JUDGMENT Bind Bansi Prasad, J. - This judgment will govern Civil Revisions Nos. 36,37,48 and 49 of 1946. They arise out of two applications for redemptions of mortgage u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act instituted in the Revenue Court. One Nandi Din Singh made two usufructuary mortgages, one in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of Sardar Singh and others, Defendants in Suit No. 17 which gave rise to Revenus Appeal No. 34 in the Count below and the other in favour of Rampal Singh and others which gave rise to Suit No. 16 from which was filed Appeal No. 35 in the lower appellate Court. The mortgages were very old, being of Sambats 1908 and 1910, corresponding to 1851 and 1853 A.D. Under each mortgage one-half of the property possessed by the mortgagor was mortgaged. 2. A number of pleas wore raised in defence and no less than eight issues were framed by the learned trial Court. Inter-alia one of the contentions was that the claims for redemption were time-barred. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that by virtue of an acknowledgment made in 1886 the claims were within time. It farther held that both the mortgages had been satisfied by the usufruct of the property. In the result it decreed both the claims for redemption and directed that the mortgagors shall not be liable to make any payment towards the mortgages. 3. The mortgagees went up in appeal. The learned District Judge upheld the finding that the claims were within time but differed from the trial Court as regards its conclusion that the entire mortgage money was paid up. In the opinion of the learned District Judge a sum of Rs. 66-5-0/- was due under one mortgage and a sum of Rs. 155-1-0/- under the other. In the result, he modified the decrees passed by the trial Court and directed the redemption of the two mortgages on the payment of the sums aforesaid. 4. Civil Revisions Nos. 36 and 37 have been filed by the mortgagees and the only point argued in this Court on their behalf is that the view taken by the Courts below about an acknowledgment having been made in 1886 is unsustainable in law. Civil Revisions Nos. 4. Civil Revisions Nos. 36 and 37 have been filed by the mortgagees and the only point argued in this Court on their behalf is that the view taken by the Courts below about an acknowledgment having been made in 1886 is unsustainable in law. Civil Revisions Nos. 48 and 49 have been filed by the mortgagors and the only contention raised on their behalf is that the lower appellate Court erred in holding that any part of the mortgage money was still due. 5. I shall first take up Civil Revisions Nos. 36 and 37. It appears that upon the death of Nandi Din Singh, the original mortgagor, his property was inherited by his son, Sheo Dayal Singh Sheo Dayal Singh died about the year 1886 and Mst. Bansi, his mother, applied for mutation in her favour. She further alleged that the entry in the village papers about the mortgages was wrong. The Tahsildar deputed the Qanungo to make an inquiry. The Qunungo examined both the mortgagees. The mortgage deeds were produced. The Tahsildar then wrote a very detailed report and therein he mentioned the admission made by the mortgagees about the subsistence of the mortgages. The statements made by the mortgagees before the Tahsildar or the Qanungo have been weeded out, but there is a certified copy of the report of the Tahsildar. There can be no doubt that in the absence of the original statements of the mortgagees their references in the judgment of the Tahsildar are admissible in evidence. In Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal (1934) 4 A.W.R. 46 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed: The question whether statements in judgments and decrees are admissible u/s 13 read with Section 43 is elaborately discussed by Sir John Woodroffe in his new edition of the Evidence Act 1931 page 181 et seq. He would hold that they are not admissible at all u/s 13; but this view is not in accordance with the decisions of the Board in Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Singh (22 I.R. 60) and Dinomoni v. Brojo Mohini (29 I.R. 24). At the bottom of page 194, however, the learned author treats the judgments as evidence of admissions by ancestors. At the bottom of page 194, however, the learned author treats the judgments as evidence of admissions by ancestors. There are great difficulties about Section 13, but Donomoni's case is express authority for the proposition that "on general principles and u/s 13" orders made under the Code of Criminal Procedure are admissible for the purposes mentioned in the passage quoted at p. 191 from the Board's judgment. 6. Learned District Judge has held on the basis of the references in the Tahsildar's report and the evidence of a witness Bishnath Singh and also on the basis of general presumption arising out of the ordinary course of conduct of affairs that in 1886 when there was a dispute about the existence of the two mortgages the mortgagees made a statement before the Tahsildar or the Qanungo asserting the mortgages. That statement was reduced to writing and they thumb-marked it. He accordingly held that all the requirements of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, had been fulfilled and that those statements operated to give a fresh start of limitation. The finding arrived at by the learned District Judge is not liable to be challenged in these revisions. It, cannot be said that he acted with any material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction. Revisions Nos. 36 and 37, therefore, fall. I agree with both the Courts below that the applications for redemptions within time. 7. I pass on now to consider Civil Revisions Nos. 48 and 49. Parties did not produce satisfactory evidence in the Courts below as regards the profits of the mortgaged property. The learned District Judge recorded the finding as to the amount of the mortgage money on the basis of the scenty material before him and on the strength of certain general presumptions. The applicants in Civil Revisions 48 and 49 must thank themselves for the results which actually happened. At all events, they should not feel any real grievance when they are getting back the property of which they had not been in possession for about a country on payment of such small sums. 8. The result is that all the four revisions fail and they are hereby dismissed. In view of the results in these revisions, I would let the parties bear their costs in this Court in all the four revisions.