JUDGMENT Das, J. - This is an application for revision of an order made by the Magistrate, First Class, of Alipore, on June 30, 1948, convicting the Petitioner u/s 420 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default of payment of the fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year more and directing payment of Rs. 1,000 out of the fine, if realised, to the complainant as compensation. An appeal against the said order was, on September 27, 1948, dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge of 24-Parganas. 2. The prosecution case may be briefly stated as follows: The complainant Hem Ranjan Mukherji was on the look-out for buying some lands. Some time in the middle of March, 1946, one Batakrishna informed the complainant that one Pulin who had a half-share in a plot of land measuring about 38 bighds was agreeable to sell his half-share at and for a price of Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 30,000. Batakrishna showed the complainant a plan and some settlement khatiydns. On a latter day, Batakrishna took the complainant to the house of Pulin and, asking the complainant to wait outside, went to the house and came out with a person who introduced himself to the complainant as Pulin. In fact, that man was not Pulin, but was Mahadeb. A few minutes later, the real Pulin came out of the house and introduced himself as Jogesh. The party consisting of the complainant, Batakrishna, Mahadeb, who impersonated Pulin, and the real Pulin, who posed as Jogesh, went to inspect the lands. After inspection, the price of Pulin's share was settled at Rs. 25,000 and it was agreed that a sum of Rs. 7,000, out of the agreed price, would be paid as earnest money. It was impressed upon the complainant that the deal should be kept secret, for otherwise Pulin's brother, who was the other co-sharer, might prevent Pulin from selling his share. Two days later, the complainant paid Rs. 3,000 out of Rs. 7,000 to Mahadeb, the faked Pulin, and Mahadeb gave to the complainant a receipt for it which was signed by him as Pulin and was attested by the real Pulin who signed as Jogesh. A few days later, the complainant paid another sum of Rs. Two days later, the complainant paid Rs. 3,000 out of Rs. 7,000 to Mahadeb, the faked Pulin, and Mahadeb gave to the complainant a receipt for it which was signed by him as Pulin and was attested by the real Pulin who signed as Jogesh. A few days later, the complainant paid another sum of Rs. 3,500 to Mahadeb and a receipt similarly executed and attested was made over to the complainant. 3. On the following day a bainapatra, drafted by a pleader Ashutosh De (P.W. 13), was executed and registered and the balance of Rs. 500, making up the total earnest money of Rs. 7,000, was paid by the complainant, but no receipt was granted on this occasion. The bainapatra was executed by Mahadeb as Pulin and one Kalicharan and one Bocha attested it, Bocha signing as Jiban. Ghosh. As the bainapatra recorded the payment of the earnest money of Rs. 7,000 in three instalments of Rs. 3,000, Rs. 3,500-and Rs. 500, the two receipts for Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 3,500 were taken back from the complainant. On the same day, an affidavit, purporting to be one by Pulin, was solemnly affirmed before a Magistrate by Mahadeb, who was identified as Pulin by a. muktedr named Kartik Chandra Basu (P.W. 14). Thereafter, the complainant took up the matter of investigation of title and the usual searches in the registration office and, while that investigation was proceeding, the complainant suddenly received information from one Sushil Biswas (P.W. 4) that he (the complainant) had been imposed upon and that the man who had posed as Pulin was not Pulin but was Mahadeb and that the man who impersonated Jogesh was the real Pulin. On a subsequent day, the complainant met the real Pulin of the street and accosted him as Pulin, but Pulin even then gave out his name as Jogesh. A man named Roustan Ali (P.W. 6), who happened to be standing near, immediately told the complainant that the real name of the person accosted was Pulin. 4. On a subsequent day, the complainant met the real Pulin of the street and accosted him as Pulin, but Pulin even then gave out his name as Jogesh. A man named Roustan Ali (P.W. 6), who happened to be standing near, immediately told the complainant that the real name of the person accosted was Pulin. 4. Thereupon, the complainant, on July 3, 1946, filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Police Magistrate at Alipore against nine several persons including the real Pulin, who is the Petitioner before us, praying that the Court might be pleased "to take "adequate steps for the arrest of the accused persons, direct the "police concerned to investigate the case and to take cognizance of "the same and put the accused upon trial and try the case according to law". This petition of complainant had a chequered career, which it is now necessary to be stated in some detail. 5. The first entry in the order-sheet under date July 3, 1946, reads as follows: Read the complaint. It discloses cognisable offences. Police to take cognisanoe. To D.D. I. concerned for investigation and report by July 26, 1946. 6. It should be noticed that the complainant was not at all examined by the Police Magistrate u/s 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Be that as it may, the matter was thereafter adjourned on not less than five occasions on the ground, amongst others, that the report had not been submitted. The entry in the order-sheet under date November 20, 1946, is as follows: Read report. It is not helpful. To Mr. S.N. Chanda, Magistrate, First Class, for judicial enquiry. To November, 23, 1946. 7. The file was transferred by the Police Magistrate to Mr. Chanda, who fixed a day for enquiry. On December 16, 1946, after perusing the papers and hearing the lawyer of the complainant, Mr. Chanda came to the conclusion that if the complainant's case were true a very serious and cognizable offence had been committed and a thorough investigation by the police was necessary before the accused were put on trial and he sent back the record to the Police Magistrate with the recommendation that the case was eminently fit for investigation by the Detective Department. It appears that at or about this time, when unsettled conditions prevailed in Calcutta, the original complaint was lost and on December 18, 1946, a copy of it was filed before the Magistrate. It is curious, however, that this important fact was not recorded anywhere in the order-sheet. Be that as it may, on receipt of the file with the report of Mr. Chanda entered in the order-sheet the Police Magistrate, on December 16, 1946, made the following order: Read report of Mr. Chanda. Forward the complaint to D.C, D.D., for favour of causing an investigation to be made and reporting by January, 11, 1947, after taking cognizance of the case. 8. A similar endorsement was made on the copy of petition of complaint by the Magistrate on the same day. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned for not less than five times, as no report came from the police inspite of tagids or reminders, the last of which was sent, as appears from the order-sheet, on April 29, 1947, when the matter was adjourned till May 14, 1947. On the last mentioned date, the complainant did not appear and the Magistrate recorded the following order: Complainant absent. No one appears on his behalf. Dismissed u/s 203 Code of Criminal Procedure Call for the document. 9. It appears that two days after the complaint had been dismissed, to wit, on May 16, 1947, a batch of three of the accused persons were produced before the Police Magistrate, who remanded them to police custody. The order-sheet shows that thereafter the police went on producing the remaining accused persons one by one in court and bail petitions were moved and granted from time to time. The entry in the order-sheet under date July 12, 1947, is as follows: No P.R. Accused as before till July 30, 1947. I.O. to expedite submission of C.S. 10. Apparently the letters "C.S." are abbreviations of the words "charge-sheet". The order-sheet shows that on November 21, 1947, the police submitted a chalan (i.e., charge-sheet) against six accused persons including Pulin u/s 420/120B, Indian Penal Code. This chalan or charge-sheet submitted u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was signed by some Mutherji with the designation "Inspector of Police, Lal Bazar." Eventually, on December 10, 1947, the case was transferred to Mr. A.K. Boy for disposal. This chalan or charge-sheet submitted u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was signed by some Mutherji with the designation "Inspector of Police, Lal Bazar." Eventually, on December 10, 1947, the case was transferred to Mr. A.K. Boy for disposal. The last mentioned Magistrate took up the case and proceeded with the trial and after examining 15 prosecution witnesses on different dates the Magistrate discharged two of the accused persons for want of evidence and framed charges against the remaining four accused persons including Pulin, all of whom pleaded not guilty. Then followed the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses on different dates. The accused were examined u/s 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No defence witness was called. After hearing arguments the learned Magistrate acquitted Kali Charan and convicted Pulin, Batakrishna and Bocha. I have already mentioned the sentence passed on Pulin. Mahadeb is absconding and could not be traced. 11. Three several appeals were filed by the three convicted persons. The learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed Bocha's appeal and acquitted him, but upheld the convictions on Pulin and Batakrishna and dismissed their respective appeals. Pulin has now moved this Court. 12. The main question of law urged before us, which was also one of the points unsuccessfully advanced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, is that all proceedings before the Magistrate and particularly the proceedings after May 14, 1947, when the petition of complaint was dismissed u/s 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were wholly without jurisdiction and illegal. In order to determine this question, it is necessary to ascertain whether the proceedings before the Magistrate were founded or the petition of complaint or on the charge-sheet. submitted by the police on November 21, 1947. If the proceedings were based or the petition of complaint and the Police Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, then he must be taken to have proceeded under Chap. XVI of that Code and in that case he clearly contravene the provisions of Section 200, which peremptorily requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint to examine the complainant at once upon oath and record in writing the substance of the examination, which has to be signed by the complainant and by the Magistrate. XVI of that Code and in that case he clearly contravene the provisions of Section 200, which peremptorily requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint to examine the complainant at once upon oath and record in writing the substance of the examination, which has to be signed by the complainant and by the Magistrate. Further, if the Polio-Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on the petitioi of complaint and desired a report from the "D.D.I "concerned," as he did and for that purpose made a order on July 3, 1946, u/s 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there could be no occasion for his directing the police to take cognizance, for, a fortiori, he himself had taken cognizanc of the offence u/s 200. Learned advocate for the Government at first sought to maintain that, seeing that the Police Magistrat did not examine the complainant u/s 200 and directed the police to take cognizance, he obviously did not proceed under Chap. XVI of the Code and his order, dated July 3, 1946, must b regarded and treated as having been made u/s 156(3), which is in Chap. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the first place, an order u/s 156(5) can only direct "an investigation "as above-mentioned", that is to say, the order must be directed to "any officer-in-charge of a police-station" referred to in Section 156 (1). It is not suggested that "D.D.I, concerned" who was directed to investigate was at all an officer-in-charge of a police station. It is only when the Magistrate proceeds u/s 202 that he can call for a report from, amongst others, "a police officer" who need not be officer-in-charge of a police-station. 13. In the next place, if the Magistrate before whom a complaint was made did not call for any report u/s 202, but, u/s 156(5), directed the officer-in-charge of the police-station to investigate, then, apart from any authority binding on us, it would seem that the Magistrate had nothing further to do with the complaint and thenceforth the matter rested with the police to investigate and, if thought fit, to submit a report u/s 173, which is commonly called a chalan or charge-sheet. In this case the chalan or charge-sheet came long afterwards on November 21, 1947. In this case the chalan or charge-sheet came long afterwards on November 21, 1947. Therefore, the report from D.D.I. which came on November 20, 1946, was not in the nature of a chalan or charge-sheet. In any event, the Police Magistrate did not find the report helpful and, on November 20, 1946, sent the petition of complaint to Mr. Chanda for judicial enquiry. This, it is admitted, could only be done by the Police Magistrate u/s 202 and it suggests that he was really proceeding under Chap. XVI of the Code. The matter, however, does not rest there. After Mr. Chanda returned the file with his report recommending investigation by the Detective Department, the Police Magistrate, on December 16, 1946, forwarded the petition of complaint "to D.C., D.D., for favour of "causing an investigation to be made and reporting by January "11, 1947, after taking cognizance of the case". Again, the question arises as to whether this order was made u/s 156 (3) or u/s 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If it were made u/s 156(5), then it should have been directed to an officer-in-charge of a police-station, which a D.C., D.D., is not suggested to be and, therefore, this order could only have been made u/s 202, for it was the last mentioned section which permitted the Magistrate to call for a report from any police officer. Further, if the order were made u/s 156(5) then, apart from any authority binding on us, it would seem the Police Magistrate had nothing more to do with the complaint and he could proceed again only when the police submitted a report in the nature and form of a chalan or charge-sheet u/s 173. But in this case, before D.C, D.D., made any report the matter came up before the Police Magistrate on May 14, 1947, when, the complainant being absent, the learned Magistrate dismissed the case u/s 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. This fact indicates that the Police Magistrate was proceeding on the basis of the petition of complaint and was acting under Chap. XVI of the Code, for, unless he thought he retained seisin of the matter, he could not have made an order dismissing the complaint u/s 203 of the Code. 15. What followed, however, clearly discloses a quite different state of affairs. XVI of the Code, for, unless he thought he retained seisin of the matter, he could not have made an order dismissing the complaint u/s 203 of the Code. 15. What followed, however, clearly discloses a quite different state of affairs. Two days after the complaint had been dismissed, a batch of the accused were produced before the Police Magistrate and the proceedings were continued. Neither was a fresh petition of complaint filed before the Police Magistrate nor was any petition filed before him or order made by him for reviving the petition of complaint that had been dismissed, nor had the order of dismissal u/s 203 been set aside by any superior Court. In these circumstances, it is difficult to say that the proceedings continued on the basis of a petition of complaint, for there was no such petition alive or pending. Further, the order under date July 12, 1947, directing the investigating officer to expedite the submission of the charge-sheet clearly indicates that the Police Magistrate was in point of fact not proceeding on any petition of complaint, but was awaiting a charge-sheet to get on with the proceedings. Indeed a charge-sheet was submitted on November 21, 1947, and it was then that the Police Magistrate transferred the case to the file of another Magistrate who entered upon the trial. 16. From what has been already stated it is fairly clear that all proceedings up to May 14, 1947, were really founded on the petition of complaint and that the Police Magistrate proceeded under Chap. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, the Police Magistrate made a fatal mistake in not complying with the provisions for examination of the complainant u/s 200 of the Code. Further, the forms of his orders directing first the "D.D.I. concerned" and then the "D.C., D.D.", to take cognizance of the case and report betray an utter confusion of ideas in his mind as to the purport and scope of the two Sections 156(5) and 202 of that Code. It may, however, be said in favour of the Police Magistrate that the prayer in the petition of complaint 'asking the court to direct an investigation may well have contributed to the confusion by including the belief that an order of investigation u/s 156(3) was prayed for. It may, however, be said in favour of the Police Magistrate that the prayer in the petition of complaint 'asking the court to direct an investigation may well have contributed to the confusion by including the belief that an order of investigation u/s 156(3) was prayed for. It is further clear that since the dismissal of the petition of complaint, the proceedings could not be continued on the basis of any petition of complaint, for there was none alive and pending and the trial proceeded on the basis of the charge-sheet. 17. Learned advocate for the Government urges that the Police Magistrate was proceeding both under Chap. XVI of the Code and u/s 156(5), as he was entitled to do under the law, and relies on certain judicial decisions which may now be considered. He first refers us to the case of King-Emperor v. Bhola Bhagat ILR (1923) Pat. 379. There, a Magistrate, to whom a complaint had been made against four persons, made an order directing-- The police to take cognizance u/s 379, Penal Code, make a quick enquiry and report by February 8, 1922. 18. The police, after making a local enquiry, arrested the accused on February 5, 1922, who were, however, rescued by a mob. Eventually, they were sent up, tried and convicted. That conviction, however, had been set aside and the matter was remanded for re-trial. In the meantime the police made enquiries against persons who had been engaged in the rescue of the accused who had been arrested on February 5, 1922, and sent up twenty persons including the accused persons in the previous case for trial. Some of these persons were convicted and sentenced. Their conviction was set aside on appeal by the Sessions Judge. The Government preferred an appeal against this acquittal. It was held in this case that the order passed by the Magistrate directing enquiry was not made u/s 202 but was an order directing the police to exercise the ordinary powers conferred on them by law and that even if the order had been made u/s 202, the police had the power to arrest the accused and send up a charge-sheet. There are general observations in the judgment of this case which tend to suggest that there is nothing in law to prevent the proceedings before the Magistrate on a complaint and independent action by way of investigation and submission of charge-sheet by the police co-existing. 19. It should, however, be borne in mind that the complaint before the Magistrate in that case was against four named persons and the Magistrate directed an enquiry, that, in course of that enquiry, those four persons were arrested but were rescued by a mob. The police, thereupon, arrested some of the mob, including those four persons, and sent them up for trial on a charge-sheet. There were, therefore, two separate proceedings one, in which there was a complaint against four persons of certain definite offences and another, in which there was no complaint, but several persons including those persons had been sent up for trial on a charge-sheet for quite different offences. The observations of the learned Judge in that case should be read in the light of this basic fact and, so read, do not appear to us to be of any assistance to the prosecution. The question before us is whether proceedings before a Magistrate on a complaint on a particular charge may run parallel with proceedings initiated on a charge-sheet submitted by the police after investigation into the same offence. 20. In Gopal Naick v. Alagirisami Naick ILR (1930) Mad. 598, also relied on "by the learned advocate for the Government, a single Judge of the Madras High Court held that the police on receiving information in a complaint forwarded by the Magistrate for enquiry u/s 202 could investigate u/s 156 of the Code and submit a charge-sheet. The learned Judge followed Bhola Bhagat's case (supra) but it does not appear to have been brought to his notice that in the Patna case there were two separate proceedings for two separate offences. Further, there is nothing in the Madras case to show that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the complaint u/s 200 of the Code and, therefore, the direction for enquiry may well have been made by him u/s 156(5). 21. The last case cited by the learned advocate for the Government is the case Rashid Ahmad v. Crown ILR (1933) Lah. 194. It is interesting to note that Mr. 21. The last case cited by the learned advocate for the Government is the case Rashid Ahmad v. Crown ILR (1933) Lah. 194. It is interesting to note that Mr. Carden Noad, who now appears before us in support of the present rule, succeeded, as Government Advocate of Lahore, in inducing the Bench of the Lahore High Court to negative the very contention that he is now urging before us, namely, that if a Magistrate is seized of a case and sends for a report u/s 202, the powers of the police u/s 156 are ousted. It was held in that case that the Magistrate had the power to obtain assistance from the police in having investigations made either u/s 156(3) or u/s 202 and that the powers given to the police by Section 156 were not affected, when an order to investigate was made by the Magistrate u/s 202 and that, though it was not open to the Magistrate, when a complaint was made to him, to direct the police to make a charge in the same case, it was open to the police to do so, if they thought proper. This case does support the learned advocate for the Government as to the legality of the coexistence of complaint and a chalan in the same case, but we are unable to accept the correctness of that decision and, at any rate, prefer to follow the Bench rulings of this Court. It should be further noted that in the Lahore case, on receipt of the complaint, the police treated it as the First Information Report u/s 154 of the Code and entered it in the register kept under that section. In the case before us there is no evidence that the complaint was registered as the First Information Report, so as to entitle the police to take up the investigation under Chap. XIV of the Code and submit a charge-sheet u/s 173 of the chapter. This fact, in our opinion, also makes the Lahore decision inapplicable to the facts of the case now before us. 22. In Isaf Nasya v. Emperor ILR (1926) Cal. 303, the District Magistrate of Rangpur had taken cognizance of a complaint u/s 190(1)(a), examined the complainant u/s 200 and then ordered a police enquiry u/s 202. This fact, in our opinion, also makes the Lahore decision inapplicable to the facts of the case now before us. 22. In Isaf Nasya v. Emperor ILR (1926) Cal. 303, the District Magistrate of Rangpur had taken cognizance of a complaint u/s 190(1)(a), examined the complainant u/s 200 and then ordered a police enquiry u/s 202. It was held that, in such a case, he was bound to dispose of the complaint himself Tinder Section 203 or 204 and his direction to the police, if they found the complaint established, to submit a charge-sheet to the proper Magistrate was without jurisdiction and that Section 156(3) of the Code did not apply to such a case. It was further held that where the police, in accordance with such a direction, investigated the case and sent up a charge-sheet to the Sub-divisional Officer of Nilphamari, within whose local jurisdiction the offences had been committed,. and that Magistrate proceeded with the case without an order of the District Magistrate u/s 204 or an order of transfer of the case u/s 192, he acted without jurisdiction. 23. The Bombay case of Emperor v. Haji Nur Mahomed ILR (1928) Bom. 339, followed the last mentioned Calcutta case. 24. The recent Full Bench decision of the Sind Court in Emperor v. Bikha Mofi AIR (1938) (Sind.) 113 : 39 Cri. L.J. 681, also, in agreement with the decision of this Court in Isaf Nasya's case (supra), lays down the same principle. 25. In Robiul Hmsain Molla v. K.K. Ram (1947) 82 C.L.J. 222, a complaint having been made to the Magistrate, the latter examined the complaint on oath and passed the following order: To O/C, Matiaburuz P.S., for enquiry and if necessary to start a ease treating the petition as F.I.R. 26. It was held that there was some slight confusion in the order and it was pointed out that the Magistrate could do one of the two things, namely, either (i) treat the petition not as a complaint but send it to the police to treat it as First Information Report and act under Chap. XIV, or (ii) examine the complainant and then direct an enquiry u/s 202 by the officer-in-charge of the police-station. XIV, or (ii) examine the complainant and then direct an enquiry u/s 202 by the officer-in-charge of the police-station. In the first case the matter would come back to the Magistrate either as a final report that there was nothing in the information or else as a charge if a case had been thought to have been made out. In the second case, the report would have come before the Magistrate as a report u/s 202 and the Magistrate would have dealt with it u/s 203, i.e., either dismiss the complaint if the report recommended no action or issue process if the report recommended that a case had been made out. In the result the learned Judges amended the order to run as follows: To O/C, Matiaburuz, for enquiry and report. 27. It appears to us that the same sort of confusion has occurred in the case before us, but the mischief in the present case has been greater, because the trial has been proceeded with and terminated in conviction. It is desirable that Magistrates taking cognizance of offences on complaint should keep in mind the difference between an order u/s 202 and one u/s 156(5) and take one of the two courses indicated in the last mentioned decision and not make a composite order as was made in that case and as has been made in the case before us and which only results in creating confusion. In our judgment, when a complaint is filed before a Magistrate, he should either take cognizance of it u/s 200 and proceed under Chap. XVI or send the complaint to the officer-in-charge of the police station directing him to treat it as the First Information Report u/s 154 and to proceed under Chap. XIV. He should not make a hybrid composite order such as has been done in this case. In the view we have taken, the Police Magistrate, having proceeded under Chap. XVI had no jurisdiction to direct the police to investigate Under Chap. XIV and the trial Magistrate acted wholly without jurisdiction in proceeding on the charge-sheet and the whole proceedings in this case have been illegal from beginning to end. 28. In the view we have taken, the Police Magistrate, having proceeded under Chap. XVI had no jurisdiction to direct the police to investigate Under Chap. XIV and the trial Magistrate acted wholly without jurisdiction in proceeding on the charge-sheet and the whole proceedings in this case have been illegal from beginning to end. 28. Apart from the illegality and want of jurisdiction pointed out above, it seems to us that the prosecution in this case is definitely on the horns of a dilemma, for the conviction in this case cannot be supported either as one on the basis of a complaint or as one under the charge-sheet. Treating the proceedings as one based on the complaint the conviction cannot be sustained for the following, amongst other reasons: (i) The Police Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the offence, failed to observe the peremptory requirements of examining the complainant u/s 200 of the Code. (ii) The complaint having been dismissed by the Police Magistrate u/s 203 of that Code and no fresh complaint having been filed nor an application having been made for reviving the old complaint nor the order of dismissal u/s 203 having been set aside by a superior tribunal, there was no complaint alive and, pending on which proceedings could be continued, and the accused convicted and sentenced. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Mir Ahwad Hossein v. Mahomed Askari ILR (1902) Cal. 726, has no application to the facts of this case, because in that case an application was made to the Magistrate praying that the case against the accused might be revived and the Magistrate then issued summons which indicates that the complaint had been revived. In the case before us no application was made for revival of the case and no summons was ever issued. 29. Nor can the proceedings resulting in the conviction be upheld as being based on the charge-sheet for the following, amongst other, reasons: (i) The complaint was not forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the police-station, within whose jurisdiction the offence took place, so as to entitle him to proceed u/s 156 and the following sections in Chap. XIV. (ii) The complaint was not treated as the First Information Report and entered in the Register kept u/s 154. XIV. (ii) The complaint was not treated as the First Information Report and entered in the Register kept u/s 154. (iii) The charge-sheet, which purported to be one submitted u/s 173, was not submitted by the officer-in-charge of the police-station within whose jurisdiction the alleged offence had been committed, but by some Inspector of Police, Lal Bazar. 30. For reasons stated above, the proceedings resulting in the conviction and sentence cannot possibly be sustained. This conclusion relieves us from considering the other questions of law as to the necessity for corroboration and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish what cannot but be regarded as a fantastic story of a man procuring another person to impersonate him for the purpose of cheating the complainant, but nevertheless being present on every occasion so as to expose himself to detection and make it easy for the complainant to implicate him in an offence of conspiracy. In our judgment, this Rule should be made absolute and the conviction and sentence imposed on the Petitioner should be set aside and we order accordingly. 31. Learned advocate for the Government submitted that the case should be remanded for re-trial. It will be remembered that the proceedings started on the filing of the complaint as far back as July 3, 1946, and it dragged on for years and we do not think the Petitioner should be exposed to further harassment and risk. We, therefore, acquit him of the charge and direct him to be set at liberty; if he is in custody and if he is out on bail we discharge the bail bond. Harries C.J. 32. I agree.