JUDGMENT J.P. Mitter, J. - This is a seller's suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,402-14, being the difference between the contract price and the resale price of goods which the Defendants failed to accept and pay for. 2. Plaintiffs' case is that, by a contract of "Indent" (Indent No. D)/1121) dated October 26, 1945, the Defendants placed an order with the Plaintiffs to import for the Defendants 100 dozen Sheffield-made "Maidan" brand stainless mirror, polished dessert knives and fifty dozen table knives of the same make and quality at 18s and 19s. 9d per dozen Clause F. and I. respectively. By the contract the goods had to be shipped "as soon as possible" and the parties were also bound by the terms and conditions stated on the back of the said indent. As was their practice, the Plaintiffs in turn placed the order with their suppliers in England, Messrs. D. and J. Fowler, Ltd., London. In the early part of November, 1945, Messrs. John Elliot and Sons of Falmouth, England, the manufacturers of the goods, reported that, owing to a sudden increase in prices due to higher wages and costs of raw materials in England, they were unable to book the said order at the prices quoted to them, but that they could do so at the lowest prices ruling at the time of shipment of the goads. Later, in the same month, the said D. and ,T. Fowler, Ltd., also reported to the same effect. At first the Defendants were not agreeable to any alteration in the price of the goods and in fact by their letter dated November 20, 1945, the Defendants countermanded the order. But, after seeing the manufacturers' letter and the supplier' report, the Defendants, on November 22, 1945, agreed in writing to pay for the goods at the lowest prices ruling at the time of shipment. This was forthwith communicated by the Plaintiffs to their suppliers in England, who, in turn, booked the modified order with the manufacturers sometime before December 6, 1945. On December 11, 1946, the goods were shipped from Liverpool and shortly thereafter D. and J. Fowler, Ltd., despatched the relative documents to India. The prices given in the shipper's invoice dated January 1, 1947, were 28s. 9d. per dozen for table knives and 26s. 3d. per dozen for dessert knives. On December 11, 1946, the goods were shipped from Liverpool and shortly thereafter D. and J. Fowler, Ltd., despatched the relative documents to India. The prices given in the shipper's invoice dated January 1, 1947, were 28s. 9d. per dozen for table knives and 26s. 3d. per dozen for dessert knives. These, according to the Plaintiffs, were the lowest ruling prices at the time of shipment. By the contract, payment for the goods had to be made "at Calcutta against "sixty days sight draft on the Defendants, in sterling," or against the Plaintiffs' bill. By the relative draft on January 3, 1947, drawn by the said D. and J. Fowler, Ltd., the Defendants had to make payment to the order of the National Bank of India, Ltd. On January 10, 1947, the Plaintiffs received the suppliers invoice and sent a copy of it to the Defendants. The same day on receipt of the copy of the invoice, the Defendants telephoned to the Plaintiffs to say that they were glad to have the goods and that they would pay as soon as the steamer arrived. On the same occasion, the Defendants asked for a copy of their indent in respect of the said goods, as, according to them their own copy had been destroyed by fire in their shop. By their letter of January 10, 1947, the Defendants acknowledged receipt of the Plaintiffs' invoice and asked for a copy of the relative indent. This request was complied with by the Plaintiffs, also on the same day. Ten days later, by their letter of January 20, 1947, the Defendants acknowledged receipt of copies of the relative invoice and their own indent but expressed their inability to accept the goods owing to "the long time that had already "elapsed" since the date of the order. At this the Plaintiffs wrote promptly to say that the supply position in England was, to the knowledge of the Defendants, very bad, specially on account of acute steel shortage and that the goods had been shipped as soon as possible. By this letter, dated January 21, 1947, the Plaintiffs requested the Defendants to accept the said draft and to return the same to the bank immediately. They also intimated to the Defendants that the steamer had arrived and was discharging her cargo. By this letter, dated January 21, 1947, the Plaintiffs requested the Defendants to accept the said draft and to return the same to the bank immediately. They also intimated to the Defendants that the steamer had arrived and was discharging her cargo. By their letter, dated January 22, 1947, the Defendants reiterated their inability to accept the goods on the ground of delay, whereupon, by their letter dated January 23, 1947, the Plaintiffs gave notice to the Defendants that on their failure to pay the relative draft immediately the goods would be resold on the Defendant's account and risk in terms of the contract. The Defendants, however, still refused to accept the goods and by their letter, dated January 27, 1947, stated that on enquiry they had learnt that the maximum period that could be allowed under the contract was only three months unless the period was extended by the indentor. In the meantime, on January 16, 1947, the relative draft had been presented to the Defendants by the National Bank of India, Ltd. On January 30, 1947, the said bank wrote to the Plaintiffs to say that the draft had been refused by the Defendants without assigning any reasons. The next day, the Defendants informed the Plaintiffs that they had returned the draft. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs paid the said draft and cleared the goods. On February 14, 1947, the Plaintiffs sold the said goods to Messrs. Jamal Ahmed and Bros, at Rs. 17 per dozen. On February 21, 1947, the Plaintiffs sent to the Defendants an account showing that Rs. 1,402-14 was the difference between the contract price and the re-sale price of the goods and that the said sum was payable to them on account of the Defendant's failure to accept and pay for the goods. By their letter, dated February 26, 1947, the Defendants repudiated their liability for the said sum or any part thereof. On July 18, 1947, the Plaintiffs filed the present suit in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. Thereafter, on the Defendant's application to this Court u/s 39 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), this suit was removed into the High Court. 3. On July 18, 1947, the Plaintiffs filed the present suit in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. Thereafter, on the Defendant's application to this Court u/s 39 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), this suit was removed into the High Court. 3. The Defendant's case inter alia is that the Plaintiffs failed and neglected to ship the goods within the time stipulated in the contract, which was "as soon as possible" and that the Defendants were, accordingly, entitled to refuse the said goods. The shipment of the goods, according to the Defendants, more than a year after the date of the contract, was not "shipment "as soon as possible" and was hopelessly out of time. In the alternative, the Defendants pleaded that, according to the usage and custom and or practice of the Calcutta market relating to shipment of knives, forks and allied goods, "shipment as soon as "possible" meant and had always meant "shipment within a "period of about three months" and that the Plaintiff's failure to ship the said goods within three months was a breach of the contract. The Defendants also pleaded, in the further alternative, that the contract had been waived, abandoned and/or treated' as cancelled by both parties. 4. It was agreed between learned Counsel appearing for the parties that the real matter of controversy in the suit was whether the goods had been shipped within the time stipulated in the contract. The issues framed were: (1) Did the Plaintiffs ship the goods within the time stipulated in the contract ? (2) To what relief, if any, are the Plaintiffs entitled ? 5. The evidence in the case is mainly documentary. Except Plaintiffs' document No. 19, all documents in the bundle entitled "Brief of Correspondence and Documents," were admitted and tendered as exhibits. In the course of the hearing, other documents were proved. For the Plaintiffs, were called their senior partner, Nabadwip Chandra Mandal and two other witnesses--Gour Mohan Das and Kalidas Ganguli of the firms of Satcowrie Das and Co. and Dutta and Co. respectively. The Defendants led no oral evidence. 6. It is not disputed that time with respect to delivery is of the essence of a commercial contract for the sale of goods. It is also not disputed that, where no time for delivery is specified delivery must be made within a reasonable time. and Dutta and Co. respectively. The Defendants led no oral evidence. 6. It is not disputed that time with respect to delivery is of the essence of a commercial contract for the sale of goods. It is also not disputed that, where no time for delivery is specified delivery must be made within a reasonable time. The question, "What "is a reasonable time," is, in each particular case, a question of fact. 7. Now, in the case before me, from the nature of the contract and in the circumstances then prevailing as to import of goods from England, the parties were not in a position to specify the time within which the goods could be shipped. What the parties did in this case was to stipulate that the goods had to be shipped "as soon as possible." Admittedly, the goods were not shipped until a year had passed since the date of the order. It is by reason of this lapse of time that I have to construe the words "as soon as possible" and then decide whether the goods were shipped within the time as expressed by the said words. In my view, the words "as soon as possible" must be taken with reference to the nature of the contract, the character of the goods dealt with and to all the surrounding circumstances and must, on ultimate analysis, mean "within a reasonable time." Had nothing at all been said in the contract as to the time of shipment, the goods would still have to be shipped within a reasonable time. 8. No Indian decision has been cited to me and I am told there is none on the point. There are, however, at least three decisions of the English Courts which afford guidance in this matter. They are--Attwood v. Emery (1856) 1 C.B. (N.S.) 110 : 140 E.R. 45; Hydraulic Engineering Company Limited v. McHaffie Goslett and Co. (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 670 and Verelst's Administratrix v. Motor Union Insurance Company Limited (1925) 2 K.B. 137. 9. In Attwood v. Emery (supra), it was held by four eminent Judges of the Court of Common Pleas that a contract by a manufacturer to furnish certain specified goods "as soon as "possible," meant, within a reasonable time, regard being had to the manufacturer's ability to produce them and the orders he might already have had in hand. 9. In Attwood v. Emery (supra), it was held by four eminent Judges of the Court of Common Pleas that a contract by a manufacturer to furnish certain specified goods "as soon as "possible," meant, within a reasonable time, regard being had to the manufacturer's ability to produce them and the orders he might already have had in hand. This decision was commented upon in Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie (supra) in which Bramwell L. J. construed the words "as soon as possible" to mean "within a reasonable time, with an undertaking to do it "in the shortest practicable time." This construction, it must be borne in mind, was with reference to the special facts of that case. Elsewhere in his judgment, however, the learned Lord Justice observed: "The work has not been done within a reasonable time and the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment". In the same case Brett L. J. said : "I do not think that Attwood v. "Emery (supra) decided anything which cannot be fully "adopted." The third learned member of the Court, Cotton L. J., construed the contract as follows: The surrounding circumstances must be looked at and they plainly shew that the Plaintiffs required the Defendants to supply the "gun" as quickly as it could be supplied, if they were provided with all proper appliances. 10. Here again the construction follows the special circumstances of the case. If, however, this case is an authority for the construction that the phrase "as soon as possible" means "as "quickly as the thing can be made in the largest establishment "with the best appliances" I cannot agree with it. In Verelst's Administratrix v. Motor Union Insurance Company, Limited (supra), Roche J. had to consider whether notice of an accident was given "as soon as possible" within the meaning of a condition in a policy of insurance. Before him, reliance was placed upon Hydraulic Engineering Company Limited v. Mc-Haffie Goslett and Co. (supra) and particularly the judgment of Cotton L. J. The learned Judge, however, held that the phrase meant as soon as possible in the circumstances which prevailed. 11. Reverting to the facts of the case before me, it must be remembered that the Defendant's contract was not with the English manufactures but with a local importer of foreign goods. (supra) and particularly the judgment of Cotton L. J. The learned Judge, however, held that the phrase meant as soon as possible in the circumstances which prevailed. 11. Reverting to the facts of the case before me, it must be remembered that the Defendant's contract was not with the English manufactures but with a local importer of foreign goods. From the evidence, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs promptly caused the order for knives to be placed with the manufacturers, who, by their letter of November 9, 1945 and before the final acceptance of the order, warned the Plaintiffs that, in the conditions then prevailing in England, delay was inevitable. This letter the Plaintiffs showed the Defendants before the latter's confirmation of the revised terms as to the price of the goods. It is common case that the parties had dealings with each other for a long time and the Plaintiffs were importing diverse goods of English manufacture for the Defendants. At no time, prior to their letter of January 20, 1947, the Defendants did inform the Plaintiffs that by reason of the delay they would not be able to accept the goods. Mr. Dutt appearing on behalf of the Defendants has drawn my attention to some three shipments of the same kind of goods, two of which were shipped a little over nine months after the orders had been placed and the third nearly eight months from the date of the order. From various other invoices, but in relation to other goods of English manufacture, it appears that, in several cases, the goods were not shipped until sixteen months after orders had been placed. In the case of the import of cutlery imported by the Plaintiffs for the firm of Dutt and Co., nearly sixteen months elapsed between the date of the order and the shipment of the goods. This was the evidence of Kalidas Ganguli and was supported by documentary evidence, but not challenged in cross-examination. It is significant that the three consignments of cutlery referred to above were all shipped on the same day. The shipping position in 1946 was notoriously bad and it seems to me that had the orders for the goods in question been placed with the manufacturers in October, 1945, the goods might well have been shipped along with the other three consignments. The shipping position in 1946 was notoriously bad and it seems to me that had the orders for the goods in question been placed with the manufacturers in October, 1945, the goods might well have been shipped along with the other three consignments. It is true there is no direct evidence as to shipping difficulties in the latter part of 1946, but it is so well-known that, to my mind, it was unnecessary to lead evidence about it. On the evidence and in all the circumstances of this case. I hold that the goods were shipped within the time stipulated in the contract. 12. Mr. Mitra, appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs, drew my attention to various conditions on the back of the indent in support of his contention that it was not open to the Defendants to refuse to accept the goods or to challenge the re-sale or the re-sale prices. In view of my finding that the goods were shipped within a reasonable time in the circumstances of this case, it is not necessary to consider the effect of the conditions at the back of the indent. The defence taken as to the custom in the trade being to treat the phrase "as soon as possible" as meaning a period of about three months is without substance. There is ho doubt that the Defendants agreed to accept the goods when they were informed over the telephone that the relative invoice had arrived. I was impressed with the manner in which Mr. Mandal gave his evidence and I accept his testimony on the point. (See Q. 59.) It is true, no mention of this fact was made in the correspondence prior to action brought, but no one was called on behalf of the Defendants to challenge this statement. As to the re-sale price, the evidence is equally convincing and I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs obtained the best price possible in the-circumstances. 13. In the result, this suit is decreed with costs.