JUDGMENT : S. KRISHNA PILLAI, J. 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 324 of 1120 on the file of the Ettumanoor Munsiff’s court is the special appellant. The suit was for recovery of a sum of Ind. Rs.390 As. 12 P.O, advanced to or spent on behalf of one Nagammal (deceased ) for her maintenance during a period of eleven and a half months preceding the date of her death on 14.6.1117. The cause of action was stated differently in the two courts below which came to different conclusions according to what appeared to each of them to be the true cause of action involved in the suit. The first court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff while the lower appellate court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has therefore brought this special appeal. 2. The plaintiff and the defendant are members of a Hindu Mitakshara family. In a prior litigation between the members of the family (O.S. No. 87 of 1099 on the file of the Kottayam District Court) the parties came to a compromise under which Krishna Iyer, the father of the defendants, agreed to pay a sum annually for the maintenance of Nagammal his mother. The plaintiff is the son of one Venkateswara Iyer, another son of Nagammal. He puts forward the claim for the amount which accrued due to the deceased Nagammal under the terms of the compromise during the above period on the ground that he maintained her during the period. It was established at the trial that, under the terms of the compromise, Krishna Iyer was bound to pay a sum of Rs. 448 annually for the maintenance of Nagammal for which sufficient family funds had been entrusted to him, that the amount was not paid by him to Nagammal, that for successive periods suits had to be filed by Venkateswara Iyer in conjunction with Nagammal for recovery of such arrears, and that during the period in question there was as before a compete default on the part of the defendants in the payment of the maintenance. It therefore follows that the defendants were liable to pay a sum equal to the plaint amount to the deceased Nagammal and that deceased Nagammal, had she lived, could have enforced payment of the same through court. 3. It therefore follows that the defendants were liable to pay a sum equal to the plaint amount to the deceased Nagammal and that deceased Nagammal, had she lived, could have enforced payment of the same through court. 3. The real question therefore is whether the plaintiff as the person who had maintained Nagammal during this period could sustain an action against the defendants who had bound themselves to pay but had failed to fulfil their undertaking. There was no assignment of the right as on previous occasions. Nor has the plaintiff claimed to be the legal representative of the deceased Nagammal in whom the right to recover the amount has vested in law. Eversley on the Law of the Domestic Relations, third edition, page 679, states the law as follows: ‘If a stranger maintains an infant out of charity or affection, he has no claim for the money expended; but if he maintains it with the intention of being repaid, he may make good his claim.” This is not based on any special rule of law governing infants, but an equitable rule applicable to all similarly circumstanced. The compromise decree would show that sufficient funds were entrusted to the defendants who contest this suit which would have enabled them to pay maintenance to Nagammal. She was their widowed grandmother and it was the duty of every member in the family to see that she was properly maintained and was not allowed to go starving. The defendant is a person who was bound by law to pay and the plaintiff, as a member of the coparcenary and a party to the compromise, was interested in seeing that payment was made. If in such circumstances the defendant failed and the plaintiff paid, the latter must be held entitled to reimbursement. 4. It is not contended in this case that the claim is extravagant or exceeds reasonable limits that may be prescribed for the maintenance of a person of the position of Nagammal, or that the plaintiff advanced the money out of charity or affection. 4. It is not contended in this case that the claim is extravagant or exceeds reasonable limits that may be prescribed for the maintenance of a person of the position of Nagammal, or that the plaintiff advanced the money out of charity or affection. The lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit firstly on the ground that there was no privity of contract and secondly on the ground that the cause of action, if any, was against the estate of Nagammal for which in the words of the learned District Judge, the plaintiff had “first of all to obtain a decree against the legal representatives of Nagammal for the amount he has actually spent on her behalf and then execute that decree and purchase in execution thereof Nagammal’s right to get arrears of maintenance from the defendants; and after that he must file a suit on the cause of action in respect of the arrears of maintenance due to Nagammal.” This view does not commend itself to us nor that such circuity of action is necessary in cases of this kind. We hold that the plaintiff as the person who had maintained Nagammal, not out of charitable disposition but as one who expected reimbursement, is entitled to a decree for the amount claimed as against the defendant who had undertaken the responsibility but had refused or neglected to perform it. 5. We therefore reverse the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court. The special appeal is thus allowed with costs here and in the lower appellate court. Appeal allowed.