This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-Judge, Cachar, who affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had decreed the plaintiffs' suit against defendant 1 upon contest and decreed the suit ex parte against defendants with costs. The trial Court had further ordered that the plaintiffs do deposit a sum of BS, 226 Within 15 days from the date of the judgment and that defendant l do execute a sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs within 80 days from the date of the deposit of the sum of Es. 225 and that if the deposit was not made within the time allowed, the suit was to stand dismissed. The facts material to the appeal are these. [2] It appears that the plaintiffs have execu­ted a sale deed in favour of defendant l for BS. 225 on condition that if the sum of Es. 225 was paid to defendant 1 within a period of ten years he would reconvey the property to the plaintiffs. It was the case of the plaintiffs that as they were making preparation for a pilgrimage, they left the sale deed with defendant 1 to be registered along with an agreement of re-conveyance which was to be reduced to writ­ing; on their return from the pilgrimage it came to their knowledge that defendant had written out an agreement relating to re-conveyance of land quite different from the land sold to him; not only did the agreement upon which defen­dant 1 relied relate to property different from the one which was sold to defendant 1 for BS. 225 but that the period at the expiry of which the property was to be re-conveyed to the plaintiffs was changed from 10 to 3 years and the consi­deration was reduced to Rs. 200. [3] The plaintiffs accordingly brought the pre-"sent suit for the specific performance of the con­tract of re-conveyance according to the terms agreed between the parties and which terms were to be incorporated in a, written document. De­fendant l contested the suit and relied upon a. written agreement, the terms of which, he con­tended, did not entitle the plaintiffs to claim specific performance of an oral agreement upon which the plaintiffs relied. De­fendant l contested the suit and relied upon a. written agreement, the terms of which, he con­tended, did not entitle the plaintiffs to claim specific performance of an oral agreement upon which the plaintiffs relied. Upon the pleadings the trial Court framed the following two issues: (1) 13 the plaintiff entitled to get a sale-deed in respects of the suit lands as alleged by him ? (2) To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? [4] The trial Court came to the conclusion* that the contract between the parties was not the contract as alleged by defendant l, that the con. tract between the parties was for the re-conveyance of the land sold by the plaintiffs to-defendant l, within a period of 10 years and for a consideration of Es. 225. The lower appellate-Court accepted this finding and dismissed the appeal and passed a decree in favour of the plain­tiffs for specific performance of the oral contract as alleged by the plaintiffs. [5] Mr. Ghose for the appellant-defendant l» has contended that the Courts below have erred in accepting the case of the plaintiffs who sought to vary the terms of a contract reduced to writing. He contended that under the provisions of S. 91, Evidence Act, the terms of the written con­tract were to be proved by the document itself and not by oral evidence and that in view of the provisions of S. 92, Evidence Act, the plaintiffs were debarred from leading any oral evidence to vary the terms of a written contract. This con­tention, however, based on the provisions of Ss. 91 and 92, Evidence Act presupposes that there was a contract between the parties as alleged by de­fendant 1. We think the trial Court was right in saying that the contract relied upon by defen­dant l, was not the contract between the parties and that the contract between the parties was the contract upon which the plaintiffs relied. In the judgment of the trial Court it is stated: "The plaintiffs have brought the present suit for enforcing the oral contract." The trial Court has further remarked in its judgment that the verna­cular word "ferath" in Ex. 2 is very significant. The question of "ferath" does not arise unless the thing has once been parted with; the plaintiffs have not parted with the land des­cribed in Ex. 2 is very significant. The question of "ferath" does not arise unless the thing has once been parted with; the plaintiffs have not parted with the land des­cribed in Ex. 2, and the question therefore of re-conveyance of the land described in EX. 2 does not arise. With this reasoning we entirely agree. It is unreasonable to suppose that the plaintiffs would enter into a contract of re-conveyance of land which had not been conveyed by them to defendant 1. In this view we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Ghose based upon the pro-visions of S3. 91 and 92, Evidence Act. The plain­tiffs relied upon an oral contract and that oral contract for the re-conveyance of the property in suit has been accepted by the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The findings of the Courts below are based on the evidence of the plaintiffs and the most important circumstance, namely, that a transferor would ordinarily seek to enter into a contract for the resale of the property transferred by him and not any other property. [6] We see no reason to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.