Judgment Manohar Lall, J. 1. This is an appeal by the defendants who are aggrieved by the concurrent decisions of the Courts below by which they have decreed the plaintiffs suit for a declaration of title to and recovery of possession of certain lands. One of the questions for consideration is the effect of certain sections of the- Oaths Act, 1873 . 2. The facts are these: The plaintiffs claim title to 8 kathas 14 dhurs of plot 539 and to 15 kathas out of plot 549 on the basis of certain transfers in their favour from the true owners. The cause of action for the suit was the dispossession of the plaintiffs and the defendants fourth-party as a result of an adverse order passed under Sec.145, Criminal P. C. 3. The defence to the action was that the plaintiffs and defendants fourth-party had no-title to the land in suit, and that on the material dates although the plaintiffs had title at one time to plot 539, but as a result of an exchange plot 539 came into possession with title of the defendants, the plaintiffs title to plot 549 was wholly denied. It was further urged that in the 145-proceedings the defendants fourth-party gave a special oath to the defendants, and as a result of that special oath, the 145-proceedinga were decided in favour of the defendants, and, therefore, the plaintiffs and the defendants fourth-party are bound by that oath and cannot re-agitate their title in the civil suit. 4. The Courts below have concurrently found title and possession with the plaintiffs and; defendants fourth-party, and have also held that in law the special oath has no force in the proceedings in the civil suit. Hence, the second appeal to this Court. 5. Mr. Harinandan Singh, learned counsel for the appellants, took us through the entire judgments of the Courts below and wanted to submit that the findings on the question of title and possession are not in accordance with law; but having perused the judgments of the Courts below I am satisfied that they have come to the conclusions on the question of fact which are binding in second appeal. No error of law has been pointed out although it was sought to be argued that the findings on the question of fact were erroneous here and there. No error of law has been pointed out although it was sought to be argued that the findings on the question of fact were erroneous here and there. With regard to plot 539, the Courts below did not believe the story of exchange, and, therefore, the plaintiffs had established their subsisting title to plot 539 all along. With regard to plot 549, the Courts below have proceeded to assess the evidence. The defendants own case was that the portion of plot 549 in dispute had been amalgamated with plot 539; this was also the case of the plaintiffs. Now, if the title of plot 539 is found to be with the plaintiffs, the amalgamation could have only been made by the plaintiffs. The Courts below have considered this as an important circumstance to defeat the defendants case that they had any title to this portion of plot 549. Having considered the matter, I am of the opinion that the Courts below have taken a view which was open to them as Courts of facts, and this Court cannot be asked to interfere in second appeal. 6. An interesting argument was raised as to the effect of the oath taken by the defendants fourth-party in the 145-proceedings. It was argued that the result was that some sort of agreement had been arrived at between the defendants fourth-party and the defendants that the defendants fourth-party had no longer any claim to plot 539 and to the portion of plot 549, that is to say, by some sort of conclusive admission, title to these plots passed to the defendants some sort of estoppel was sought to be established. I do not agree with this contention, because upon a plain reading of the various sections of the Oaths Act, it is clear to me that the effect of the special oath is to treat that as a conclusive piece of evidence in those proceedings, when the oath was administered by an agreement between the parties. See Section 8 and Sec.11. Sec.11 distinctly states that the evidence so given shall, as against the person who offered to be bound as aforesaid, be conclusive proof of the matter stated. It is obvious that this is conclusive proof of the matter in those proceedings and the Court in charge of the proceedings is bound to decide the proceedings in accordance with the evidence specially given on oath. It is obvious that this is conclusive proof of the matter in those proceedings and the Court in charge of the proceedings is bound to decide the proceedings in accordance with the evidence specially given on oath. It is also clear that it is the adjudication upon such conclusive evidence which is res judicata between the parties and not the evidence, as was sought to be made out by Mr. Harinandan Singh. 7. The case of Mithu Lal V/s. Sri Lal, 45 ALL. 724 : (A.I.R. (11) 1924 ALL. 126) was relied upon by Mr. Harinandan Singh; but what that case decided was that where one party has entered into a valid agreement with the other that the case may be decided according to the special oath and the other party has taken a special oath, then the Court is not competent to ignore the statement and enter into further evidence to decide that litigation. This is in accordance with what I have observed above and does not help the appellants. 8. The next case relied upon was the case of Sanyasi Baritya V/s. Artaswaro, 36 Mad. 287 : (18 I. C. 835). In that case it was held that an adjudication by a Court on an oath made by one of the parties to the suit would make the matter or issue covered by the adjudication res judicata in a subsequent litigation between the same parties where the subject-matter of the suit is different. It would be noticed that the adjudication is res judicata and not the evidence. This case is of no assistance in the present case because the only adjudication in the 145-proceedings was not that the title was with the defendants, but that the possession should be given to the defendants and was given to the defendants. The effect of the adjudication was not that the aggrieved party was debarred from bringing the regular civil suit, but that the proceedings then before the Court must be decided in accordance with the special oath. Moreover, on reading p. 294, it appears that the learned Judges came to the same conclusion as was pointed out by us in the course of the argument. I am reading from the top of p. 294. Referring to the case of Badiaddin Ahmed V/s. Nizamuddin Haider, 33 Cal. Moreover, on reading p. 294, it appears that the learned Judges came to the same conclusion as was pointed out by us in the course of the argument. I am reading from the top of p. 294. Referring to the case of Badiaddin Ahmed V/s. Nizamuddin Haider, 33 Cal. 386 : (10 C. W. N. 501) the learned Judges observed: "In that case proceedings taken under Sec.144, Criminal P. C., were settled by an oath taken by one of the parties. The result of an order in such a proceeding does not prevent a suit in a Civil Court by the unsuccessful party to establish his right to any property concerned in the proceeding. * * * * The doctrine of res judicata would not apply to a prior decision in a criminal proceeding between the parties in a Court which would have no jurisdiction to try the later proceedings in the civil litigation. It need hardly be observed that the scope of the doctrine cannot be extended by the fact that the decision of any matter proceeded on evidence furnished by an oath." I think Mr. Harinandan Singh cannot have been unaware of these observations of the learned Judges at p. 294, and that he cited this case really to meet the view of the Courts below that Sections 10 and 11, Oaths Act, are not applicable to criminal proceedings. In my opinion, these sections are applicable to Section 144 or Sec.145 proceedings; but obviously they are not applicable to criminal proceedings which are between the Crown or Government and the accused unless these may be criminal proceedings between the complainant and the accused in certain circumstances. 9 A later Madras case of Ranganatha Aiyar V/s. Jayavelu Mudaliar, A. I. R. (27) 1940 Mad. 627 : (193 I. C. 591) also supports the view which I have taken. In that case the proceeding under Order 21, Rule 100, Civil P. C., was decided in favour of a party as a result of a special oath in a suit instituted under Order 21, Rule 103, Civil P. C., and a suit was brought to set aside this order. It was argued that the special oath which was taken in the course of the proceedings under Rule 100 was a bar to the trial of the same matter between the parties. It was argued that the special oath which was taken in the course of the proceedings under Rule 100 was a bar to the trial of the same matter between the parties. The argument was overruled by the learned Judges holding (1) that the primary meaning of Sec.11 is that the evidence given in any proceeding in which a challenge has been made and an oath has been taken shall be in that proceeding conclusive proof of the matter stated; (2) that in a subsequent proceeding unless that statement has been brought on the record, it cannot even be considered; (3) in that regular suit any evidence which has been given under the special provisions of the Oaths Act in the earlier proceeding under Rule 100, Civil P. C., cannot be conclusive, but will merely be treated as an evidence. With respect, I agree with these observations. 10. Having regard to the views expressed above, I come to the conclusion that the Courts below were right in overruling the second contention also. 11. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. Mahabir Prasad, J. 12 I agree.