JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. This is a 'special appeal' from a decision dated 05-11-1948 of a Division, Bench of this Court convicting and sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for life for an offence of murder. The appellant was tried by the Sessions Judge of Ujjain for the murder of a person, named Takhatsingh on 18-01-1948. The Sessions Judge finding the accused guilty of the offence of murder submitted the proceedings under S.6, Gwalior Criminal Procedure Code, Samvat 1999 for passing a sentence higher than imprisonment for fourteen years which he was not empowered to do under the Code. The decision dated 05-11-1948 of the Divisional Bench under the Madhya Bharat High Court Ordinance, Samvat 2005 (ordinance No.2 of 1948) read with the Gwalior Criminal Procedure Code, is final. The appellant has, however, filed this appeal under S.25, High Court of Judicature Act, Samvat 2005, (Act No. 8 of 1949) under which any person convicted by a Divisional Bench of two Judges of this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary or appellate jurisdiction and sentenced to death or to an imprisonment for more than fourteen years may appeal to a Full Bench of the High Court against the conviction. The High Court of Judicature Act came into force on 18-01-1949. By this Act, the Legislature reenacted the provisions of ordinance No. 2 of 1948 in similar words but with a provision relating to special appeals superadded and enter (?) certain other minor alterations which are not material for the purposes of this appeal. On these facts the preliminary question that arises for consideration is whether there is under S.25, High Court Act, any appeal at all from an order of the High Court, made before the Act came into force. 2. On these facts the preliminary question that arises for consideration is whether there is under S.25, High Court Act, any appeal at all from an order of the High Court, made before the Act came into force. 2. On behalf of the appellant it has been contended that the words of S.2 (2), High Court Act (Act No. 8 of 1949) make it very clear that the Act applies not only to future proceedings but also to proceedings pending on a date long before the Act came into force, namely " pending in the Courts of any State on the date on which the State is included in the United State, after those dates " and that being so, the Court was bound to give effect to it even if it meant giving the Act retrospective effect and depriving of their existing finality judgments, decrees or orders which when the Act came into force were final. It is urged that as the decision now under appeal was passed by a Divisional Bench of this Court in a criminal case, pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Ujjain, on the date on which the Gwalior State was included in the United State, the decision is appealable under S.2(2) and S.25, High Court Act. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that there was nothing in the wording of Act No. 8 of 1949 which would suggest that it was intended to apply to proceedings which though pending on the date in the Courts of any State on which the State was included in the United State, had at the date of the commencement of the High Court Act become final and conclusive under ordinance No. 2 of 1948 and that the Act cannot be construed so as to take away the vested right of the respondent to treat the decision, dated 05-11-1948 of this Court as final, which had accrued to the respondent before the High Court Act came into force. On a careful consideration of the principles of retrospective operation of statutes and their application to the present case we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant. 3. On a careful consideration of the principles of retrospective operation of statutes and their application to the present case we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant. 3. It is a well established rule of construction of statutes that no statute unless it be a statute dealing with procedure only, should be construed to have a retrospective operation unless the statute so provides either expressly or by necessary implication or intendment. Further, a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. If the enactment is expressed in language, which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only (Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn, pp.221; 222). It is now authoritatively settled that the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a vested right which inheres in a party from the commencement of the action in the Court of first instance, (See Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. V. Irving, 1905 A.C. 369: 74 L.J.P.C. 77); Nana. v. Sheku, 32 Bom. 337: (10 Bom. L.R. 330); Sardar Ali v. Dolimuddin, 56 Cal. 512: (AIR (15) 1928 Cal. 640 F.B.); Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Income tax Commissioner, Delhi, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242: (9 Lah. 284); Hasan v. Emperor, AIR (31) 1944 Bom. 252: (46 Cr.L.J. 328); In re Vasudeva Samiar, 52 Mad. 361: (AIR (16) 1929 Mad. 381 S.B.) ani Sitao v. Emperor, AIR (30) 1943 Nag 36: (44 Cr.L.J. 237). The extreme instance of the strong leaning against giving retrospective effect to statutes is the case of Moon v. Durden, (1848) 2 Ex. 22. In this case the Court of Exchequer had to consider whether S.18, Gaming Act 1845, was retrospective. This section contained the words "no suit shall be brought or maintained in any Court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money etc." The words "or maintained "would ordinarily have been held to be applicable to a pending suit. Nevertheless the Court held that the section did not apply to suits which had been instituted though not decided before the Act came into force. Nevertheless the Court held that the section did not apply to suits which had been instituted though not decided before the Act came into force. In Beading v. Goll, the Court of Appeal in England held that the Gaming Act, 1922, which provided that no action under S.2, Gaming Act 1835, to recover back money paid in respect of gaming debts "shall be entertained in any Court " did not apply so as to put an end to pending actions. Again in Henshall v. Porter, (1923) 2 K.B. 193: (92 L.J.K.B. 866), the Court went further and held that the Gaming Act 1922 which prohibited all Courts from entertaining such suits did not apply to cases where the cause of action had arisen before the passing of the Act, though no suit had been instituted until the Act had been passed. These English cases have been relied upon in deciding questions of construction of Indian Statutes in United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqua Begum, AIR (28) 1941 F.C. 16: (I.L.R. 1941 Kar. F.C. 72). In Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving, (1905 A.C. 369: 74 L.J.P.C. 77) during the pendency of litigation in the Court of first instance in Australia the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, came into force. Section 73, Constitution Act, provided that "the High Court shall have jurisdiction……..to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders and sentences……of any Court of any State from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council." In spite of the use of the words "all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences" and the words "from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council" in S.73, the Privy Council held that the right of appeal of an unsuccessful party to litigation, was a substantive right which could not be taken away by a statute passed after that right had accrued and that the party had a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council. The principle enunciated by their Lordships of the Privy Council has been followed by the Provincial High Courts in the cases referred to above and other cases. The same principle operating in a converse direction appears in the Privy Council decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242: (9 Lah. 284). The same principle operating in a converse direction appears in the Privy Council decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242: (9 Lah. 284). In that case Indian Act 24 of 1926 gave parties a right to appeal to Privy Council from decisions of the High Court in income-tax matters. Their Lordship held that this Act of 1926 gave parties no right of appeal where the decision of the High Court had been given before the date when the Act came into force. They held "that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders which when the statute came into force, were final, are proceedings which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided. " Similarly it has been recently held by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Dilaram v. Atmaram, AIR (36) 1949 ALL. 225: (1948 A.L.J. 552 F.B) that the finality of a decision cannot be taken away by a statute passed after the decision unless a right of appeal against that order is expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the statute. 4. The learned Advocate-General has drawn our attention to a decision of Bench of five Judges of the then Chief Court of Oudh reported in Debi Prasad v. Phundan Lal, 18 Luck. 1: (AIR (29) 1942 oudh 291 F.B.). In that case the question for decision was whether a second appeal against the decree of the first appellate Court lay under S.45(2 a), U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, as amended by U. P. Act 11 of 1939, where the first appeal to the lower appellate Court had been filed before but decided after 30-09-1939. The majority of the Full Bench answered the question by saying that a second appeal lies on the ground that "a distinction should be drawn between the case where the right of appeal is taken away and the case where another right of appeal is added. The interference with the rights of the parties is clearly of a different nature in the two cases. The interference with the rights of the parties is clearly of a different nature in the two cases. The right of appeal is a positive right and it accrues at the time of the filing of a suit but the absence of the right of appeal cannot be called a right at all. The prohibition of appeal by law existing at the time of the institution of a suit does not amount to a substantive or existing right accruing to the parties. It is a mere negation of such right. If, therefore, the Legislature chooses to give such a right during the pendency of the case, there is no principle of law which prevents it doing so." The minority view was that in a case instituted prior to the amendment of the Act in 1939: "no second appeal lay as the right of appeal in a suit is governed by the law which prevails when the suit is filed unless there was a provision to the contrary. A new enactment, passed during the pendency of an action, has not a retrospective effect, unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. It cannot affect vested rights, and could not apply to pending actions." This case is distinguishable as the amendment came into force while the case was pending in the Court below and the decision of the appeal was given after the amendment. In the case before us the decision under appeal was given prior to the Act conferring a new right of appeal. If the decision in this case had been given after the High Court Act and if it had been contended that the decision had become final under the law prevailing when the proceedings were instituted then it may have been necessary for us to consider the views expressed by the learned Judges in the Oudh case. Even as it is, Bennett, Agarwal and Madeley JJ. who expressed the majority view have clearly stated in the opinions delivered by them that if the order in question in that case had been made prior to the amendment of 1939 then having regard to the view expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. I.T. Commr, Delhi, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242 (9 Lah. Ltd. v. I.T. Commr, Delhi, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242 (9 Lah. 284), it would have been regarded as final under the old law and no appeal would have been competent. The learned Advocate-General also cited before us the decision of the Punjab Chief Court in Bhagwandas v. Kanshiram, 25 I.C. 180: (AIR (1) 1914 Lah. 356). Under the Punjab Courts Act, as it stood before the amending Act I [1] of 1912, there was no right of further appeal in a case decided by the first appellate Court, but at the date of filing an appeal from the appellate decree the Amending Act had come into force which conferred a right of second appeal from the decree appealed from. It was held that the second appeal was competent, This decision is not very helpful as it does not give any reasons at all in support of the conclusion that the second appeal was competent. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. I.T. Commr, Delhi, AIR, (14) 1927 P.C. 242: (9 Lah. 284), the Privy Council was dealing with a matter of civil rights and the principle underlying that decision that a new right of appeal cannot affect decisions already made at the time the right of appeal is created; for prejudice will be caused to a party who has sought and obtained a decision which at the time it was given was final, should not be applied to criminal proceedings. The argument cannot be accepted. The State was a party to the criminal prosecution against the appellant and is interested in the finality of the decision given in the prosecution and on an argument of the absence of prejudice to the State, the firmly established rule against giving retrospective effect to statutes, cannot be departed from in criminal cases: Hasan Abdul Karim v. Emperor, AIR (31) 1944 Bom. 252: (46 Cr.L.J. 328). 6. It now remains to examine S.2 (b) and S.25 of the Act and see what effect, if any, they have on the appeal before us. 252: (46 Cr.L.J. 328). 6. It now remains to examine S.2 (b) and S.25 of the Act and see what effect, if any, they have on the appeal before us. It is true that under S.2 (b), the High Court Act applies to, "all criminal and civil proceedings pending in the Courts in any State on the date on which the State is included in the United State and to such ,proceedings, arising in the said States, after those dates" As did ordinance No. 2 of 1948 by virtue of S.4(b) apply to these proceedings in the very terms used in S.2(b), High Court Act. But while under the Ordinance there was no right of appeal at all from judgments, decrees, orders and sentences passed by a Divisional Bench of this Court in the proceedings mentioned in S.4(b) of the Ordinance, S.25, High Court Act makes such judgments, orders, etc., appealable to a Full Bench of this Court. Section 25, High Court Act, brought into existence a right of appeal which did not previously exist and must be treated as dealing with substantive rights and as such the provisions of the High Court Act, creating that right, cannot have retrospective effect unless the Act itself makes an express provision to that effect or unless there is a plain implication to that effect in the language of the Act. The real question, therefore, is whether the wording of S.2(b) of the Act on which reliance has been placed by the appellant, is deliberately, enacted for the express purpose of bringing within the ambit of S.25 of the Act, decisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court, given both before and after the commencement of the Act. It seems to us that the question does not admit of doubt. The effect of S.2 (b) of the Act is the same as that of the similarly worded S.4(b) of the Ordinance. It seems to us that the question does not admit of doubt. The effect of S.2 (b) of the Act is the same as that of the similarly worded S.4(b) of the Ordinance. If a subsequent Act which repeals a former Act, uses the same language which was used in the former Act referring to the same subject and passed with the same purpose and for the same object, then the repealed Act may properly be referred to for the purpose of construing the subsequent Act and unless there is some strong reason to the contrary, re enacted words and expressions must be read in the same sense in the subsequent Act: Balakrishnudu v. Narayanaswami Chetty, 37 Mad. 175: (AIR (1) 1914 Mad. 51), Emperor v. Ranchhod Lal, AIR (35) 1948 Bom. 370: (49 Cr.L.J. 677 F.B.), It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the High Court Act must be construed with reference to itself and not with reference to the state of previous law contained in an Ordinance promulgated by the Raj Pramukh. The argument is untenable. Under Art.1c of the Covenant, entered into by the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India for the formation of the Madhya Bharat, an Ordinance made and promulgated by the Raj Pramukh, has the like force of law as an Act passed by the Interim Legislative Assembly. The Madhya Bharat Legislature by re-enacting in the High Court Act, the provisions of the Ordinance No. II [2] of 1948 in the same language as was used in the Ordinance, has only provided for the continuance of this Court, established under the Ordinance and for the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction. The temporary law embodied in the Ordinance having been made perpetual with certain alterations by an Act of the Legislature, is in effect perpetual ab initio. That being so, in our view, in construing the High Court Act, it is not only legitimate but inevitable to consider the state of the law at the time of the passing of the High Court Act. That being so, in our view, in construing the High Court Act, it is not only legitimate but inevitable to consider the state of the law at the time of the passing of the High Court Act. Reverting to S.4(b) of the Ordinante No. II [2] of 1948 and to the similar S.2 (b), High Court Act, it would appear that they do no more than extend the jurisdiction of this Court over all proceedings, "pending in any State on the date on which the Sate is included in the United State and to such proceedings arising in the said States after those dates." In their absence the jurisdiction of this Court would have been confined to those proceedings which were pending at the time of the establishment of this Court and those which arose after this date. The necessity and the object of these provisions are obvious when it is remembered that ordinance No. II [2] of 1948 establishing this Court came into force long after the Covenanting States had been integrated into the Madhya Bharat Union. It cannot, therefore, be held that S.2 (b), High Court Act, is deliberately enacted for the express purpose of making the decisions of the Madhya Bharat High Court, given before the coming into force of the Act, appealable under S.25 of the Act. 7. The effect of reading S.25(b) of the Act with S.2(b) of the Act is no more than to state in general terms that a judgment passed by a Divisional Bench of this Court in the criminal proceedings mentioned in S.2(b) of the Act convicting and sentencing the accused to death or to life imprisonment or to imprisonment for more than fourteen years shall be appealable to a Full Bench, This is not an express provision to the effect that a decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court, final at the date when the High Court Act came into force, is appealable. It is one thing to say that a decision given in future will be appealable and quite another to say that a decision which at the moment is final will be appealable in future. It is one thing to say that a decision given in future will be appealable and quite another to say that a decision which at the moment is final will be appealable in future. Section 2(b) of the High Court Act taken together with S.25 is fairly capable of two interpretations, namely, either that an appeal lies against decision given after the High Court Act came into force or that an appeal lies against a decision given whether before or after the Act came into force. To hold that under S.2(b) and S.25, High Court Act, an order made before the commencement of the Act is not appealable, does no violence whatsoever to the terms of the section. The express provision or the necessary and distinct implication to make the Act applicable to orders final at the date when the Act came into force must, as observed in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Commr. of Income-tax, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242: (9 Lah. 284) and Dila Ram v. Atma Ram, 1948 A.L.J. 552: (AIR (36) 1949 ALL. 225 F.B.) be of an appeal against that order, In Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905 A. C. 369:74 L.J.P.C. 77) and in Moon v. Durden, (1848) 2 Ex. 22, which have been referred to above the Privy Council and the Court of Exchequer declined to infer retrospective effect from a language which was much more specified than in the present case. These cases are very strong authorities for holding in the present case that the High Court Act should not be construed so as to deprive of their existing finality orders which when the Act came into force, were final. In our judgment there is no express provision in the High Court Act which makes S.25 retrospective so as to apply to judgments, decrees, orders and sentences final at the date of the coming into force of the Act and there is nothing in the wording of S.2 (b) and S.25 of the Act which compels us to hold that they were intended to have such a retrospective effect. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant addressed us at langth to show that the Divisional Bench did not notice many relevant facts in the proceedings and that this has resulted in erroneous findings of fact and law. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant addressed us at langth to show that the Divisional Bench did not notice many relevant facts in the proceedings and that this has resulted in erroneous findings of fact and law. As we are dismissing this appeal on a preliminary point, we express no opinion on the propriety of the conviction of the appellant. If an error has been committed in the decision of the Divisional Bench the proper course for the appellant is to apply to the Government who, if they are convinced that there has been an error, will, no doubt, exercise their prerogative of remitting the sentence .which has been passed. 9. Mehta, J. I agree with Dixit, J. 10. Chaturvedi, J. I concur in the judgment of my learned brother Dixit, J. but wish to add a few words. 11. This Court (i.e. the High Court of Judicature for the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa, Madhya Bharat) was established under the provisions of Ordinance No. 2 of 1948 (Samvat 2005). S.4 of which related to its "extent and application" and is reproduced below: "4. (a) This Ordinance shall apply to the territories of any of the Covenanting States and of any other State, the Ruler of which agrees with the approval of the Government of India to the merger of that State in the United State from the date of taking over of the administration of the Covenanting States under Art.6 of the Covenant, or from the date of inclusion of States under Art.2, as the case may be, and it shall apply to all the persons within those territories over whom the Courts having jurisdiction in the said States, had jurisdiction. (b) This Ordinance shall apply to all criminal and civil proceedings, including those under testamentary and intestate, matrimonial, divorce and insolvency jurisdiction, pending in the Courts in any State on the data on which the administration of the State is taken over by the Raj Pramukh, or on the date on which the State is included in the United State, as the case may be, and to such proceedings, arising in the said States, after those dates." 12. This section is quite clear. This section is quite clear. Clause (b) of this section extended the jurisdiction of the High Court to all criminal and civil proceedings pending in the Courts in any Covenanting State at the date of merger of that particular State. No useful purpose can to served by differentiating between civil and criminal proceedings; for Sub-S (b) applies equally to both. As is well known, this High Court came into existence on 29-07-1948 i.e. much after the dates on which the administration of the Covenanting States has been taken over by the Raj Pramukh; and cl.b of S.4 was meant to apply the provisions of Ordinance No. II [2] to civil and criminal proceedings pending in the Courts of the Covenanting States on the dates of merger and thus extended the jurisdiction of this High Court to the said proceedings with retrospective effect from the said dates of merger. 13. The High Court of Judicature Act, Samvat 2005 (Act No. VIII [8] of 1949) which repealed Ordinance No. II [2] of 1948 received the assent of His Highness the Raj Pramukh on 13-01-1949 and provided for the continuance of the High Court of Judicature for the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bhara) established under the aforesaid Ordinance. Section 2 of this Act reproduced without any change, the wordings of S.4 of this Ordinance repealed. Where words or expressions in a statute are reproduced from an earlier statute which is repealed, in my opinion it must be assumed that the Legislature wanted to give those words or expressions only that much and that kind of retrospective operation neither more nor less than that which was given to the words or expressions of the statute repealed. Consequently S.2 (b), High Court of Judicature Act cannot be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than the wordings of S.4 (b) of ordinance No. 2 of 1948. 14. Unless there are express words to show contrary intention, the repeal cannot affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Ordinance. The orders, judgments and decrees of the Divisional Bench of this High Court were final; and nothing is clearer than that the Courts ought to be slow to give that kind of retrospective operation to a statute which may disturb existing rights or obligations. In the case reported in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. The orders, judgments and decrees of the Divisional Bench of this High Court were final; and nothing is clearer than that the Courts ought to be slow to give that kind of retrospective operation to a statute which may disturb existing rights or obligations. In the case reported in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, Delhi, AIR (14) 1927 P.C. 242: (9 Lah. 284) the order passed had become final under the law then prevailing and it was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that the finality of that order could not be taken away by the provisions of the new Act conferring a new right of appeal unless there are specific words to that effect. There is a very well known passage to this effect in the case of Re Athulmney; Ex parte Wilson, (1898) 2 Q.B. 547: (67 L.J.P.C. 935), also which is cited in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes.It says: "No rule of construction is firmly established than this; that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a Statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only." 15. The learned Advocate General has, in his arguments, before us emphasised the importance of the majority judgment in Devi Prasad v. Phundanlal, AIR (29) 1942 oudh 291: (18 Luck. 1 FB). The crucial question there was whether an amending Act conferring the right of a second appeal manifests any intention to act retrospectively and applies to a pending action; and if the said provision is held to apply to a pending action, does it not amount to an interference with an existing right or obligation in the parties to the pending appeal either of whom is entitled to have the order passed in that appeal, treated as final and not subject to interference by a further appeal or revision? It was in connection with this question that Madeley J., delivering the majority judgment, observed that the right of having no appeal is negative and the right to have an absolute decree if you get a decree in your favour at all is very definitely hypothetical. In his opinion the prohibition of appeal by law existing at the time of the institution of a suit does not amount to a substantive or existing right according to the parties. It is a mere negation of such right and if, therefore, the Legislature chooses to give such a right during the pendency of the case, there is no principle of law which prevents it doing so. These observations of the learned Judge should be deemed as limited to the specific question referred to the Full Bench in that case. Prohibition of appeal by law existing at the time of the institution of a suit is entirely different from prohibition of further appeal by law existing at the time of the decision of a case or of a first appeal by the Divisional Bench. The former may be a mere negation of a substantive right; the latter is certainly not a negation. On the other hand, it is definitely a substantive right. As the question in that case was not the same as is before us, Devi Prasad v. Phundanlal, AIR (23) 1942 Oudh 291: (18 Luck. 1 FB) cannot be of much help to us in interpreting S.2(b), High Court of Judicature Act. 16. In Laurie v. Renad, (1892) 3 ch. 402: 42 Dig. 696: (61 L.J.Ch. 580), Lindley L.J. said at page 421 that ''a Statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary." The preamble of the High Court of Judicature Act (Act No.VIII [8] of 1949) makes it quite clear that the Act was necessary only to provide for the continuance of the High Court which was established under ordinance No. II [2] of 1948; and S.2 (b) can be construed only to provide for the continuance of the jurisdiction of this High Court which it had acquired under the said Ordinance over all civil and criminal proceedings, pending in the Courts of the Covenanting States on the dates of merger. In fact, the language of S.2 (b) cannot be construed to give a greater retrospective operation than this. In fact, the language of S.2 (b) cannot be construed to give a greater retrospective operation than this. 17. If the Legislature had intended that S.25 should have retrospective operation, and all the decisions of the Divisional Bench passed before 13-01-1949 be deprived of their existing finality, there was nothing to prevent it from clearly laying down a provision to that effect in the High Court of Judicature Act. Having given the matter the best consideration, I have come to the conclusion that a clearer and a much stronger language than is contained in S.2(b) would be necessary to give S.25, retrospective operation. I, therefore, agree that the appeal should be dismissed on the preliminary point. 18. I may also mention here that we had heard this appeal on merits also. Personally I feel that the story given in the confession of the accused does not tally with the medical evidence and version of other prosecution witnesses. As the appeal is being dismissed on the preliminary point, at this stage, I must however add that in the interests of justice, the Government should scrutinise the evidence in the case to determine whether it should act under S.39, High Court of Judicature Act or not.