JUDGMENT P.B. Mukharji, J. - This is a suit by the Plaintiff for vacant possession of land encroached upon by the Defendants measuring about 15 chittacks alleged to be forming part of the divided eastern portion of premises No. 38/1, Bosepara Lane, Calcutta, and for mandatory injunction for demolition of structures on the said encroached land and for a declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner of such encroached land and for damages or mesne profits. The suit was filed on the 8th May, 1946. There are four Defendants in this suit. The first two Defendants Kamala and Bimala are alleged to be the owners of the adjoining premises Nos. 41 and 41/1, Ramkanta Bose Street. The third and the fourth Defendants Bilait Hossain and Ferozuddin Ahmed are alleged to be the owners of the huts on the premises No. 41/1, Ramkanta Bose Street which huts are said to be actually encroaching upon the Plaintiff's land. I will describe the first and second Defendants as the landlord Defendants and the third and fourth Defendants as the hut owner Defendants. The hut owner Defendants have not entered appearance and have not filed any written statement but one of them, namely, the fourth Defendant Ferozuddin Ahmed has given evidence on behalf of the first landlord Defendant. The second landlord Defendant Bimala has not entered appearance and has not filed any written statement. The first landlord Defendant Kamala entered appearance, filed her written statement and has defended the suit at the trial. Her defence is first a denial that there has been any encroachment at all on the Plaintiff's land. Secondly she has also said that encroachment even, if any, is not to the extent of 15 chittacks in area. Thirdly, she has also taken the defence of adverse possession and she contends that encroachment, even if any, has been in existence for over 20 years. She has also stated, in her written statement that she is the owner of 41/1, Ramkanta Bose Street and not of 41, Ramkanta Bose Street and she claims to be the only owner of the land on which the huts stand and that the hut-owner Defendants are her tenants. 2. On behalf of the appearing Defendant the following issues have been raised: 1. (a) Has there been any encroachment upon any land belonging to the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint ? 2. On behalf of the appearing Defendant the following issues have been raised: 1. (a) Has there been any encroachment upon any land belonging to the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint ? (b) If so, to what extent ? 2. Is the defendant Kamala entitled to the encroached land on which the hats stand, by adverse possession ? 3. Is the suit bad for mis-joinder of parties and causes of action ? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to any relief ? [His Lordship criticised the abuse of the practice of placing a suit as a short case and proceeded as follows:] Issue No, 1 (a) and (b): 3. The Plaintiff purchased premises No. 38/1, Bosepara Lane, Calcutta, from her father on the 22nd June, 1945. The conveyance in her favour has been exhibited in this suit (Ex. D). In the conveyance the area described is 1B. 6K. 7Ch. 28 Sq. it. That area is supposed to include-- The encroachment on a triangular piece of land with its base on the Bosepara Lane along the eastern boundary by the Bustee huts on the adjoining premises Nos 41 and 41/1, Ramkanta Bose Street. [His Lordship narrated the history of the premises No. 38/1, Bosepara Lane and the events leading to the institution of the suit on 8th May, 1946 and then proceeded as follows:] 4. From a perusal of the documents and correspondence certain facts emerge. The present encroachment, on the Plaintiff's own documents, was in existence at any rate from the 18th November, 1938, when Messrs. Talbot & Co. made their report Ex, 1 in this suit. It is also clear from the mortgage deed of the 25th June, 1924, that the area of 38/1, Bosepara Lane was 1B. 5K. 14Ch. Apparently some encroachment was there in 1924. The difference between the area in the mortgage deed and the sale certificate is 9Ch. 28 Sq. ft. Defendant Kamala's Engineer Mr. K.C. Banerjee admitted an encroachment of 5 ch. 33 sq. ft. only. 5. This admission of 5 ch. 33 sq. ft. has been strongly criticised by Mr. Barman appearing on behalf of the Defendant Kamala. His argument is that the admission was only with reference to the plan of Mr. K.C. Banerjee. But the plan of Mr. K.C. Banerjee has not been produced by or on behalf of the Plaintiff. ft. only. 5. This admission of 5 ch. 33 sq. ft. has been strongly criticised by Mr. Barman appearing on behalf of the Defendant Kamala. His argument is that the admission was only with reference to the plan of Mr. K.C. Banerjee. But the plan of Mr. K.C. Banerjee has not been produced by or on behalf of the Plaintiff. The result is that it is no longer possible in the absence of that plan to find out the nature, scope and extent of this admitted 5 ch. 33 sq. ft. of encroachment. In fact Mr. Barman has argued that non-production of this plan of Mr. K.C. Banerjee should lead me to presume that if produced it would neither have supported the case of the Plaintiff nor the so-called admission. In any event I accept Mr. Barman's argument to this extent that the admission of encroachment to the extent of 5 ch. 33 sq. ft. is valueless for the purpose of making a decree upon that admission for the simple reason that this admitted 5 ch. 33 sq. ft. have not been identified or specified. It is also argued that this admission, even if there was any, by Mr. K.C. Banerjee was inadvertent on the ground that the documents referred to in Mr. M.N. Sen's letter were not considered. 6. In the plaint, although encroachment to the extent of 15 ch. is alleged in paragraph 1 thereof, the boundaries with identification of this encroached area are not given. Notwithstanding the pleading in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the quantum of encroachment was disputed, there is in the plaint in description at all by boundaries so as to identify the encroached land in respect of which the decree is claimed. Under the law, Or. 7, r. 53, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it. Not only is there no sufficient description, there is in fact no description at all except to say that the encroached land is "about 15 chittacks." 7. Mr. Barman has argued that there was a breach of the mandatory provision of Or. 7, r. 3 of the CPC and I should, therefore, reject the plaint. I do not consider that to be the correct view of the law. Rejection of plaint is provided for under Or. 7, r. 11 and in my judgment non-compliance with Or. Mr. Barman has argued that there was a breach of the mandatory provision of Or. 7, r. 3 of the CPC and I should, therefore, reject the plaint. I do not consider that to be the correct view of the law. Rejection of plaint is provided for under Or. 7, r. 11 and in my judgment non-compliance with Or. 7, r. 3 does not make the suit liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 8. But the position of the Plaintiff at the trial has been far worse. In my judgment she has failed to prove that there has been an encroachment for 15 ch. and in any event, the boundaries of such encroachment. [His Lordship then proceeded to discuss the evidence on the issue and concluded as follows:--] For these reasons, I am not satisfied with the evidence given on behalf of the Plaintiff and in my judgment the Plaintiff has failed to prove that any land of her was encroached and if so, to what extent and in what area. Issue No. 2: 9. For the purpose of this issue I will assume that there has been some encroachment (whatever its area may be) by the huts of Belait Hussain and Ferozuddin Ahmed against whom alone the charge is made of encroaching by huts. [His Lordship then proceeded to discuss the oral and documentary evidence on the issue and went on to observe as follows:] I have no hesitation in accepting their evidence and holding that the encroachment, even if any, has been openly and notoriously enjoyed for over 12 years and adversely against the Plaintiff. I hold it is established that Ferozuddin and his father have been in possession of the huts in question since 1920 and that Bilait Hossain was in possession of his huts from 1924-25 to 1946-47 and that such huts have been in the same condition and on the same land. The existence of these huts I hold to be a sufficiently notorious fact to create title by adverse possession in favour of the Plaintiff. The existence of these huts I hold to be a sufficiently notorious fact to create title by adverse possession in favour of the Plaintiff. If a tenant during his tenancy encroaches the land of a third person and holds it with his tenure, such tenant is considered to have made the encroachment not for his own benefit but for that of his landlord and if the tenant has acquired the title against the third person by adverse possession, such tenant has acquired for his landlord and not for himself. Chief Justice Sir Richard Garth in Nuddearchand v. Meajan ILR 10 Cal. 820 (1884) upheld this principle which is known as the doctrine of "tenant stealing for the landlord." See also Saroj v. Surjya ILR 63 Cal. 497 (1936). Indeed Defendant Kamala's letter of the 20th May, 1942,................... shows that she took the view that a settlement had to be made with the tenants who were already established there and for which time was asked. Apparently no settlement with tenants could be made. 10. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan 38 C.W.N. 285 : s.c. ILR 61 Cal. 262 (1988) pointed out that for adverse possession the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. The existence of the huts on the encroached land in 38/1, Bosepara Lane, in my judgment, is in this case adequate in continuity, publicity and extent. As their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out in that case that it is not necessary that adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the competitor and that it is sufficient that the possession is overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening. Indeed if the Plaintiff or her predecessor-in-title had at all been vigilant they could easily have noticed the existence of the huts on the land of 38/1, Bosepara Lane. It cannot be said that there was any attempt at concealment because by openly erecting huts on the land the claimants were drawing the attention of the whole world. Mr. Niren De who appeared with Mr. Talukdar, argued that the huts may have passed unnoticed. It cannot be said that there was any attempt at concealment because by openly erecting huts on the land the claimants were drawing the attention of the whole world. Mr. Niren De who appeared with Mr. Talukdar, argued that the huts may have passed unnoticed. There is no evidence to suggest that. But if they were unnoticed then that is lack of due vigilance, as the Privy Council pointed out. To the same effect also is the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Maharaja Sris Chandra Nandy v. Baijnath 35 C.W.N. 352 (P.C.) (1930). I, therefore, hold that Defendant Kamala has acquired title to the encroached land even, if any, by adverse possession so far as the huts of Belait and Feroz are concerned. 11. The decision in Framji v. Goculdas ILR 16 Bom 338 1886 has to be read with facts of the case. At p. 341 of that report the structures were mere sheds with no walls. There the learned Judge disbelieved the evidence as to the existence of such structures. Besides, there the Defendant had admittedly a right of passage across a part of the land for the purpose of access to the well and in that view the learned Judges in that case held that temporary user of the nature there considered might well pass entirely unobserved by the owner of the land. The character of user there was quite insufficient. Apart from sheds with no walls, whose existence was disbelieved by the trial Judge, the other user was, throwing rubbish on the land and as was pointed out in that judgment that fact might be relevant on the question of a right of easement but not conclusive on the question of title by adverse possession. 12. The facts of the case before me are very different from those considered in Framji v. Goculdas ILR 16 Bom 888 (1886). Here there are actual living huts with walls. They may be called temporary structures but they are good enough for at least 50 years (Feroz. Q. 129). It is not the law that title by adverse possession cannot be acquired by building temporary huts on other's lands. It all depends on each case and the test is the character and quality of user. They may be called temporary structures but they are good enough for at least 50 years (Feroz. Q. 129). It is not the law that title by adverse possession cannot be acquired by building temporary huts on other's lands. It all depends on each case and the test is the character and quality of user. Unlike the Bombay case I am satisfied with and' believe the evidence about the existence and continuity of the structures in this case. Besides, there is no right of passage in this case as in the Bombay case under the cover of which there might be a user which could be explained away on other grounds. On records in this case the dispute about the encroachment was sufficiently long-standing at least from the date of the report of Talbot & Co. In this case the evidence called by the Defendant on this point is in my judgment clear, cogent and overwhelming. 13. The decision of the Privy Council in Allah Rakhi v. Mohammed Abdur Rahim ILR 56 All, 111 (1934) proceeded on the basis of leave and licence. If the possession is referable to leave and licence that possession can never be said to be adverse. From the facts at pp. 120-21 of that report it is clear that their Lordships of the Privy Council considered possession in that case consistent with such leave and licence. No case of leave and licence has been made in evidence in this case. 14. I accordingly answer Issue No. 2 in the affirmative. [His Lordship went on to deal with Issue No. 13 and after recording his findings thereon concluded as follows:] Issue No. 4. 15. Having regard to my findings on Issues Nos. 1 and 2, I hold that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. In my judgment the suit fails and is dismissed with costs, as against Defendant Kamala, but without costs as against the other Defendants.