Judgment Manohar Lall, J. 1. In this appeal by the plaintiffs the only question for determination is whether the registration of an award which is signed by all the arbitrators is invalid by reason of the fact that one of the arbitrators did not appear at the time of the registration. 2. The plaintiffs case was that the lands in suit are the entire khata 35 and 1/4 of khata 46, and were originally in the possession of Kali Prasad Singh, Radhika Singh and Kishun Singh as ryots under the Bettiah Raj, and the remaining 3/4ths belonged to Rameshwar Singh and Mt. Anurago Kuer as ryots under the Raj. In the year 1933, the Raj instituted a suit for arrears of rent for the lands of khata 35 and l/4th land of khata 46, and impleaded as defendants the ryots of both the khatas. In execution of the rent decree the Raj became the auction-purchaser on 27th April 1934, and took dakhaldehani and possession on 15th April 1935. On 17th February 1936, the Raj settled the lands of khata 35 and l/4th of the land of khata 46 with the plaintiffs at an annual rental of RS. 29-11-6, and since then the plaintiffs have continued in possession. In the meantime in the year 1938, a criminal proceeding under Sec.107, Criminal P. C., wag started between the plaintiffs on the one hand and Radhika Singh, Kalika Singh and others on the other hand which terminated under an order of the Deputy Magistrate dated 24th June 1938, in which he wrongly held that the Bettiah Raj notwithstanding the dakhaldehani could not obtain direct possession against the original tenants who continued in possession and that the plaintiffs also did not succeed in getting possession from the tenants. It was suggested in that order that the parties might have their rights decided by the civil Court. The plaintiffs averred in the plaint that within three weeks of this order the panchanama dated 15th July 1938 came into existence by which the parties, namely, the plaintiffs and the original ryots agreed to have their dispute settled by arbitrators. It was suggested in that order that the parties might have their rights decided by the civil Court. The plaintiffs averred in the plaint that within three weeks of this order the panchanama dated 15th July 1938 came into existence by which the parties, namely, the plaintiffs and the original ryots agreed to have their dispute settled by arbitrators. But as none of the punchas whose names are found in the panchanama were appointed by the plaintiffs, nor had the punchas ever assembled or heard the parties, the so-called award dated 20th July 1938, of which the plaintiffs had no knowledge whatsoever till some years later was not at all binding on them. The plaintiffs alleged that notwithstanding Sec.107, Criminal P. C., proceedings or the award, they have continued in possession of the entire 10 bighas of lands, and the cause of action for the suit was a recent interference by the defendants with the possession of the plaintiffs on 27th August 1944. Accordingly, the suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted on 5th September 1944. 3. The case of the defendants was that the parties deliberately executed the punchanama, referred to above, and the punchas named therein were appointed with the approval and consent of the parties, that the punchas heard the parties, received their evidence and then pronounced their award on 20th July 1938, and on the document being presented for registration on 5th September 1938, it was registered by the Registering Officer on 2lst November 1938, when four of the punchas appeared and admitted their execution, but fifth punch, Sheo Dayal Chaudhuri, did not appear for some reason or other. It was, therefore, pleaded that the parties are bound by the award of the punchas which allotted only five plots recorded in khata 35 with an area of 3 bighas 7 kathas 11 dhurs to the plaintiffs, and the remaining plots of this khata as also the l/4th of the interest in khata 46 were awarded to be retained by the original ryots in their possession. The defendants further pleaded that since the date of the award the defendants have a right to remain in possession of the lands awarded to them and in which they are actually in possession and that the present suit is merely a device to get rid of the valid award. The defendants further pleaded that since the date of the award the defendants have a right to remain in possession of the lands awarded to them and in which they are actually in possession and that the present suit is merely a device to get rid of the valid award. One of the grounds urged by the plaintiffs against the validity of the award is that one of the punchas did not appear and admit execution, as stated already. 4. The Courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiffs story that they were in peaceful possession of the entire land up to the date of Sec.107, Criminal P. C., proceedings cannot be believed and that the plaintiffs, just like their landlord, were unable to oust the original ryots from possession, and further that the plaintiffs have been able to establish their possession over 3 bighas 7 kathas 11 dhurs of lands to which they have obtained title as against the defendants by virtue of the award of the arbitrators. The Courts below have also held that the award is not invalid on the ground that one of the arbitrators did not admit execution before the Sub-Registrar. On these findings the suit of the plaintiffs has been dismissed after it has been made clear that the title and possession of the plaintiffs in respect of the lands given to them under the award are not being affected, as they are in possession thereof. Hence, the appeal by the plaintiffs. 5. Mr. De argues that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the award gave a valid title to the defendants regarding a portion of the land which was settled by the Raj with the plaintiffs in 1938. His argument is that the Registering officer had no jurisdiction to register the award when one of the parties did not appear and admit execution, and he drew attention to the provisions of Sec.35, Registration Act, which provides that the registering officer shall refuse to register the document as to the persons so denying, appearing or dead or not appearing. 6. In my opinion, this argument is not sound. The registering officer has jurisdiction to register the document so far as regards the persons who appeared and admitted execution. What then is the effect when one of the co- executants of an award does not appear and admit execution? 6. In my opinion, this argument is not sound. The registering officer has jurisdiction to register the document so far as regards the persons who appeared and admitted execution. What then is the effect when one of the co- executants of an award does not appear and admit execution? In my opinion, the position is exactly the same as was pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Raghubir Pandey V/s. Kaulesar Pandey, 23 Pat. 719 : (A.I.R. (32) 1945 Pat. 140). In that case it was held that an award which contains the unanimous decision of the arbitrators is binding on the parties even though one of the arbitrators accidentally, inadvertently or deliberately does not sign the award. The position is exactly the same when one of the arbitrators accidentally, inadvertently or deliberately does not admit execution of that award before the Registrar, when it has been found that the award contains his signature and was executed by turn. 7. The argument of Mr. De, founded upon the analogy that where two persons have transferred their interest in the property to the vendee by a document requiring registration the title cannot pass to the extent of the share of the vendor who has not admitted execution cannot apply in this case because the arbitrators award like the judgment of the Judges does not transfer any interest of any arbitrator in the property, but merely decides the dispute between the parties. Further more, the parties have accepted the position under the award, and the defendants are entitled to rely upon the provisions of Sec. 53A, T. P. Act, as they are in possession validly since the date of the award of that portion of the land which had been allotted to them by the arbitrators. It is no fault of the defendants that one of the arbitrators did not appear and admit his execution of the award. 8. Mr. B.N. Mitter for the respondents submitted that the decree of the Courts below can be supported upon a consideration of the relevant sections of the Arbitration Act (Act X [10] of 1940) and relied upon the case of Chaturbhuj Mohanlal V/s. Bhicam Chand, 53 C. W. N. 410 and the case of Moolchand Jothajee V/s. Rashid Jamshed Sons & Co., I.L.R. (1946) Mad. 840: (A. I. R. (33) 1946 Mad. 346). 840: (A. I. R. (33) 1946 Mad. 346). In these cases it has been held that the provisions of Sections 31 and 32, Arbitration Act of 1940, are mandatory and that no objections regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award can be decided by a Court other than the Court in which the award may be filed. I fail to see how this argument can be of any help to the respondents; because in this case the award has not been filed and made a decree of any Court. Moreover, it is doubtful if the provisions of the new Arbitration Act can be invoked in aid of or against the validity of an award which was pronounced before this Act came into force. 9. In the result for the reasons given earlier, I would dismiss this appeal with costs. Mahabir Prasad, J. 10 I agree. The effect of the non-registration of the award by one of the arbitrators cannot be in any event any thing more than that the signature of the non-registering arbitrator not having been admitted before the Registrar has to be ignored. In other words, the award is to be treated as not containing the signature of the arbitrators. As held in Raghubir Pandeys case, 23 Pat. 719: (A. I. R. (32) 1945 Pat. 140), an award is not invalid for the reason that it does not contain the signature of one of the agreeing arbitrators.