one another. It is pointed out that the revised adjustment account filed by Halim Raza on 15th August 1946, differs in material particulars from an earlier report submitted by the said pleader commissioner. There was also a suggestion by the appellant that the accounts which were with the defendants second party had been tampered with. In the view which we have taken of these two appeals, it is unnecessary to go into these contentions at this stage. 6. We are of opinion that the accounts have not been properly checked and the case is one in which the accounts submitted for both the periods must be checked by a registered auditor who has experience in the checking of such accounts. Learned counsel for both parties have agreed to this course. 7. 6. We are of opinion that the accounts have not been properly checked and the case is one in which the accounts submitted for both the periods must be checked by a registered auditor who has experience in the checking of such accounts. Learned counsel for both parties have agreed to this course. 7. For the reasons given above I would allow these two appeals and set aside the orders of the learned Subordinate Judge. The liability, if any, of the present appellant for the two periods in question must be determined afresh after the accounts for both the periods have been checked by a registered auditor, qualified to check accounts of this nature. The learned Subordinate Judge will select such an auditor, and the costs of the examination of the accounts will be borne by the appellant and the defendants second party half and half. There will be no order for costs of the hearing of the two appeals in this Court, and the parties must bear their own costs. Subsequent costs incurred will be dealt with by the learned Subordinate Judge when he passes final orders after considering the report of the registered auditor. Reuben, J. 8 I agree.