JUDGMENT S.R. Das Gupta, J. - This application has been made on behalf of the Plaintiff for re-transferring the suit from this Court to Dacca court in Eastern Pakistan. This suit was originally instituted in the Dacca court and in the year 1944, an order was made by Ameer Ali J. directing this suit to be transferred to this Court and thereafter it has been transferred to this Court and has been marked as Extraordinary Suit No. 3 of 1945. The present application has been made by the Plaintiff for an order that this suit should be re-transferred to the Dacca court and he has set out his grounds in para. 10 of the petition and the main ground, as Mr. Sen has contended before me, is that his client, who is a very old man, will be unable to come to Calcutta and there will be difficulty in giving instructions to the lawyers for the purpose of this case. Excepting one party, none of the parties appearing before me is supporting this application. 2. A preliminary point has been taken and to my mind, it is fatal to Mr. Sen's getting an order for re-transferring the suit from this Court to Dacca court. It has been contended by the other side that this Court has no jurisdiction to make such an order as is prayed for, namely, re-transferring this suit from this Court to a court in Eastern Pakistan. Mr. Sen appearing, for the Applicant tried to maintain his position, so far as the preliminary point is concerned, in this way: He relied on Clause 13 of the High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947, and according to him, Sub-clauses (2) of Clause 13 read with Sub-clauses (4) of Clause 13 would give me jurisdiction to make such an order. Sub-clause (1) reads as follows: Subject as hereinafter provided, the High Court in Calcutta shall have no jurisdiction in respect of the territories for the time being included in the Province of East Bengal. 3. The portion of Sub-clauses (2), which is material for the present-purpose, reads as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in this order: (a) any proceedings which, immediately before the appointed day, are pending in the High Court in Calcutta on its Original Side, including any proceedings then pending in the said High Court as a Court of reference, shall be heard and determined by that Court. Sub-clause (4) reads as follows: Subject to the following provisions of this Article with respect to appeals, any order made by the High Court in Calcutta either-- (a) before the appointed day ; or (b) in any proceedings with respect to which the said High Court retains jurisdiction by virtue of paras. (2) and (3) of this Article: shall for all purposes have effect not only as an order of the High Court in Calcutta but also as an order made by the High Court of East Bengal. 4. Mr. Sen contends that these provisions read with Section 24(1)(b)(iii) of the CPC authorise me to make the order prayed for. The material portion of Section 24 of the CPC is as follows: (1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage-- (a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try dispose of the same, or (b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any court subordinate to it, and-- (iii) re-transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn. 5. Mr. Sen contends that if, under Clause 13(2)(a) of the High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947, this Court has got jurisdiction to try this suit as it was pending in this Court prior to the said order coming into effect and if this Court has transferred the suit which was originally instituted in Dacca court under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a), then this Court has also jurisdiction u/s 24(1)(b)(iii) to re-transfer this suit to Dacca court from which it was transferred, because, as he contends, this Court has got the power to re-transfer any suit for trial or disposal to the court from which it was withdrawn. Mr. Sen contends that this suit having been withdrawn from the Dacca court can be re-transferred under the said clause to the Dacca court. I am unable to accept Mr. Sen's contention and I am of the opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to make the order which is asked for by Mr. Sen. 6. I should add that, in the beginning, Mr. I am unable to accept Mr. Sen's contention and I am of the opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to make the order which is asked for by Mr. Sen. 6. I should add that, in the beginning, Mr. Sen wanted to contend that this Court has no jurisdiction at all over the subject-matter of this suit and he wanted to argue that Sub-clauses (2)(a) of the High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947, does not apply at all to this case, because it was not a suit which was pending on the Ordinary Original Side of this Court but was an extraordinary original suit and was marked as such. According to his said contention, the only suits which can be tried by me are the suits which were pending at the material date on the Ordinary Original Side of this High Court and this suit, not being pending as such Ordinary Original Suit but being an extraordinary suit, does not come under the category of the suits which are mentioned in Clause 13(2)(a). But, on further consideration, Mr. Sen has not pressed this point, because he realised that if he pressed this point he would be in a greater difficulty, because, in that case, I shall have no jurisdiction at all to make the order which he is asking for in any event. Mr. Sen not having pressed this point, I need not deal with the same except that I express my view that the suits which are contemplated under Clause 13(2)(a) are not merely suits, which are pending in the Ordinary Original Side of this Court, but also all suits which are pending on the Original Side including proceedings pending in the Court as a Court of reference, whether they are suits coming within ordinary original jurisdiction or suits coming within extraordinary original jurisdiction of this Court. 7. With regard to the other point of Mr. Sen, namely, that I have got jurisdiction to make the order which he has asked for, I agree with the contention which has been put forward by Mr. Gupta and also with the contentions of Mr. A.K. Sen and Mr. Rahman, appearing for some of the parties. 7. With regard to the other point of Mr. Sen, namely, that I have got jurisdiction to make the order which he has asked for, I agree with the contention which has been put forward by Mr. Gupta and also with the contentions of Mr. A.K. Sen and Mr. Rahman, appearing for some of the parties. It appears that because of the provisions of Clause 13(2) of the High Courts (Bengal) Order, 1947, this Court would have no jurisdiction in respect of he territories for the time being included in the Province of Cast Bengal. By that it is meant that properties and land which fall within the Province of East Bengal would be excluded from the jurisdiction of this Court. It also implies to my mind-hat this Court will have no jurisdiction over the courts which ,re functioning in the Province of East Bengal. But some exception is made to this position in Clause 13(5) of the said order. One of such exceptions is contained in Clause 13(2)(a) which I have enumerated. Now, the effect of that clause to my mind is that his High Court has got jurisdiction over suits which ire pending on the Original Side from before the appointed lay, but that jurisdiction is to hear and determine such suits and in exercise of that jurisdiction, if this Court makes an order, then, under Clause 13(4)(b), that order would have effect not only as an order made by the High Court in Calcutta but by the High Court of East Bengal. As I have said, the only jurisdiction of this Court is to hear and determine the suits which are referred to ruder Clause 12(2)(a) and (b) and if any Order is made by this Court n the exercise of that jurisdiction, namely, in hearing and determining that suit, that would have effect as an order made by the High Court, East Bengal. The order which is asked for by Mr. Sen is an order which cannot be said to be an order which can be made in the exercise of that jurisdiction. In other words, it would not be an order made while hearing and determining the suit at all, but an order to send the matter to a different court, the effect of which is that this Court would not hear and determine this suit. That being so, I am unable to accept Mr. In other words, it would not be an order made while hearing and determining the suit at all, but an order to send the matter to a different court, the effect of which is that this Court would not hear and determine this suit. That being so, I am unable to accept Mr. Sen's contention that I have jurisdiction to make the order which he is asking for. 8. With regard to Section 24(2)(6)(iii) of the Code of Civil Procedure, I am also of the opinion that, even under that section, I would have no jurisdiction to make the order asked for. Section 24(2)(b) of the CPC speaks of the right of this Court to withdraw any suit, appeal, or other proceedings pending in any court subordinate to it and Sub-clauses (iii) of Clause (b) of that section speaks of the right to re-transfer the same for trial or disposal to the court from which it was withdrawn. Mr. Sen contended that on the Original Side I have got the power to act u/s 24 and it has not been disputed that Section 24 applies to the Original Side of this Court. But, to my mind, Section 24(2)(6), under which the power has been given to this Court to transfer a suit or proceeding from any court subordinate to it, should be read along with Section 24(2)(6)(iii), or, in other words, the two should not be read disjunctively but should be read with reference to each other. In my view, the power to withdraw must be of a suit, appeal or proceeding pending in a court, which is subordinate to the court which makes the order and the power to re-transfer must also be only to such subordinate court. Mr. Gupta has also drawn my attention to certain provisions of the Indian Independence Act and he has placed before me Section 1 of the said Act where it is stated as follows: (1) As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan. (2) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as "the new Dominions" and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in, this Act referred to as the "appointed day". 9. (2) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as "the new Dominions" and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in, this Act referred to as the "appointed day". 9. He also placed before me Section 8(2) of the said Act, where it is stated as follows: 8 (2). Except in so far as other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion under Sub-section (1) of this section each of the new Dominions and all Provinces and other parts thereof shall be govern, ed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935 and the provisions of that Act and of the Orders in Council, Rules and other Instruments made thereunder, shall, so far as applicable and subject to any express provisions of this Act and with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as may be specified in orders of the Governor-General under the next succeeding section, have effect accordingly: Provided that-- (a) the said provisions shall apply separately in relation to each of the new Dominions and nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as continuing on (sic) after the appointed day any Central Government or Legislature common to both the new Dominions. 10. Mr. Gupta has also drawn my attention to certain provisions of the India (Adaptation of Existing Indian Laws) Order, 1947 and particularly to Article 4(1) and Article 10 of that Order in support of his contention. It appears that after the Indian Independence Act, the two Dominions have acquired two separate independent status and the laws of one Dominion are not applicable to another Dominion. The law which is prevalent in the Dominion of India is the law of the Dominion of India and the law which is prevalent in Pakistan is the law of Pakistan and one has no bearing on the other. It is true that the CPC is applicable now both to this country and also to Pakistan, but the CPC as administered in India is the law of India and the CPC as administered in Pakistan is the law of Pakistan. But it is abundantly clear that one Dominion has got a status separate and independent from another Dominion and it cannot be said that any court of this country has any jurisdiction whatsoever over the court in the other country. But it is abundantly clear that one Dominion has got a status separate and independent from another Dominion and it cannot be said that any court of this country has any jurisdiction whatsoever over the court in the other country. If that is so, then if I exercise the power which is asked for by Mr. Sen I would be exercising some jurisdiction over a court over which I have no jurisdiction. Mr. Rahman rightly points out that transferring a case from this Court to Dacca, court would mean exercising a jurisdiction over the Dacca court, in other words, that would be imposing something over the Dacca court which I have no right to do. 11. I also agree with the contentions of Mr. A.K. Sen, appearing or some of the parties, that prior to the passing of the Indian independence Act, the CPC was originally restricted to British India and it was not applicable even to the Native States and after the passing of the Indian Independence Act the CPC as the law of the Dominion of India under which authority is given to the courts to exercise D jurisdiction is not applicable to any court outside the Dominion f India and therefore any power which is conferred by the Code f Civil Procedure as the law of the Dominion of India is exercisable strictly within the Dominion of India and cannot be exercised with reference to any country which is outside the said Dominion and therefore cannot be exercised with reference to a Court which is in Pakistan. 12. I have come to the conclusion that this Court has no jurisdiction to make an order for transfer of any case from this Court to any court in East Bengal, and in view of my decision on this preliminary point, it becomes unnecessary for me to say anything as to the merits of the application. But I would just mention that I have not been very much impressed with the actual merits of this application. I fail to see why the Plaintiff, whose suit was transferred from the Dacca court in the year 1944, would wait till 1949 to make the present application. In any event, as Mr. But I would just mention that I have not been very much impressed with the actual merits of this application. I fail to see why the Plaintiff, whose suit was transferred from the Dacca court in the year 1944, would wait till 1949 to make the present application. In any event, as Mr. Sen has contended, his main grievance is that his (sic) is unable to come and give instructions to lawyers in Calcutta and these reasons do not seem to me to be very convincing, but, I need not say anything further in this matter. The order that I make on this application is mainly occasioned by the view that I have expressed on the preliminary point. 13. There is another prayer in the application to which none of the opposing parties is raising any objection and that prayer is for substitution of the heirs of some of the Defendants who have died and I shall concede to that prayer and I shall make an order in terms of prayer B, sub-prayers 1, 1A, 2 and 3. I am not making any order as to sub-prayers 4, 5, 6 at the moment. The Applicant will take proper steps for the purpose. There will be an order in terms of prayers 7, 8 and 9. The receiver will get his costs out of the estate as between attorney and client. He will in the first instance pay Mr. A.K. Sen's client's costs of this application out of his share in the estate. Costs of all other parties as in a partition suit. Certified for counsel.