Judgement Appeal (No. 28 of 1945) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (September 17, 1943) which varied a judgment and decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore (October 31, 1940). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The first question for determination in this appeal was whether under a contract of indemnity, dated August 25, 1910, the appellants were liable to indemnify the first respondent for loss sustained by him in connexion with a certain purchase. In the event of the appellants being held not liable the first respondent desired to contend that the second respondent was liable to make good to him the whole or part of his loss. One Inuganti Venkata Rama Rao, the son of the second respondent (who will be referred to hereafter as " the son "), obtained from his maternal grandfather, by way of gift, a one-fourth share in the Mokhasa village of Somavaram. During his minority, the second respondent (who will be referred to generally as " the vendor”), as his guardian, agreed to sell the said property to the father of the first respondent for Rs. 27,302. The purchaser was unwilling to purchase the property from the vendor as guardian of a minor without an indemnity. Accordingly, the Maharaja of Venkatagiri, the grandfather of the appellants, who was a close relation of the son, undertook to indemnify the purchaser from all loss he might suffer if the son, after attaining majority, should dispute the alienation. Such indemnity was contained in a written bond, dated August 25, 1910. The question raised in the appeal depended in the main on the construction of the bond. The precise terms of the bond are set out in the judgment of the Board. The term “the purchaser "as used hereafter will include the father of the first respondent and his successors in interest at the relevant dates, and the term "the surety " will include the Maharaja of Venkatagiri and his successors at the relevant dates. On October 14, 1910, the vendor executed a sale deed conveying the one-fourth share in the village of Somavaram to the purchaser who paid the purchase money of Rs. 27,302. On October 14, 1910, the vendor executed a sale deed conveying the one-fourth share in the village of Somavaram to the purchaser who paid the purchase money of Rs. 27,302. One square yard of vacant land in the village of Vundur, which was within the sub-registration District of Samalkot, was included in the sale deed with a view to having the document registered at Samalkot, which was near the place of residence of the vendor, instead of at Tiruvur where the Somavaram property was situated. The document was registered at Samalkot on February 14, 1911. In 1922, which was some years after the death of the Maharaja of Venkatagiri and more than three years after the son had attained his majority, the son instituted a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada against the purchaser (defendants 1 and 2). He sought to recover possession of the one-fourth share in the Mokhasa village of Somavaram, together with mesne profits, on the ground that the said alienation by the vendor was not binding on him for want of legal necessity. He also pleaded that the sale deed was void and inoperative as the registration of the document at Samalkot was a fraud on the law relating to registration of documents because the plot of one square yard of Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 121 ( 1948- 1949) Raja Velugoti Sarvagna v. Raja Sobhanadri Apparao 60 land which was included in the sale deed was not intended to be conveyed, but was included solely with the object of giving jurisdiction to the sub-registrar of Samalkot to register the document at Samalkot. The vendor was also impleaded in the suit as the fourth defendant and the surety was impleaded as the third defendant. The suit was tried by the Subordinate Judge of Bezwada who, on September 20, 1924, held that the sale was not for legal necessity and was not binding on the son, but as he had failed to institute the suit within three years from the date of his attaining majority he was not entitled to succeed on that ground. The learned judge, however, decreed the suit on the alternative ground that the sale deed was void and inoperative as it was not registered according to law and the purchaser acquired no title to the property. The learned judge, however, decreed the suit on the alternative ground that the sale deed was void and inoperative as it was not registered according to law and the purchaser acquired no title to the property. The purchaser appealed to the High Court at Madras against the said decision of the Subordinate Judge. On August 20, 1930, the High Court reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and held that the registration of the sale deed was valid, and accordingly dismissed the suit. The son appealed to His Majesty in Council, and on January 13, 1936, the Board reversed the decision of the High Court, and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge, with a slight modification as to the amount of mesne profits. It was noted in the judgment of the Board that it was common ground between the parties that if the conveyance of October 14, 1910, was effective the suit must fail; for if it were necessary for the son to ask that the conveyance should be set aside as not binding on him, his suit was out of time; but if it could be regarded as a nullity there would be no case of limitation. The Board held that there was no intention either to sell or buy the yard of land in Samalkot district, and its inclusion in the sale was a mere device to evade the Registration Act (( 1936) L. R. 63 I. A. 169.). Consequently there was no effective registration of the conveyance, which was no obstacle to the sons suit for possession. In pursuance of the order of the Board, the son, in December, 1937, recovered possession of the properties sold from the purchaser together with mesne profits and costs. On February 14, 1938, satisfaction of the decree was entered. On January 30, 1939, the purchaser (the present first respondent) instituted the present suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Nellore, to enforce the indemnity bond, and to recover a sum of Rs. 53,737-5-10 from the surety (the present appellants) as the representatives of the Maharaja of Venkatagiri. He impleaded the present appellants as defendants 1—3 and the vendor (present respondent No. 2) as defendant 4. In the alternative, he claimed to recover the said sum from the vendor personally and from his family properties. His claim was made up of the following items Rs. He impleaded the present appellants as defendants 1—3 and the vendor (present respondent No. 2) as defendant 4. In the alternative, he claimed to recover the said sum from the vendor personally and from his family properties. His claim was made up of the following items Rs. 27,302, the purchase money, with Rs. 1,774-10-1 interest thereon, Rs. 11,400, mesne profits paid by him, Rs. 6,884, the costs paid by him in the previous litigation, and Rs. 6,376 the costs incurred by him in that litigation and certain sums as interest on those items. On October 31, 1941, the Subordinate Judge delivered judgment. He held that the indemnity bond was true and valid, that the defendants 1 to 3 (the surety) wee not liable to refund the sale consideration of Rs. 27,302 as the conditions of the bond as to delivery of possession had not been fulfilled, but were liable to pay to the plaintiff the mesne profits and costs paid by him to the son, that the suit was not barred by limitation, and that the fourth defendant (the vendor) was liable to pay back the sale money which had been paid to him by the plaintiffs father. In the result, he gave a decree for a sum of Rs. 24,660-11-9 against defendants 1 to 3 (appellants) and for Rs. 29,076-10-1 against the fourth defendant (second respondent). A decree dated October 31, 1940, was accordingly passed. Against that decree of the Subordinate Judge defendants 1 to 3 appealed to the High Court at Madras by appeal 260 of 1941, disputing their liability for the amount decreed against them. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of cross-objections to the decree in respect of the claim disallowed as against defendants 1 to 3. The fourth defendant filed appeal No. 267 of 1941 disputing his liability for the amount decreed against him. The appeals and the memorandum of cross-objections were heard Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 121 ( 1948- 1949) Raja Velugoti Sarvagna v. Raja Sobhanadri Apparao 61 together by the High Court (Krishnaswami Ayyangar and Horwill JJ.), and on September 17, 1943, Horwill J. delivered the judgment of the court in all the matters. The appeals and the memorandum of cross-objections were heard Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 121 ( 1948- 1949) Raja Velugoti Sarvagna v. Raja Sobhanadri Apparao 61 together by the High Court (Krishnaswami Ayyangar and Horwill JJ.), and on September 17, 1943, Horwill J. delivered the judgment of the court in all the matters. The learned judges held, disagreeing with the Subordinate Judge, that defendants 1 to 3 were liable for the sale money as well as for the sum for which the Subordinate Judge had held them liable, and passed a decree against them for the full amount claimed. They held that the plaintiff had fulfilled the terms of the indemnity bond, and accordingly they dismissed the appeal of the defendants 1 to 3 (appellants) and allowed the cross-objections of the plaintiff (the first respondent). In the appeal preferred by the fourth defendant (second respondent) they held that the fourth defendant was the guardian of the son at the time the properties were sold, that the money was received by him and that, as he did not prove that it was applied for the benefit of the son, he was liable to refund the amount to the plaintiff under s. 65 of the Indian Contract Act ; and that there was no proof that the plaintiffs father committed any fraud on the registration law as all the parties acted in good faith and in the honest belief, as the law then stood, that there was no harm in including one square yard of site with a view to facilitating the registration of the document at Samalkot. They held further that the claim against the fourth defendant (the second respondent) was not barred by limitation, but as such claim was only in the alternative, and as the claim for the full amount was allowed against the appellants, the High Court allowed the appeal of the fourth defendant and dismissed the suit as against him. One decree in appeals 260 and 267 of 1941 was passed on September 17, 1943, by which by cl. 1 the present appellants were ordered to pay to the present first respondent the sum of Rs. 53,737-5-10 with interest, and by cl. 3 to pay to him certain costs; and by cl. 2 the suit was dismissed as against the present respondent No. 2, who by cl. 1 the present appellants were ordered to pay to the present first respondent the sum of Rs. 53,737-5-10 with interest, and by cl. 3 to pay to him certain costs; and by cl. 2 the suit was dismissed as against the present respondent No. 2, who by cl. 4 was ordered to pay the costs of present respondent No. 1. 1949. Jan. 18, 19 ; Feb. 8. Khambatla K.C. arid Chinna Durai for the appellants. There are not, as the trial judge held there were, two separate indemnities given under the bond—one in respect of the refund of the purchase price and the other in respect of the mesne profits. The bond has to be read as one, and the condition of giving possession to the surety has not been fulfilled. If that is right that is an end of the matter and the father, the second respondent, remains liable to refund. A validly registered sale was a condition precedent to the incurring of any obligation under the bond, and therefore, the sale deed not in fact having been validly registered, the purchaser, the first respondent, has no claim against the appellants under the bond. What the indemnity bond contemplated was that if the minor, after attaining majority, said that he would not execute a ratification agreement, and, more than that, that he was challenging the alienation, then the purchaser was to call on the surety to fulfil his obligation and refund the purchase price provided he handed over the property to the surety. The proper meaning of the bond was (a) the dispute of the alienation by the minor relates only to his rights qua minor to challenge the alienation Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, 10th ed., paras. 528, 529; (b) the dispute must be brought soon after the minor attains majority, and " soon after" must mean at least within the period of limitation; (c) the effect of the engagement is that as soon as the minor raises the dispute the purchaser is to deliver possession of the property to the surety and without having anything to do with the minor or guardian, and without raising any objection. Rewcastle K.C. and Subba Row for the first respondent. Both courts in India have held the appellants to be liable under the indemnity bond, but have differed as to the extent of the liability. Rewcastle K.C. and Subba Row for the first respondent. Both courts in India have held the appellants to be liable under the indemnity bond, but have differed as to the extent of the liability. The reason for the giving of the bond was simply that the purchaser was unwilling to take the risk of buying the property of a minor who might later defeat the sale. It was said for the appellants that the bond only relates to indemnity against such risks as the infant challenging the sale on the ground that it had not been for legal necessity, or for his advantage, and so on. But there is nothing in the language of the bond which limits the dispute to the sale on certain specified grounds. It may be for any reason ; the language is as wide as it can possibly be. With regard to the registration point, there was initially a valid sale deed, though it was rendered invalid because of an error as to registration. The sale deed may not be evidence, but the sale can be proved aliunde, e.g., by payment of the money. The bond Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 121 ( 1948- 1949) Raja Velugoti Sarvagna v. Raja Sobhanadri Apparao 62 should be read as a business document, and the first respondent given the protection of the guarantee. The contingency contemplated by the parties arose when the first respondent suffered loss as a result of the minors action in disputing the sale made by his guardian, and the appellants as representing the indemnifier are bound to make good the loss so suffered, and, as the High Court rightly found, to the full amount of that loss. The first respondent has fulfilled the obligations imposed on him by the bond. Alternatively, he is entitled to recover the amount claimed by him from the second respondent, the minors father. Khambatta K.C. replied. March 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above and continued The rights of the first respondent as purchaser against the appellants as sureties depend in the first place on the construction of the indemnity bond of August 25, 1910. Khambatta K.C. replied. March 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above and continued The rights of the first respondent as purchaser against the appellants as sureties depend in the first place on the construction of the indemnity bond of August 25, 1910. The bond was expressed to be made by the Maharaja of Venkatagiri in favour of the father of the first respondent and was in the following terms— " As regards lands house-sites and tiled houses pertaining " to the one-fourth share in Somavaram Mokhasa village, " which were made to pass under a settlement deed, to " minor Inuganti Venkatarama Row Garu, daughters son " of Rajah Chelikani Venkatagopala Row Garu, one of 44 the sharers of Somavaram Sarwa Mokhasa (village), " attached to Tiruvur Sub-Registration District, Kistna " District, the price settled for your purchasing the same, " as mentioned in the said settlement deed, from the minors " natural father and guardian Inuganti Sooryaprakasa 14 Row Garu, for the benefit of the minor, is Rs. 27,302-0-0, in words, twenty-seven thousand three hundred and two "rupees. You may pay the said amount to the said “guardian, Inuganti Sooryaprakasa Row Garu, for the said 44 minor and get a sale deed executed. " We (I) hereby agree that, if, soon after the minor ceases to be a minor and becomes a major, a ratification " Khararnama (agreement) is not caused to be executed and delivered to you and if, for any reason, without 14 consenting to the said sale, the minor Inuganti Venkatarama Row Garu raises disputes, and. loss is sustained " by you thereby and if you deliver possession to us (me) " of the quarter share in the said Somavaram village, 41 and the tiled houses, house-sites and all which shall have " been sold to you, we ourselves (I myself) shall, as soon " as the same are passed to us (me) without having anything "to do with the minor or his natural father and guardian, " Inuganti Sooryaprakasa Row Garu, and without raising " any objection, refund the sum of Rs. 27,302-0-0, in " words, twenty-seven thousand three hundred and two " rupees, which you shall have given towards the sale " consideration, and that, if, as regards the past profits for " the said share, the minor should file a suit against you " and obtain a decree, we ourselves (I myself) shall, after " you transfer to us (me) all the accounts that you may " obtain in connexion with the said past profits for taking " steps against the said minor, in respect of the losses that " may be sustained by you thereby, pay the decree amount " relating to the said past profits. This is the indemnity bond caused to be written by Ammanamanchi Venkata” Narasimhayya, in Venkatagiri, and delivered with our (my) “consent." The risks incurred by anyone purchasing the property of a Hindu minor from his guardian are well known to those conversant with Hindu law. The minor son at any time within three years after attaining his majority may repudiate the sale on the ground that it was not for necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and if he does so the burden of proving that the sale was justified, or that the purchaser made all proper inquiries, lies on the purchaser, who may find such burden difficult to discharge. The first contention of the appellants is that the indemnity bond was directed to this risk, and not to the risk of loss occasioned by failure to register the sale deed ; a loss arising, not from any Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 121 ( 1948- 1949) Raja Velugoti Sarvagna v. Raja Sobhanadri Apparao 63 action of the minor, but from the negligence of the purchaser himself. Their Lordships think that this argument must prevail and that the whole tenor of the bond shows that it was directed solely to indemnifying the purchaser against the risk involved in buying from the guardian of a minor and was not intended to be a general guarantee of title. Their Lordships think that this argument must prevail and that the whole tenor of the bond shows that it was directed solely to indemnifying the purchaser against the risk involved in buying from the guardian of a minor and was not intended to be a general guarantee of title. The bond recites that the proposed sale is from the minors father and guardian at the price specified and states " You may pay the said amount " to the said guardian for the said minor and get a sale deed " executed." This stipulation appears to their Lordships to be the foundation of the obligation undertaken by the surety, and they think that the words " get a sale deed " executed " postulate an effective sale deed conferring a title which could be transferred to the surety, and not one of no force through lack of registration. Again, the obligation of the bond is conditional, amongst other things, on the minor son, soon after becoming a major, not causing a ratification agreement to be executed and delivered to the surety. This points to the transaction, the subject of indemnity, being one capable of ratification by the minor. The minor on attaining majority could ratify a sale deed made by his guardian on his behalf, but he could not ratify a sale deed inoperative through lack of registration. He might, no doubt, if so minded, execute a fresh sale deed but that would not be ratification. There is nothing in the bond to suggest that it covers loss arising through failure of the purchaser to register the sale deed according to law. As, in their Lordships opinion, the loss suffered by the first respondent is not covered by the indemnity bond, it is not necessary to determine the validity of further defences raised by the appellants, namely, that their liability under the bond was discharged by alteration in the property to be included in the sale by the addition of the yard of land in Samalkot District, and also by the failure of the purchaser to effect proper registration of the sale deed, an argument which the appellants supported by reference to the case of Wulff v. Jay (( 1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 756.). Nor need their Lordships consider the further argument that there was failure to comply with the conditions of the bond relating to handing over possession of the property sold to the surety which discharged him from liability to repay the purchase money as held by the Subordinate Judge. In the opinion of their Lordships, therefore, the appeal of the appellants must succeed, and the question then arises whether respondent No. 1 can claim to recover from respondent No. 2 or his representative the whole or any part of the loss sustained by him. In their Lordships view no question between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 is before the Board in this appeal. As already noted, there were two appeals to the High Court, No. 260 by the appellants and No. 267 by the second respondent. The High Court passed only one decree in both appeals, and had there been two separate decrees it is clear that respondent No. 1 would have had to appeal against the decree in appeal No. 267, in which he alone was directly concerned. But the composite decree passed by the High Court is easily divisible. It is apparent from the terms of the decree that cll. 1 and 3 were passed in appeal No. 260 and ell. 2 and 4 in appeal No. 267. The rights of the parties cannot be affected by the act of the High Court in including in a single decree decrees passed in two separate appeals. In their petition dated March 6, 1944, to the High Court for leave to appeal to the Privy Council the appellants sought leave to appeal only against the decree in appeal No. 260, and the order of the court granting leave was confined to that appeal. Nor have the appellants raised any claim against respondent No. 2. In these circumstances respondent No. 1 ought to have presented a petition, to His Majesty praying for leave to appeal against that part of the decree of the High Court passed in appeal No. 267 which dismissed the suit of respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2. That course is not now open to respondent No. 1 for two reasons. In these circumstances respondent No. 1 ought to have presented a petition, to His Majesty praying for leave to appeal against that part of the decree of the High Court passed in appeal No. 267 which dismissed the suit of respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2. That course is not now open to respondent No. 1 for two reasons. In the first place, respondent No. 2 has died, so their Lordships are informed, since the hearing of the appeal commenced; and in the second place, the jurisdiction of the Board to hear an appeal by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2 or his representative at the present time would seem to be taken away by the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947. These matters, however, do not affect the questions arising between the appellants and respondent No. 1, and this judgment is confined to those questions. Respondent No. 1 will be free to take such action as he may be advised against so Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 121 ( 1948- 1949) Raja Velugoti Sarvagna v. Raja Sobhanadri Apparao 64 much of the said decree of the High Court, dated September 17, 1943, as was granted in appeal No. 267. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be allowed, that cll. 1 and 3 of the decree of the High Court dated September 17, 1943, be set aside, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Nellore, dated October 31, 1940, so far as it holds the present appellants liable for a sum of Rs. 24,660-11-9 and interest be also set aside, and that the suit of the first respondent against the appellants be dismissed. The first respondent must pay the costs of the appellants throughout.