JUDGMENT Das Gupta, J. - Three points arise for decision in this application for revision of an order passed by the Small Cause Court Judge, Calcutta, directing possession to be delivered of certain premises in Calcutta to the Opposite Party, It appears that the application for delivery of possession was filed on the 2nd of November, 1944. A decree was passed on the 4th of May, 1945, directing that the Petitioner was to vacate the premises by the 4th of November, 1945. After an amendment of the House Rent Control Order by the inclusion of a new section, sec. 9 (b), an order was passed by the Small Cause Court Judge on the 18th of January, 1946, in these terms "Decree set aside. Plaintiff is allowed two months' time to take proper steps." After this the landlord Plaintiff filed an application before the Kent Controller for permission to prosecute the suit on the ground that the Petitioner was a defaulter. That application was, however, rejected by the Rent Controller on the 23rd April, 1946, but on appeal Mr. Guha, the District Judge, Ali-pore, granted permission to prosecute the pending suit. An application to this Court for revision against this order was unsuccessful. Thereafter the suit was proceeded with in the Small Cause Court and an order for delivery of possession was passed, as mentioned above, on the 6th of September, 1946. The first point raised by Mr. Sarkar on behalf of the Petitioner is that when on the 18th January, 1946, the decree was by the order of the Court set aside, that amounted to a final order amounting practically to the disposal of the suit, so that there was no pending suit to prosecute, for which permission could either be sought or granted. There can be no doubt that if this order of the 18th of January, 1946, be construed as a final order finally deciding all questions at issue between the parties with the result that nothing else remained to be decided between the parties in these proceedings, Mr. Guha's order granting permission to prosecute the suit would be of no avail. I am unable, however, to construe this order as suggested by Mr. Sarkar. It is true that sec. Guha's order granting permission to prosecute the suit would be of no avail. I am unable, however, to construe this order as suggested by Mr. Sarkar. It is true that sec. 9 (b) of the Rent Control Order under which obviously the Small Cause Court Judge passed the order setting aside the decree docs provide merely for the setting aside of a decree and makes no further provision for anything else. This does not mean, however, that when setting aside the decree the Court is also bound at the same time to dismiss the suit entirely. The Court may do so, hut for sufficient reasons the Court may also decide, while setting aside the decree to keep the matter alive. In the present case, it seems clear to me from the order of the Court that the Plaintiff was allowed two months' time that the Court decided to keep the matter alive. Unless the suit was kept alive, the order allowing two months' time to take proper steps would be meaningless. Mr. Sarkar argues that this order was redundant. I am unable to treat it as such. The entire order is to be treated as a whole and it is against the recognised rules of construction to treat integral parts of an order as redundant when it is possible to put a proper meaning thereof. My conclusion is that by this order dated the 18th of June, 1946, the learned Small Cause Court Judge was keeping the suit alive while setting aside the decree which was already passed. The contention that there was no live suit after this order and that consequently Mr. Guha's permission was of no avail, must, therefore, fail. 2. The next point urged by Mr. Sarkar is that as the original application for permission was under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, and by the time that Mr. Guha passed his order granting permission on the 3rd of June, 1947, the Calcutta House Rent Control Order had ceased to be in operation and the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, had come into operation, the order passed by Mr. Guha would he of no avail. For this he has relied on the authority of the decision of a Bench of this Court in the case of Sarju Tewari v. Bankim Chandra Banerji 52 C.W.N. 669 (1948). Guha would he of no avail. For this he has relied on the authority of the decision of a Bench of this Court in the case of Sarju Tewari v. Bankim Chandra Banerji 52 C.W.N. 669 (1948). In that case it was held that a permission obtained under the Calcutta Rent Control Order of 1943 cannot be deemed to be a valid permission under the corresponding provision of the new Ordinance. This decision can be of assistance for a decision of the present case only if the order passed by Mr. Guha be considered to be a permission obtained under the Calcutta House Rent Order. I am clearly of opinion that it cannot be so considered. The application which was filed before the Rent Controller for permission was apparently between the dates 18th of January. 1946, and the 23rd of April, 1946, and so obviously under the Calcutta House Rent Control Act. The appeal was filed before the District Judge also under the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Act. Does that order make the order passed by the District Judge an order under the House Rent Control Act? Clearly it cannot. For the Calcutta House Rent Control Order had ceased to be in operation on the 30th of September, 1946, so that at the time when Mr. Guha passed his order he could not possibly pass any order under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order of 1943. The only provision of law under which he could have passed an order was under the Calcutta House Rent Control Ordinance, 1946, and though he does not mention in his the provision of law under which he was passing his order it seems plain that when he did grant the permission, he obviously granted it under the Ordinance. 3. In this connection it is important to notice that under sec. 26 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, all proceedings commenced under any provision of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, shall, on the said Order ceasing to be in operation, be continued and be, as far as may be, deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance, that is to say, the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946. The proceedings that were pending before the District Judge had "been commenced under the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1946, but in consequence of the provisions of sec. 26 of the Rent Ordinance, 1946, it will be deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provisions of this Ordinance, that is, sec. 25 of the Ordinance. 4. Mr. Sarkar has pointed out that this view will operate harshly as against his client as thereby he is being deprived of the right of appeal from the first order under the Ordinance granting permission. If, for example, the application which had been made before the Rem Controller before the 30th of September, 1946, was pending before the Rent Controller after the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, came into operation, the result of sec. 26 would be that that will be considered to be a proceeding under sec. 13 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance and an appeal would lie under the previsions of sec. 25. In the present case, however, as an appeal had already been filed under the Rent Order, the result of sec. 26 in the view I have taken of it would be that he would not get any further appeal from this first order under the Ordinance granting permission. That this is the effect is clear. I am unable to agree, however, that that is any reason for putting any unnatural construction on the words of sec. 26. The section as already stated clearly says:-- Any proceedings commenced under any provision of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943,......shall, on the said Orders ceasing to be in operation be continued and be, as far as may be, deemed to have been commenced under the corresponding provision of this Ordinance...... 5. An appeal under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, is also a proceeding commenced under the provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and when this was pending before the District Judge on the date on which Rent Ordinance came into operation, it must, on the strict interpretation of the words of sec 26, be deemed to have been commenced under sec. 25 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946. Once that is found, it follows that the District Judge had full power to grant permission under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946. Whether he passed the order rightly or wrongly can-not be entered into now. 6. 25 of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946. Once that is found, it follows that the District Judge had full power to grant permission under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946. Whether he passed the order rightly or wrongly can-not be entered into now. 6. The last point taken by Mr. Sarkar is that the proceedings before the Small Causes Court must be held to have abated by operation of the provisions in sec. 45 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act (Act XXXVIII of 1948) which became law in November, 1948. The provision runs thus:-- For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that all proceedings pending before the Controller at the commencement of this Act in connection with applications for permission to institute or prosecute a suit or proceeding, or to execute or proceed with the execution of a decree or order, for the recovery of possession of any premises from a tenant and all appeals preferred against, or applications filed for review of orders passed on such applications and pending at such commencement shall abate 7. In my opinion it is absolutely clear that this provision deals with the abatement of (a) certain proceedings pending at the commencement of the Kent Control Act before the Controller and (b) all appeals or applications for review of orders that may be pending at the commencement of this Act in connection with applications for permission (1) to institute or prosecute a suit or proceeding, (2) to execute or proceed with the execution of a decree or order and (3) for the recovery of possession of any premises from a tenant. This provision in sec. 45 has, in my judgment, no application to proceedings before the Small Causes Court suits which have been instituted on the basis of permission obtained before the Controller. All the points raised in the application fail. The application is, therefore, dismissed and the Rule discharged with costs--hearing-fee, one gold mohur.