JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of Banerjee J. decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for ejectment. 2. The Plaintiff was the owner of certain premises known as No. 11/A, Ramesh Datta Street, situate within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court. The Defendant was a tenant of the Plaintiff of three rooms on the first floor. The tenancy was a monthly one at a rental of Rs. 21 per month. 3. The Plaintiff alleged that she required these rooms for her own occupation and she served a notice to quit on the tenant to expire at the end of the month of August, 1948. The Defendant refused to give up possession and it became necessary for the Plaintiff to file an ejectment suit. She could not, however, do (sic) owing to the Rent Ordinance, which was then in force, without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller. The Plaintiff applied to the Rent Controller for permission to bring a suit, stating that she required these premises for her own occupation and further that they were in a ruinous state or in a state of very bad repair and required thorough repairing or (sic). The Rent Controller refused permission to the Plaintiff to bring this suit and an appeal was preferred to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes. He set aside the order of the Rent Controller and gave the Plaintiff permission o file a suit. It appears that the Defendant applied to the Chief Judge to review his order, but that application failed and ms dismissed. 4. On September 1, 1948, the Plaintiff filed this suit. In the plaint she alleged that the premises were required bona fide for her own occupation. The Defendant in his written statement denied these allegations and his case was that the premises were a good repair and did not require either rebuilding or extensive repairing. He suggested that the suit was brought D evict him, because he had refused to pay an increased rent remanded by the Plaintiff. 5. The matter eventually came to trial and two issues were raised: (1) Are the premises bona fide required by the Plaintiff for the purposes of building and rebuilding and/or for her own occupation? (2) Has this Court jurisdiction to try this suit? 6. 5. The matter eventually came to trial and two issues were raised: (1) Are the premises bona fide required by the Plaintiff for the purposes of building and rebuilding and/or for her own occupation? (2) Has this Court jurisdiction to try this suit? 6. The learned Judge, who tried the suit, found in favour of the Plaintiff on both these issues. He held that the Court had jurisdiction to hear the suit and further that the premises were in a ruinous and dilapidated state and required rebuilding, further, he held that the Plaintiff bona fide required these remises for her own occupation. Accordingly, he made a decree giving the Plaintiff possession of the three rooms in question. 7. The point of jurisdiction arose by reason of Section 16 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, which came into force on December 1, 1948, that is, three months after this suit had been instituted. I shall consider this question of jurisdiction at a later stage. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has not seriously challenged the findings of the learned Judge upon the first issue. There appears to me to have been ample evidence upon which the learned Judge could find that these premises were in a very dilapidated condition and required either rebuilding or extensive repairing. He also accepted the evidence of the Plaintiff, corroborated as it was by other circumstances, that she required these rooms for her own occupation. But for the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, the Plaintiff, on establishing these facts, would be entitled to a decree. 9. On behalf of the Defendant, however, it was urged in the trial court that Section 16 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, ousted the jurisdiction of the Court and that, after December 1, 1948, this Court had no longer jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit. By a notification, this Act came into force on December 1, 1948. 10. By a notification, this Act came into force on December 1, 1948. 10. Section 16, Sub-section (1) of the Act is in these terms: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being it force, no suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant for the recovery of (sic) or possession of any premises which the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta is competent to try shall be instituted in, or tried by, any court other than the said court of Small Causes of Calcutta. 11. The argument of the Defendant-Appellant is that the Court of Small Causes was competent to try this suit for possession, and that being so, this Court could not hear the suit by reason of the provisions of Section 16, Sub-section (1), to which I have made reference. 12. I shall assume, in the first place, that the section applies to pending litigation, because, as I have said, this suit was pending when the Act came into force. The argument for the Appellant is that, as the Small Cause Court could, under Sections 41 to 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, make an order for possession in respect of these premises, it could entertain the present suit. That being so, this Court could not proceed to try it. 13. It appears to me that the sub-section cannot possible deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to hear this suit. It must be remembered that the suit was a suit for the recovery of possession. It was a suit for obtaining a decree, which, if obtained, would, subject to appeal, be conclusive and binding for ever between the parties. It was a suit in which the title of the Plaintiff could be decided and that being so, it was clearly, in my view, a suit which the Small Cause Court could never try. 14. The jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, with respect to proceedings for the recovery of possession, is contained in Sections 41 to 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Those sections contemplate a summary proceeding, in which the Applicant can, if the Small Cause Court is satisfied that he is entitled to possession, obtain an order addressed to bailiff of the court directing him to give possession of the property to the Applicant on a particular day. 15. Those sections contemplate a summary proceeding, in which the Applicant can, if the Small Cause Court is satisfied that he is entitled to possession, obtain an order addressed to bailiff of the court directing him to give possession of the property to the Applicant on a particular day. 15. It is to be observed that the order, which is obtained in the Small Cause Court, is in no way conclusive and may be challenged under the provisions of Sections 46, 47 or 49 of the Act. For example, if a landlord brings proceedings against a tenant, the tenant may apply to the Court of Small Causes u/s 47 to stay the proceedings, pending an action which the tenant can bring in the High Court for trespass. It must be remembered that an Applicant, who makes an application for possession under Sections 41 to 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Acts, shall be deemed to commit an act of trespass against the tenant, though he does not oust the tenant if he has no ground for making the application. In other words, an application for possession may be stayed for many years and that can never be the fate of an action in this Court for recovery of possession. Again, if an order for possession is made by the Small Cause Court, it can be challenged by the tenant or any other persons aggrieved u/s 46 of the Act. If the tenant can establish in a suit that the landlord had no right to possession as against him, then the order of the Small Cause Court is completely wiped out. Again, u/s 49, an order of the Small Cause Court is no bar to a title suit, as the recovery of possession of any property under Sections 41 to 43 of the Act is no bar to the institution of a suit in this Court for trying the title thereto. 16. It will be seen, therefore, that the order which is obtained in the Small Cause Court is very different from a decree for possession obtained in this Court and the Small Cause Court cannot make a decree for possession, which is final and conclusive between the parties, subject only to appeal. 16. It will be seen, therefore, that the order which is obtained in the Small Cause Court is very different from a decree for possession obtained in this Court and the Small Cause Court cannot make a decree for possession, which is final and conclusive between the parties, subject only to appeal. The suit before Banerjee J. was a suit for recovery of possession and prayed for a final and conclusive decree for possession which would for ever bind the parties. No proceeding with such a prayer can ever be brought before the Small Cause Court. All that the Small Cause Court can be asked to do is to make a summary order for possession, in other words, to make an order directing the bailiff to grant the Applicant physical possession of the premises subject always to the rights of the tenant or any other person aggrieved to challenge the order by appropriate proceedings. 17. For these reasons, it appears clear to me that the Small Cause Court is not competent to try an ejectment suit or a suit for the recovery of possession. In fact, Section 19 of the Small Cause Courts Act makes it clear that that is so. Section 19(d) of the Act provides that the Small Cause Court shall have no jurisdiction in suits for the recovery of immoveable property and the suit before Banerjee J. was a suit for the recovery of immoveable property. All that the Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to entertain is an application for physical possession and the order which it makes is in no way binding or conclusive. That being so, it appears to me that Section 16 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, was no bar to this suit, as that section only bars a suit which the Small Cause Court was competent to try. As that court could never try the present suit, the jurisdiction of this Court was not ousted and the view of the learned single Judge cannot possibly be assailed. 18. As I have stated, I have assumed that Section 16(7) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, would apply to pending cases, that is, suits which were instituted before the Act came into force, but which had not been tried before the Act came into force. 18. As I have stated, I have assumed that Section 16(7) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, would apply to pending cases, that is, suits which were instituted before the Act came into force, but which had not been tried before the Act came into force. Counsel for the Appellant has urged that the Act clearly applies to pending suits, because it directs that no suit which the Court of Small Causes is competent to try shall be instituted in or tried by any Court other than the said Court of Small Causes. It is suggested that this Act prevents the institution of such a suit after the Act came into force or the trial of such a suit after the Act came into force and therefore, the Act would apply to a suit instituted before the Act came into force but not tried until afterwards. 19. I am far from satisfied that Section 16(7) of the Act applies to suits which were pending in this Court when the Act came into force. It is unnecessary to consider the point at any length, but it appears to me that the section is very similar to a section which was construed by the Court of Exchequer in Moon v. Burden (1848) 2 Exch. 22 : 154 E.R. 389. In that case, an Act, which came, into force on August 8, 1845, enacted that all contracts and agreements by way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event upon which any wager shall have been made. The Court of Exchequer (Piatt B. dissenting) held that the statute had not a retrospective operation, so as to defect an action for a wager, commenced before the statute was passed. In that case the suit was instituted before the Act came into force, but had not been tried when the Act was passed. As the suit had not been tried, it was being maintained after the passing of the Act. Nevertheless, the Court of Exchequer held that the Act did not apply to a pending suit. In that case the suit was instituted before the Act came into force, but had not been tried when the Act was passed. As the suit had not been tried, it was being maintained after the passing of the Act. Nevertheless, the Court of Exchequer held that the Act did not apply to a pending suit. This case has been followed by a number of cases in England, the most recent being Beadling v. Goll (1922) 39 T.L.R. 128. That case dealt with the Gaming Act of 1922. By Section 1 of that Act it was provided that no action for the recovery of money u/s 2 of the Gaming Act, 1835, shall be entertained in any Court. It was held by the Court of Appeal that that Act did not apply to pending cases, though suits instituted before the Act was passed could in a sense be said to be entertained after the Act was passed. 20. A very similar view was taken by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Doolubdass Pettamberdass v. Ramloll Thackoorseydass (1850) 7 Moo P.C.C. 239 : 13 E.R. 873. In that case, after certain contracts were entered into and an action commenced in the Supreme Court at Calcutta, wagering contracts were declared invalid by an Act of the Indian Legislature, No. XXI of 1848, which enacted that all agreements whether made in speaking, writing, or otherwise, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void and no suit shall be allowed in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won on any wager, or entrusted to any person to abide the event of any game, or on which any wager is made. Their Lordships held that this legislative enactment did not affect existing contracts, or actions already commenced upon such contracts, there being no words in the Act sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights. 21. It will be seen that in this case the statute stated that certain actions should not be allowed. The suit had been instituted before the Act came into force, but had not been tried and it was, therefore, argued that, in trying it, the Court would be allowing such a suit. Nevertheless, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that that statute did not apply to pending cases. 22. The suit had been instituted before the Act came into force, but had not been tried and it was, therefore, argued that, in trying it, the Court would be allowing such a suit. Nevertheless, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that that statute did not apply to pending cases. 22. It may be contended that this statute could be given retrospective effect, because it really deals with mere matters of procedure and there is no objection in most cases to a procedural enactment being given retrospective effect. However, it appears to me that Section 16(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, deals with far more than procedure. It seeks to bar a right of suit in the High Court to all landlords in the presidency and if the Appellant's construction was right, all that the landlords in this Presidency would have in future would be a right to a summary order, which was not conclusive between the parties. They would have lost their right to sue in this Court for a final and conclusive decree. It seems, to me that this section affects rights and is far more than a procedural one. That being so, it appears at least extremely doubtful whether this section can possibly apply to pending proceedings. My own view is that it cannot. 23. Further, to hold that the section applied to pending proceedings would create serious difficulties. If pending suits for possession in this Court could not be heard, then what was to happen to them? There is no provision in the Act for the transfer of these suits to the Court of Small Causes and further, if they could be transferred, they could not be heard by reason of the very limited jurisdiction of that court. All that the Plaintiffs in these pending suits could do would be to file fresh applications in the Court of Small Causes and the costs in this Court would of course be thrown away. Difficulties might arise with regard to limitation in these fresh applications. All that the Plaintiffs in these pending suits could do would be to file fresh applications in the Court of Small Causes and the costs in this Court would of course be thrown away. Difficulties might arise with regard to limitation in these fresh applications. They might be filed out of time, though it might be argued that the Plaintiff would be entitled to exclude the time taken in litigating in the High Court u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, though strictly it could not be said that the time taken in litigating in this Court was time taken in litigating in a Court without jurisdiction, because this Court certainly had jurisdiction until this Act came into force. It will, therefore, be seen that, if this Act was held to apply to pending cases, serious difficulties would arise. However, as the Act cannot possibly apply to ejectment suits these difficulties cannot arise. 24. In the result, therefore, I can see no ground for interfering with the judgment and decree of the trial Court and I would, accordingly, dismiss this appeal with costs. Sinha, J. 25. I agree.