JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - This is an appeal from the judgment of my learned brother Sinha J., (1948) 52 C.W.N. 826 whereby he set aside an award of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dated September 17, 1947. 2. Two points were urged before Sinha J. The first ground urged was that there was no valid reference to arbitration, as here was no dispute which could be referred to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. Sinha J. held that there were disputes between the parties which were within the arbitration clause and that they were in existence before the date of reference, accordingly, he overruled this contention. 3. The next point urged was that the arbitrators were guilty of disconduct, inasmuch as they, made an award on the basis of a extension of the date of delivery without taking any evidence. Sinha J. held that it was impossible for (sic), arbitrators to decide this point erne way or the other with taking oral evidence. Under the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce wide powers have been conferred on (sic) Tribunal of Arbitration and it is left to the arbitrators decide whether they would take any oral evidence or (sic) Sinha J. held that the arbitrators did not exercise the power a judicial manner and he, therefore, set aside the award on the ground of misconduct. 4. Before us the contention has been urged by Mr. Bachaw Learned Counsel for the Respondents, that there was really valid reference to arbitration, inasmuch as prior to the date reference, no claim was made for damage cm the basis of t difference between the contract rate and the market-rate prevailing on October 31, 1946. The Appellants claim Rs. 14,250 on the basis of the market-rate prevailing at J end of October. The question is, had the Tribunal Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce jurisdiction adjudicate upon this matter which was referred to them? 5. By contract No. 183, dated January 24, 1946, the Respondent Khusiram Benarshilal sold to the Appellants (sic) Goverdhandass 300,000 yards of hessian at Rs. 28 per 100 year Delivery under the contract was to be made in the months April to June at the rate of 100,000 yards monthly. 1 contract contained an arbitration clause in wide terms. 5. By contract No. 183, dated January 24, 1946, the Respondent Khusiram Benarshilal sold to the Appellants (sic) Goverdhandass 300,000 yards of hessian at Rs. 28 per 100 year Delivery under the contract was to be made in the months April to June at the rate of 100,000 yards monthly. 1 contract contained an arbitration clause in wide terms. It admitted that goods were delivered in respect of the (sic) portion, but there was default in respect of half of (sic) quantity of the May and June portions and the result (sic) that a total quantity of 100,000 yards of hessian remain undelivered. 6. On September 21, 1946, the Appellants wrote to Respondents purporting to extend the delivery date of (sic) contract to October 31 by mutual consent of parties. Prompt came a reply on the same date from the Respondents where they clearly stated that no arrangement had been made regarding extension of deliveries. They added that they we unable to deliver the goods as they had not received the said from their sellers and they requested the buyers to send the difference bill. At that time the Jute Price Control Order in operation and no difference bills were sent. 7. A week later, that is on September 28, the Appellants (sic) to the Respondents. The last paragraph of that letter relevant. It reads as follows: However, as you do not agree now to the extended period of delivery pies arrange to deliver the balance one lakh yards hessian cloth immediately receipt of this letter, failing which we shall hold you responsible for any loss will have to undergo in this transaction. 8. There is no doubt that the Appellants jettisoned their case of tension of contract which they had alleged in the letter of September 21. Then there was further correspondence between he parties. On October 1 the Respondents replied that they had denied all responsibility. On October 7 the Appellants wrote asking for delivery of the goods without further delay and heartened legal steps in default of immediate delivery. This letter makes it clear that the Appellants had given the go-by to heir case of extension of the date of delivery and wanted to claim damages for loss, unless there was immediate delivery of he goods. On October 9 the Respondents replied reaffirming their former position. This letter makes it clear that the Appellants had given the go-by to heir case of extension of the date of delivery and wanted to claim damages for loss, unless there was immediate delivery of he goods. On October 9 the Respondents replied reaffirming their former position. On February 21, 1947, the Appellants made out two bills, each for Rs. 1,750 and therein they claimed difference at Rs. 3-8 per 100 yards. There is some dispute as to whether these bills were actually sent to the Respondents. But it appears that On May 19 the bills were sent by the Appellants to the Gunny Traders Association for presentation to the Respondents for payment. According to the Respondents, the Association sent the bills to them early in the month of June, 1947. They accepted liability for these bills and wanted the Appellants to send their man to collect the amount but nobody turned up to receive payment. 9. Nothing happened thereafter till June 4, 1947, when the Appellants sent a letter of reference to the Registrar, Tribunal of Arbitration, Bengal Chamber of Commerce. In the last paragraph of that letter it was stated that they were claiming Rs. 14,250 on the basis of the market-rate prevailing on October 31, 1946 and that they had extended the date of delivery of the balance goods until that day. The Respondents filed their statement in reply. They stated that they had admitted liability on the basis of the difference bills which had been forwarded to the Gunny Traders Association. They maintained that they had been all along agreeable to pay the amount mentioned in these bills. They, accordingly, demanded that the reference should be dismissed. 10. On September 17, 1947, the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce made an award for Rs. 11,000 against the Appellants together with interest and costs. 11. It is really difficult to follow on what basis the Appellants claimed the sum of Rs. 14,250 and how they could claim any damage on the basis of the market-rate prevailing at the end of October 1946, in view of the correspondence which had gone before and in view of their two bills whereby they claimed only Rs. 3,500. But the question we have to decide is whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction to entertain this claim for Rs. 3,500. But the question we have to decide is whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction to entertain this claim for Rs. 14,250 on the basis of the rate prevailing at the end of October. That claim had never been put forward before the, reference to the Tribunal of Arbitration on June 4, 1947, an the Respondents never had any opportunity of dealing with the same. Really the matter referred to in the letter of reference was never in issue between the parties prior to that date. 12. The existence of a dispute is an essential condition for the jurisdiction of an arbitrator. If there is no dispute there can b no right to demand arbitration at all. This was clearly laid down by Rankin J., as he then was, in Uttam Chand Saligram v. Jewa Mamooji ILR (1919) Cal. 534. A point as to which there is no dispute cannot be referred to arbitration. Failure to pay does no necessarily constitute a dispute or difference: Russell en Arbitration, 12th Ed., p. 334. Assuming that there was failure or neglect to pay the amount of Rs. 3,500 mentioned h the two difference bills and there was no dispute with regard t' that amount--and we are satisfied that there was never any demand for Rs. 14,250 on the basis of the market-rate prevailing at the end of October 1946--it cannot be said that there was any dispute between the parties with regard to the same. 13. The leading case on the subject is London and North Western and Great Western Joint Railway Companies v. H. Billington Limited (1899) A.C. 79. Lord Halsbury L.C. pointed out ii that case that there must be a difference between the parties before any arbitration can be claimed and that difference should be placed before the arbitrators for adjudication. 14. In Ladha Singh Bedi v. Kalyani Prasad Singh Deo ILR (1939) Cal. 181, 193 R.C. Mitter J. dealing with this case pointed out as follows: The noble Lord then drew an analogy from an arbitration out of court. He said that before the arbitrator could enter upon the reference, it must be shown that a difference had arisen between the parties before the submission and that the arbitrator would have jurisdiction only to adjudicate upon the particular difference which had arisen before the submission. 15. We agree with Mitter J.'s reading of that judgment. He said that before the arbitrator could enter upon the reference, it must be shown that a difference had arisen between the parties before the submission and that the arbitrator would have jurisdiction only to adjudicate upon the particular difference which had arisen before the submission. 15. We agree with Mitter J.'s reading of that judgment. He has correctly explained the view taken by the noble Lord in the above case. The same view has been taken by Wadia J. in Dawoodbhai Abdulkader Vs. Abdulkader Ismailji, AIR 1931 Bom 164 . 16. In order to make out the jurisdiction of the tribunal of arbitration the Appellants must show that the subject-matter of the reference was some dispute between the parties and that the particular dispute had arisen actually before the matter went before the arbitrators. We hold that the Appellants have failed o satisfy this condition precedent. At no stage was any demand made for Rs. 14,000. It is not a question of quantum of damages merely with regard to the breach of the contract, as Mr. Chaudhuri on behalf of the Appellants wanted to put it. It is a different cause of action altogether. The claim that was referred in the two bills was the only claim which was before the parties. The claim that was made in the letter of reference was lever communicated to the Respondents. A dispute implies an assertion of right by one party and repudiation thereof by another. There was no such assertion of right and therefore, (sic) here could be no repudiation with regard to the matter which (sic) actually referred to arbitration. The jurisdiction of an arbitrator depends not upon the existence of a claim or the accrual of a cause of action, but upon the existence of a dispute: Balmuhund Ruia v. Gopiram Bhotica (1919) 24 C.W.N. 775. 17. It is unfair that a party should be driven to a tribunal of arbitration and confronted with a claim there which had never been put forward previously and which he had no chance of considering at all. We are not resting our decision on the ground of equity or (sic). It is a question of authority of jurisdiction. It is only the existence of a difference or dispute which confers jurisdiction "upon a private forum to adjudicate upon that dispute. We are not resting our decision on the ground of equity or (sic). It is a question of authority of jurisdiction. It is only the existence of a difference or dispute which confers jurisdiction "upon a private forum to adjudicate upon that dispute. At no point of time was any claim made on the basis put forward in that letter or reference to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. 18. With respect to Sinha J. we do not agree with him when he says that in this case the Appellants' bills were merely an offer to take a lower sum in place of a higher sum to which the Appellants were entitled. This is not a correct view of the correspondence to which I have already referred. We do not agree with the learned Judge when he says that the question which the arbitrators were called upon to decide was the dispute which was in existence before the date of reference. The particular dispute in respect of which the adjudication was sought never arose before the reference and therefore, we canned uphold the finding of the learned Judge that there was a preexisting dispute between the parties which could be arbitrated upon by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. 19. Having regard to the view we have taken on the question of jurisdiction, we need not discuss the question of misconduct. We are satisfied that the tribunal of arbitration had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the award was rightly set aside. 20. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Certified for two counsel. Harries C.J. 21. I agree.