JUDGMENT 1. This Rule is issued in the matter of a conviction under sec. 7 of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, read with sec. 8 of the same Act. The Petitioner was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100, in default rigorous imprisonment for one month. The cloths seized were ordered to be forfeited. From November, 1948, convicting the Petitioner under sec. 7 of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, read with sec. 8 of the same Act and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 100 or in default to undergo R.I. for one month, it being directed that the cloth seized be forfeited. the chalan it appears that the accused was charged with moving a quantity of cloth by rickshaw over the Howrah Bridge. There were some 500 yards of cloth of different descriptions as well as a small number of dhoties and sarees. It is in evidence that the Petitioner was stopped on the Howrah Bridge by a Policeman at 11-30 p.m., while he was taking the goods on a rickshaw. The learned Magistrate has considered the defence, namely, the accused was hawking cloths on the Howrah Bridge. He held that the evidence of the Constable was supported by the rickshaw puller who stated that the accused hired the rickshaw at Burrabazar and loaded two bundles of cloth to be carried to Mograhat in the District of Howrah. The learned Magistrate accepted their evidence. The evidence of the defence witnesses was that the accused was a hawker of cloths. The learned Magistrate held that the accused was taking cloths from Calcutta to Howrah in a rickshaw and had no forwarding note or permit authorising the transport. He, therefore, convicted the accused and sentenced him to a fine of Rs. 100, in default rigorous imprisonment for one month. The learned Advocate has first submitted that there is no evidence of mens rea. He refers to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bholaprosad Lala v. The King 53 C.W.N. 300 (1949) as authority for the general proposition that the prosecution must establish mens rea on the part of the accused. The learned Advocate has first submitted that there is no evidence of mens rea. He refers to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bholaprosad Lala v. The King 53 C.W.N. 300 (1949) as authority for the general proposition that the prosecution must establish mens rea on the part of the accused. In that case, however, the accused was a servant and it was ordered that the case be sent back for re-hearing as the learned Judges were not satisfied that the purported plea of guilty was a plea of guilty in fact and in law. In the present case, the accused on his own evidence is not a servant but a hawker, that is, an independent contractor, so to speak. As for mens rea, his position is different from that of a mere servant who might say that the mens rea was that of his employer and he knew nothing of the incident. In the present case, the Petitioner was trading for his own benefit, no doubt on a commission basis but still for his own benefit, and he cannot be heard to say that he did not know what his intention was. Apart from this, the fact which was not contested, that be was caught at Howrah Bridge at 11-30 p.m. is, in our opinion, a strong indication of mens rea. 2. Next, the learned Advocate refers to the alterations in the schedule to the Act. Before June 22, 1948, Calcutta and the Sadar Sub-Division of the District of Howrah was regarded as one entity within which movement could take place without permit. On June 22, 1948, the schedule was amended and Calcutta was separated from the Sadar Sub-Division of Howrah for the said purpose. On September 11, 1948, the schedule was again amended and Calcutta and the Sadar Sub-Division of Howrah was again treated as one entity. The offence in this case was committed on the 23rd of August, 1948. At first the learned Advocate drew our attention to the date of the judgment, the 26th of October, 1948, but there is clearly no merit in the suggestion that the material date is the date of the judgment and not the date of the offence. 3. The learned Advocate then suggested that illiterate persons could not be expected to be well-up in dates on which alterations are made. 3. The learned Advocate then suggested that illiterate persons could not be expected to be well-up in dates on which alterations are made. Ignorance of law is no excuse and we are satisfied that he must have known that he was not permitted by law to carry the cloth from Calcutta to Howrah at the time. Indeed, he did not raise the defence in the trial Court that he thought that he was legally entitled to carry the cloth from Calcutta to Howrah. 4. The next argument is one of jurisdiction. 5. The learned Advocate submits that the Petitioner had, in fact, crossed the boundary and was in the District of Howrah when he was caught. The evidence is that the accused was two paces on the Calcutta side. Be that as it may, the offence was certainly a continuing offence and it was triable in any jurisdiction in which the offence took place, Independently of this consideration. Sec. 531 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that no finding, etc., shall be set aside merely on the ground that the enquiry, etc., took place in a wrong local area " unless it appears-that such error has occasioned a failure of justice." In the present case, it is clear that there has been no failure of justice. 6. The result is that all the grounds taken fail. With regard to the sentence, we are of opinion that the sentence is suitable. The Rule is, therefore, discharged. The Petitioner will pay the fine or serve the sentence of imprisonment in default.