JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5 against an order passed by the learned Munsif of the Court of Sealdah deciding an issue regarding the valuation of a suit. 2. The facts briefly are these: The Plaintiff instituted a suit against the Defendants, stating that they were mere licensees with respect to a house belonging to the Plaintiff and that the license had been revoked. The Plaintiff claimed possession of the property with respect to which license had been issued on the ground that the licensees were refusing to vacate in spite of revocation of the license. He valued his suit at Rs. 100, so far as the prayer for ejectment was concerned. There was a separate valuation for the Plaintiff's claim for mesne profits. The Defendants objected, stating that the case was governed by the provisions of Section 7v of the Court-fees Act and that the valuation should be the value of the subject-matter of the suit as provided for in that section. The learned Munsif repelled this contention, holding that, in a suit of this description, the Plaintiff could put his own valuation on the suit, which, if reasonable, should not be interfered with. Against this decision the Defendants have moved this Court and obtained this Rule. In my opinion, this Rule should be made absolute. The suit is undoubtedly one for the recovery of possession of a house and it comes u/s 7v its valuation should, therefore, be made in one of the ways provided in the aforesaid clause of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. The Plaintiff is not entitled to put his own valuation in a suit of this description. The learned Munsif relied upon a decision of a single Judge of this Court: Basiram Christian v. Ganesh Chandra Das Gupta (1920) 24 C.W.N. Clause xvii. The material portion of the decision as reported is in the following terms: In a suit for ejectment (of a licensee) if the value of the suit could be the value of the rights which on his plaint the Plaintiff seeks to recover. The Munsif has held that the value of Rs. 100/- is more than sufficient for that right and I am not prepared to hold in revision that decision is wrong. 3. The Munsif has held that the value of Rs. 100/- is more than sufficient for that right and I am not prepared to hold in revision that decision is wrong. 3. With very great respect to the learned Judge who decided this case, I am unable to follow the argument. If the report is a correct one, all that the learned Judge is saying is that, if the suit could be valued in the way that it has been valued, then the valuation is not unreasonable. The whole question is whether the suit could be valued in the way in which it has been valued. I am not prepared to rely upon this case, as it is not in an authorised report. There is a case, viz., Barkatunisa Begum v. Kaniza Fatma ILR (1926) Pat. 631 which seems to take a similar view. The Bombay High Court, however, has taken a different view in the case of Ratilal Manilal Vs. Chandulal Chhotalal, AIR 1947 Bom 482 . I am not bound by either of these decisions, but I prefer to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court. The suit is clearly one for the recovery of possession of a house and the subject-matter of the suit is the house. In the Patna case, it seems to have been held that the subject-matter of a similar suit is something other than land and that it was the right of the licensee, which the Plaintiff sought to set aside. I cannot appreciate this view. After a license has been revoked all that the Plaintiff requires is the recovery of the premises and that, it seems to me, would be the subject-matter of the suit. The Plaintiff in the present case seeks for nothing more and I hold that the subject-matter of the suit is the premises sought to be recovered. In this connection I would refer to the provisions of Section 7xi(cc) of the Court-fees Act. There, a special provision has been made for the recovery of immovable property by a landlord from his tenant, including a tenant holding over after the determination of the tenancy. Now, if this provision had not been there, a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of land from a tenant holding over after the tenancy had been determined would have been governed by Clause v of Section 7. Now, if this provision had not been there, a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of land from a tenant holding over after the tenancy had been determined would have been governed by Clause v of Section 7. The legislature thought fit to provide that such a case will not be governed by Clause v and it made a provision in Clause xi regarding court-fees payable in such a case. There is no corresponding provision made by the legislature in respect of a licensee whose license has been revoked. It seems, therefore, that the legislature intended that, in the case of a licensee, the valuation of the suit should be governed by the provisions of Clause v of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. 4. In these circumstances, I hold that the decision of the learned Munsif is wrong and I set aside the decision on this issue and direct that the learned Munsif should dispose of the case on the basis of this decision and in the light of the observations made above. 5. The Rule is made absolute. There will be no order for costs.