Benoy Shankar Dhandania v. Choteylal Dhandania — 1949 DIGILAW 154 (CAL)

Judgement SINHA, J. :- This is an appeal from a judgment of Das, J., dated 12-8-1948 dismissing the plffs suit for a declaration that the decree and order made in suit No. 1676 of 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the said suit) are invalid and void, for setting aside the said decree and order and for other reliefs. 2. The relationship of the parties will appear from the following genealogical table : 3. The said suit was instituted by Hiralal Dhandhania and his three infant sons against Choteylal and his infant son Tulsidas and one Bhagwatiprasad. It was alleged in the plaint that plffs. formed a Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, and the deft. Choteylal and his son Tulsidas formed a joint Hindu family, the deft. Bhagwatiprasad having separated from Choteylal. The plffs. asked for a declaration of their half share in the immoveable properties mentioned in the schedule to the plaint and for partition and separate possession. Bhagwatiprasad in his written statement stated that he, along with his two infant sons, was entitled to a one-third of halt share or one-sixth share in the properties and claimed separate allotment and possession in respect of his said one-sixth share. 4. During the pendency of the suit, on 14-10-1943 the plff. 3 Bimal Sankar, the third son of Bhagwati Prasad was born. 5. The said suit was ultimately settled on 9-8-1944, when terms of settlement were filed before Ameer Ali, J. 6. The terms of settlement were as follows : "1. Beony Shankar Dhandhania, Bejoy Shankar Dhandhania and Bimal Shankar Dhandhania, sons of the deft. Bhagwati Prasad Dhandhania are added as parties to this suit and the deft. Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania be appointed guardian ad litem of the said minors Benoy Shankar Dhandhania, Bejoy Shankar Dhandhania and Bimal Shankar Dhandhania. (2) The four properties in the suit namely, (1) 55 Muktaram Babu Street, Calcutta, (2) Garden house and land at 25 Ghosepara 2nd Lane in the district of 24 Parganas, (3) Two storied house in the Mohalla Sujaganj in the town of Bhagalpur district Bhagalpur and (4) one storied house known as Silk Factory at No. 40, Chunahartolla Lane in Bhagalpur district Bhagalpur let out on rent have been valued at Rs. 1,65,000 (Rupees one lac sixty five thousand). (3) The said four properties are allotted to the deft. 1,65,000 (Rupees one lac sixty five thousand). (3) The said four properties are allotted to the deft. Choteylal Dhandhania and Tulsiprasad Dhandhania and as owelty they have paid to the plff. Hiralal Dhandhania for self and as karta and the next friend of the minor plffs. Purshottandas Dhandhania Ratanlal Dhandhania and Banwarilal Dhandhania the sum of Rs. 82,500/-. (4) The defts. Choteylal Dhandahnia and Tulsiprasad Dhandhania have paid Rs. 27,500/- to the deft. Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania. (5) The plffs. Hiralal Dhandhania, Purshottamdas Dhandhania, Ratanlal Dhandhania and Bankarilal Dhandhania and the defts. Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania (the said Hiralal Dhandhania and Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania are also acting for as next friends and guardians of their respective minor sons) will have no claim whatsoever to the said four properties mentioned in Cl. 1 hereof and the said plff. Hiralal Dhandhania and the deft. Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania have not in any way encumbered their share in the said properties in question. (6) The possession on the properties will be delivered to Choteylal Dhandhania by the said Hiralal Dhandhania, Purshottamdas Dhandhania, Ratanlal Dhandhania and Banwarilal Dhandhania and Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania, Benoy Shankar Dhandhania, Bejoy Shankar Dhandhania and Bimal Shankar Dhandhania provided that the pltfs. Hiralal Dhandhania and his sons and members of his family as also Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania and his sons and members of the family may occupy the portions of the premises No. 55 Muktaram Babu Street, Calcutta, now in their occupation as licensees of the said defts. Choteylal Dhandhania and Tulsiprasad Dhandhania upto Kartik Sudi 2001 sambat year. Each party will bear and pay their own costs." 7. On 9-8-1944, Ameer Ali, J., made an order the minutes of which are as follows : "The suit treated on the list and this suit and the pending application are disposed of on the following terms : 1. Benoy Shankar, Bijoy Shankar and Bimal Shankar sons of Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania added as party defts. in this suit. 2. Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania the deft. in this suit appointed guardian-ad-litem of Benoy Shankar, Bejoy Shankar and Bimal Shankar the said Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania not having any interest directly or indirectly in conflict with that of Benoy Shankar, Bejoy Shankar and Bimal Shankar. No formal order need be drawn and the said defts. waive service of the writ of summons. (3) Order in terms of settlement filed. in this suit appointed guardian-ad-litem of Benoy Shankar, Bejoy Shankar and Bimal Shankar the said Bhagwatiprasad Dhandhania not having any interest directly or indirectly in conflict with that of Benoy Shankar, Bejoy Shankar and Bimal Shankar. No formal order need be drawn and the said defts. waive service of the writ of summons. (3) Order in terms of settlement filed. (4) Liberty to Hiralal Dhandhania and Bhagwati Prasad Dhandhania to compromise the suit on behalf of their minor sons the minor plffs. and minor defts. herein. (5) Certified for the benefit of the minor plffs. and defts. (6) Each party to pay its own costs throughout irrespective of any order to the contrary." 8. Shortly after the terms were put in, Choteylal transferred the properties to his cousin Babulal. 9. On 5-1-1944 a notice of motion was taken out on behalf of the applts. for setting aside the said decree made by Ameer Ali, J. The application was heard by Das, J., who held that the applicants had adopted a wrong procedure and that the application was not maintainable. He also held that no grounds had been made out for setting aside the said decree and dismissed the application alike on grounds of procedure and on merits. 10. Against this order an appeal was preferred. On 26-4-1945, the appeal was dismissed. The appeal Court did not go into the merits as it held that the proceedings before Das, J., did not lie. 11. On 30-5-1945 the suit, out of which this appeal arises, was filed by the applts. against (a) Choteylal and his sons Tulsiprasad (b) Hiralal and his infant sons (c) Bhagwatiprasad and (d) Babulal Dhandhania, claiming inter alia a declaration that the decree and order made by Ameer Ali, J., on 9-8-1944 were invalid and void, for setting aside the said decree and order and rehearing of the said suit and for a declaration that the conveyance in favour of Babulal was void and inoperative and for other incidental reliefs. 12. The suit came up for hearing before Das, J., on 12-8-1948. No oral evidence was adduced before him. The pleadings in the said suit, the terms of settlement, and the minutes of the order and the decree made by Ameer Ali, J., on 9-8-1944 were put in. 12. The suit came up for hearing before Das, J., on 12-8-1948. No oral evidence was adduced before him. The pleadings in the said suit, the terms of settlement, and the minutes of the order and the decree made by Ameer Ali, J., on 9-8-1944 were put in. The learned Judge did not go into the matter in detail having regard to the fact that he had considered the points raised before him, in his judgment on the application for setting aside the decree dated 9-8-1944 to which I have already made reference. He adhered to the views which he had expressed in that judgment and dismissed the suit with costs. 13. On the hearing of the appeal before us the following contentions were raised by the appellants counsel. (a) No leave under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent having been obtained when the appellants were added as defts. in suit No. 1676 of 1941, the decree made by Ameer Ali, J., on 9-8-1944 was without jurisdiction and void. (b) No leave to compromise the suit on behalf of the minors was applied for or obtained by Bhagawati Prasad before the compromise was effected. The compromise had been effected by the parties before the suit was mentioned to the Court on 9-8-1944. When the compromise was effected no leave had been obtained as it could not have been obtained, because the minors had not till then been made parties to the suit. Rs. 27,500/- payable under the terms of settlement had been paid by a cheque before the suit was mentioned before Ameer Ali, J. The terms of settlement were filed before the order was made. (c) No formal application was made to the learned Judge for amendment of the plaint and for adding the appellants as defts. in the said suit and for the appointment of Bhagwatiprasad as the guardian-ad-litem of his minor sons. No notice was given to the minors under O. 32, R. 3(4) and the order for appointment of Bhagwatiprasad as guardian-ad-litem was made without any such notice. No affidavit of fitness and absence of conflicting interest was filed as is required to be done under O. 32, R. 3 (3). The appointment of Bhagwatiprasad as guardian-ad-litem was improper as his interest was adverse to that of the minors. No affidavit of fitness and absence of conflicting interest was filed as is required to be done under O. 32, R. 3 (3). The appointment of Bhagwatiprasad as guardian-ad-litem was improper as his interest was adverse to that of the minors. By the terms of settlement no property was allotted to the minors, nor was any money in lieu of their share in the properties given to them. All the properties were allotted to Choteylal and Tulsi Prasad, who were to pay to Hiralal as owelty Rs. 82,500/- for himself and as karta and next friend of his infant sons and Rs. 27,500/- was paid to Bhagwati Prasad. In the result, the minors did not obtain any share in the properties or any money in lieu of their share. 14. I will deal with the points raised in the order in which they have been mentioned. (a) Das, J., in his judgment dated 5-2-1945, held that no leave under Cl. 12 was necessary as Bhagwati was the father and karta of his branch of the family, though he was not so described in the plaint in suit No. 1676 of 1941. Bhagwati Prasad in his written statement asserted not only his own rights, but also those of his sons. Bhagawati Prasad, therefore, fully represented the interest of the minors in the said suit. He also observed as follows : "The plffs were, dormantly as it were, parties to the suit. Therefore the bringing them on the record did not amount to addition of new parties, but only clarified the position by making explicit what was implicit." 15. If the appellants were already parties to the suit No. 1676 of 1941, it is clear that no leave under Cl. 12 was necessary for joining them. But the question is, were they parties to the said suit? It will appear from a reference to the plaint in that suit that it was nowhere stated therein that Bhagwati had any sons or that he was being made a party as representing himself and his minor sons. The sons of Hiralal and Choteylal were expressly mentioned in the plaint. It is true that it was not necessary to mention in the plaint that Bhagwati was made a party as karta provided it was clear from the pleading that it was intended to implead him as representing his sons. The sons of Hiralal and Choteylal were expressly mentioned in the plaint. It is true that it was not necessary to mention in the plaint that Bhagwati was made a party as karta provided it was clear from the pleading that it was intended to implead him as representing his sons. There is no such indication anywhere in the plaint. On a plain reading of the plaint one would come to the conclusion that Bhagwati was impleaded in his individual capacity. It is true that in his written statement Bhagwati mentioned that he had two sons and he claimed a declaration that he, along with his said two sons, was entitled to a one-sixth share in the property. The written statement, however, need not be considered for the decision of the question as to whether or not leave under Cl. 12 was necessary at the time of the addition of the minor sons of Bhagwati Prasad by order of Ameer Ali, J. If in the plaint the minors sons of Bhagwati had not been made parties, the fact that they were mentioned in the written statement of Bhagwati could not have the effect of joining them as parties. It will also be remembered that the plff. 3 was born subsequent to the filing of the written statement. 16. I seems to me that when the order was made by Ameer Ali, J., amending the cause title and adding the three sons of Bhagwati Prasad as party defts. in the suit, new parties were brought in for the purpose presumably of binding them by the decree. Prior to that date Bhagwati Prasad had been impleaded in his individual capacity and his sons had not been made parties to the suit. Even if it is assumed that Bhagwati Prasad had been impleaded in the said suit as karta, the order made by Ameer Ali, J., had the effect of adding new parties. It may be that the minor sons would have been bound by the decree made in the suit as originally framed if their interest was represented by their father and karta Bhagwati Prasad. But it does not follow that simply because a person is bound by a decision in the suit, he must be taken to be a party to it. Before the amendment no order could be made in the suit against them in their individual capacity. But it does not follow that simply because a person is bound by a decision in the suit, he must be taken to be a party to it. Before the amendment no order could be made in the suit against them in their individual capacity. When they were made parties by the order of Ameer Ali, J., they became entitled to ask for a decree declaring their share and also to ask for a partition as between them and their father. By the amendment the scope of the suit was enlarged. Reliefs which could not be given in the suit as originally framed could be given after the amendment. 17. In my view, therefore, the addition of the appellants as parties by the Order of Ameer Ali, J., made them in their individual capacity subject to the jurisdiction of the Court and amounted in any event to joining them as new parties. Up to the time of the amendment no suit had been "received" by the High Court against the appellants at all and in any event, against the appellants in their individual capacity. 18. It is not disputed that out of the four properties three were situate outside and one within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Leave was, therefore, necessary for filing a suit for partition, which is a suit for land, against these minors. No such leave was obtained. It is now established that leave originally obtained at the time of the filing of a suit does not cover an amended plaint. Where a deft. is added fresh leave must be obtained even if leave had been obtained when the suit was originally filed. It is contended that there was no change in the cause of action. Even so, if new parties are joined against whom it is intended to proceed in the suit and to obtain a decree, the obtaining of the leave is imperative, because it is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court sets jurisdiction to decide the suit against the parties only if it grants leave which is a condition precedent. No leave was obtained to proceed against the newly added defts. and it follows that the Court never got any jurisdiction to make any decree or order against them in the suit. The Court sets jurisdiction to decide the suit against the parties only if it grants leave which is a condition precedent. No leave was obtained to proceed against the newly added defts. and it follows that the Court never got any jurisdiction to make any decree or order against them in the suit. The decree made, unless declared to be void, or set aside, binds the minors and prevents them from laying any claim to the sum of Rs. 27,500/- which by the decree is stated to have been given to Bhagwati Prasad. 19. In my judgment it must be held that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the decree against the appellants. 20. Mr. Khaitan next contends that no leave was necessary as the defts. were residing within the jurisdiction. He urges that in a suit for land, if a portion of the land is situate, and the defts., reside, within jurisdiction, it is not necessary to obtain leave of Court for the institution of the suit. He referred to the terms of Cl. 12 in support of his submission. Whatever may be the grammatical construction of Cl. 12, it is now well established that in a suit for land, if the entire land is not situate within jurisdiction, it is necessary that leave of the Court should be obtained before the institution of the suit in order that the suit may be filed in this Court. It is unnecessary to refer to the authorities which are numerous. I will only set out a passage from the judgment of Rankin, C.J., in Manindra Chandra v. Lal Mohun, 56 Cal 940. The passage is as follows : "Clause 12 is a clause which, if it was to be construed for the first time according to its grammatical construction and in strict accordance with its wording, might perhaps have to be given a somewhat different meaning to that which is well settled now in all the High Courts of India. The passage is as follows : "Clause 12 is a clause which, if it was to be construed for the first time according to its grammatical construction and in strict accordance with its wording, might perhaps have to be given a somewhat different meaning to that which is well settled now in all the High Courts of India. The effect of the construction upon which all the High Courts are agreed is that as regards suits for land, the H.C. can take cognizance, if the land is situate wholly within the local limits or, where the land is situate in part only within such limits, if leave has been first obtained; and that as regards suits, other then those for land, the High Court has jurisdiction, if the cause of action has arisen wholly within the limits or where the cause of action has arisen in part only within the limits, if the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained or if the deft. dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within these limits." 21. Mr. Khatians contention, on this point made. Order 32, R. 7, Civ. P. C., provides : 22. (b) The next point is whether the decree was bad by reason of the fact that no leave to compromise was obtained before the decree was made. Order 32 R. 7, Civ. P. C., provides : "No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian." 23. It was held by the P. C. in Chhabbalal v. Kallu Lal, 73 IA 52 that R. 7 of O. 32 is imperative and its terms must be strictly complied. The rule contemplates, as is clear from the language used, that the guardian must approach the Court in which the suit is pending and obtain its leave to compromise and after having obtained such leave, he obtains the right to enter into a compromise on behalf of the minor whom he represents in the suit. The result of not obtaining the leave as contemplated by O. 32, R. 7 is that the compromise is voidable at the instance of the minor. The result of not obtaining the leave as contemplated by O. 32, R. 7 is that the compromise is voidable at the instance of the minor. It was held in the case of Awadhesh Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad, AIR (27) 1940 Pat 663 that the guardian cannot enter into a compromise without the leave of the Court and such leave must be expressly recorded in the proceedings by the Court : "The terms of O. 32, R. 7, Civ. P. C., are not complied with by merely asking the Court to approve of a compromise which has actually been entered into. The language of the rule makes it clear that the Court must consider the proposed terms of the compromise before they are agreed to by the parties and must grant leave to the guardian to enter into the compromise. It has been strongly urged on behalf of the respondent that approving of the terms of the compromise after it has been entered into is sufficient compliance with O. 32, R. 7, Civ. P. C., but, in my judgment, approving of something already done is very different from considering the terms of the proposed compromise. This matter was considered by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mariam Bibi v. Amna Bibi, ILR (1937) All 317. In that case it was expressly laid down that leave to enter into an agreement in a suit must be obtained before the agreement is entered into and leave cannot be given after the agreement has been concluded. A similar view was held by a Bench of this Court in a recent case Kedar Nath v. Basant Lal, 18 Pat 271 and in my judgment these cases must be followed." Per Harries, C.J., in Awadhesh Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad, AIR (27) 1940 Pat 663. 24. Let us now see on the facts of this case whether the compromise was effected before leave had been obtained to settle the suit by the guardian. It will be remembered that the compromise was effected on the date of the decree i.e. on 9-8-1944. Mr. Khaitan has drawn our attention to an affidavit filed by Choteylal Dhandhania on the application to set aside the decree dated 9-8-1944 to which I have already referred. Relevant portion of the affidavit may be quoted. "Through the intervention of Mr. It will be remembered that the compromise was effected on the date of the decree i.e. on 9-8-1944. Mr. Khaitan has drawn our attention to an affidavit filed by Choteylal Dhandhania on the application to set aside the decree dated 9-8-1944 to which I have already referred. Relevant portion of the affidavit may be quoted. "Through the intervention of Mr. Anandilal Poddar (at present the Mayor of Calcutta) helped by other friends and relations of the party, the disputes were amicably settled between the parties bona fide and for the benefit of all concerned. The said compromise was entered into with full understanding and consent by or on behalf of all the parties concerned. The deft. Bhagwati Prasad was assisted by Madangopal Poddar who is a Marwari Lawyer of experience and who fully looked after and protected the interest of the deft. Bhagwati Prasad Dhandhania and his family. I crave reference to the original terms and the signature therein appearing. It was suggested by Madangopal that although the deft. Bhagwati Prasad was representing his sons in the suit, the sons of Bhagawati Prasad might be added simply for the sake of greater safety and none of the parties objected thereto." 25. On a reference to the terms of settlement it appears that one of the terms was that the appellants should be added as parties to the said suit and Bhagawati Prasad should be appointed their guardian ad litem and the terms are signed by Bhagawati Prasad as self and guardian ad litem of his minor sons. It will be remembered that when the terms were signed no application had been made to the Court for the appointment of Bhagawati as guardian. The terms of settlement recite that a sum of Rs. 27,500 had been paid to Bhagwati Prasad. It is, therefore, clear that Bhagawati Prasad and the other parties had entered into a compromise at a time when his minor sons had not been added as parties and when Bhagawati Prasad was not acting as guardian of the minor defts. Bhagawati Prasad, however, had obtained payment of a sum of Rs. 27,500 on agreeing to those terms. On the same day, though the suit was not appearing on the hearing list, it was mentioned to the learned Judge and the terms of settlement, signed by the parties, were filed. Bhagawati Prasad, however, had obtained payment of a sum of Rs. 27,500 on agreeing to those terms. On the same day, though the suit was not appearing on the hearing list, it was mentioned to the learned Judge and the terms of settlement, signed by the parties, were filed. On that the learned Judge made an order the terms of which will appear from the minutes which I have already quoted. The minor defts. were added as parties, Bhagawati was appointed as guardian though no formal appln. had been made in that behalf, and an order was made in terms of the settlement filed. The learned Judge after having made the order according to the terms of settlement, gave liberty to Bhagawati to compromise the suit on behalf of his minor sons and certified the compromise for their benefit. It is clear that the learned Judge considered the terms not of a proposed compromise but of a compromise which had already been effected, and in accordance with which payment had already been made. Nothing was done by the guardian Bhagawati after he had obtained the leave of the Court to compromise. The compromise was an accomplished fact before the parties had approached the Court. The learned Judge only put his seal of approbation on a compromise already effected. 26. This is not in my judgment in accordance with the provisions of O. 32, R. 7, which contemplates, as I have already stated, that the learned Judge must consider the terms of the compromise before it has been effected and make up his mind whether it would give the guardian permission to enter into the proposed compromise. After that leave has been obtained, the guardian has to consider the terms of the compromise and the effect thereof and to enter into the compromise if he thinks fit. The salutary provisions of O. 32, R. 7 were not, in my judgment, complied with in this case, and the machinery of the Court was utilised for the purpose of binding the minors to a compromise which Bhagawati had already effected and under which he had already obtained payment. 27. (c) The next point is whether the compromise which was effected by Bhagawati on behalf of his minor sons was for their benefit and can be upheld. 27. (c) The next point is whether the compromise which was effected by Bhagawati on behalf of his minor sons was for their benefit and can be upheld. It will be noticed that no formal application was made for appointment of Bhagawati Prasad as guardian ad litem of his minor sons. No notice was given to the minor sons as is required to be done under O. 32, R. 4. No affidavit verifying the facts that the proposed guardian had no interest in matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minors and that he was a fit person to be so appointed was filed as is required to be done under O. 32, R. 3(4). The interest of Bhagawati Prasad was adverse to that of the minors inasmuch as the properties of the joint family were allotted to Choteylal and his sons including the ancestral dwelling house of the joint family, and the other parties were paid out in money representing their share in the joint family property and the minors share in the money was paid to Bhagawati Prasad not for and on behalf of his minor sons but to himself individually. It will be noticed from the terms of settlement that in the case of payment of Hiralal it was expressly mentioned that payment was to be made to Hiralal on behalf of himself and his sons. The minor sons of Bhagwati are mentioned when it is stated in Cls. (5) and (6) of the terms of settlement that they would have no claim to the whole property and that possession would be delivered by them but they are not mentioned in Cl. (4) which provides for payment of Rs. 27,500 to Bhagawati Prasad. Under terms of settlement, therefore, Bhagawati Prasad became entitled to the entire sum of Rs. 27,500/- and the decree having been made in the presence of his minor sons it became impossible for them to claim after the decree that they had any interest in the said amount. Even if the terms provided for payment of Rs. 27,500/- to Bhagawati for self and on behalf of his minor sons, he could not receive the minors share of the money without leave of the Court as provided in O. 32, R. 6. Even if the terms provided for payment of Rs. 27,500/- to Bhagawati for self and on behalf of his minor sons, he could not receive the minors share of the money without leave of the Court as provided in O. 32, R. 6. No such leave was obtained and indeed the Court does not, seem to have considered this point presumably because the terms provided for payment to Bhagwati Prasad in his individual capacity. The Court could not in view of O. 32, R. 6(2) give leave to Bhagwati to receive the money of the minors without requiring Bhagawati to furnish security and without giving directions for sufficiently protecting the property of the minors from waste and for ensuring its proper application. It is clear, therefore, that by the decree no share in the joint properties was allotted to the minors nor was any money in respect of their share paid to them nor was any money directed to be paid to Bhagawati on behalf of his minor sons which would have necessitated the Court granting leave and taking security and making directions under O. 32, R. 6. 28. It seems to me, therefore, that the interest of the minors was prejudiced and sacrificed by the terms of settlement. If the decree is upheld the result would be that the minors would be relieved of all their properties without having obtained anything in lieu thereof. They would be completely at the mercy of Bhagawati Prasad in the matter of payment of any share in the sum of Rs. 27,500/- to them. The provision of O. 32, R. 6 has been clearly violated if the payment was intended to be for Bhagawati and his minor sons. Bhagwati, if he wants, can stick to the money as his own. It appears to me that the appellants were not properly or substantially represented before Ameer Ali, J., and their interest was not properly or at all looked after. Leave to compromise and the certificate of the learned Judge that the settlement was for the benefit of the minors were obtained as a matter of course without all the relevant matters being placed before the learned Judge by somebody who could represent the interest of the minors in the settlement. 29. It follows that the minors cannot be bound by decree which was made without their being properly or substantially represented in the suit. 29. It follows that the minors cannot be bound by decree which was made without their being properly or substantially represented in the suit. 30. For these reasons the appeal is allowed and it is declared that the decree and order referred to in the plaint and the conveyance in favour of the resp. Babulal are void and inoperative as against the plff. appellants. The respondents will pay the costs of the suit and of the appeal. 31. Certified for two Counsel. 32. HARRIES, C.J. :- I agree. Appeal allowed.