JUDGMENT Blank, J. - This is an appeal by the defendant from concurrent decisions of a learned Subordinate Judge of Midnapore and a learned Munsif of the same station. The plaintiff's case is that he and defendants 2 to 4 are co-sharer zemindars of a certain mahal in the Midnapore Collectorate, the plaintiff being the owner of 1/3rd and defendants 2 to 4 owning the remainder and that defendant 1, the appellant, was appointed Naib for all the co-sharers in 1324 B.S. on terms specified in para. 2 of the plaint including that out of the realisation of the mahal, the defendant would pay the specified revenue and cesses and credit the balance to the different co-sharers and submit accounts to them according to their shares. In 1337 B.S., the different co-sharers opened separate accounts in the Collectorate and the collections of the different co-sharers were separated inter se from Pous, 1346 B.S. The plaintiff's further case is that the appellant continued to be the Naib of the different co-sharers making separate collections and paying separate revenue according to their respective shares till 23rd Baisakh 1347 B.S. corresponding to 6th May 1940, when the plaintiff claims to have dismissed defendant 1 from his service and to have demanded accounts from him by registered notice. The plaintiff sued for accounts from 1338 to 1346 B.S. and impleaded his co-sharers as pro forma defendants on the averment that they did not agree to join in the suit with the plaintiff. 2. Defendant 1 contested the suit. He submitted that the suit was not maintainable as framed and pleaded limitation on the footing that he had resigned his service under the plaintiff in saraban 1346 B.S., viz., on 17th August 1939, on one Kedar Ghosh being appointed Naib in his place on the preceding day. 3. The Courts below have considered the evidence and the law as it was placed before them. They have found that the suit was maintainable as framed and that it was not barred by limitation. Both parties agree throughout that the article of the Limitation Act with which the Court is concerned, is Art. 89 and that the limitation is to run from the date of the termination of the agency. 4. They have found that the suit was maintainable as framed and that it was not barred by limitation. Both parties agree throughout that the article of the Limitation Act with which the Court is concerned, is Art. 89 and that the limitation is to run from the date of the termination of the agency. 4. The Courts below found that the defendant was in plaintiff's service after the date he had set up for his resignation, in particular relying on Exhibits 3(a) and 3(b), letters dated 16th December 1939 and 12th February 1939 respectively, that the defendant was in the plaintiff's service on 16th December 1939. It was found concurrently that the agency terminated by the dismissal on 6th May 1940. An argument was raised that on separate accounts being opened and collections being separated, there was a termination of the joint agency but the Court of appeal below has negatived the argument on the circumstances of the present case and has observed that in fact the defendant continued in plaintiff's service after the accounts and collections of the co-sharers had been separated. The Court of appeal below, therefore, held that the plaintiff dismissed the defendant on 6th May 1940 and the present suit being filed on 11th March 1943 was well within time. 5. In this Court Mr. Amarendra Nath Bose for the appellant submitted that the frame of the plaint shows that the plaintiff claims an account and consequential reliefs exclusively of his share; that he is, therefore, framing the suit only for his own benefit and this he is not entitled to do as one of the three joint principals. Mr. Bose referred to the authorities particularised at p. 24 of the paper book for the proposition that where a person was an agent of more than one joint principal, the principals separately were not competent to sue him for accounts. The learned advocate also argued the ground of limitation and submitted that the agency had been terminated more than three years before the date of the suit, viz., on 18th October 1939, on the beginning of separate collections, alternatively on 16th August 1939 when the plaintiff appointed Kedar to take charge of the collection and the appellant resigned and went away the next day. He finally submitted that it was not open to the plaintiff to give up part of his claim. 6. Mr. He finally submitted that it was not open to the plaintiff to give up part of his claim. 6. Mr. Khitindra Kumar Mitra for the respondent answered the points raised seriatim. He referred to the end of para. 2 of the plaint, viz.: after payment of revenue and cess etc....from the collected amount be (appellant) would remit the realised amount....properly according to the shares of the cosharers and would submit all the collection papers of all mouzas and would render the accounts and would explain the accounts to the three cosharers according to their shares. The learned advocate submits that this must mean that the nett collections were to be remitted separately according to the shares of the cosharers and that on accounts being submitted, the accounts were to be rendered separately to the cosharers according to their shares. 7. Mr. Bose in reply submits that the words "according to their shares" can only refer to the words "explain the amount" but two considerations are fatal to this view. Both sides agree that the plaint correctly represents the arrangement between the parties. It is to be noted first that the remittance of the nett realisation is to be made according to the shares of the cosharers; this can only mean separate remittances to the credit of such of them and is inconsistent with Mr. Bose's suggestion that the meaning of the passage is that only one set of accounts is to be kept but it is to be explained separately for each of the cosharers. Secondly, it is inconceivable that collections are to be remitted separately and only one set of accounts is to be maintained but that one set is to be explained separately to the three cosharers. A more natural meaning is that three sets of accounts are to be maintained. The explanation can only take the form of an account. It cannot take the form of the defendant giving an oral explanation baaed on the collection papers without any account, whether summarised or full, to reduce his explanation into writing. It being found that the accounts are to be kept separately, the decisions and the passages in the text book referred to by Mr. Bose take on a particular meaning. Mr. Bose places them before me for the general proposition that where there are joint principals, there can only be joint account. It being found that the accounts are to be kept separately, the decisions and the passages in the text book referred to by Mr. Bose take on a particular meaning. Mr. Bose places them before me for the general proposition that where there are joint principals, there can only be joint account. As a general proposition, this cannot be contested, but on the facts of the present case, as found by the Courts below, I am satisfied, after giving all possible weight to the arguments of the learned advocates, that the principals in the present case were joint and several principals and that there can be no objection to joint and several accounting. If judicial authority is required it is necessary to refer only to the decision in the case of Sital Prasad v. Raja Brij Narain Roy, reported in 21 C.W.N. 620 : (A.I.R. 1917 Cal. 436), where the observation is made: We cannot hold, as an inflexible rule of law, that whenever two principals appoint an agent to take charge of some matter in which they are jointly interested, the death of one of them terminates the authority of the agent, not merely as regards the deceased but also as regards the surviving principal. We have in each case to determine the true intention of the parties to the contract, from the terms thereof and from the surrounding circumstances. This was a decision of the year 1916 and it is of interest to note that it was referred to and followed in this Court in the decision reported in Monindra Lal Chatterjee Vs. Hari Pada Ghose and Others, AIR 1936 Cal 650 . 8. Apart from the state of authority in this Court it appears to me material to point out that if Mr. Bose is right, in the very common cases of cosharers appointing one Naib for their separate collections it would never be possible for one of the co-sharers to sue the Naib for his account if one or more of the other cosharers neglected or refused to join as plaintiffs. This cannot be the law. 9. Bose is right, in the very common cases of cosharers appointing one Naib for their separate collections it would never be possible for one of the co-sharers to sue the Naib for his account if one or more of the other cosharers neglected or refused to join as plaintiffs. This cannot be the law. 9. The arguments that the agency wag terminated before the date of the suit either on 18th October 1939, or on 16th August 1939, can be dismissed with the observation that they are negatived by the concurrent findings of fact and that those findings are based on a proper consideration of all the evidence before the Court. 10. The same applies mutatis mutandis to the argument as to limitation. The concurrent findings of fact are clear that the plaintiff dismissed the defendant on 6th May 1940 and that the defendant did not resign on nth August 1939. 11. The remaining ground that it is not open to the plaintiff to give up part of his claim is without substance. 12. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.